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STATE CONSTITUTIONS

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Preamble.

We, the people, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, do ordain and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government, as the Constitution of the State of Nebraska.

Annotations

The Preamble of the Constitution is not a part of the Constitution, but only a general statement of purpose. The State of Nebraska does not derive any of its substantive powers from the Preamble to the Nebraska Constitution. The Preamble cannot exert any power to secure the declared objects of the Constitution unless, apart from the Preamble, such power can be found in, or can be properly implied from, some express delegation in the Constitution. Omaha National Bank versus Spire, 223 Nebraska 209, 389 National Western [Reporter]2d 269 (1986).


1-1. Statement of rights.

All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof. To secure these rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 1988, Initiative Measure Number 403.

Annotations

1. Personal rights

Section 29-2203 does not violate either the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution. State versus Ryan, 233 Nebraska 74, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 610 (1989).


Statute providing it shall be unlawful just to be in place where controlled substance is being used illegally is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. State versus Adkins, 196 Nebraska 76, 241 National Western [Reporter]2d 655 (1976).


Requirement of continuous residency of four months independent of school attendance to establish residence for tuition purposes does not violate this section. Thompson versus Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 187 Nebraska 252, 188 National Western [Reporter]2d 840 (1971).


Failure to appoint counsel to represent a defendant in a criminal case upon appeal did not violate this section. State versus Dabney, 181 Nebraska 263, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 768 (1967).


Sexual psychopath law does not deny equal protection of the laws. State versus Madary, 178 Nebraska 383, 133 National Western [Reporter]2d 583 (1965).


Statute prohibiting state and federal officers and employees from being delegates to county, district, and state political conventions did not violate this section. State ex rel. Baldwin versus Strain, 152 Nebraska 763, 42 National Western [Reporter]2d 796 (1950).


Habitual criminal law, defining habitual criminal and providing punishment therefor, is not violative of this section. Rains versus State, 142 Nebraska 284, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 887 (1942).


The provision of an agreement between a labor organization and an employer that when a female employee, member of the organization, marries, her employment shall terminate, does not violate constitutional rights of employee. Brisbin versus E. L. Oliver Lodge Number 335, 134 Nebraska 517, 279 National Western [Reporter] 277 (1938).


The right to engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors is not an inherent and inalienable right which the state is forbidden to abridge. Griffin versus Gass, 133 Nebraska 56, 274 National Western [Reporter] 193 (1937).


Statute forbidding possession of liquor elsewhere than in private dwelling is not void as discriminatory. Fitch versus State, 102 Nebraska 361, 167 National Western [Reporter] 417 (1918).


"Sunday Law" is not repugnant to the Constitution. In reference Caldwell, 82 Nebraska 544, 118 National Western [Reporter] 133 (1908).


A statute regulating and limiting the hours of employment of females in manufacturing, mechanical and mercantile establishments, hotels and restaurants is not repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution. Wenham versus State, 65 Nebraska 394, 91 National Western [Reporter] 421 (1902), 58 Lawyers Reports Annotated 825 (1902).


2. Property rights

Statute requiring fencing of right-of-way by railroads did not operate to deprive railroad of equal rights. Linenbrink versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 177 Nebraska 838, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 417 (1964).


Every citizen has the right to acquire property and sell it at such price as he can obtain in fair barter. Elder versus Doerr, 175 Nebraska 483, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 528 (1963).


A private employment agency is not a business in which the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included as a method of regulation. Boomer versus Olsen, 143 Nebraska 579, 10 National Western [Reporter]2d 507 (1943).


Act regulating sale of motor vehicles for purpose of preventing fraud is not a violation of constitutional rights. Nelsen versus Tilley, 137 Nebraska 327, 289 National Western [Reporter] 388 (1939), 126 A.L.R. 729 (1939).


The right to acquire property and dispose of it in such innocent manner as he pleases for such price as he can obtain in fair barter is guaranteed to every person. State ex rel. English versus Ruback, 135 Nebraska 335, 281 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1938).


Property used for "religious purpose" is within the spirit of Constitution exempting it from taxation. Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite versus Board of County Commissioners, 122 Nebraska 586, 241 National Western [Reporter] 93 (1932), 81 A.L.R. 1166 (1932).


City ordinance requiring Sunday closing of places of business for sale or exchange of motor vehicles is valid under police power, and not discriminatory under this article. Stewart Motor Company versus City of Omaha, 120 Nebraska 776, 235 National Western [Reporter] 332 (1931).


Statute requiring railroad company to fence right-of-way is constitutional. Middaugh versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 114 Nebraska 438, 208 National Western [Reporter] 139 (1926).


Law prohibiting merchants from giving trading stamps is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Hartigan versus Sperry & Hutchinson Company, 94 Nebraska 785, 144 National Western [Reporter] 795 (1913), 49 L.R.A.N.S. 1123 (1913).


3. Taxation

Ordinance of city of Lincoln imposing occupation tax on taxicabs was not objectionable as unjust, discriminatory and denial of equal protection of the laws, though no tax was imposed on trucks carrying freight. Richter versus City of Lincoln, 136 Nebraska 289, 285 National Western [Reporter] 593 (1939).


Gross premium tax on foreign insurance companies is an excise tax on privilege of doing business in Nebraska, and does not violate equal rights clause of Constitution. State ex rel. Smrha versus General American Life Ins. Company, 132 Nebraska 520, 272 National Western [Reporter] 555 (1937).


4. Right to bear arms

The "Right to Bear Arms" amendment to this provision does not abolish the death penalty in Nebraska. Anderson versus Gunter, 235 Nebraska 560, 456 National Western [Reporter]2d 286 (1990).


Section 28-1203(1) is not vitiated by the "Right to Bear Arms" amendment of 1988, is a valid exercise of the State's police power in reasonable regulation of certain firearms, and does not contravene this provision. State versus LaChapelle, 234 Nebraska 458, 451 National Western [Reporter]2d 689 (1990).


The constitutional right to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation by statute if the statute does not frustrate the guarantee of the constitutional provision. State versus Comeau, 233 Nebraska 907, 448 National Western [Reporter]2d 595 (1989).


5. Miscellaneous

Section 39-6,193, imposing vicarious liability on owners-lessors of trucks for damages by lessees and operators of the leased trucks, is constitutional. Bridgeford versus U-Haul Company, 195 Nebraska 308, 238 National Western [Reporter]2d 443 (1976).


Act establishing vocational technical schools does not violate this section. Campbell versus Area Vocational Technical School Number 2, 183 Nebraska 318, 159 National Western [Reporter]2d 817 (1968).


Statute creating Nebraska Power Review Board did not violate this section. City of Auburn versus Eastern Nebraska Public Power District, 179 Nebraska 439, 138 National Western [Reporter]2d 629 (1965).


Zoning ordinance of city of Omaha did not violate this section. Wolf versus City of Omaha, 177 Nebraska 545, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 501 (1964).


Sunday closing law violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. Terry Carpenter, Incorporated versus Wood, 177 Nebraska 515, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 475 (1964).


Sunday closing ordinance of city of first class violated this section. Skag-Way Department Stores, Incorporated versus City of Grand Island, 176 Nebraska 169, 125 National Western [Reporter]2d 529 (1964).


Zoning act and ordinance sustained as constitutional. Schlientz versus City of North Platte, 172 Nebraska 477, 110 National Western [Reporter]2d 58 (1961).


In the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the court will consider its history, the development of the evil sought to be restrained, the established laws, usages and customs at time of its adoption, and scope of the remedy its terms imply. First Trust Company of Lincoln versus Smith, 134 Nebraska 84, 277 National Western [Reporter] 762 (1938).


Statute arbitrarily dividing county into commissioner districts, without regard to population, is unconstitutional. State ex reference. Harte versus Moorhead, 99 Nebraska 527, 156 National Western [Reporter] 1067 (1916).


The constitutional right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is not infringed by statutes prohibiting deceit or fraud. In reference Barnes, 83 Nebraska 443, 119 National Western [Reporter] 662 (1909).


Bill of rights is not enumeration of all powers reserved to people. State ex rel. Smyth, Attorney General versus Moores, 55 Nebraska 480, 76 National Western [Reporter] 175 (1898), 41 Lawyers Reports Annotated 624 (1898).


Law of land and due process do not mean merely legislative enactments. The Atchison & Nebraska R.R. Company versus Baty, 6 Nebraska 37, 29 American R. 356 (1877).


1-2. Slavery prohibited.

There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 2. (1875).

Annotations

An employer's intentional concealment of the dangers inherent in the work environment and the true nature and effect of an occupational disease does not constitute involuntary servitude—the use or threat of physical force or legal coercion to extract labor from an unwilling worker—and thus construing the Workers' Compensation Act to include such conduct does not violate U.S. Constitution amendment 13 or this provision. Abbott versus Gould, Incorporated, 232 Nebraska 907, 443 National Western [Reporter]2d 591 (1989).


Imprisonment at hard labor for contempt of court, arising out of violation of injunctive order, is involuntary servitude prohibited by this section. Smolczyk versus Gaston, 147 Nebraska 681, 24 National Western [Reporter]2d 862 (1946).


1-3. Due process of law; equal protection.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor be denied equal protection of the laws.

Source

Nebraska Constitution art I, Section 3 (1875);
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 20CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Criminal prosecutions

The amendment to this provision providing that "no person shall ... be denied equal protection of the laws" operates prospectively only. In order to prove that a defendant's race unconstitutionally taints enforcement of the death penalty, the defendant must at a minimum establish that the decision to enforce the death penalty is based on a conscious discriminatory purpose, resulting in a discriminatory effect suffered by the defendant. A defendant has a life interest in connection with the imposition of the death penalty and is entitled to due process in the imposition of the sentence. State versus Reeves, 258 Nebraska 511, 604 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (2000).


This section provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty "without due process of law", and Article 1, section 11, provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall have the right to "trial by an impartial jury". These provisions are interconnected and require that criminal convictions rest upon a jury determination that a criminal defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime charged. State versus White, 249 Nebraska 381, 543 National Western [Reporter]2d 725 (1996).


The due process clause of this provision precludes admissibility of an involuntary confession. State versus Mantich, 249 Nebraska 311, 543 National Western [Reporter]2d 181 (1996).


The due process clause precludes admissibility of an involuntary confession. State versus Martin, 243 Nebraska 368, 500 National Western [Reporter]2d 512 (1993).


Allegedly coercive conduct on the part of private detective obtaining a statement from defendant did not carry over to statement made by defendant several hours later in the presence of others. State versus Phelps, 241 Nebraska 707, 490 National Western [Reporter]2d 676 (1992).


Section 29-2203 does not violate either the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution. State versus Ryan, 233 Nebraska 74, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 610 (1989).


Prosecutions for felonies, including murder, may be had on informations filed by the county attorney, and such procedure neither violates the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution. State versus Burchett, 224 Nebraska 444, 399 National Western [Reporter]2d 258 (1986).


No one has a vested right in a procedure, and procedural matters can be changed at any time before trial and are binding on a defendant. State versus Palmer, 224 Nebraska 282, 399 National Western [Reporter]2d 706 (1986).


Photographic lineup did not violate due process despite defendant's argument that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive in that the relative heights of suspects were readily determinable by reference to the strategically placed doorframe visible in each photograph. State versus Palmer, 224 Nebraska 282, 399 National Western [Reporter]2d 706 (1986).


Trial court's determination that defendant's incriminating statements were made in a non-custodial setting was not clearly wrong; thus, police did not violate defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. State versus Saylor, 223 Nebraska 694, 392 National Western [Reporter]2d 789 (1986).


Due process is afforded defendant in capital case by the traditional trial to court or jury, the presentence report on defendant, a presentence hearing and findings relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and automatic review in Supreme Court, all to assure the death penalty will not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. State versus Simants, 197 Nebraska 549, 250 National Western [Reporter]2d 881 (1977); State versus Rust, 197 Nebraska 528, 250 National Western [Reporter]2d 867 (1977).


Sections 29-3301 to 29-3307 do not violate privilege against self-incrimination, are constitutional, and apply to physical evidence, not to oral communications or testimony. State versus Swayze, 197 Nebraska 149, 247 National Western [Reporter]2d 440 (1976).


Due process does not require a prosecuting attorney to hold an adversary hearing prior to determining the manner in which a minor defendant shall be proceeded against. State versus Grayer, 191 Nebraska 523, 215 National Western [Reporter]2d 859 (1974).


Whether an identification procedure is violative of due process will be determined upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. State versus Sanchell, 191 Nebraska 505, 216 National Western [Reporter]2d 504 (1974).


Failure to appoint counsel to represent a defendant in a criminal case upon appeal did not violate this section. State versus Dabney, 181 Nebraska 263, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 768 (1967).


Use of any confession obtained in violation of the due process clause requires reversal of the conviction, even though there is other evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. State versus Long, 179 Nebraska 606, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 813 (1966).


Due process of law in a criminal case includes right to trial by jury and right to defend in person or by counsel. Johnson versus State, 169 Nebraska 783, 100 National Western [Reporter]2d 844 (1960).


Detention in jail for six months awaiting trial was not a denial of due process. Svehla versus State, 168 Nebraska 553, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 649 (1959).


Proceedings in contempt were not violative of due process. Cornett versus State, 155 Nebraska 766, 53 National Western [Reporter]2d 747 (1952).


Denial of continuance did not operate to violate due process clause. Hawk versus State, 151 Nebraska 717, 39 National Western [Reporter]2d 561 (1949).


Where a jury in a criminal case disagrees and is properly discharged, a second trial upon original charge, even though one or more degrees of the offense have been withdrawn, does not violate this section. State versus Hutter, 145 Nebraska 798, 18 National Western [Reporter]2d 203 (1945).


A person charged with a crime waives constitutional rights by judicial confession of guilt. In reference Application of Carper, Tesar versus Bowley, 144 Nebraska 623, 14 National Western [Reporter]2d 225 (1944).


Where, after objection that copy of amended information had not been served, trial proceeded upon the original information which had been served, there was no violation of this section. Hoctor versus State, 141 Nebraska 329, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 558 (1942).


An information alleging all facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense, does not violate constitutional provision as to due process of law. Chadek versus State, 138 Nebraska 626, 294 National Western [Reporter] 384 (1940).


Habitual criminal statute upheld. Right of accused to counsel deemed waived where no demand made. Davis versus O'Grady, 137 Nebraska 708, 291 National Western [Reporter] 82 (1940).


Due process of law in a criminal case requires a law creating or defining the offense, a court of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to answer the charge, trial according to the settled course of judicial proceeding, and a right to be discharged unless found guilty. Dutiel versus State, 135 Nebraska 811, 284 National Western [Reporter] 321 (1939).


Statute prohibiting granting of new trial if Supreme Court considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, does not justify court in denying new trial where accused's constitutional right to fair trial was violated. Scott versus State, 121 Nebraska 232, 236 National Western [Reporter] 608 (1931).


The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Coxbill versus State, 115 Nebraska 634, 214 National Western [Reporter] 256 (1927).


The judge of a district court has no jurisdiction to try and determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with a felony who pleads not guilty, without a trial to a jury, and such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the accused. Michaelson versus Beemer, 72 Nebraska 761, 101 National Western [Reporter] 1007 (1904).


Prosecution of accused on information of prosecuting attorney did not contravene the due process of law clause of the Constitution. Bolln versus State, 51 Nebraska 581, 71 National Western [Reporter] 444 (1897).


2. Vague or overbroad

Statute providing it shall be unlawful just to be in place where controlled substance is being used illegally is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. State versus Adkins, 196 Nebraska 76, 241 National Western [Reporter]2d 655 (1976).


Motor vehicle flight to avoid arrest, act held unconstitutional upon the ground of vagueness and uncertainty. Heywood versus Brainard, 181 Nebraska 294, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 772 (1967).


Grade A Milk Act contained an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency and was unconstitutional. Lincoln Dairy Company versus Finigan, 170 Nebraska 777, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 227 (1960).


Municipal ordinance directed against obscene publications was void for uncertainty. State versus Pocras, 166 Nebraska 642, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 263 (1958).


3. Arbitrary or unreasonable

In setting rates that may be charged by a utility, a state cannot set rates which are unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory and which, therefore, deprive the utility of property without the due process of law. K N Energy, Incorporated versus Cities of Broken Bow et al., 244 Nebraska 113, 505 National Western [Reporter]2d 102 (1993).


If it becomes apparent that a statute does not tend to preserve the public health, safety, or welfare but tends more to stifle legitimate business by creating a monopoly or trade barrier, it is unconstitutional. Gillette Dairy, Incorporated versus Nebraska Dairy Products Board, 192 Nebraska 89, 219 National Western [Reporter]2d 214 (1974).


Public Auction Law imposes arbitrary and unreasonable limitations on conduct of a lawful business. Blauvelt versus Beck, 162 Nebraska 576, 76 National Western [Reporter]2d 738 (1956).


Primary purpose of constitutional guaranty afforded by this section was security of the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. Rein versus Johnson, 149 Nebraska 67, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 548 (1947).


Prohibiting manufacture and sale of milk to which has been added any fat or oil other than milk, violates the Constitution as being arbitrary and unreasonable and taking property without due process of law. Carolene Products Company versus Banning, 131 Nebraska 429, 268 National Western [Reporter] 313 (1936).


Statute regulating size of loaf of bread and authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to fix reasonable excess tolerance is not violative of due process clause. Petersen Baking Company versus Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934), affirming 124 Nebraska 464, 247 National Western [Reporter] 39 (1933).


Statute fixing maximum weights for loaves of bread is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Burns Baking Company versus Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), reversing Burns Baking Company versus McKelvie, 108 Nebraska 674, 189 National Western [Reporter] 383 (1922).


4. Procedural due process

Municipal employees' claim that they were denied substantive due process of law by employer's payment of disability pension benefits failed because employees presented no evidence that employer denied employees the benefit of vested employment benefits. Constitutional deprivations are not founded upon speculation or mere possibilities. Bauers versus City of Lincoln, 255 Nebraska 572, 586 National Western [Reporter]2d 452 (1998).


The exclusive remedy provided by the Workers' Compensation Act satisfies the due process requirements of this provision, as well as the requirements of Nebraska Constitution Article 1, section 13, that every person shall have a remedy by due course of law for any injury done to him or her. Abbott versus Gould, Incorporated, 232 Nebraska 907, 443 National Western [Reporter]2d 591 (1989).


The hearing each motorist has on each offense before points are assessed, and right to appeal to district court from revocation of his motor vehicle operator's license under sections 39-669.27 and 39-669.28, R.R.S.1943, pending which the court may stay revocation, provide due process. Stauffer versus Weedlun, 188 Nebraska 105, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 218 (1972).


A person has no property in rules of the common law and such rules subject to constitutional limitations may be changed by the Legislature. State Securities Company versus Norfolk Livestock Sales Company, Incorporated, 187 Nebraska 446, 191 National Western [Reporter]2d 614 (1971).


Preliminary hearing before a county judge not an attorney not violative of this section. State versus Howard, 184 Nebraska 274, 167 National Western [Reporter]2d 80 (1969).


Statute providing for withdrawal from area vocational technical schools did not violate this section in failing to provide hearing for determination of validity of signatures. Chaloupka versus Area Vocational Technical School Number 2, 184 Nebraska 196, 165 National Western [Reporter]2d 719 (1969).


Requirement for furnishing of probate appeal bond did not deprive party of due process of law. Rundall versus Whiteside, 182 Nebraska 176, 153 National Western [Reporter]2d 736 (1967).


Requirement of due process of law was satisfied by original notice of hearing before board of appraisers in eminent domain proceedings. Weiner versus State, 179 Nebraska 297, 137 National Western [Reporter]2d 852 (1965).


The incorporation of a village by the county board upon a petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants is not a denial of due process of law. Kriz versus Klingensmith, 176 Nebraska 205, 125 National Western [Reporter]2d 674 (1964).


Due process of law was not denied by failure to mail notice of intention to pass resolution of necessity declaring advisability of constructing sewer. Jones versus Village of Farnam, 174 Nebraska 704, 119 National Western [Reporter]2d 157 (1963).


Procedure for investigation of conduct of attorneys was not a denial of due process of law. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association versus Jensen, 171 Nebraska 1, 105 National Western [Reporter]2d 459 (1960).


Prosecution before a judge disqualified by pecuniary interest is a violation of due process of law. Conkling versus DeLany, 167 Nebraska 4, 91 National Western [Reporter]2d 250 (1958).


Provision for service of process upon Director of Banking in action for violation of Installment Loan Act was constitutional. McNish versus General Credit Corp., 164 Nebraska 526, 83 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (1957).


Act for change of boundaries of school district required notice and opportunity to be heard. Schutte versus Schmitt, 162 Nebraska 162, 75 National Western [Reporter]2d 656 (1956).


Judgment is void unless a proper method of notification is employed. Board of Trustees of York College versus Cheney, 160 Nebraska 631, 71 National Western [Reporter]2d 195 (1955).


Service under reciprocal nonresident guardianship act did not violate due process clause. Howell versus Fletcher, 157 Nebraska 196, 59 National Western [Reporter]2d 359 (1953).


Statute authorizing annexation of additional territory of rural fire protection district did not deny due process. Seward County Rural Fire Protection District versus County of Seward, 156 Nebraska 516, 56 National Western [Reporter]2d 700 (1953).


Fact that examiner of State Railway Commission considered the interrelationship of various applications when determining action to be taken on each application separately was not a denial of due process. In reference Application of Petersen & Petersen, Incorporated, 153 Nebraska 517, 45 National Western [Reporter]2d 465 (1951).


Party who invoked special proceeding could not question constitutionality thereof under this section. Lackaff versus Department of Roads & Irrigation, 153 Nebraska 217, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1950).


Action of county board in determining population of county at a secret meeting without notice to county officers whose salaries were thereby affected, vitally affected the rights and interests of the officers and is void. Shambaugh versus Buffalo County, 133 Nebraska 46, 274 National Western [Reporter] 207 (1937).


Where juror failed to disclose his ineligibility when questioned by trial court, and is permitted to serve on jury, a new trial should be granted. Berg versus Griffiths, 126 Nebraska 235, 252 National Western [Reporter] 918 (1934).


A statute providing that an action for injury to person or property by a common carrier, bus or trucking company may be brought in any county on the road or line where service could be obtained on a driver thereof is not improper or taking of property without due process of law. Schwarting versus Ogram, 123 Nebraska 76, 242 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1932), 81 A.L.R. 769 (1932).


Statute authorizing counties to foreclose lien for taxes delinquent more than three years is not taking property without due process of law. Commercial Savings & Loan Association versus Pyramid Realty Company, 121 Nebraska 493, 237 National Western [Reporter] 575 (1931).


Legislation authorizing county superintendent, clerk, and county board to change boundary lines between school districts without notice or hearing is a violation of due process of law. Ruwe versus School District Number 85 of Dodge County, 120 Nebraska 668, 234 National Western [Reporter] 789 (1931).


Statute relating to service on nonresident car owners is constitutional except as to provision for 90 day continuance and does not deprive such owners of property without due process of law. Herzoff versus Hommel, 120 Nebraska 475, 233 National Western [Reporter] 458 (1930).


Statute empowering department to cancel water appropriation, in view of provision for notice and appeal does not deprive one of his property without due process of law. Dawson County Irrigation Company versus McMullen, 120 Nebraska 245, 231 National Western [Reporter] 840 (1930).


Curative act to validate proceedings for creation of a light and power district, but applicable only to particular district, is unconstitutional because it violates due process of law clause. Anderson versus Lehmkuhl, 119 Nebraska 451, 229 National Western [Reporter] 773 (1930).


Where an increase in the assessed valuation of property as returned by county, is made by the State Board of Equalization without notice and without affording sufficient opportunity to be heard, it amounts to confiscation of property without due process. American Tel. & Tel. Company versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Nebraska 142, 227 National Western [Reporter] 455 (1929); Northwestern Bell Tel. Company versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Nebraska 138, 227 National Western [Reporter] 452 (1929); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Company versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Nebraska 137, 227 National Western [Reporter] 454 (1929); Stanton County versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 119 Nebraska 136, 227 National Western [Reporter] 454 (1929).


Failing to provide for notice to resident owners of appraisers' meeting to assess damages in condemnation proceedings by county contravened the Constitution. Sheridan County versus Hand, 114 Nebraska 813, 210 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1926).


The issuance of bonds upon a petition of not less than fifty-one per cent of the voters stands upon the same legal footing as bonds issued by virtue of an election and the fact the taxpayer is given no opportunity to contest the validity of the bonds is not taking of property without due process of law. McCord versus Marsh, 108 Nebraska 723, 189 National Western [Reporter] 386 (1922).


Failure to provide in statute for notice to the property owner of the time and place at which the appraisers would meet for purpose of making their assessment in condemnation of school site is unconstitutional and actual notice cannot operate as a substitute. Albin versus Consolidated School District Number 14 of Richardson County, 106 Nebraska 719, 184 National Western [Reporter] 141 (1921).


Law permitting jury, in court's discretion, to view premises does not violate constitutional provision of taking property without due process of law. Drollinger versus Hastings & N. W. R. R. Company, 98 Nebraska 520, 153 National Western [Reporter] 619 (1915).


Law purporting to validate proceedings of probate court under prior act which had been held unconstitutional contravenes due process of law and is unconstitutional. Draper versus Clayton, 87 Nebraska 443, 127 National Western [Reporter] 369 (1910).


Striking answer from files and denying defendant right to further defense in divorce suit violates the constitutional right of the defendant to due process of law. McNamara versus McNamara, 86 Nebraska 631, 126 National Western [Reporter] 94 (1910).


No judgment of a court is due process of law if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without due notice to the party. Herman versus Barth, 85 Nebraska 722, 124 National Western [Reporter] 135 (1910).


To constitute due process of law it is not necessary that notice be given of each step in the process of taxation. It is sufficient if the taxpayer has an opportunity to appear, at some time before a tribunal having jurisdiction, and there procure an adjustment of his liabilities. State versus Several Parcels of Land, 83 Nebraska 13, 119 National Western [Reporter] 21 (1908).


Statute authorizing the revival of a dormant judgment against a nonresident upon service by publication is not repugnant to state Constitution. White versus Ress, 80 Nebraska 749, 115 National Western [Reporter] 301 (1908).


Statute providing for the organization of a drainage district whenever the same will promote the public health, convenience or welfare, funds to be raised in proportion to benefits received, notice giving owner right to appear and be heard and to appeal from order of assignment, does not amount to the taking of private property for private use, nor for public use without just compensation nor without due process of law. State ex rel Harris versus Hanson, 80 Nebraska 724, 115 National Western [Reporter] 294 (1908).


A statute that provides for seizure and forfeiture of guns used in hunting out of season, if no hearing provided for, is unconstitutional. McConnell versus McKillip, 71 Nebraska 712, 99 National Western [Reporter] 505 (1904).


Whenever an opportunity is offered to invoke equal protection of law by judicial proceeding appropriate for the purpose and adequate to secure the end and object sought to be attained, due process of law is said to be satisfied. Reed versus Reed, 70 Nebraska 779, 98 National Western [Reporter] 73 (1904).


In an action to quiet the title to real estate on the grounds of adverse possession, the former owner has not been deprived of his property without due process of law if the period has expired which, under the law, would bar an action for its recovery by the real owner. Linton versus Heye, 69 Nebraska 450, 95 National Western [Reporter] 1040 (1903), affirmed in 194 U.S. 628 (1904).


Act providing for assessment of damages under herd law, by arbitration, if cumulative, and not exclusive is not taking of property without due process of law. Randall versus Gross, 67 Nebraska 255, 93 National Western [Reporter] 223 (1903).


Statute providing that all witness fees and costs uncalled for within a certain specified time, in default of which they shall be paid into school fund is not taking of property without due process of law. Douglas County versus Moores, 66 Nebraska 284, 92 National Western [Reporter] 199 (1902).


Drainage district assessments, where owners are given opportunity to appear and be heard and accorded a right to review, are not taking of property without due process of law. Dodge County versus Acom, 61 Nebraska 376, 85 National Western [Reporter] 292 (1901).


Lord Campbell's Act gives right of action to personal representative of deceased for death of passenger and does not deprive railroad companies of their property without due process of law. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Company versus Zernecke, 59 Nebraska 689, 82 National Western [Reporter] 26 (1900); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Company versus Hambel, 2 Nebraska Unof. 607, 89 National Western [Reporter] 643 (1902).


"Due process of law" is defined as such exertion of power of government as sanctioned by settled maxims of law and under such safeguards for protection of individual rights as prescribed for class of cases to which the one in question belongs. It has never been construed as right to be heard in court of last resort, but is satisfied by proceeding applicable to subject matter and conformable to such general rules as affect all persons alike. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Headrick, 49 Nebraska 286, 68 National Western [Reporter] 489 (1896).


Providing for organization of drainage districts and charging lands for payment of bonds, upon petition and notice is valid. Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irrigation District versus Collins, 46 Nebraska 411, 64 National Western [Reporter] 1086 (1895).


A statute authorizing a city to change existing grades but failing to provide for notice to property owners of appraisers' meeting is unconstitutional. McGavock versus City of Omaha, 40 Nebraska 64, 58 National Western [Reporter] 543 (1894).


Due process requires that a prisoner receive meaningful access to the courts to defend civil suits brought against the prisoner. Board of Regents versus Thompson, 6 Nebraska Appelate 734, 577 National Western [Reporter]2d 749 (1998).


5. Reasonable regulation

Due process is not violated in termination of parental rights statutes where a parent of ordinary intelligence can ascertain, without guessing, the prescribed standards governing parental conduct. State versus A. H., 198 Nebraska 444, 253 National Western [Reporter]2d 283 (1977).


Section 39-6,193, imposing vicarious liability on owners-lessors of trucks for damages by lessees and operators of the leased trucks, is constitutional. Bridgeford versus U-Haul Company, 195 Nebraska 308, 238 National Western [Reporter]2d 443 (1976).


Legislative act requiring continuous residency of four months independent of school attendance to establish residence for tuition purposes does not violate this section. Thompson versus Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 187 Nebraska 252, 188 National Western [Reporter]2d 840 (1971).


Prohibiting wholesaler from giving discounts for quantity purchases of alcoholic liquor to retailers is not a denial of due process. Central Markets West, Incorporated versus State, 186 Nebraska 79, 180 National Western [Reporter]2d 880 (1970).


Statute authorizing county board to relocate roads did not violate this section. Emry versus Lake, 181 Nebraska 568, 149 National Western [Reporter]2d 520 (1967).


Statute providing for limited access to interstate highway is not violative of due process. Fougeron versus County of Seward, 174 Nebraska 753, 119 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (1963)


Act authorizing revocation of driver's license for failure to submit to blood or urine test did not violate this section. Prucha versus Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Nebraska 415, 110 National Western [Reporter]2d 75 (1961).


Statute requiring a warehouseman to report list of property held in storage was not a denial of due process of law. United States Cold Storage Corp. versus Stolinski, 168 Nebraska 513, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 408 (1959).


Statute prohibiting state and federal officers and employees from being delegates to county, district, and state political conventions did not violate this section. State ex rel. Baldwin versus Strain, 152 Nebraska 763, 42 National Western [Reporter]2d 796 (1950).


Act requiring proper lights on mainline switch stands by railroads was not void under due process clause. State versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 147 Nebraska 970, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 824 (1947).


Claim made and rejected that appropriation of surface and ground waters without compensation violated this section. Dischner versus Loup River P.P. District, 147 Nebraska 949, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 813 (1947).


Legislative act providing for proceedings with reference to children born out of wedlock sustained as constitutional. In reference Application of Rozgall, 147 Nebraska 260, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1946).


While it is competent for the Legislature to classify, the classification, to be valid, must rest on some reason of public policy, or some substantial difference of situation or circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects classified. Webber versus City of Scottsbluff, 141 Nebraska 363, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 635 (1942).


Statutes creating housing authorities and granting right of eminent domain to operate for slum clearance do not violate due process clause. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


Act regulating and licensing sale of motor vehicles, and prohibiting price discriminations does not interfere with rights of property or personal liberty. Nelsen versus Tilley, 137 Nebraska 327, 289 National Western [Reporter] 388 (1939).


Act regulating manufacture of ice cream and dairy products is a proper exercise of police power. State versus McCosh, 134 Nebraska 780, 279 National Western [Reporter] 775 (1938).


City ordinance requiring persons engaged in business of moving houses to procure licenses is constitutional and reasonable exercise of police power. State versus Phillips, 133 Nebraska 209, 274 National Western [Reporter] 459 (1937).


Ordinance requiring peddler to have a license must be reasonable, considering the nature of the business and not so high as to prohibit the carrying on of the business. Hoyt Bros. versus City of Lincoln, 130 Nebraska 79, 263 National Western [Reporter] 898 (1936).


Zoning ordinance enacted as having substantial relation to public health, safety and general welfare is not deprivation of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Herbert versus Anderson, 122 Nebraska 738, 241 National Western [Reporter] 545 (1932); City of Lincoln versus Logan-Jones, 120 Nebraska 827, 235 National Western [Reporter] 583 (1931); City of Lincoln versus Foss, 119 Nebraska 666, 230 National Western [Reporter] 592 (1930).


Statute denying to persons under 16 the right to motor vehicle drivers' license is not in violation of this section. State ex rel. Oleson versus Graunke, 119 Nebraska 440, 229 National Western [Reporter] 329 (1930).


A valid exercise of police power may affect or destroy values where the use of the property for its original purpose has become unlawful by a change in public policy as disclosed by a new statute, but legislation on that ground is constitutional and does not deprive one of property without due process of law. Miller versus McLaughlin, 118 Nebraska 174, 224 National Western [Reporter] 18 (1929), affirmed in 281 U.S. 261 (1930).


Statute relating to drainage by irrigation company of sub-irrigated land is constitutional and does not violate the due process clause of Constitution. State ex rel. Read versus Farmers Irrigation District, 116 Nebraska 373, 217 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1928).


Authorizing life insurance company to change plan of business from mutual to stock by amending articles does not violate provision relating to due process of law in Constitution. Leininger versus North Amer. National L. Ins. Company, 115 Nebraska 801, 215 National Western [Reporter] 167 (1927).


Prohibiting foreign installment investment company doing business without certificate of approval by Department of Trade and Commerce is not in violation of due process of law. Investors Syndicate versus Bryan, 113 Nebraska 816, 205 National Western [Reporter] 294 (1925).


Statute prohibiting the soliciting of certain classes of claims for the purpose of instituting suits thereon outside of the state and providing a penalty therefor, are regulatory measures and as such, do not infringe the rights of an individual under the Constitution. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Davis, 111 Nebraska 737, 197 National Western [Reporter] 599 (1924).


Statute providing for the housing of municipal courts in the county courthouse does not interfere with vested rights of the county in such property, and is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of the use of property without due process of law. State ex rel. City of Omaha versus Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County, 109 Nebraska 35, 189 National Western [Reporter] 639 (1922).


Statute prohibiting liquor to be kept elsewhere than in private dwelling is not in violation of constitutional provision for due process of law. Fitch versus State, 102 Nebraska 361, 167 National Western [Reporter] 417 (1918).


City ordinance prohibiting the removal of garbage through the streets or alleys by any one not employed by the city for that purpose, is not unconstitutional as taking the property of a restaurant proprietor for public use without just compensation or as depriving him of his property without due process of law. Urbach versus City of Omaha, 101 Nebraska 314, 163 National Western [Reporter] 307 (1917).


Statute fixing maximum rates of premium for surety and fidelity companies under certain circumstances by the insurance board is not taking property without due process of law. State ex rel. Martin versus Howard, 96 Nebraska 278, 147 National Western [Reporter] 689 (1914).


Ordinance prohibiting billiard and pool halls does not take property without due process of law. Cole versus Village of Culbertson, 86 Nebraska 160, 125 National Western [Reporter] 287 (1910); McCarter versus City of Lexington, 80 Nebraska 714, 115 National Western [Reporter] 303 (1908).


Every property holder is secured in his title thereto and holds it under implied rule and understanding that its use may be so regulated and restricted that it shall not be injurious to others having equal right of enjoyment of their property, or to the rights of the community. Wenham versus State, 65 Nebraska 394, 91 National Western [Reporter] 421 (1902).


Statute prohibiting transfer of mortgaged chattels without written consent does not violate Constitution. State versus Heldenbrand, 62 Nebraska 136, 87 National Western [Reporter] 25 (1901).


Statute imposing penalty for neglecting to remove obstruction in line of newly established highway does not deprive owner of property without due process of law. Black versus Stein, 23 Nebraska 302, 36 National Western [Reporter] 548 (1888).


Zoning ordinance of city of Lincoln limiting the rental of a single-family dwelling to one family, which is defined as including not more than three unrelated persons, does not violate due process. State versus Champoux, 5 Nebraska Appelate 68, 555 National Western [Reporter]2d 69 (1996).


Statute allowing reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiff in suit on policy covering real property does not violate the Constitution on taking of property without due process of law. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Company versus Dobney, 189 U.S. 301 (1903).


Statute regulating the practice of veterinary medicine and surgery is not a violation of this section. Peet Stock Remedy Company versus McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Circuit 1929).


Amendment to charter and ordinance thereunder authorizing city to sell gasoline and oil does not violate provision of Constitution relating to taking of property without due process of law. Mutual Oil Company versus Zehrung, 11 F.2d 887 (D. Nebraska 1925).


6. Deprived of liberty

A penal law which makes criminal an act which the utmost care and circumspection would not enable one to avoid violates this section. Markham versus Brainard, 178 Nebraska 544, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 84 (1965).


Sexual psychopath law did not deprive accused of his liberty without due process of law. State versus Madary, 178 Nebraska 383, 133 National Western [Reporter]2d 583 (1965).


Sentence of juvenile offender to state penitentiary was not a denial of due process of law. Lingo versus Hann, 161 Nebraska 67, 71 National Western [Reporter]2d 716 (1955).


Habitual criminal law, defining habitual criminal and providing punishment therefor, is not violative of this section. Rains versus State, 142 Nebraska 284, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 887 (1942).


7. Deprived of property

The right of ingress and egress by way of a street is a property right of which an abutting property owner cannot be deprived without compensation. Swanson versus State Dept. of Roads, 178 Nebraska 671, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 810 (1965).


Statute requiring fencing of right-of-way of railroads did not deprive railroad company of due process of law. Linenbrink versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 177 Nebraska 838, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 417 (1964).


Statutory authorization for recovery of treble the actual damages sustained violates this section. Abel versus Conover, 170 Nebraska 926, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 684 (1960).


Legislative act will not be permitted to operate retrospectively when effect would be to interfere with vested rights. Dell versus City of Lincoln, 170 Nebraska 176, 102 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1960).


Holder of school land lease giving option to purchase fee title could not be deprived of that right by subsequent legislation. Pfeifer versus Ableidinger, 166 Nebraska 464, 89 National Western [Reporter]2d 568 (1958).


Right of owner of property abutting a street to ingress and egress to and from his premises is a property right of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law. Hillerege versus City of Scottsbluff, 164 Nebraska 560, 83 National Western [Reporter]2d 76 (1957).


Repeal of ordinance creating a water district did not invade any property rights. Brasier versus City of Lincoln, 159 Nebraska 12, 65 National Western [Reporter]2d 213 (1954).


Suspension of license under Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act does not deprive licensee of property right. Hadden versus Aitken, 156 Nebraska 215, 55 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1952).


Provision for allowance of claim for reimbursement against recipient of old age assistance is not violative of due process. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board versus Myhre, 149 Nebraska 669, 32 National Western [Reporter]2d 262 (1948).


Relieving drainage district from liability for damages because of vote of landowners not to become part thereof violated this section. Cooper versus Sanitary District Number 1 of Lancaster County, 146 Nebraska 412, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 619 (1945).


Zoning ordinance requiring certain size of buildings and ground area did not operate to deny property owners due process of law. Dundee Realty Company versus City of Omaha, 144 Nebraska 448, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 634 (1944).


It is a general rule that a person has no vested right in statutory licenses, permits or privileges. Beisner versus Cochran, 138 Nebraska 445, 293 National Western [Reporter] 289 (1940).


Statute making a stay bond a judgment against the surety does not conflict with the due process clause. Baker Steel & Machinery Company versus Ferguson, 137 Nebraska 578, 290 National Western [Reporter] 449 (1940).


Act taking away right of licensees to sell alcoholic liquors at wholesale in quart bottles, by fixing uniform standards for containers, though reducing value of property formerly used in liquor traffic, does not violate constitutional provision. Marsh & Marsh versus Carmichael, 136 Nebraska 797, 287 National Western [Reporter] 616 (1939).


Statute authorizing reparation of freight rates unlawfully collected cannot be construed to permit retroactive action by Railway Commission. Farmers Union Livestock Commission versus Union Pacific R. R. Company, 135 Nebraska 689, 283 National Western [Reporter] 498 (1939).


Every person legally possesses the right of acquiring the absolute and unqualified title to every species of property recognized by law, with all rights incidental thereto, and, in connection with the right of personal liberty, it includes the right to dispose of such property in such innocent manner as he pleases, and to sell it at such price as he can obtain in fair barter. State ex rel. English versus Ruback, 135 Nebraska 335, 281 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1938).


Public power districts taking land by eminent domain does not violate due process clause of Constitution providing just compensation is paid. Johnson versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 133 Nebraska 97, 274 National Western [Reporter] 386 (1937).


Creating depositors' final settlement fund authorizing assessment against state banks for payment of losses in banks closed is invalid for the reason one is deprived of his property without due process. Hubbell Bank versus Bryan, 124 Nebraska 51, 245 National Western [Reporter] 20 (1932), certiorari denied 289 U.S. 753 (1933).


Water right acquired prior to 1895 is a vested property right not to be taken away by legislative action. City of Fairbury versus Fairbury Mill & Elevator Company, 123 Nebraska 588, 243 National Western [Reporter] 774 (1932).


City ordinance prohibiting installation and operation of "automatic coin-in-the-slot gasoline pumps" at filling station is not violative of this section. Hawkins versus City of Red Cloud, 123 Nebraska 487, 243 National Western [Reporter] 431 (1932).


Statute transferring assets from depositors' guaranty fund to depositors' final settlement fund, excluding assets subject to payment of judgment liens, is not a violation of due process clause. Bliss versus Bryan, 123 Nebraska 461, 243 National Western [Reporter] 625 (1932).


Appropriation by Legislature of public money to reimburse depositors for losses sustained by depositors in banks operated by guaranty fund commission is in violation of due process provision of federal and state Constitutions. Weaver versus Koehn, 120 Nebraska 114, 231 National Western [Reporter] 703 (1930).


Statute authorizing license to guardian to mortgage insane ward's realty without requiring notice to ward does not violate the Constitution relating to taking of property without due process of law. Mead versus Polly, 119 Nebraska 206, 228 National Western [Reporter] 369 (1929).


Order of Railway Commission requiring the physical connection of two telephone companies and directing that they shall divide all new business in a certain proportion, is in effect taking of property without due process of law. Blackledge versus Farmers Independent Tel. Company of Red Cloud, 105 Nebraska 713, 181 National Western [Reporter] 709 (1921), 16 A.L.R. 343 (1921).


Law depriving citizens of right to sell hog-cholera serum under certain conditions is unconstitutional. Hall versus State, 100 Nebraska 84, 158 National Western [Reporter] 362 (1916), Lawyers Reports Annotated 1916F 136 (1916).


Order of Railway Commission requiring railroad to construct private overhead crossing violates due process of law as provided in the Constitution. Postle versus Chicago, B & Q. R. R. Company, 98 Nebraska 192, 152 National Western [Reporter] 379 (1915).


Ordinance declaring that the carcasses of all dead animals found within the city, which were not slain for food, should at once become the property of the public contractor, is void so far as it attempts to take private property without due process of law. Whelan versus Daniels, 94 Nebraska 642, 143 National Western [Reporter] 929 (1913).


License to sell intoxicating liquors is but a mere temporary permit and is not a property right within the meaning of this section. Harding versus Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 90 Nebraska 232, 133 National Western [Reporter] 191 (1911).


A statute limiting the dower right of a non-resident widow to lands of which her husband died seized, and extending the dower right of a resident widow to other lands, does not contravene the Constitution. Miner versus Morgan, 83 Nebraska 400, 119 National Western [Reporter] 781 (1909).


Statute authorizing the entry of a judgment for costs against a complaining witness in a criminal case is unconstitutional. Teats versus Fox, 75 Nebraska 747, 106 National Western [Reporter] 779 (1906); Rickley versus State, 65 Nebraska 841, 91 National Western [Reporter] 867 (1902).


Statute preventing and punishing the desecration of the flag of the United States is not obnoxious to the provisions of Constitution against depriving any person of his property without due process of law and against special or class legislation. Halter versus State, 74 Nebraska 757, 105 National Western [Reporter] 298 (1905).


Divesting persons entitled thereto of unclaimed witness fees for benefit of school fund is taking of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Broatch versus Moores, 52 Nebraska 770, 73 National Western [Reporter] 299 (1897).


Commission's order to compel railroad to establish underpass for convenience and benefit of landowner in use of his own property is taking of property without due process of law. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Company versus Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930), Holmberg versus Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Company, reversing 115 Nebraska 727, 214 National Western [Reporter] 746 (1927).


"Cedar Rust" law does not deprive cedar tree owners of property without due process of law. Upton versus Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Nebraska 1932).


8. Contract rights

Act reducing penalty for violation of Installment Loan Act did not violate this section. Davis versus General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Nebraska 865, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 907 (1964).


Recovery on behalf of city by taxpayer of amount paid on void contract did not deny defendant due process of law. Arthur versus Trindel, 168 Nebraska 429, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 208 (1959).


Construction of a collective bargaining contract decided upon contract and estoppel and not under due process clause of Constitution. Brisbin versus E. L. Oliver Lodge Number 335, 134 Nebraska 517, 279 National Western [Reporter] 277 (1938).


Statute may not operate retrospectively where it would impair obligation of contracts or interfere with vested rights. Travelers Ins. Company versus Ohler, 119 Nebraska 121, 227 National Western [Reporter] 449 (1929).


Requiring contract work for a city to be performed by union labor violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Wright versus Hoctor, 95 Nebraska 342, 145 National Western [Reporter] 704 (1914).


Statutes on unfair competition do not contravene the Constitution relative to class legislation, freedom of contract or of taking property without due process of law. It is not the making of contracts which is forbidden, but the conduct, purpose and motives of the parties in connection with their acts. State versus Drayton, 82 Nebraska 254, 117 National Western [Reporter] 768 (1908).


Anti-pass law, imposing a penalty on either who give or receive a free railroad pass, is not an impairment of contract or taking property without due process of law. State versus Martyn, 82 Nebraska 225, 117 National Western [Reporter] 719 (1908).


Regulation of Board of Soldiers and Sailors Home providing that certain specific per cent of pension be paid into cash fund of home is a matter of contract and not that of depriving inmate of property without due process of law. Howell versus Sheldon, 82 Nebraska 72, 117 National Western [Reporter] 109 (1908).


9. Labor and employment

Sunday closing law violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. Terry Carpenter, Incorporated versus Wood, 177 Nebraska 515, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 475 (1964).


Sunday closing ordinance of city of first class violated this section. Skag-Way Department Stores, Incorporated versus City of Grand Island, 176 Nebraska 169, 125 National Western [Reporter]2d 529 (1964).


Fixing of a scale of wages to be paid by a successful contractor at a public letting violated this section. Philson versus City of Omaha, 167 Nebraska 360, 93 National Western [Reporter]2d 13 (1958).


City ordinance fixing closing hour of barber shops but not of beauty parlors is a discrimination within the due process clause of the Constitution. Ernesti versus City of Grand Island, 125 Nebraska 688, 251 National Western [Reporter] 899 (1933).


Statute requiring taxicab operators to deposit liability insurance or other security is not taking property without due process of law. Petersen versus Beal, 121 Nebraska 348, 237 National Western [Reporter] 146 (1931).


Ordinance prohibiting the selling or exchange of motor vehicles on Sunday is constitutional as police regulation. Stewart Motor Company versus City of Omaha, 120 Nebraska 776, 235 National Western [Reporter] 332 (1931).


Sunday labor law is not repugnant to this section. In reference Caldwell, 82 Nebraska 544, 118 National Western [Reporter] 133 (1908).


Statute regulating hours of employment of females in certain businesses is not unconstitutional. Wenham versus State, 65 Nebraska 394, 91 National Western [Reporter] 421 (1902).


Prescribing 8 hour day for certain kinds of labor is a denial of due process of law. Low versus Rees Printing Company, 41 Nebraska 127, 59 National Western [Reporter] 362 (1894).


10. Taxes and special assessments

A statute which authorized taxation of capital gain including portion of gain which accrued during taxing period prior to adoption of act was not unconstitutional. Altsuler versus Peters, 190 Nebraska 113, 206 National Western [Reporter]2d 570 (1973).


Laws for the levy and collection of general taxes stand upon a different footing than laws for the levy and collection of special assessments or special taxes. Frye versus Haas, 182 Nebraska 73, 152 National Western [Reporter]2d 121 (1967).


Penalty for failure to return personal property for taxation operated to deprive person of property without due process of law. Bachus versus Swanson, 179 Nebraska 1, 136 National Western [Reporter]2d 189 (1965).


An order by district court to produce a copy of income tax return is not a violation of due process clause of state Constitution. Rhodes versus Edwards, 178 Nebraska 757, 135 National Western [Reporter]2d 453 (1965).


Fixing of tax levy for municipal university did not violate due process clause. Ratigan versus Davis, 175 Nebraska 416, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 12 (1963).


Action of State Board of Equalization and Assessment in raising values was not denial of due process. County of Howard versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Nebraska 339, 63 National Western [Reporter]2d 441 (1954).


Ordinance of city of Lincoln imposing occupation tax on taxicabs does not violate due process of law. Richter versus City of Lincoln, 136 Nebraska 289, 285 National Western [Reporter] 593 (1939).


City taxes levied and assessed in accordance with home rule charter do not violate constitutional provision. Eppley Hotels Company versus City of Lincoln, 133 Nebraska 550, 276 National Western [Reporter] 196 (1937).


Gross premium tax on foreign insurance companies is an excise tax on privilege of doing business in Nebraska, and not violative of due process clause of Constitution. State ex rel. Smrha versus General American Ins. Company, 132 Nebraska 520, 272 National Western [Reporter] 555 (1937).


Statute imposing excise tax on gasoline is consistent with the due process clause of the Constitution. Burke versus Bass, 123 Nebraska 297, 242 National Western [Reporter] 606 (1932).


A special assessment levied upon state banks was not deprivation of private property in violation of this section. Abie State Bank versus Weaver, 119 Nebraska 153, 227 National Western [Reporter] 922 (1929), affirmed in Abie State Bank versus Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).


Sanitary District Law does not require the officers of a sanitary district to give notice of the levying of a tax which is within their power to levy; if they exceed their power, they may be enjoined. Whedon versus Wells, 95 Nebraska 517, 145 National Western [Reporter] 1007 (1914).


Occupation tax is a revenue measure and does not violate this section. Norris versus City of Lincoln, 93 Nebraska 658, 142 National Western [Reporter] 114 (1913).


Due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial hearing in matters of taxation. Trainor versus Maverick Loan & Trust Company, 80 Nebraska 626, 114 National Western [Reporter] 932 (1908).


The provisions of the statute granting the landowner the right to object to the confirmation of sale, affords him an opportunity to have the question of the validity of the tax determined before he is deprived of his property. State versus Several Parcels of Land, 75 Nebraska 538, 106 National Western [Reporter] 663 (1906).


Statute providing for an assessment of railway property by State Board of Equalization is not deprivation of property by taxation without due process of law. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Richardson County, 72 Nebraska 482, 100 National Western [Reporter] 950 (1904); State ex rel. Morton versus Back, 72 Nebraska 402, 100 National Western [Reporter] 952 (1904).


An owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law if he has an opportunity to question its validity or the amount of tax or assessment at some stage of the proceedings, either before the amount is finally determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection. Hacker versus Howe, 72 Nebraska 385, 101 National Western [Reporter] 255 (1904).


Statute providing for foreclosure of tax lien on land for payment of delinquent taxes by proceeding in district court with notice by publication sufficiently answers the demand of due process of law. Woodrough versus Douglas County, 71 Nebraska 354, 98 National Western [Reporter] 1092 (1904).


The power of the state to levy taxes obviously carries with it the power to collect them and to provide all means necessary or appropriate to insure and enforce their collection. Leigh versus Green, 64 Nebraska 533, 90 National Western [Reporter] 255 (1902).


11. Laws held generally to violate due process

Rural Cemetery District Act violated this provision of the Constitution. Anderson versus Carlson, 171 Nebraska 741, 107 National Western [Reporter]2d 535 (1961).


Weather Control Act of 1957 violated this section. Summerville versus North Platte Valley Weather Control District, 170 Nebraska 46, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 748 (1960).


Fair Trade Act violated due process clause. McGraw Electric Company versus Lewis & Smith Drug Company, Incorporated, 159 Nebraska 703, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 608 (1955).


12. Laws held generally not to violate due process

This section was not violated in adoption of Legislative Bill 425 (Laws 1967) amending section 14-1041 and creating section 14-1042, R.R.S.1943. Evans versus Metropolitan Utilities District, 187 Nebraska 261, 188 National Western [Reporter]2d 851 (1971).


Statutes relating to annexation of urban and suburban land by first-class cities and providing annexation benefits thereto held constitutional. Plumfield Nurseries, Incorporated versus Dodge County, 184 Nebraska 346, 167 National Western [Reporter]2d 560 (1969).


Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz versus Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Nebraska 410, 149 National Western [Reporter]2d 105 (1967).


Statute creating Nebraska Power Review Board did not violate this section. City of Auburn versus Eastern Nebraska Public Power District, 179 Nebraska 439, 138 National Western [Reporter]2d 629 (1965).


Zoning ordinance of city of Omaha did not violate this section. Wolf versus City of Omaha, 177 Nebraska 545, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 501 (1964).


Statute authorizing paving in city of the second class did not deny due process of law. Elliott versus City of Auburn, 172 Nebraska 1, 108 National Western [Reporter]2d 328 (1961).


Reorganization of School Districts Act did not violate this section. Nickel versus School Board of Axtell, 157 Nebraska 813, 61 National Western [Reporter]2d 566 (1953).


Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District versus Hall County, 152 Nebraska 410, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1950).


Unfair Sales Act sustained as constitutional. Hill versus Kusy, 150 Nebraska 653, 35 National Western [Reporter]2d 594 (1949).


Par Check Law sustained as constitutional exercise of police power. Placek versus Edstrom, 148 Nebraska 79, 26 National Western [Reporter]2d 489 (1947).


Statute prohibiting trial of divorce suit until six months after service of summons does not violate due process of law. Garrett versus State, 118 Nebraska 373, 224 National Western [Reporter] 860 (1929).


Employees liability act does not violate the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company versus Wickline, 103 Nebraska 21, 170 National Western [Reporter] 193 (1918).


Innkeepers' act providing for night watchman to protect guest from fire does not contravene the Constitution in that it deprives the innkeeper of life, liberty and property without due process of law. Strahl versus Miller, 97 Nebraska 820, 151 National Western [Reporter] 952 (1915), Ann. Cas. 1917A 141 (1915).


Bulk sales law does not violate provision of taking property without due process of law. Appel Mercantile Company versus Barker, 92 Nebraska 669, 138 National Western [Reporter] 1133 (1912).


13. Miscellaneous

Constitutionality of legislative act as being in violation of this section raised but not decided, as act was in violation of another section of the Constitution. Williams versus County of Buffalo, 181 Nebraska 233, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 776 (1967).


Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities District versus Merritt Beach Company, 179 Nebraska 783, 140 National Western [Reporter]2d 626 (1966).


Claim of deprivation of property without due process of law under labor relations ordinance was raised but not decided. Midwest Employers Council, Incorporated versus City of Omaha, 177 Nebraska 877, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 609 (1964).


Unconstitutionality of tax statute under this section raised but not decided. Creigh versus Larsen, 171 Nebraska 317, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 187 (1960).


Issue of double taxation of motor vehicles raised but not decided. Peterson versus Hancock, 166 Nebraska 637, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (1958).


Effect of instruction as denial of due process raised but not decided. Liakas versus State, 161 Nebraska 130, 72 National Western [Reporter]2d 677 (1955).


Constitutionality of statute authorizing service by publication raised but not decided. Johnson versus Richards, 155 Nebraska 552, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 737 (1952).


1-4. Religious freedom.

All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship against his consent, and no preference shall be given by law to any religious society, nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required as a qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious beliefs; but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 4 (1875).

Annotations

Right to religious freedom was not denied by requirement that all schools be taught by qualified teacher. Meyerkorth versus State, 173 Nebraska 889, 115 National Western [Reporter]2d 585 (1962).


Legislature cannot authorize donations by public corporations for religious purposes. United Community Services versus Omaha National Bank, 162 Nebraska 786, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1956).


A public exhibition of religious worship, in the form of a seance for gain on stage or at show, is not a religious liberty guaranteed by Constitution. Dill versus Hamilton, 137 Nebraska 723, 291 National Western [Reporter] 62 (1940).


Restricting term "Religious purpose" to church organization is a transgression of the constitutional inhibition made by this section. Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite versus Board of County Commissioners, 122 Nebraska 586, 241 National Western [Reporter] 93 (1932), overruled Scottish Rite Bldg. Company versus Lancaster County, 106 Nebraska 95, 182 National Western [Reporter] 574 (1921), and Mt. Moriah Lodge, A.F. & A.M. versus Otoe County, 101 Nebraska 274, 162 National Western [Reporter] 639 (1917).


Use of state funds to support a school maintained by religious denomination is in violation of this section. State ex rel. Public Sch. District Number 6 of Cedar County versus Taylor, 122 Nebraska 454, 240 National Western [Reporter] 573 (1932).


Holding Sunday School or religious meetings in a country schoolhouse so infrequently as not to exceed four times a year, and which does not interfere with the school work, does not constitute a place of worship within the meaning of this section. State ex rel. Gilbert versus Dilley, 95 Nebraska 527, 145 National Western [Reporter] 999 (1914).


Courts will not refuse to protect property rights because they may thereby interfere with religious convictions of some individual or group. Constitution contemplates courts may be called upon to protect religious denominations in peaceable enjoyment of own form of worship. Parish of the Immaculate Conception versus Murphy, 89 Nebraska 524, 131 National Western [Reporter] 946 (1911).


Reading in public schools of passages from the Bible, singing of hymns, and offering prayer, in accordance with the doctrines of sectarian churches, is forbidden by the Constitution. State ex rel. Freeman versus Scheve, 65 Nebraska 853, 91 National Western [Reporter] 846 (1902), judgment adhered to 65 Nebraska 876, 93 National Western [Reporter] 169 (1903).


1-5. Freedom of speech and press.

Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 5 (1875).

Annotations

1. Freedom of speech

The parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under this provision and the U.S. Constitution. State versus Hookstra, 263 Nebraska 116, 638 National Western [Reporter]2d 829 (2002).


A content-neutral nude dancing ordinance satisfies the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech when the ordinance (1) is within the power of the government to enact, (2) reasonably furthers a substantial government interest, (3) is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) imposes a restriction that is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the substantial government interest. Village of Winslow versus Sheets, 261 Nebraska 203, 622 National Western [Reporter]2d 595 (2001).


The parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under the Nebraska and U.S. Constitutions. Village of Winslow versus Sheets, 261 Nebraska 203, 622 National Western [Reporter]2d 595 (2001).


The free speech provision of the Nebraska Constitution does not guarantee a picketer or a protester an audience, it only guarantees a reasonable opportunity to speak. Hartford versus Womens Services, P.C., 239 Nebraska 540, 477 National Western [Reporter]2d 161 (1991).


A prior restraint on speech is not per se unconstitutional, but there is a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. To be lawful, a prior restraint on speech must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints. Content-based restrictions on commercial speech are permissible. Commercial speech is speech related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and the audience, or speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction. Speech intended to exercise a coercive impact is not removed from the reach of the first amendment. J. Q. Office Equip. versus Sullivan, 230 Nebraska 397, 432 National Western [Reporter]2d 211 (1988).


As used in section 28-729, "resist" is not unconstitutionally vague, and use of "fighting words" to constitute "abuse" depends upon the circumstances under which used. State versus Boss, 195 Nebraska 467, 238 National Western [Reporter]2d 639 (1976).


2. Freedom of the press

Obscenity is not within the protection of freedom of the press. State versus Pocras, 166 Nebraska 642, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 263 (1958).


The freedom implies the publisher's respect for the constitutional rights of others, including the rights of litigants to appear before an independent, impartial court uninfluenced or unembarrassed by contemptuous publications pending litigation. State versus Lovell, 117 Nebraska 710, 222 National Western [Reporter] 625 (1929).


The publication of political matter in a newspaper cannot be enjoined merely because it is false or misleading, such relief being forbidden by this section of the Constitution. Howell versus Bee Pub. Company, 100 Nebraska 39, 158 National Western [Reporter] 358 (1916).


Constitution does not protect any person from punishment for contempt of court for publishing a newspaper article commenting upon a pending cause or proceeding when the publication is calculated to hinder, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. Rosewater versus State, 47 Nebraska 630, 66 National Western [Reporter] 640 (1896).


3. Truth

When a publication is made by a chief officer of a fraternal insurance association, addressed to the members of the association, concerning a subject matter which affects the general welfare of the association, such communication, although containing words which are libelous per se, is qualifiedly privileged, and is a complete defense unless it is shown by plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence that the publication was made with express malice. Peterson versus Cleaver, 105 Nebraska 438, 181 National Western [Reporter] 187 (1920).


Where the purpose of members of village board in signing notice to hotel keeper was to do away with bawdy house, rather than to injure plaintiff, it was with good motives, and for justifiable ends. Deupree versus Thorton, 98 Nebraska 804, 154 National Western [Reporter] 557 (1915).


Truth alone is not a defense in action for libel unless with good motives and for justifiable ends. Wertz versus Sprecher, 82 Nebraska 834, 118 National Western [Reporter] 1071 (1908); Neilson versus Jensen, 56 Nebraska 430, 76 National Western [Reporter] 866 (1898); Pokrok Zapadu Pub. Company versus Zizkovsky, 42 Nebraska 64, 60 National Western [Reporter] 358 (1894).


In a criminal prosecution for publishing an alleged libelous article, the truth of the article, when established, is a perfect defense. Razee versus State, 73 Nebraska 732, 103 National Western [Reporter] 438 (1905), but see Wertz versus Sprecher, 82 Nebraska 834, 118 National Western [Reporter] 1071 (1908).


4. Miscellaneous

The protections of sections 5 and 7 of this article intertwine when films are the "things" seized. State versus Skolnik, 218 Nebraska 667, 358 National Western [Reporter]2d 497 (1984).


Statute providing it shall be unlawful just to be in place where controlled substance is being used illegally is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. State versus Adkins and Sutherland, 196 Nebraska 76, 241 National Western [Reporter]2d 655 (1976).


Statute providing that candidates for judicial and educational offices should not be nominated, indorsed, recommended, censured, criticized or referred to in any manner by any political convention, or primary, or at any primary election is a violation of this section. State ex rel. Ragan versus Junkin, 85 Nebraska 1, 122 National Western [Reporter] 473 (1909).


City ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills or circulars upon public streets, does not violate this section. In reference Anderson, 69 Nebraska 686, 96 National Western [Reporter] 149 (1903).


1-6. Trial by jury.

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the Legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve in courts inferior to the District Court, and may by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases in any court by not less than five-sixths of the jury.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 6 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 1.

Annotations

1. Meaning and effect

The purpose of this provision is to preserve the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law and under statutes in force when the Nebraska Constitution was adopted in 1875. The essential character of a cause of action and the remedy or relief it seeks as shown by the allegations of the petition determine whether a particular action is one at law to be tried to a jury or in equity to be tried to a court. State ex rel. Cherry versus Burns, 258 Nebraska 216, 602 National Western [Reporter]2d 477 (1999).


Right to jury trial not abridged by mandatory review of medical claim under Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act. Prendergast versus Nelson, 199 Nebraska 97, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 657 (1977).


The court may require that a motion to waive a jury trial be made or filed within a reasonable time prior to trial as a condition to the consent of the court. State versus Godfrey, 182 Nebraska 451, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 438 (1968).


Determination of sentence to be imposed by court instead of jury does not violate this section. Poppe versus State, 155 Nebraska 527, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1952).


Constitution merely preserves right of jury trial as it existed at common law and under statutes in force when Constitution was adopted. One charged with drunken driving under city ordinance is not entitled to jury trial in absence of statute. State versus Hauser, 137 Nebraska 138, 288 National Western [Reporter] 518 (1939).


Constitutional provision does not extend right to jury trial beyond the limits existing at time of adoption of Constitution; jury trial is not a constitutional right in proceeding for appointment or removal of guardian. In reference Guardianship of Warner, 137 Nebraska 25, 288 National Western [Reporter] 39 (1939).


The right of trial by jury is a right not extended by the Constitution but one preserved. In an equity case the court may, but is not bound to, give a jury trial. Omaha Fire Insurance Company versus Thompson, 50 Nebraska 580, 70 National Western [Reporter] 30 (1897).


An action upon a contract for the payment of money only, unencumbered by any collateral agreements, contracts or securities whatever, is a legal action and the issue of fact is triable to a jury. Kuhl versus Pierce County, 44 Nebraska 584, 62 National Western [Reporter] 1066 (1895).


Where a petition states a cause of action for equitable relief and prays for equitable relief, a jury cannot be demanded as a matter of right for the trial of any issue arising in the case. Sharmer versus McIntosh and Johnson, 43 Nebraska 509, 61 National Western [Reporter] 727 (1895).


2. Waiver

Right to a trial by jury may be waived by defendant in criminal case. State versus Carpenter, 181 Nebraska 639, 150 National Western [Reporter]2d 129 (1967).


In a civil action, right of trial by jury may be waived. McKinney versus County of Cass, 180 Nebraska 685, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 416 (1966); Davis versus Snyder 45 Nebraska 415, 63 National Western [Reporter] 789 (1895).


Right to trial by jury may be waived. Johnson versus State, 169 Nebraska 783, 100 National Western [Reporter]2d 844 (1960).


Party who invoked special proceeding could not question constitutionality thereof under this section. Lackaff versus Department of Roads & Irrigation, 153 Nebraska 217, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1950).


A plea of guilty waived defendant's right to be served with copy of accusation, time in which to examine the charge and prepare his defense, and waived all other preliminary steps. In reference Application of Rice, Rice versus Olson, 144 Nebraska 547, 14 National Western [Reporter]2d 850 (1944), reversed in 324 U.S. 786 (1945).


A request by both parties for direction of a verdict amounts to a waiver of a jury. In reference Bose's Estate, 136 Nebraska 156, 285 National Western [Reporter] 319 (1939).


Right to trial by jury in civil case is mere personal privilege which the litigant may waive. Berg versus Griffiths, 126 Nebraska 235, 252 National Western [Reporter] 918 (1934)


In felony case, where prisoner waived jury and trial had to court the judgment and sentence is void. Michaelson versus Beemer, 72 Nebraska 761, 101 National Western [Reporter] 1007 (1904); Arnold versus State, 38 Nebraska 752, 57 National Western [Reporter] 378 (1894).


3. Entitled to jury trial

Cited in determining that material issues of fact in contested garnishment proceedings are triable to jury. Christiansen versus Moore, 184 Nebraska 818, 172 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1969).


It is a part of our fundamental law that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. Fugate versus Skate, 169 Nebraska 420, 99 National Western [Reporter]2d 868 (1959).


Value of an attorney's services is ordinarily a jury question. Neighbors & Danielson versus West Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 162 Nebraska 816, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 667 (1956).


Right of trial by jury is not denied to defendant charged with being the father of a child born out of wedlock. In reference Application of Rozgall, 147 Nebraska 260, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1946).


Cashier of insolvent bank, made party to proceeding to establish preference, is entitled to jury trial. Gering versus Buerstetta, 118 Nebraska 54, 223 National Western [Reporter] 625 (1929).


In proceeding to revive dormant judgment, where payment or satisfaction is pleaded, it is error for the court to deny a request for a trial by jury. Farak versus First National Bank of Schuyler, 67 Nebraska 463, 93 National Western [Reporter] 682 (1903); McCormick & Brother versus Carey, 62 Nebraska 494, 87 National Western [Reporter] 172 (1901).


Clause in fire insurance policy providing that no action shall be brought thereon after breach but all differences settled by arbitration is void, as tending to oust the courts of the jurisdiction. Phoenix Ins. Company versus Zlotky, 66 Nebraska 584, 92 National Western [Reporter] 736 (1902); Hartford Fire Ins. Company versus Hon, 66 Nebraska 555, 92 National Western [Reporter] 746 (1902).


In action for money judgment for breach of contract, though equitable in nature, the issue should be submitted to a jury if demand is made for one. Lett versus Hammond, 59 Nebraska 339, 80 National Western [Reporter] 1042 (1899).


If purpose of action is primarily for recovery of money, though in part equitable in nature, the right to trial by jury exists. Yager versus Exchange National Bank of Hastings, 52 Nebraska 321, 72 National Western [Reporter] 211 (1897); Omaha Fire Ins. Company versus Thompson, 50 Nebraska 580, 70 National Western [Reporter] 30 (1897).


In garnishment proceedings, if the garnishee makes legal or equitable claim to the funds he is entitled to trial by jury. Clark versus Foxworthy, 14 Nebraska 241, 15 National Western [Reporter] 342 (1883).


4. Not entitled as matter of right

Notwithstanding constitutional mandates regarding a jury trial, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for petty offenses carrying a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 6 months or less. State versus Kennedy, 224 Nebraska 164, 396 National Western [Reporter]2d 722 (1986).


It is within the power of the Legislature to provide that the trial of petty offenses in violation of a city or village ordinance shall be triable without a jury. State versus Johnson, 191 Nebraska 535, 216 National Western [Reporter]2d 517 (1974).


Right to jury trial not given in school district reorganization appeal. Schroeder versus Oeltjen, 184 Nebraska 8, 165 National Western [Reporter]2d 81 (1969).


Trial without a jury for violation of city or village ordinance is not a violation of this section. State versus Lookabill, 176 Nebraska 254, 125 National Western [Reporter]2d 695 (1964).


Legislature may authorize trial of petty offenses without a jury for violation of city or village ordinance. State versus Amick, 173 Nebraska 770, 114 National Western [Reporter]2d 893 (1962).


Election contest is a summary action and is not a suit in which a trial by jury is guaranteed under the Constitution. McMaster versus Wilkinson, 145 Nebraska 39, 15 National Western [Reporter]2d 348 (1944).


Action to quiet title to real estate, acquired by accretion, is tried as an equitable action, without a jury. Frank versus Smith, 138 Nebraska 382, 293 National Western [Reporter] 329 (1940).


Enjoining defendants from betting on horse races in their places of business is an equitable remedy to prevent a nuisance and not a proceeding to punish defendants, and does not violate constitutional guarantee of jury trial. State ex rel. Hunter versus The Araho, 137 Nebraska 389, 289 National Western [Reporter] 545 (1940).


Cases arising under Workmen's Compensation Act may be tried and determined as a suit in equity, and it is not in violation of Constitution not to provide for jury. Nosky versus Farmers Union Cooperative Association, 109 Nebraska 489, 191 National Western [Reporter] 846 (1922).


This section has no application to judicial proceedings concerning the amount or legality of special assessments for benefits to highways within a drainage district. Drainage District Number 1, Richardson County versus Richardson County, 86 Nebraska 355, 125 National Western [Reporter] 796 (1910).


On a motion for a deficiency judgment in the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, the mortgagors are not entitled to a trial by a jury. Daniels versus Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, 73 Nebraska 257, 102 National Western [Reporter] 458 (1905).


Action by county, to foreclose tax lien, is a suit in equity and there is no constitutional right of a trial by jury. Woodrough versus Douglas County, 71 Nebraska 354, 98 National Western [Reporter] 1092 (1904).


Quo warranto and injunction to exclude a corporation from the privilege of doing business in this state does not require a trial by jury. State versus Standard Oil Company, 61 Nebraska 28, 84 National Western [Reporter] 413 (1900).


In quo warranto proceedings against a public officer, a jury trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right. State ex rel. Broatch versus Moores, 56 Nebraska 1, 76 National Western [Reporter] 530 (1898).


The accused is not entitled to jury trial in prosecution under city ordinance. Liberman versus State, 26 Nebraska 464, 42 National Western [Reporter] 419 (1889).


An action to foreclose mechanic's lien is essentially a suit in equity, and a party is not as a matter of right entitled to a jury therein. Dohle versus Omaha Foundry & Machine Company, 15 Nebraska 436, 19 National Western [Reporter] 644 (1884).


Contempt proceeding is solely to protect public justice from obstruction and the accused is not entitled to trial by jury. Gandy versus State, 13 Nebraska 445, 14 National Western [Reporter] 143 (1882).


5. Miscellaneous

The right of trial by jury hereunder does not apply to second offense drunk driving because that is a misdemeanor, not recognized by the common law or any statute in existence when the Constitution was adopted. State versus Young, 194 Nebraska 544, 234 National Western [Reporter]2d 196 (1975).


Denial of request for a separate trial of defendant in a criminal case did not violate this section. State versus Adams, 181 Nebraska 75, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 144 (1966).


Verdict in civil case by five-sixths of jury was authorized. Cartwright & Wilson Constr. Company versus Smith, 155 Nebraska 431, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 274 (1952).


Right of jury trial is not denied where adverse claims are presented and tried in mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank versus Barnes, 143 Nebraska 58, 8 National Western [Reporter]2d 545 (1943).


Where defendant is charged with a felony, it is prejudicial error for court, without notice to and in absence of defendant and his counsel, to instruct jury orally while it is deliberating upon its verdict. Strasheim versus State, 138 Nebraska 651, 294 National Western [Reporter] 433 (1940).


Where cause of action is reversed and remanded, both parties are entitled to a retrial of the cause generally and it is error for trial court to enter judgment for a certain amount though Supreme Court had indicated that aggrieved party was entitled to damages. Parish versus County Fire Ins. Company, 137 Nebraska 385, 289 National Western [Reporter] 765 (1940).


A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can only be entered when the pleadings of the party in whose favor verdict was rendered confess facts entitling other party to judgment. Wolfinger versus Shaw, 136 Nebraska 604, 287 National Western [Reporter] 63 (1939).


A verdict so clearly excessive as to induce the belief that it must have been found through passion, prejudice or mistake, will be set aside. Collins versus Hughes & Riddle, 134 Nebraska 380, 278 National Western [Reporter] 888 (1938).


It is error to submit a case to a jury and permit it to speculate with the rights of litigants where no question for the jury is involved. Smith versus Epstein Realty Company, 133 Nebraska 842, 277 National Western [Reporter] 427 (1938).


Function of determining facts must, under the Constitution, be discharged by jury in action for damages for personal injuries. Storm versus Christenson, 130 Nebraska 86, 263 National Western [Reporter] 896 (1936).


Practice of nonsuiting plaintiff at close of opening statements to jury disapproved. Temple versus Cotton Transfer Company, 126 Nebraska 287, 253 National Western [Reporter] 349 (1934).


Statute authorizing city to condemn public utility property, although no jury trial provided, is constitutional. City of Mitchell versus Western Public Service Company, 124 Nebraska 248, 246 National Western [Reporter] 484 (1933).


Statute vesting magistrates and police courts with powers to try liquor violations without jury where penalty within certain limits, does not violate this section. State versus Kacin, 123 Nebraska 64, 241 National Western [Reporter] 785 (1932).


A fair determination of the facts involved in a criminal prosecution adversely to the accused, by a constitutional jury, is a prerequisite to the infliction of punishment. Scott versus State, 121 Nebraska 232, 236 National Western [Reporter] 608 (1931).


Mandamus will not lie to vacate order denying jury trial for liquor offense, in view of adequate remedy by appeal or error. State ex rel. Garton versus Fulton, 118 Nebraska 400, 225 National Western [Reporter] 28 (1929).


Litigant cannot demand jury on issue of adverse possession in suit to quiet title. Krumm versus Pillard, 104 Nebraska 335, 177 National Western [Reporter] 171 (1920).


Legislature may enact a law declaring possession and transportation of intoxicating liquors to be misdemeanors, and providing that violators of the law be tried before magistrates and police courts without a jury, where the penalty does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for three months. Bell versus State, 104 Nebraska 203, 176 National Western [Reporter] 544 (1920).


Provision for assessment of $300 against building enjoined as liquor nuisance, if construed as penalty, is unconstitutional as violating owner's right to jury trial. State ex rel. McGuire versus Macfarland, 104 Nebraska 42, 175 National Western [Reporter] 663 (1919).


Every person is guaranteed a fair and impartial trial by an impartial jury, and the obligation to protect these constitutional rights devolves upon the courts, and no court, when called upon to act, can shirk or evade the responsibility cast upon it by law. Wilson versus State, 87 Nebraska 638, 128 National Western [Reporter] 38 (1910).


In a law action a party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. Yeiser versus Broadwell, 80 Nebraska 718, 115 National Western [Reporter] 293 (1908).


Whether or not a right to trial by jury exists must be determined from the object of the action as determined by the averments of the petition, and in case of ambiguity by resort to the prayer. Gandy versus Wiltse, 79 Nebraska 280, 112 National Western [Reporter] 569 (1907).


Where a statute providing for selection of juries is incomplete, it is invalid because its requirements cannot be complied with. State ex rel Mickey versus Reneau, 75 Nebraska 1, 106 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1905).


Provision for jury of less than twelve in inferior courts does not violate this section. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Headrick, 49 Nebraska 286, 68 National Western [Reporter] 489 (1896); Moise versus Powell, 40 Nebraska 671, 59 National Western [Reporter] 79 (1894).


1-7. Search and seizure.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 7 (1875).

Annotations

1. Search warrant

Provisions in warrants allowing no-knock search warrants offend neither U.S. Constitution amendment IV nor this provision. State versus Eary, 235 Nebraska 254, 454 National Western [Reporter]2d 685 (1990).


A valid search as incident to an arrest without a warrant necessarily depends on the legality of the arrest itself. State versus Wickline, 232 Nebraska 329, 440 National Western [Reporter]2d 249 (1989).


When a law enforcement officer has knowledge, based on information reasonably trustworthy under the circumstances, which justifies a prudent belief that a suspect has committed a crime, the officer has probable cause to arrest without a warrant. State versus Wickline, 232 Nebraska 329, 440 National Western [Reporter]2d 249 (1989).


A search pursuant to a warrant is presumed valid. If police have acted pursuant to a search warrant, the defendant bears the burden of proof that the search or seizure is unreasonable; but, if police have acted without a search warrant, the State has the burden of proof that the search was conducted under circumstances substantiating the reasonableness of such search or seizure. State versus Vrtiska, 225 Nebraska 454, 406 National Western [Reporter]2d 114 (1987).


Seizure of theater owner's films without a warrant is not justified under this provision in the absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances or some other recognized exception. State versus Skolnik, 218 Nebraska 667, 358 National Western [Reporter]2d 497 (1984).


A warrant to search a house also covers the land around the house and associated outbuildings used by the inhabitants of the house. State versus Vicars, 207 Nebraska 325, 299 National Western [Reporter]2d 421 (1980).


Items not listed on a search warrant but in plain view of officers searching an area described in the warrant for items listed on the warrant may be seized. State versus King, 207 Nebraska 270, 298 National Western [Reporter]2d 168 (1980).


This section not violated where law enforcement officers learning of attempted arson from trespassers inspected premises without entry or search to ascertain that no fire was in progress before obtaining search warrant. State versus Howard, 184 Nebraska 274, 167 National Western [Reporter]2d 80 (1969).


Law permitting search warrant to be issued upon information and belief is not in violation of this section. Watson versus State, 109 Nebraska 43, 189 National Western [Reporter] 620 (1922).


The right to a search warrant is in no instance authorized until a showing, on oath, of probable cause and particular description is given of place or premises to be searched and thing to be seized. Peterson versus State, 64 Nebraska 875, 90 National Western [Reporter] 964 (1902).


Law enforcement officers may search the entirety of a motor vehicle, including closed compartments and baggage, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A warrantless search of containers within a motor vehicle is allowed where there exists probable cause to believe that contraband is located in the vehicle. State versus Claus, 8 Nebraska Appelate 430, 594 National Western [Reporter]2d 685 (1999).


2. Evidence

Once a person is lawfully arrested, if the search is within the scope of a search which may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest, then the evidence obtained from the search is properly admitted. State versus Roberts, 261 Nebraska 403, 623 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (2001).


Evidence obtained pursuant to an arrest by an officer who was without statutory or common-law authority to arrest should be suppressed. State versus Tingle, 239 Nebraska 558, 477 National Western [Reporter]2d 544 (1991).


The eyewitness report of a citizen informant may be self-corroborating; the fact that a citizen voluntarily came forward with information is itself an indicium of reliability. State versus King, 207 Nebraska 270, 298 National Western [Reporter]2d 168 (1980).


Evidence obtained as the result of an illegal arrest without a warrant is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. State versus O'Kelly, 175 Nebraska 798, 124 National Western [Reporter]2d 211 (1963).


Evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search is not rendered inadmissible. Haswell versus State, 167 Nebraska 169, 92 National Western [Reporter]2d 161 (1958).


Seizure by officer of property beyond scope and terms of search warrant, is a violation of this section; nevertheless articles seized and information procured may be used as evidence. Billings versus State, 109 Nebraska 596, 191 National Western [Reporter] 721 (1923).


Taking prisoner's shoes while confined in jail and introducing same in evidence against him does not contravene prohibition against unreasonable seizure. Russell versus State, 66 Nebraska 497, 92 National Western [Reporter] 751 (1902).


Trooper's pat-down search, performed for an improper purpose, was unconstitutional, and evidence found was inadmissible. State versus Scovill, 9 Nebraska Appelate 118, 608 National Western [Reporter]2d 623 (2000).


Trooper's warrantless search of defendant's car, glove box, and items strewn about the scene of a vehicle accident lacked probable cause, and evidence found was inadmissible. State versus Scovill, 9 Nebraska Appelate 118, 608 National Western [Reporter]2d 623 (2000).


3. Waiver of right

The right to be free from search and seizure may be waived by consent of a citizen as long as such consent is given freely and is not the product of a will overborne. State versus Ready, 252 Nebraska 816, 565 National Western [Reporter]2d 728 (1997).


The right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure may be waived by the consent of the citizen. State versus Graham, 241 Nebraska 995, 492 National Western [Reporter]2d 845 (1992).


The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure can be waived by the citizen's consent. State versus Dixon, 237 Nebraska 630, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1991).


The right under the federal and state Constitutions to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure may be waived by the consent of the citizen. Consent is an exception to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment; however, a consensual search may not exceed the scope of the consent given. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, or in other words, what a typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. State versus Claus, 8 Nebraska Appelate 430, 594 National Western [Reporter]2d 685 (1999).


4. Action by private individual

The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures proscribes only governmental action and is inapplicable to searches or seizures effected by private individuals. State versus Dixon, 237 Nebraska 630, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1991).


Under both the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and this provision, whether a search by a private person is actually a search by the State depends on whether the private person must be regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the State. A private person's status as a state agent in a search is not restricted to a search ordered, requested, or initiated by a state official, but may include a search which is a joint endeavor between a private person and a state official. Some conduct by the police in advancement or inducement of a search by a private person must be proven to make out a joint endeavor. State versus Sardeson, 231 Nebraska 586, 437 National Western [Reporter]2d 473 (1989).


If a search is a joint endeavor involving a private person and a state or government official, the search is subject to the constitutional safeguard against an unreasonable search, prohibited by the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and this provision. State versus Jolitz, 231 Nebraska 254, 435 National Western [Reporter]2d 907 (1989).


5. Seizure, what constitutes

A "seizure" of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property. State versus Dixon, 237 Nebraska 630, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1991).


A seizure for purposes of this provision requires either a police officer's application of physical force to a suspect or a suspect's submission to an officer's show of authority. State versus Cronin, 2 Nebraska Appelate 368, 509 National Western [Reporter]2d 673 (1993).


6. Miscellaneous

The exclusionary rule is inapplicable in child protection proceedings. In reference Interest of Corey P. et al., 269 Nebraska 925, 697 National Western [Reporter]2d 647 (2005).


In Nebraska, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by U.S. Constitution amendment IV and Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 7. To determine whether an individual has an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 7, one must determine whether an individual has a legitimate or justifiable expectation of privacy in the place subjected to canine scrutiny. Ordinarily, two inquiries are required. First, the individual must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. By using a canine to sniff for illegal drugs in a hallway outside an apartment, the police have engaged an investigative technique by which they are able to obtain information regarding the contents of a place that has traditionally been accorded a heightened expectation of privacy, and while such investigative technique may be minimally intrusive, it nevertheless implicates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 7, and requires independent reasonable suspicion. Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 7, an occupant has a legitimate expectation of some measure of privacy in the hallway immediately outside his or her apartment or at the threshold of his or her home. Given such constitutional protection, before a drug-detecting canine can be deployed to test the threshold of a home, police officers must possess at a minimum reasonable, articulable suspicion that the location to be tested contains illegal drugs. State versus Ortiz, 257 Nebraska 784, 600 National Western [Reporter]2d 805 (1999).


Under this provision, it is reasonable for the police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine procedure incident to booking and jailing the suspect. There is no requirement that such inventory policies be established in writing. State versus Filkin, 242 Nebraska 276, 494 National Western [Reporter]2d 544 (1993).


A defendant is guaranteed the right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. State versus Houser, 241 Nebraska 525, 490 National Western [Reporter]2d 168 (1992).


No new arrest occurred when correctional authorities allowed police officers to interview a person being held in jail on other charges, and thus there was no constitutional basis to challenge the officers' seizure of the person when he attempted to leave the interviewing room. State versus Green, 240 Nebraska 639, 483 National Western [Reporter]2d 748 (1992).


The test to determine whether an investigative stop is justified is whether the police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts which indicate that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur and that the suspect may be involved. An officer is not required to wait until a crime has occurred before making an investigatory stop. It is sufficient if there is an objective manifestation that the person stopped is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State versus Rein, 234 Nebraska 917, 453 National Western [Reporter]2d 114 (1990).


Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Nebraska Constitution prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of the home. State versus Trahan, 229 Nebraska 683, 428 National Western [Reporter]2d 619 (1988).


A person's capacity to claim the protection of this section as to unreasonable searches and seizures, like its counterpart, U.S. Constitution amendment IV, depends upon whether the person who claims such protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. An unreasonable search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. Because the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched premises, they were without standing to claim a violation of U.S. Constitution amendment IV in regard to the search of their former residence. State versus Hodge and Carpenter, 225 Nebraska 94, 402 National Western [Reporter]2d 867 (1987).


Seizure of property which is in plain sight in vehicle's completely open trunk while driving on a public thoroughfare is lawful under the plain view doctrine provided there is probable cause to associate the property which is in plain view with criminal activity. State versus Holman, 221 Nebraska 730, 380 National Western [Reporter]2d 304 (1986).


The protections of sections 5 and 7 of this article intertwine when films are the "things" seized. State versus Skolnik, 218 Nebraska 667, 358 National Western [Reporter]2d 497 (1984).


An investigatory stop and search is not constitutionally permissible where the officer has no reasonable suspicion a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. State versus Colgrove, 198 Nebraska 319, 253 National Western [Reporter]2d 20 (1977).


Sections 29-3301 to 29-3307 do not violate privilege against self-incrimination, are constitutional, and apply to physical evidence, not to oral communications or testimony. State versus Swayze, 197 Nebraska 149, 247 National Western [Reporter]2d 440 (1976).


In a "stop and frisk" situation, if after a patdown, officers had nothing more than a suspicion that vehicle contained controlled substances they did not have probable cause to arrest occupants or search vehicle. State versus Aden, 196 Nebraska 149, 241 National Western [Reporter]2d 669 (1976).


Statements and admissions by a defendant in proceedings under sexual psychopath law were not obtained in violation of this section. State versus Madary, 178 Nebraska 383, 133 National Western [Reporter]2d 583 (1965).


Statute requiring a warehouseman to furnish tax assessor a list of property stored in warehouse was not violative of this section. United States Cold Storage Corp. versus Stolinski, 168 Nebraska 513, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 408 (1959).


Filiation proceedings are essentially civil in character. In reference Application of Rozgall, 147 Nebraska 260, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1946).


A citizen has the right to keep existence of his private papers and effects secret from the world unless required by due process of law to make disclosure. Clarke versus Nebraska National Bank, 49 Nebraska 800, 69 National Western [Reporter] 104 (1896).


Under section 84-106, a deputized railroad security officer is constrained by the Fourth Amendment like any sheriff or police officer. State versus Claus, 8 Nebraska Appelate 430, 594 National Western [Reporter]2d 685 (1999).


Where a police officer had indicated, prior to searching the defendant's person, that he was looking for drugs and weapons, a reasonable person would have believed that consenting to the officer's request to search the vehicle would include the officer's examination of the contents of unlocked closed containers within the vehicle, and thus the defendant's authorization of the officer's search extended to the safety glasses bag lying in plain view on the front seat, in which bag the officer discovered marijuana and methamphetamine. State versus Claus, 8 Nebraska Appelate 430, 594 National Western [Reporter]2d 685 (1999).


Whether one who consents later objects to an ongoing search is a significant inquiry determining whether there is a limitation placed on the scope of the consent that has been granted. State versus Claus, 8 Nebraska Appelate 430, 594 National Western [Reporter]2d 685 (1999).


This provision does not foreclose an officer from making observations that lead to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity during a caretaking encounter. State versus Smith, 4 Nebraska Appelate 219, 540 National Western [Reporter]2d 375 (1995).


1-8. Habeas corpus.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 8 (1875);
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 30CA, Section 1.

1-9. Bail; fines; imprisonment; cruel and unusual punishment.

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for treason, sexual offenses involving penetration by force or against the will of the victim, and murder, where the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 9 (1875);
Amended 1978, Laws 1978, Legislative Bill 553, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Bail

Pursuant to this provision, not all offenses are bailable offenses. State versus Boppre, 234 Nebraska 922, 453 National Western [Reporter]2d 406 (1990).


Denial of bail on murder charge where proof is evident or presumption great is no basis for claim guilty plea involuntary. State versus Hamilton, 187 Nebraska 359, 190 National Western [Reporter]2d 862 (1971).


One charged with first degree murder has no absolute right to bail. State versus Pilgrim, 182 Nebraska 594, 156 National Western [Reporter]2d 171 (1968).


Throughout state history bail has been provided for and favored. State versus Seaton, 170 Nebraska 687, 103 National Western [Reporter]2d 833 (1960).


A fugitive from justice who is in custody by virtue of a rendition warrant issued by the Governor in an extradition proceeding is not entitled to bail pending appeal. In reference Application of Campbell, 147 Nebraska 382, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 698 (1946).


That all persons shall be "bailable by sufficient sureties" is a rule which should apply to one arrested in a "children born out of wedlock" proceeding, as well as to one charged with a felony or misdemeanor. State versus Noxon, 96 Nebraska 843, 148 National Western [Reporter] 903 (1914).


The use of term "bail" without limitation or qualification would seem to imply a bail as understood at common law before adoption of Constitution, and the court may admit to bail after sentence and pending appeal. Ford versus State, 42 Nebraska 418, 60 National Western [Reporter] 960 (1894).


2. Excessive bail

The issue of excessiveness of pretrial bail is not reviewable after a conviction and sentence. State versus Harig, 192 Nebraska 49, 218 National Western [Reporter]2d 884 (1974).


Habitual criminal statute does not contravene provision prohibiting excessive bail. Davis versus O'Grady, 137 Nebraska 708, 291 National Western [Reporter] 82 (1940).


Excessive bail is not whether the amount of bail required is high but rather is the bail demanded per se unreasonable and disproportionate to crime charged in indictment. In reference Scott, 38 Nebraska 502, 56 National Western [Reporter] 1009 (1893).


Denying bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses violates the "excessive bail" clause of the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment. Hunt versus Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Circuit 1981).


3. Fines and punishment

Section 29-2203 does not violate either the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution. State versus Ryan, 233 Nebraska 74, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 610 (1989).


The death penalty may deter offenders, is not invariably disproportionate to the severity of the crime of murder, and is not per se cruel and unusual punishment. State versus Simants, 197 Nebraska 549, 250 National Western [Reporter]2d 881 (1977); State versus Rust, 197 Nebraska 528, 250 National Western [Reporter]2d 867 (1977); State versus Stewart, 197 Nebraska 497, 250 National Western [Reporter]2d 849 (1977).


Statute providing six months jail sentence plus two-year revocation of motor vehicle operator's license did not violate this section. State versus Tucker, 183 Nebraska 577, 162 National Western [Reporter]2d 774 (1968).


Provision for sterilization of feeble-minded persons as prerequisite to parole or release from state institution is not "cruel and unusual punishment" and is not repugnant to this section of the Constitution. In reference Clayton, 120 Nebraska 680, 234 National Western [Reporter] 630 (1931).


Sentence under statute providing for "bread and water" diet for prisoner is not repugnant to this section. State ex rel. Carson versus Smith, 114 Nebraska 661, 209 National Western [Reporter] 330 (1926); State ex rel. Nelson versus Smith, 114 Nebraska 653, 209 National Western [Reporter] 328 (1926).


The return of the property or of the value thereof in embezzlement or larceny cases, in addition to the penal sentence, should not be considered as any part of the punishment as excessive or unusual. Everson versus State, 66 Nebraska 154, 92 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1902).


4. Miscellaneous

This constitutional provision does not abridge the Legislature's power to select such punishment as it deems most effective in the suppression of crime, provided the punishment is not grossly disproportionate to the crime. State versus Ruzicka, 218 Nebraska 594, 357 National Western [Reporter]2d 457 (1984).


A constitutional amendment adding first degree sexual assault to offenses for which bail may be denied is constitutional and is not violative of the fourteenth Amendment due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. Parker versus Roth, 202 Nebraska 850, 278 National Western [Reporter]2d 106 (1979).


A sentence under a law not yet operative is null and void. State ex rel. Whitacre versus Smith, 114 Nebraska 659, 209 National Western [Reporter] 332 (1926).


1-10. Presentment or indictment by grand jury; information.

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, in case of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army and navy, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; Provided, That the Legislature may by law provide for holding persons to answer for criminal offenses on information of a public prosecutor; and may by law, abolish, limit, change, amend, or otherwise regulate the grand jury system.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 10 (1875).

Annotations

1. Not violation of section

Legislative act providing for filiation proceedings is not violative of this section. In reference Application of Rozgall, 147 Nebraska 260, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1946).


Trial under information by county attorney does not deprive of due process and is in accord with this section. Bolln versus State, 51 Nebraska 581, 71 National Western [Reporter] 444 (1897).


2. Miscellaneous

Prosecutions for misdemeanors are exempt from requirement of being brought only on indictment or information. Otte versus State, 172 Nebraska 110, 108 National Western [Reporter]2d 737 (1961).


Permitting prosecutions for felony by information does not conflict with Fourteenth Amendment to Constitution of the United States. Jackson versus Olson, 146 Nebraska 885, 22 National Western [Reporter]2d 124 (1946).


Legislature may provide for prosecution on information instead of indictment. Duggan versus Olson, 146 Nebraska 248, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 353 (1945).


Where information charging grand larceny was signed by acting county attorney and not county attorney, the error, unless objected to before a plea to the merits, is waived. State ex rel. Gossett versus O'Grady, 137 Nebraska 824, 291 National Western [Reporter] 497 (1940).


Assistant attorney general is not authorized to make and sign an information in his own name, and one so signed is a nullity. Lower versus State, 106 Nebraska 666, 184 National Western [Reporter] 174 (1921).


Legislature is not limited to exclusive choice between indictment or information as form of prosecution but may provide for both. Dinsmore versus State, 61 Nebraska 418, 85 National Western [Reporter] 445 (1901).


The proceeding by quo warranto is a civil remedy; it is the means employed by the state to cancel and recall a privilege which the corporation proceeded against has abused. State versus Standard Oil Company, 61 Nebraska 28, 84 National Western [Reporter] 413 (1900).


The filing of information by county attorney is the commencement of the criminal prosecution; filing of complaint before magistrate, in felony or other case which he has no jurisdiction to try, does not arrest running of statute of limitations and is not the beginning of the prosecution by the state. State versus Robertson, 55 Nebraska 41, 75 National Western [Reporter] 37 (1898).


Person appointed by court to act in county attorney's absence is authorized to sign information. Korth versus State, 46 Nebraska 631, 65 National Western [Reporter] 792 (1896).


1-11. Rights of Accused.

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of accusation, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 11 (1875).

Annotations

1. Nature and cause of accusation

Defendant's right to demand the nature and cause of accusation does not require State to specify upon which aggravating circumstances of section 29-2523(1) the State intends to rely. State versus Palmer, 224 Nebraska 282, 399 National Western [Reporter]2d 706 (1986).


A finding of guilt of an offense included within the charge of a greater offense does not violate this section. State versus McClarity, 180 Nebraska 246, 142 National Western [Reporter]2d 152 (1966).


It is sufficient if the information states the elements of the crime in the language of the statute. State versus Jarrett, 177 Nebraska 459, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 259 (1964).


Failure to specify section of statute upon which charge in information was based was error without prejudice. State versus Easter, 174 Nebraska 412, 118 National Western [Reporter]2d 515 (1962).


Information attempting to charge disturbing the peace must set out the particular language or conduct on which the offense is predicated. State versus Coomes, 170 Nebraska 298, 102 National Western [Reporter]2d 454 (1960).


An information must inform the accused with such reasonable certainty of the charge against him that he may prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense. May versus State, 153 Nebraska 369, 44 National Western [Reporter]2d 636 (1950).


In prosecution for criminal trespass, complaint must describe locus definitely enough to notify defendant of charge against him. Kissinger versus State, 123 Nebraska 856, 244 National Western [Reporter] 794 (1932).


Embezzlement information must charge particular property with sufficient certainty to apprise defendant of facts relied upon for conviction. Davis versus State, 118 Nebraska 828, 226 National Western [Reporter] 449 (1929).


Amendment of information for larceny of sum of money, during trial, by inserting count for larceny of cream checks, violates constitutional rights of defendant. Stowe versus State, 117 Nebraska 440, 220 National Western [Reporter] 826 (1928).


Law abrogating distinction between principal and accessory does not violate constitutional right to demand nature and cause of accusation. State versus Girt, 115 Nebraska 833, 215 National Western [Reporter] 125 (1927); Scharman versus State, 115 Nebraska 109, 211 National Western [Reporter] 613 (1926).


Information need not negative statutory exceptions. Fitch versus State, 102 Nebraska 361, 167 National Western [Reporter] 417 (1918).


Object of information is to inform accused of precise offense for which he must answer. Moline versus State, 67 Nebraska 164, 93 National Western [Reporter] 228 (1903).


A person may not be informed against for one crime and convicted of another and different one. In reference McVey, 50 Nebraska 481, 70 National Western [Reporter] 51 (1897).


2. Presence of accused

Accused has right to appear and defend in person. State versus Beasley, 183 Nebraska 681, 163 National Western [Reporter]2d 783 (1969).


In trial for manslaughter where trial court orally instructs jury while it is deliberating upon its verdict, in absence of and without notice to defendant or his counsel, such action is violation of constitutional rights of the accused. Strasheim versus State, 138 Nebraska 651, 294 National Western [Reporter] 433 (1940).


Accused cannot as a matter of right insist upon being present at time of filing, arguing or ruling upon motion for new trial. Davis versus State, 51 Nebraska 301, 70 National Western [Reporter] 984 (1897).


Accused cannot as a matter of right insist upon being present at time of interlocutory proceedings prior to the selection of the jury. Miller versus State, 29 Nebraska 437, 45 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1890).


Taking of testimony during voluntary and temporary absence of accused does not contravene Constitution. Hair versus State, 16 Nebraska 601, 21 National Western [Reporter] 464 (1884).


3. Meet witnesses face to face

The analysis of the right to confrontation under this provision is the same as that under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State versus Jacob, 242 Nebraska 176, 494 National Western [Reporter]2d 109 (1993).


Both the federal and the state Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to confront or meet the witnesses against him face to face. Implicit in confrontation is the right to cross-examine all witnesses. A limitation of the right of confrontation can only be necessitated by a showing of a compelling interest and any infringement must be as minimally obtrusive as possible. Record in case did not show a compelling need to protect the child witness from further injury and absent such a showing, the use of closed-circuit television did not withstand constitutional scrutiny. State versus Warford, 223 Nebraska 368, 389 National Western [Reporter]2d 575 (1986).


Question of whether defendant could demand production as witness of inmate in penitentiary raised but not decided. Garcia versus State, 159 Nebraska 571, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (1955).


Death certificate was not admissible to show cause of death. Vanderheiden versus State, 156 Nebraska 735, 57 National Western [Reporter]2d 761 (1953).


Contempt proceedings based on hindrance to due administration of justice did not violate this section. Cornett versus State, 155 Nebraska 766, 53 National Western [Reporter]2d 747 (1952).


Constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face does not apply to contempt proceedings. State ex rel. Wright versus Barlow, 132 Nebraska 166, 271 National Western [Reporter] 282 (1937).


The guaranty of the Constitution of the right to meet the witnesses against him does not apply in disbarment proceedings in which depositions were taken by prosecution, as proceedings are civil, not criminal. State ex rel. Spillman versus Priest, 118 Nebraska 47, 223 National Western [Reporter] 635 (1929).


4. Process for witnesses

The accused in a criminal prosecution has a right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; however, a criminal defendant does not possess an absolute constitutional right to demand the personal attendance of a prisoner witness incarcerated outside the county of the venue of trial. As a result, section 25-1233 does not violate the compulsory process clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. State versus Stott, 243 Nebraska 967, 503 National Western [Reporter]2d 822 (1993).


Refusal to order compulsory process for witness whose testimony was immaterial was not prejudicial error. O'Rourke versus State, 166 Nebraska 866, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 820 (1958).


Right to compel attendance of witness includes taking of depositions out of the state. Dolen versus State, 148 Nebraska 317, 27 National Western [Reporter]2d 264 (1947).


Constitution is not contravened by overruling of motion for continuance on ground of absence of material witnesses when it appears that witness was without process of court. Fanton versus State, 50 Nebraska 351, 69 National Western [Reporter] 953 (1897).


The county is not liable for defendant's witness costs, where he is indicted for a felony. Hewerkle versus Gage County, 14 Nebraska 18, 14 National Western [Reporter] 549 (1883).


5. Speedy trial

The constitutional right to a speedy trial is distinct from the provision for a speedy trial prescribed by the Nebraska speedy trial act. State versus Oldfield, 236 Nebraska 433, 461 National Western [Reporter]2d 554 (1990).


The right to a speedy trial applies only to criminal trials and, thus, does not apply to postconviction actions, which are civil in nature. State versus Bostwick, 233 Nebraska 57, 443 National Western [Reporter]2d 885 (1989).


If a trial court relies upon section 29-1207 (4)(f), R.R.S.1943, in excluding a period of delay from the six-month computation, a general finding of "good cause" will not suffice; there must be specific findings as to the good cause. State versus Kinstler, 207 Nebraska 386, 299 National Western [Reporter]2d 182 (1980).


It may be reasonably argued that the exclusionary period set forth in section 29-1207(4), R.R.S.1943, would cover the period from a defendant's commitment as a sexual sociopath to the court's opinion in State versus Shaw, 202 Nebraska 766, 277 National Western [Reporter]2d 106 (1979) or the Legislature's enactment of sections 29-2911 to 29-2921, R.R.S.1943. However, since this defendant was not brought to trial within six months of either date, the issue of when to begin computing the time will not be decided here. State versus Kinstler, 207 Nebraska 386, 299 National Western [Reporter]2d 182 (1980).


Trial within six months of date information filed was "speedy public trial" under this section. State versus Costello, 199 Nebraska 43, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 97 (1977).


In all criminal proceedings, accused is entitled to have a speedy public trial. State versus Bruns, 181 Nebraska 67, 146 National Western [Reporter]2d 786 (1966).


Period of time within which retrial must be had after a mistrial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State versus Fromkin, 174 Nebraska 849, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 25 (1963).


Preliminary proceedings before magistrate in filiation proceedings are in no sense a trial of the merits. In reference Application of Rozgall, 147 Nebraska 260, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1946).


Preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not a criminal prosecution or trial within the meaning of this section. Roberts versus State, 145 Nebraska 658, 17 National Western [Reporter]2d 666 (1945).


The question of whether a defendant has had a speedy trial is to be determined by what is fair and reasonable under all the facts and circumstances in each particular case. Maher versus State, 144 Nebraska 463, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 641 (1944).


Accused must be brought to trial in accordance with Constitution and statutes, or be discharged. Critser versus State, 87 Nebraska 727, 127 National Western [Reporter] 1073 (1910).


The Constitution does not entitle accused to demand to be brought before county judge, as such, and proceed with prosecution. In reference Chenoweth, 56 Nebraska 688, 77 National Western [Reporter] 63 (1898).


6. Impartial jury

This provision provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall have the right to "trial by an impartial jury", and Article 1, section 3, provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty "without due process of law". These provisions are interconnected and require that criminal convictions rest upon a jury determination that a criminal defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime charged. State versus White, 249 Nebraska 381, 543 National Western [Reporter]2d 725 (1996).


If several juries are picked at one time from a single jury panel for a series of trials, examination must be allowed if requested for good reason in subsequent trials in the series to determine if any jurors should be excused for cause. State versus Myers, 190 Nebraska 466, 209 National Western [Reporter]2d 345 (1973).


Right to trial by jury may be waived by defendant in criminal case. State versus Carpenter, 181 Nebraska 639, 150 National Western [Reporter]2d 129 (1967).


Right to trial by an impartial jury was not violated by bet of juror on result of verdict. Fugate versus State, 169 Nebraska 420, 99 National Western [Reporter]2d 868 (1959).


To safeguard right of fair and impartial trial, Legislature has provided for peremptory challenges and challenges for cause of jurors. Oden versus State, 166 Nebraska 729, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 356 (1958).


Denial of challenge of jury did not violate this section. Bell versus State, 159 Nebraska 474, 67 National Western [Reporter]2d 762 (1954).


Determination of sentence to be imposed by court instead of jury does not violate this section. Poppe versus State, 155 Nebraska 527, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1952).


Disqualification of a juror to serve upon account of having sat as a juror in another trial of an offense arising out of the same incident may be waived. Bufford versus State, 148 Nebraska 38, 26 National Western [Reporter]2d 383 (1947).


Gambling places, being nuisances, may be enjoined in equity, without violating constitutional right of person accused of crime to a jury trial. State ex rel. Hunter versus The Araho, 137 Nebraska 389, 289 National Western [Reporter] 545 (1940).


Legislature may provide for trial of petty offenses without jury, where such offenses were not recognized as crimes when Constitution adopted. State versus Hauser, 137 Nebraska 138, 288 National Western [Reporter] 518 (1939).


Accused was guaranteed a fair trial by an impartial jury, and whether such a jury was obtainable in the jurisdiction must first be decided by the trial court. Kirchman versus State, 122 Nebraska 30, 239 National Western [Reporter] 207 (1931).


After a juror has denied on his voir dire that he has said he believed respondent to be guilty, it may be shown by other witnesses that the juror had made such statement. Trobough versus State, 119 Nebraska 128, 227 National Western [Reporter] 443 (1929).


It is not a violation of constitutional rights to try defendant for misdemeanor before jury of eleven, with his consent. Miller versus State, 116 Nebraska 702, 218 National Western [Reporter] 743 (1928).


When, on the trial of a criminal case, a motion to quash the venire because of alleged disqualifications of its several members is made by defendant and overruled by the court, error cannot be predicated on the ruling in the absence of a voir dire examination showing that the jurors against whom the motion was directed were challenged for cause, and that defendant exercised the peremptory challenges allowed under the statute. Kaufmann versus State, 112 Nebraska 718, 200 National Western [Reporter] 998 (1924).


Defendant waived right to object to disqualification of juror, who was not a resident of the county where offense was committed, by failing to interrogate him as to residence. Marino versus State, 111 Nebraska 623, 197 National Western [Reporter] 396 (1924); Seaton versus State, 109 Nebraska 828, 192 National Western [Reporter] 501 (1923).


Where two or more persons are jointly indicted or informed against for the commission of a single offense and sever in their trials, jurors who sat in trial of one are thereby disqualified to sit in trial of another. Seaton versus State, 106 Nebraska 833, 184 National Western [Reporter] 890 (1921).


Fact that juror has opinion which requires evidence to remove will not disqualify him if he can put aside opinion, and is otherwise qualified in accordance with statute. Whitcomb versus State, 102 Nebraska 236, 166 National Western [Reporter] 553 (1918); Lucas versus State, 75 Nebraska 11, 105 National Western [Reporter] 976 (1905).


7. County where offense committed

This provision grants to a criminal defendant the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, but does not grant a defendant a constitutional right to be tried in a particular county. State versus Vejvoda, 231 Nebraska 668, 438 National Western [Reporter]2d 461 (1989).


Courts of county where offense is committed have jurisdiction to try accused for crime. State versus Furstenau, 167 Nebraska 439, 93 National Western [Reporter]2d 384 (1958).


Defendant has right to be tried in county where the alleged offense was committed. Gates versus State, 160 Nebraska 722, 71 National Western [Reporter]2d 460 (1955).


Where a person in one county procures the commission of a crime in another through the agency of an innocent person, he is subject to prosecution in the county where the acts were done by the agent. Robeen versus State, 144 Nebraska 910, 15 National Western [Reporter]2d 69 (1944).


The constitutional right to a trial before a jury of the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed is a mere personal privilege of the accused which he may waive. Marino versus State, 111 Nebraska 623, 197 National Western [Reporter] 396 (1924); Kennison versus State, 83 Nebraska 391, 119 National Western [Reporter] 768 (1909).


The right to a trial, anywhere or under any conditions, may be waived and in practice is waived when the accused makes a judicial confession of his guilt. The right to jury from the vicinage may be waived by judicial finding of guilt. McCarty versus Hopkins, 61 Nebraska 550, 85 National Western [Reporter] 540 (1901).


The offense of larceny is committed in every county into which stolen goods are carried, and prosecution may be in any such county. Hurlburt versus State, 52 Nebraska 428, 72 National Western [Reporter] 471 (1897).


The constitutional right to a trial before a jury of the county or district where the crime is alleged to have been committed is a mere personal privilege of the accused, and not conferred upon him from any consideration of public policy; that privilege may be waived by accused. State ex rel. Scott versus Crinklaw, 40 Nebraska 759, 59 National Western [Reporter] 370 (1894).


County where crime committed means precise portion of territory or division of state over which court may exercise power in criminal matters, and limited to that from which a jury for the particular term may legally be drawn. Olive versus State, 11 Nebraska 1, 7 National Western [Reporter] 444 (1881).


8. Testimony at former trial

Evidence of a witness at former trial may be read at later trial, where witness cannot be found after diligent search. Davis versus State, 171 Nebraska 333, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 490 (1960).


Testimony of a witness under oath face to face with defendant at preliminary hearing, with opportunity for cross-examination, is admissible upon subsequent trial for same offense where attendance of the witness cannot be had. Jackson versus State, 133 Nebraska 786, 277 National Western [Reporter] 92 (1938).


Testimony at former trial is admissible where witness was cross-examined in open court, if attendance at second trial cannot be procured. Koenigstein versus State, 103 Nebraska 580, 173 National Western [Reporter] 603 (1919).


Where a deceased witness testified upon a former trial of the same party for the same offense, being brought "face to face" with the accused and cross-examined by him, it is competent upon a subsequent trial to prove the testimony of such deceased witness and such proof does not violate this section of Constitution. Hair versus State, 16 Nebraska 601, 21 National Western [Reporter] 464 (1884).


9. Representation by counsel

A criminal defendant who proceeds pro se is held to the same trial standard as if he or she were represented by counsel. State versus Shepard, 239 Nebraska 639, 477 National Western [Reporter]2d 567 (1991).


An accused is entitled to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings against him, including sentencing. State versus Ryan, 233 Nebraska 74, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 610 (1989).


Neither the U.S. nor Nebraska Constitution requires that two attorneys be appointed to represent a criminal defendant in a capital case. State versus Ryan, 233 Nebraska 74, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 610 (1989).


The exercise of sixth amendment rights to counsel is subject to the necessities of judicial discretion. State versus Ryan, 233 Nebraska 74, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 610 (1989).


Under both the state and federal Constitutions, a defendant in a criminal trial has a right to represent himself and proceed without counsel if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. State versus Kirby, 198 Nebraska 646, 254 National Western [Reporter]2d 424 (1977).


The right to counsel does not apply as a matter of absolute right to a lineup or showup by the police previous to the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. State versus Sanchell, 191 Nebraska 505, 216 National Western [Reporter]2d 504 (1974).


There is no requirement that counsel be furnished accused prior to preliminary hearing. State versus O'Kelly, 175 Nebraska 798, 124 National Western [Reporter]2d 211 (1963).


Accused has right to counsel and opportunity to make due preparation for trial. Stagemeyer versus State, 133 Nebraska 9, 273 National Western [Reporter] 824 (1937).


10. Miscellaneous

A defendant may waive his or her rights under this provision through his or her knowing and voluntary absence at trial. State versus Zlomke, 268 Nebraska 891, 689 National Western [Reporter]2d 181 (2004).


In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and this provision of the Nebraska Constitution, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State versus Buckman, 259 Nebraska 924, 613 National Western [Reporter]2d 463 (2000).


In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice should not be presumed for derogatory comments made during final arguments. In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice should not be presumed when a tactical decision has been made to concede the elements of a lesser-included offense to avoid a conviction for a greater offense. State versus Hunt, 254 Nebraska 865, 580 National Western [Reporter]2d 110 (1998).


To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State versus Boppre, 252 Nebraska 935, 567 National Western [Reporter]2d 149 (1997).


Notwithstanding constitutional mandates regarding a jury trial, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for petty offenses carrying a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 6 months or less. State versus Kennedy, 224 Nebraska 164, 396 National Western [Reporter]2d 722 (1986).


The failure of the accused to object to the setting of a trial date more than six months after charges were filed did not constitute a waiver of his rights under this section. State versus Kinstler, 207 Nebraska 386, 299 National Western [Reporter]2d 182 (1980).


Jury sentencing is not required in a capital case. Nebraska's procedure of having a three-judge panel impose sentence meets the requirements of this section and of the U.S. Constitution. State versus Anderson and Hochstein, 207 Nebraska 51, 296 National Western [Reporter]2d 440 (1980).


Venue may be proven like any fact, by testimony or by conclusion reached as the only logical inference under the facts. State versus Liberator, 197 Nebraska 857, 251 National Western [Reporter]2d 709 (1977).


Permitting amendment as to date of prior felony alleged in information in habitual criminal charge was not error. State versus Harig, 192 Nebraska 49, 218 National Western [Reporter]2d 884 (1974).


Hearsay testimony of prosecution witness violated this section. State versus Davis, 185 Nebraska 433, 176 National Western [Reporter]2d 657 (1970).


Section of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act sustained as constitutional. State ex rel. Brito versus Warrick, 176 Nebraska 211, 125 National Western [Reporter]2d 545 (1964).


A preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not a criminal prosecution or trial. Wilson versus Solomon, 172 Nebraska 616, 111 National Western [Reporter]2d 372 (1961).


Rights guaranteed under this section are personal privileges which may be waived. Johnson versus State, 169 Nebraska 783, 100 National Western [Reporter]2d 844 (1960); Hawk versus State, 151 Nebraska 717, 39 National Western [Reporter]2d 561 (1949).


A proceeding for contempt is not a criminal prosecution. State ex rel. Beck versus Lush, 168 Nebraska 367, 95 National Western [Reporter]2d 695 (1959).


Preliminary hearing is not a criminal prosecution or trial. Lingo versus Hann, 161 Nebraska 67, 71 National Western [Reporter]2d 716 (1955).


Rights guaranteed by this section are personal privileges and may be waived by a judicial confession of guilt. Kissinger versus State, 147 Nebraska 983, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 829 (1947).


A person charged with a crime waives constitutional rights by judicial confession of guilt. In reference Application of Tail, Tail versus Olson, 145 Nebraska 268, 16 National Western [Reporter]2d 161 (1944); In reference Application of Carper, Tesar versus Bowley, 144 Nebraska 623, 14 National Western [Reporter]2d 225 (1944).


Habitual criminal law, defining habitual criminal and providing punishment therefor, is not violative of this section. Rains versus State, 142 Nebraska 284, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 887 (1942).


Rights may be waived by a judicial confession of guilt. Davis versus O'Grady, 137 Nebraska 708, 291 National Western [Reporter] 82 (1940); Alexander versus O'Grady, 137 Nebraska 645, 290 National Western [Reporter] 718 (1940).


Constitutionality of statute forbidding picketing cannot be determined where information on which defendant was convicted was insufficient to charge offense. Dutiel versus State, 135 Nebraska 811, 284 National Western [Reporter] 321 (1939).


Refusal to allow accused to cross-examine state's witness for bias and prejudice violated this section. Flannigan versus State, 124 Nebraska 748, 248 National Western [Reporter] 92 (1933).


Separate causes consolidated and tried simultaneously on stipulation, does not violate this section. Luke versus State, 123 Nebraska 101, 242 National Western [Reporter] 265 (1932).


Magistrates and police courts are vested with jurisdiction to try without jury all violations of liquor act and of all of such ordinances wherein the penalty does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for a period of three months. State versus Kacin, 123 Nebraska 64, 241 National Western [Reporter] 785 (1932).


Statute prohibiting granting of new trial if Supreme Court considers no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, does not justify court in denying new trial where accused's right to fair trial was violated. Scott versus State, 121 Nebraska 232, 236 National Western [Reporter] 608 (1931).


The showing of prior convictions for violating liquor laws, by cross-examining defendant and wife, in prosecution for larceny is a violation of this section. Kleinschmidt versus State, 116 Nebraska 577, 218 National Western [Reporter] 384 (1928).


The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Coxbill versus State, 115 Nebraska 634, 214 National Western [Reporter] 256 (1927).


Order of court excluding spectators from courtroom is a violation of this section. Rhoades versus State, 102 Nebraska 750, 169 National Western [Reporter] 433 (1918).


No instruction should be given the jury which would impose upon defendant a burden to which he was not legally subject, and the effect of which would be to prevent him from having a fair and impartial trial under the law of the land. Kennison versus State, 80 Nebraska 688, 115 National Western [Reporter] 289 (1908).


Accused cannot waive jury in felony case and sentence is void in trial by court alone. Michaelson versus Beemer, 72 Nebraska 761, 101 National Western [Reporter] 1007 (1904).


The proceeding by quo warranto is a civil remedy; it is the means employed by the state to cancel and recall a privilege which the corporation proceeded against has abused. State versus Standard Oil Company, 61 Nebraska 28, 84 National Western [Reporter] 413 (1900).


In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and this provision, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State versus Cardona, 10 Nebraska Appelate 815, 639 National Western [Reporter]2d 653 (2002).


1-12. Evidence against self; double jeopardy.

No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to give evidence against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 12 (1875).

Annotations

1. Giving evidence against self

Defendant's statement to television representative was not the type of official questioning to which this section applies. State versus Phelps, 241 Nebraska 707, 490 National Western [Reporter]2d 676 (1992).


A defendant is not required to make a statement of any kind under his constitutional right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. State versus Houser, 241 Nebraska 525, 490 National Western [Reporter]2d 168 (1992).


A suspect's awareness of all possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived the privilege against self-incrimination. State versus Dixon, 237 Nebraska 630, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1991).


In an opening statement for a jury trial, a prosecutor's comment concerning the necessity of the defendant's testimony or an expression concerning the plausibility or credibility of anticipated testimony from a defendant violates an accused's right to remain silent at trial. State versus Pierce, 231 Nebraska 966, 439 National Western [Reporter]2d 435 (1989).


If the State calls a defendant as a witness at a hearing for revocation of the defendant's probation, the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent is not violated, since a revocation of probation is not a stage of prosecuting a defendant on a criminal charge and because the defendant's admission of a probation violation is not necessarily admission of a crime committed by the defendant. State versus Sites, 231 Nebraska 624, 437 National Western [Reporter]2d 166 (1989).


Probation revocation proceedings are not criminal in nature; the privilege against giving evidence against oneself does not arise. State versus Burow, 223 Nebraska 867, 394 National Western [Reporter]2d 665 (1986).


Trial court's determination that defendant's incriminating statements were made in a non-custodial setting was not clearly wrong; thus, police did not violate defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. State versus Saylor, 223 Nebraska 694, 392 National Western [Reporter]2d 789 (1986).


Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination invoked by wife in a dissolution action in response to questions by husband regarding extramarital relations with another man. Ritchey versus Ritchey, 208 Nebraska 100, 302 National Western [Reporter]2d 372 (1981).


Sections 29-3301 to 29-3307 do not violate privilege against self-incrimination, are constitutional, and apply to physical evidence, not to oral communications or testimony. State versus Swayze, 197 Nebraska 149, 247 National Western [Reporter]2d 440 (1976).


In determining whether the testimony of a witness who had pleaded guilty to a similar charge but had not been sentenced, who invoked the privilege on self-incrimination during the cross-examination may be used against the defendant, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the credibility of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. State versus Bittner, 188 Nebraska 298, 196 National Western [Reporter]2d 186 (1972).


In order to deny a claim to the privilege against self-incrimination by a witness, it must be perfectly clear to the judge from a careful consideration of all of the circumstances in the case that the witness is mistaken and that the answer or answers cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate. State versus Holloway, 187 Nebraska 1, 187 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1971).


Photographs taken of defendant without his permission do not violate this section. State versus Blackwell, 184 Nebraska 121, 165 National Western [Reporter]2d 730 (1969).


Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is restricted to oral testimony, and does not apply to chemical analysis of body fluids. Prucha versus Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Nebraska 415, 110 National Western [Reporter]2d 75 (1961).


This section does not apply to one charged with contempt of court and one so charged may be required to testify the same as any other competent witness. State ex rel. Wright versus Barlow, 132 Nebraska 166, 271 National Western [Reporter] 282 (1937).


Physician's testimony as to sanity of accused, based on examination without court order or attorney's consent, but without objection at time, is not compelling him to give evidence against self. Wehenkel versus State, 116 Nebraska 493, 218 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1928).


Requiring defendant to answer questions on cross-examination as to previous convictions for misdemeanor violates the provisions of this section. Coxbill versus State, 115 Nebraska 634, 214 National Western [Reporter] 256 (1927).


2. Jeopardy

The concept of double jeopardy applies only in successive prosecution cases and does not apply to a single trial where the defendant has been put in jeopardy only once. State versus Furrey, 270 Nebraska 965, 708 National Western [Reporter]2d 654 (2006).


Whether an amended complaint or information constitutes a continuation of a single trial depends on the nature of the amendment. State versus Furrey, 270 Nebraska 965, 708 National Western [Reporter]2d 654 (2006).


An administrative disciplinary proceeding in which a prisoner loses good time does not place him in jeopardy. A conviction and sentence in a criminal prosecution following an administrative disciplinary proceeding do not constitute double jeopardy. State versus Lynch, 248 Nebraska 234, 533 National Western [Reporter]2d 905 (1995).


Second trial after appellate reversal because of procedural error does not place a defendant in double jeopardy where there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to submit case to jury and to convict defendant. State versus Palmer, 224 Nebraska 282, 399 National Western [Reporter]2d 706 (1986).


Prosecution for traffic infraction held to be a criminal offense within the meaning of double jeopardy herein. State versus Knoles, 199 Nebraska 211, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 873 (1977).


This Article does not preclude successive prosecutions by federal and Nebraska governments. State versus Pope, 190 Nebraska 689, 211 National Western [Reporter]2d 923 (1973).


Successive prosecutions by federal and state governments in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over substantially the same offense are not prohibited by this section. State versus Pope, 186 Nebraska 489, 184 National Western [Reporter]2d 395 (1971).


The conviction of a defendant for intoxication does not bar a subsequent prosecution for offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State versus Eckert, 186 Nebraska 134, 181 National Western [Reporter]2d 264 (1970).


Order of trial court to set aside verdict and order a new trial did not contravene double jeopardy provision of Constitution. State versus Houp, 182 Nebraska 298, 154 National Western [Reporter]2d 465 (1967).


Sexual psychopath law did not place accused who had been previously convicted of sexual offense in double jeopardy. State versus Madary, 178 Nebraska 383, 133 National Western [Reporter]2d 583 (1965).


A proceeding for contempt is not a criminal case. State ex rel. Beck versus Lush, 168 Nebraska 367, 95 National Western [Reporter]2d 695 (1959).


Determination of sentence to be imposed by court instead of jury does not violate this section. Poppe versus State, 155 Nebraska 527, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1952).


Where two persons were killed in automobile collision, acquittal on charge of manslaughter for killing one did not bar prosecution for killing of the other. Jeppesen versus State, 154 Nebraska 765, 49 National Western [Reporter]2d 611 (1951).


Where a jury in a criminal case disagrees and is properly discharged, a second trial upon original charge, even though one or more degrees of the offense have been withdrawn, does not violate this section. State versus Hutter, 145 Nebraska 798, 18 National Western [Reporter]2d 203 (1945).


Habitual criminal statute does not contravene this section. Davis versus O'Grady, 137 Nebraska 708, 291 National Western [Reporter] 82 (1940).


Discharge of jury and retrial of defendant does not violate constitutional guaranty under this section. Shaffer versus State, 123 Nebraska 121, 242 National Western [Reporter] 364 (1932).


Court, after sentence for less than minimum term prescribed by statute had been served, was without power to vacate it and impose greater penalty. Hickman versus Fenton, 120 Nebraska 66, 231 National Western [Reporter] 510 (1930).


Where offense charged in information upon which defendant was previously tried and acquitted was inclusive of the offense for which she is being held for trial, jeopardy attached by virtue of the former trial, and habeas corpus will lie. In reference Resler, 115 Nebraska 335, 212 National Western [Reporter] 765 (1927).


Where jury is discharged after deliberating so long that there is no probability of agreeing and the accused held to a further trial, it is without any infringement of this section. Sutter versus State, 105 Nebraska 144, 179 National Western [Reporter] 414 (1920).


If during a trial of a misdemeanor before a magistrate, it appears that defendant should be put upon his trial for a felony and the magistrate orders a new complaint to be filed and proceeds to sit as examining magistrate, finds probable cause and binds accused over to district court to answer to the felony, this is not violation of this section. Larson versus State, 93 Nebraska 242, 140 National Western [Reporter] 176 (1913).


Where one accused of a felony is put upon trial under an information defective upon its face, and after trial begun, information is amended and the trial proceeded with, there being no change in the offense charged, the accused is not thereby placed in jeopardy a second time. McKay versus State, 91 Nebraska 281, 135 National Western [Reporter] 1024 (1912).


If complaint does not contain necessary averments to constitute criminal charge, there is no former jeopardy. Roberts versus State, 82 Nebraska 651, 118 National Western [Reporter] 574 (1908).


Where the same facts constitute two or more offenses, wherein the lesser offense is not necessarily involved in the greater, and when the facts necessary to convict on a second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first, then the first prosecution will not be a bar to the second, although the offenses were both committed at the same time and by the same act. Warren versus State, 79 Nebraska 526, 113 National Western [Reporter] 143 (1907).


Judgment of court having no jurisdiction over subject matter is void and does not constitute a bar to further proceedings on same charge. Peterson versus State, 79 Nebraska 132, 112 National Western [Reporter] 306 (1907).


To constitute former jeopardy it must appear that party was put upon trial before court having jurisdiction, upon indictment or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain conviction and that the jury was impaneled and sworn, and thus charged with his deliverance. Steinkuhler versus State, 77 Nebraska 331, 109 National Western [Reporter] 395 (1906).


Confinement of accused under void or erroneous sentence is not a bar to rendition of legal sentence under verdict. McCormick versus State, 71 Nebraska 505, 99 National Western [Reporter] 237 (1904).


Statute directing the assessment of a fine in double the amount embezzled, in addition to the imprisonment imposed in case of conviction is not open to objection that it inflicts a double penalty. Everson versus State, 66 Nebraska 154, 92 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1902).


The proceeding by quo warranto is a civil remedy; it is the means employed by the state to cancel and recall a privilege which the corporation proceeded against has abused. State versus Standard Oil Company, 61 Nebraska 28, 84 National Western [Reporter] 413 (1900).


By appealing, accused thereby waives right to object to further prosecution on reversal, on ground that he has been once put in jeopardy. McGinn versus State, 46 Nebraska 427, 65 National Western [Reporter] 46 (1895).


The constitutional provision against placing accused twice in jeopardy does not apply to mere civil actions for recovery of penalties. Mitchell versus State, 12 Nebraska 538, 11 National Western [Reporter] 848 (1882).


1-13. Justice administered without delay; Legislature; authorization to enforce mediation and arbitration.

All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him or her in his or her lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law and justice administered without denial or delay, except that the Legislature may provide for the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration agreements, and other forms of dispute resolution which are entered into voluntarily and which are not revocable other than upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 13 (1875);
Amended 1996, Laws 1995, Law Report 1CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Not unconstitutional

The court's incorporation by reference of the conditions of confinement set forth in a doctor's report did not deny access to the district court. State versus Hayden, 233 Nebraska 211, 444 National Western [Reporter]2d 317 (1989).


The exclusive remedy provided by the Workers' Compensation Act satisfies the due process requirements of Nebraska Constitution Article 1, section 3, as well as the requirements of this provision, that every person shall have a remedy by due course of law for any injury done to him or her. Abbott versus Gould, Incorporated, 232 Nebraska 907, 443 National Western [Reporter]2d 591 (1989).


Statute allowing drainage district two years from ascertainment of compensation by appraisers, within which to enter upon and appropriate the land, does not violate this section. Drainage District Number 1 of Pawnee County versus Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 96 Nebraska 1, 146 National Western [Reporter] 1055 (1914).


Ruling of district court refusing to allow plaintiff in divorce to proceed with trial without first complying with order for payment of temporary alimony does not contravene Constitution. Reed versus Reed, 70 Nebraska 779, 98 National Western [Reporter] 73 (1904).


Drainage proceedings do not contravene Constitution, because party aggrieved has right of appeal to courts. Dodge County versus Acom, 61 Nebraska 376, 85 National Western [Reporter] 292 (1901).


2. Unconstitutional

Section 25-2602 violates this article to the extent that it provides for arbitration of future disputes. State versus Nebraska Association of Pub. Employees, 239 Nebraska 653, 477 National Western [Reporter]2d 577 (1991).


Existence of an emergency does not impair or destroy constitutional limitations, and the mortgage moratorium act is unconstitutional as it contravenes the spirit and terms of this section. First Trust Company of Lincoln versus Smith, 134 Nebraska 84, 277 National Western [Reporter] 762 (1938); Strehlow versus Krings, 134 Nebraska 82, 277 National Western [Reporter] 784 (1938).


Nonsuiting of plaintiff at close of opening statements to jury violates this section. Temple versus Cotton Transfer Company, 126 Nebraska 287, 253 National Western [Reporter] 349 (1934).


Order of district court in divorce suit, striking out answer of defendant as to dissolution of marriage, and refusing to allow him to defend, except as to the amount of alimony, on account of his failure to comply with order for the payment of temporary alimony, violates the Constitution. McNamara versus McNamara, 86 Nebraska 631, 126 National Western [Reporter] 94 (1910).


County judge cannot require party to pay fees or costs in advance as condition to "performing those services which would be necessary to enable the defendant to press his defense." Douglas County versus Vinsonhaler, 82 Nebraska 810, 118 National Western [Reporter] 1058 (1908).


Dismissal of action by district judge without determination of merits because of fraud or imposition on the court by one of the parties is denial of constitutional rights. Fitch versus Martin, 80 Nebraska 60, 113 National Western [Reporter] 796 (1907).


Statute providing for impaneling of juries which is so incomplete as to render it incapable of accomplishing its purpose, contravenes Constitution and is void. State ex rel. Mickey versus Reneau, 75 Nebraska 1, 106 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1905).


Stipulation in insurance contract which provides that no suit shall be maintained but that all differences shall be adjusted by arbitration is void as contravening this section. Phoenix Ins. Company versus Zlotky, 66 Nebraska 584, 92 National Western [Reporter] 736 (1902); Hartford Fire Ins. Company versus Hon, 66 Nebraska 555, 92 National Western [Reporter] 746 (1902).


3. Miscellaneous

This provision does not create any new rights but is merely a declaration of a general fundamental principle. It is a primary duty of the courts to safeguard this declaration of right and remedy, but where no right or remedy exists under either common law or statute, this constitutional provision creates none. Paulk versus Central Lab. Assocs., 262 Nebraska 838, 636 National Western [Reporter]2d 170 (2001).


This constitutional provision does not provide a remedy for ex parte communications. State versus Lotter, 255 Nebraska 456, 586 National Western [Reporter]2d 591 (1998).


Based on this provision, Nebraska courts have held that predispute arbitration agreements are unenforceable; however, this rule cannot be enforced when it conflicts with the laws of the United States. Dowd versus First Omaha Section Corp., 242 Nebraska 347, 495 National Western [Reporter]2d 36 (1993).


Legislature may direct claimant to comply with the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act prior to exercise of court remedy. Prendergast versus Nelson, 199 Nebraska 97, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 657 (1977).


Pursuant to this section, right of member to sue his union is not dependent upon prior exhaustion of administrative remedies. Poppert versus Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 187 Nebraska 297, 189 National Western [Reporter]2d 469 (1971).


Rule of prior cases, that any change in law exempting charitable hospitals from liability should be made by Legislature, was in violation of this section. Myers versus Drozda, 180 Nebraska 183, 141 National Western [Reporter]2d 852 (1966).


This section does not create any new rights but is merely a declaration of a general fundamental principle. Pullen versus Novak, 169 Nebraska 211, 99 National Western [Reporter]2d 16 (1959).


Right of action against charitable institution was not created. Muller versus Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Nebraska 279, 70 National Western [Reporter]2d 86 (1955).


Right to trial without unreasonable and unnecessary delay is guaranteed. Sullivan versus Storz, 156 Nebraska 177, 55 National Western [Reporter]2d 499 (1952).


Party who invoked special proceeding could not question constitutionality thereof under this section. Lackaff versus Department of Roads & Irrigation, 153 Nebraska 217, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1950).


Remedy is afforded unaffected by subsequent death of wrongdoer. Rehn versus Bingaman, 151 Nebraska 196, 36 National Western [Reporter]2d 856 (1949).


Litigants are entitled to access to the courts when they have probable cause for believing an injury has been done to their lands, goods, person or reputation. Fender versus Waller, 139 Nebraska 612, 298 National Western [Reporter] 349 (1941).


Damages to land caused by seepage from a reservoir is an injury to land as set out in this section. Applegate versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 136 Nebraska 280, 285 National Western [Reporter] 585 (1939).


Guest law does not deprive motorist's guest of protection of constitutional provision but merely changes degree of proof essential to recovery. Clarke versus Weatherly, 131 Nebraska 816, 270 National Western [Reporter] 316 (1936); Rogers versus Brown, 129 Nebraska 9, 260 National Western [Reporter] 794 (1935); Howard versus Gerjevic, 128 Nebraska 795, 260 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1935); Gilbert versus Bryant, 125 Nebraska 731, 251 National Western [Reporter] 823 (1933).


Administrator may bring action for damages after death of intestate for pain and suffering inflicted on deceased, by virtue of self-executing provisions of this section. Wilfong versus Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company, 129 Nebraska 600, 262 National Western [Reporter] 537 (1935).


The writ of error coram nobis provides a corrective judicial process that the Constitution guarantees shall not be denied. Carlsen versus State, 129 Nebraska 84, 261 National Western [Reporter] 339 (1935).


Contract of employment providing for arbitration of disputes does not deprive employee of right to seek redress in courts. Rentscheler versus Missouri P. R. R. Company, 126 Nebraska 493, 253 National Western [Reporter] 694 (1934).


Provisions of this section are self-executing in their nature and mandatory upon all courts of this state. Burnham versus Bennison, 121 Nebraska 291, 236 National Western [Reporter] 745 (1931).


In a tax foreclosure proceeding by a county to recover delinquent taxes on land without making purchaser at a prior administrative sale a party, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale buys subject to the right of one having a valid lien upon the premises to redeem from such sale, and the one claiming a lien cannot be barred without a hearing. Smith versus Potter, 92 Nebraska 39, 137 National Western [Reporter] 854 (1912).


A mortgagor should not be permitted, in person or by his will, to raise a controversy over the mortgaged property which will delay enforcement of the mortgage in the event of default in payment thereof. Shackley versus Homer, 87 Nebraska 146, 127 National Western [Reporter] 145 (1910).


Where a party has, without fault or neglect on his part or his attorneys', failed to obtain a transcript for a review on error in this court, a new trial will be granted, if necessary, to secure him his constitutional right. Zweibel versus Caldwell, 72 Nebraska 47, 99 National Western [Reporter] 843 (1904).


This section guarantees a remedy only for such as result from an invasion or infringement of a legal right, or the failure to discharge a legal duty or obligation, and is not a guarantee of a remedy for every species of injury in respect of such matters. Goddard versus City of Lincoln, 69 Nebraska 594, 96 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1903).


1-14. Treason.

Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against the state, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 14 (1875).

1-15. Penalties; corruption of blood; transporting out of state prohibited.

All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; nor shall any person be transported out of the state for any offense committed within the state.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 15 (1875).

Annotations

Unconstitutionality of tax statute under this section raised but not decided. Creigh versus Larsen, 171 Nebraska 317, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 187 (1960).


Permitting recovery of money paid on void contract was not the imposition of a penalty within the meaning of this section. Arthur versus Trindel, 168 Nebraska 429, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 208 (1959).


Conviction of felony does not deprive party of civil rights, including right to maintain action for damages for personal injury. Bosteder versus Duling, 115 Nebraska 557, 213 National Western [Reporter] 809 (1927).


Sentence to penitentiary does not corrupt the blood nor prevent legal representative of accused, who died pending appeal, from succeeding to property rights of accused. Stanisics versus State, 90 Nebraska 278, 133 National Western [Reporter] 412 (1911).


Penalty imposed by statute is not unconstitutional unless so excessive as to shock sense of mankind. McMahon versus State, 70 Nebraska 722, 97 National Western [Reporter] 1035 (1904).


Enforcement of penalty after proper notice and failure to remove fence or other obstruction from line of newly established highway does not contravene Constitution. Black versus Stein, 23 Nebraska 302, 36 National Western [Reporter] 548 (1888).


1-16. Bill of attainder; retroactive laws; contracts; special privileges.

No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be passed.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 16 (1875).

Annotations

1. Ex post facto law

The ex post facto clause does not prohibit retroactive application for civil disabilities and sanctions; only retroactive criminal punishment for past acts is prohibited. State versus Worm, 268 Nebraska 74, 680 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (2004).


The registration requirement for an offender convicted of an aggravated offense under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act is not a criminal punishment. State versus Worm, 268 Nebraska 74, 680 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (2004).


Statutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage, for they do not attach criminality to any act previously done, and which was innocent when done, nor aggravate any crime already committed, nor provide greater punishment, nor do they alter the degree of proof needed to convict. State versus Palmer, 224 Nebraska 282, 399 National Western [Reporter]2d 706 (1986).


Act reducing penalty for violation of Installment Loan Act did not violate this section. Davis versus General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Nebraska 865, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 907 (1964).


Change in point system law for revocation of license to operate motor vehicle was not ex post facto legislation. Durfee versus Ress, 163 Nebraska 768, 81 National Western [Reporter]2d 148 (1957).


Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to penal or criminal matters, and does not apply to civil penalties imposed for failure to pay taxes. In reference Estate of Rogers, 147 Nebraska 1, 22 National Western [Reporter]2d 297 (1946).


Law making an act criminal which was innocent when done, or making crime greater than when committed, or which alters situation of party to his disadvantage, or inflicts greater punishment than law annexed to crime when committed, is ex post facto and exceeds the power granted Legislature in the Constitution. State versus McCoy, 87 Nebraska 385, 127 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1910); Marion versus State, 20 Nebraska 233, 29 National Western [Reporter] 911 (1886); Marion versus State, 16 Nebraska 349, 20 National Western [Reporter] 289 (1884).


A criminal law is not retroactive in its operation. State versus Hoon, 78 Nebraska 618, 111 National Western [Reporter] 462 (1907).


Law intended to affect transactions which occurred, or rights accrued, before it became operative, and which ascribed to them effects not inherent in their nature, in view of the law enforced at time of occurrence, is retrospective. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus State ex rel. City of Omaha, 47 Nebraska 549, 66 National Western [Reporter] 624 (1896).


2. Obligation of contract

Allowance of credit against malpractice judgment for any nonrefundable benefits claimant receives is not an unconstitutional impairment of contract. Prendergast versus Nelson, 199 Nebraska 97, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 657 (1977).


The Legislature may abrogate a right of action for a tort to happen in the future. State Securities Company versus Norfolk Livestock Sales Company, Incorporated, 187 Nebraska 446, 191 National Western [Reporter]2d 614 (1971).


Retrospective statute distinguishing judgment liens for alimony and child support held to be constitutional. Hidy versus Hidy, 184 Nebraska 527, 169 National Western [Reporter]2d 285 (1969).


Statute creating Nebraska Power Review Board did not violate this section. City of Auburn versus Eastern Nebraska Public Power District, 179 Nebraska 439, 138 National Western [Reporter]2d 629 (1965).


Contract to sell school lands could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. Pfeifer versus Ableidinger, 166 Nebraska 464, 89 National Western [Reporter]2d 568 (1958).


Charter of public corporation does not constitute contract with state. United Community Services versus Omaha National Bank, 162 Nebraska 786, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1956).


Nonsigner provision of Fair Trade Act violated this section. McGraw Electric Company versus Lewis & Smith Drug Company, Incorporated, 159 Nebraska 703, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 608 (1955).


This section is a binding limitation on the exercise of governmental powers, legislative, executive or judicial, which "emergency" may not impair, destroy or modify, and the mortgage moratorium act violates constitutional provision on cessation of emergency for which enacted. First Trust Company of Lincoln versus Smith, 134 Nebraska 84, 277 National Western [Reporter] 762 (1938); Strehlow versus Krings, 134 Nebraska 82, 277 National Western [Reporter] 784 (1938).


Disconnecting of lands from village is not impairment of contract of holder of village bonds. Hustead versus Village of Phillips, 131 Nebraska 303, 267 National Western [Reporter] 919 (1936); Hardin versus Pavlat, 130 Nebraska 829, 266 National Western [Reporter] 637 (1936).


This provision of Constitution does not conflict with Article 12, section 7, of Constitution, providing for double liability of stockholders of state banks. Luikart versus Higgins, 130 Nebraska 395, 264 National Western [Reporter] 903 (1936).


Statute may not operate retrospectively where it would impair obligation of contracts or interfere with vested rights. Travelers Ins. Company versus Ohler, 119 Nebraska 121, 227 National Western [Reporter] 449 (1929).


Generally, the laws in force at the time a contract is entered into form a part of it and enter into its obligation, but the law then in force affording a remedy for a breach of the contract may be modified or changed without impairing the obligation of the contract, provided that an adequate remedy is left. Norris versus Tower, 102 Nebraska 434, 167 National Western [Reporter] 728 (1918).


Contracts between an irrigation company and consumers under the ditch, with reference to annual rates which should be charged for the use of water, were entered into with the law forming a part of the contract and subject to legislative control. McCook Irrigation & Water Power Company versus Burtless, 98 Nebraska 141, 152 National Western [Reporter] 334 (1915).


Curative acts, which attempt to take away property rights already vested, violate the Constitution. Draper versus Clayton, 87 Nebraska 443, 127 National Western [Reporter] 369 (1910); Helming versus Forrester, 87 Nebraska 438, 127 National Western [Reporter] 373 (1910).


Anti-pass laws, prohibiting free transportation by railroads, do not impair contracts. State versus Martyn, 82 Nebraska 225, 117 National Western [Reporter] 719 (1908).


An act which in effect takes away from counties any cause of action which they might have against persons who have been treasurers, for money which they have been allowed by the county board to retain as commissions on money received, impairs contract obligations of county. Kearney County versus Taylor, 54 Nebraska 542, 74 National Western [Reporter] 965 (1898).


Obligation is impaired whenever remedy is taken away or abolished, or legal obligations diminished, suspended or destroyed by abolishing remedy, or when enforcement burdened by new or unreasonable conditions or restrictions. American Bldg. & Loan Association versus Rainbolt, 48 Nebraska 434, 67 National Western [Reporter] 493 (1896).


Lease of public lands providing that lessor shall have right to choose one of the arbitrators for every five years for purpose of valuation, is indispensable contract right and cannot thereafter be changed by subsequent legislation. State ex rel. Brown versus McPeak, 31 Nebraska 139, 47 National Western [Reporter] 691 (1891).


Statute merely changing remedy or mode of enforcing contract is not impairment so as to violate this section. Henry O. Jones versus Elizabeth Davis, 6 Nebraska 33 (1877).


Act requiring holder of over-due county warrant drawing 10 per cent to surrender same to county for bonds drawing 7 per cent is void as impairing contract obligation. Brewer versus Otoe County, 1 Nebraska 373 (1871).


Reorganization of insolvent state bank under Bank Act of 1929 held to impair obligation of contract as to nonconsenting depositor. Hessen Siak Shams versus Nebraska State Bank of Bloomfield, 48 F.2d 894 (D. Nebraska 1931).


3. No irrevocable grant of special privilege

Provisions of Grid System Act constituted a grant of special privileges and an unlawful splitting of a class, and was unconstitutional. Wittler versus Baumgartner, 180 Nebraska 446, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1966).


Installment Sales Act of 1965 did not violate this section. Engelmeyer versus Murphy, 180 Nebraska 295, 142 National Western [Reporter]2d 342 (1966).


Legislative Bill 11 of the 1963 Special Session violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. State Securities Company versus Ley, 177 Nebraska 251, 128 National Western [Reporter]2d 766 (1964).


Legislative act permitting higher rate of interest to be charged by retailers of motor vehicles was a grant of special privilege in violation of this section. Stanton versus Mattson, 175 Nebraska 767, 123 National Western [Reporter]2d 844 (1963).


Constitutionality of Installment Sales Act of 1959 under this section raised, but case decided under another section of the Constitution. Elder versus Doerr, 175 Nebraska 483, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 528 (1963).


Levy of tax for municipal university did not violate special privileges clause. Ratigan versus Davis, 175 Nebraska 416, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 12 (1963).


Imposition of liability for reimbursement on estate of recipient of old age assistance does not violate this section. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board versus Myhre, 149 Nebraska 669, 32 National Western [Reporter]2d 262 (1948).


A private employment agency is not a business in which the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included as a method of regulation. Boomer versus Olsen, 143 Nebraska 579, 10 National Western [Reporter]2d 507 (1943).


Statutes creating housing authorities for slum clearance sustained against claim of violation of this section. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


Statutory provision limiting issuance of motor vehicle dealer's license for sale of new cars to persons enfranchised by the manufacturers is an unlawful restriction on right to follow a lawful pursuit. Nelsen versus Tilley, 137 Nebraska 327, 289 National Western [Reporter] 388 (1939).


The Legislature is not prohibited from dictating how county road funds shall be used or allocated. City of Fremont versus Dodge County, 130 Nebraska 856, 266 National Western [Reporter] 771 (1936).


Provisions of irrigation act providing for granting by irrigation board of priority of right to use of water does not contravene this section of the Constitution. Farmers Canal Company versus Frank, 72 Nebraska 136, 100 National Western [Reporter] 286 (1904).


Municipal grant of franchise for distribution of electric current, if not exclusive, and in the absence of specific limitation or duration, was in perpetuity and conveyed rights of property within the provisions of this section. Old Colony Trust Company versus Omaha, 230 U.S. 100 (1913).


Statute authorizing city to make irrevocable contract with gas and electric company for maximum rates for twenty-year term is not a violation of this section forbidding Legislature to make "any irrevocable grant of special privileges." Nebraska Gas & Electric Company versus City of Stromsburg, 2 F.2d 518 (8th Circuit 1924).


4. Miscellaneous

Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities District versus Merritt Beach Company, 179 Nebraska 783, 140 National Western [Reporter]2d 626 (1966).


1-17. Military subordinate.

The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 17 (1875).

1-18. Soldiers quarters.

No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war except in the manner prescribed by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution art I, Section 18 (1875).

1-19. Right of peaceable assembly and to petition government.

The right of the people peaceably to assemble to consult for the common good, and to petition the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 19 (1875).

Annotations

A political meeting or convention is an assemblage within the meaning of the Constitution that the right of the people to assemble and consult for common good shall never be abridged. With good motives and for justifiable ends the membership of such a body may jointly speak and publish the truth about candidates for office and this right extends to aspirants for judicial and educational offices. State ex rel. Ragan versus Junkin, 85 Nebraska 1, 122 National Western [Reporter] 473 (1909).


The people have the right to petition the Governor on the subject of proposed legislation. Weis versus Ashley, 59 Nebraska 494, 81 National Western [Reporter] 318 (1899).


1-20. Imprisonment for debt prohibited.

No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action on mesne or final process.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 20 (1875);
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 26CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Cases involving fraud

Section 28-611(1), R.R.S.1943, the Nebraska "bad check statute", does not violate this section of the Constitution because section 28-611(1), R.R.S.1943, contains the elements of fraud by its very definition. State versus Kock, 207 Nebraska 731, 300 National Western [Reporter]2d 824 (1981).


Section 69-109, R.S.Supp.,1980, held not to violate this section, since a requirement of fraud has been engrafted onto the statute by judicial interpretation and thereafter statute was reenacted in same form by Legislature, thus supplying the fraud requirement. State versus Hocutt, 207 Nebraska 689, 300 National Western [Reporter]2d 198 (1981).


Statute which permits criminal prosecution without requiring proof of fraud violates this section. State ex rel. Norton versus Janing, 182 Nebraska 539, 156 National Western [Reporter]2d 9 (1968).


2. Debt

Award of alimony, suit money and attorney's fees in divorce action does not create "debt" within meaning of this section. Jensen versus Jensen, 119 Nebraska 469, 229 National Western [Reporter] 770 (1930).


Order to pay temporary alimony is not a mere debt, and imprisonment for contempt in willfully refusing to obey such order does not violate this section. Cain versus Miller, 109 Nebraska 441, 191 National Western [Reporter] 704 (1922).


Fine for violation of liquor laws, one-fourth to be paid to complaining witness, is not a debt. Sothman versus State, 66 Nebraska 302, 92 National Western [Reporter] 303 (1902).


Judgment in "children born out of wedlock" proceeding is not debt. Ex parte Donahoe, 24 Nebraska 66, 38 National Western [Reporter] 28 (1888); Ex parte Cottrell, 13 Nebraska 193, 13 National Western [Reporter] 174 (1882).


3. Miscellaneous

Statute, making issuance of no-fund check a criminal offense, does not violate constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt. White versus State, 135 Nebraska 154, 280 National Western [Reporter] 433 (1938).


Act providing for prosecution and punishment by imprisonment of husband for refusal to pay alimony for support of minor child is not violative of this section. Fussell versus State, 102 Nebraska 117, 166 National Western [Reporter] 197 (1918).


This section has no application to the case of a license tax imposed upon peddlers, if the object is the raising of revenue and its enactment was an exercise of the taxing power and not the police power. Rosenbloom versus State, 64 Nebraska 342, 89 National Western [Reporter] 1053 (1902).


1-21. Private property compensated for.

The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 21 (1875).

Annotations

1. Property, what constitutes

A Nebraska Public Service Commission order which directed incumbent local exchange carriers to comply with an order establishing multidwelling unit regulations and a statewide policy for access to multidwelling units by competitive local exchange carriers did not constitute a taking. In reference Application of Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., 260 Nebraska 780, 619 National Western [Reporter]2d 809 (2000).


Recovery may be had for damages to property occasioned by temporary takings. Whitehead Oil Company versus City of Lincoln, 245 Nebraska 680, 515 National Western [Reporter]2d 401 (1994).


Lawful covenants restricting the use of land and binding upon successors in title constitute an interest in the land and property in the constitutional sense. Horst versus Housing Authority, 184 Nebraska 215, 166 National Western [Reporter]2d 119 (1969).


A tenant for a term of years has a property right in land which is protected by this section. Johnson versus City of Lincoln, 174 Nebraska 837, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 297 (1963).


Unexercised option to purchase real estate need not be compensated for in eminent domain proceedings. Phillips Petroleum Company versus City of Omaha, 171 Nebraska 457, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 727 (1960).


Legislature could not lawfully deprive lessee of school land lease of option to purchase. Pfeifer versus Ableidinger, 166 Nebraska 464, 89 National Western [Reporter]2d 568 (1958).


City is not liable to adjacent property owner for destruction of shade trees in street. Weibel versus City of Beatrice, 163 Nebraska 183, 79 National Western [Reporter]2d 67 (1956).


Claim made and rejected that appropriation of surface and ground waters without compensation violated this section. Dischner versus Loup River P. P. District, 147 Nebraska 949, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 813 (1947).


Property rights of a lessee under school land lease are protected from invasion under the power of eminent domain. State versus Platte Valley P. P. & I. District, 147 Nebraska 289, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 300 (1946).


The right to use water for a beneficial purpose is a property right, subject to the constitutional provisions regulating the taking of private property for public use. Loup River Public Power District versus North Loup River Public Power & Irrigation District, 142 Nebraska 141, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 240 (1942).


Accretions are property within the meaning of this section. Thies versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 137 Nebraska 344, 289 National Western [Reporter] 386 (1939).


Right of irrigation district to appropriate water is property and this right is protected by way of damages when water is diverted. Nine Mile Irrigation District versus State, 118 Nebraska 522, 225 National Western [Reporter] 679 (1929).


Riparian rights under an appropriation of water are property. McCook Irrigation & Water Power Company versus Crews, 70 Nebraska 115, 102 National Western [Reporter] 249 (1905).


A riparian's right to the use of the flow of the stream passing through or by his land is a right inseparably annexed to the soil and such right is entitled to protection as such, the same as private property rights. Crawford Company versus Hathaway, 67 Nebraska 325, 93 National Western [Reporter] 781 (1903).


Mortgagee's interest in property taken for public use is property, and requires notice to mortgagee in eminent domain proceedings. Dodge versus Omaha & S. W. R. R. Company, 20 Nebraska 276, 29 National Western [Reporter] 936 (1886).


2. Public use

Private property may not be taken under the power of eminent domain for a private use. Burger versus City of Beatrice, 181 Nebraska 213, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 784 (1967).


Acquisition of aviation easement was a damage for public use, for which compensation could be recovered. Johnson versus Airport Authority, 173 Nebraska 801, 115 National Western [Reporter]2d 426 (1962).


Where land is taken outside the boundaries of right-of-way condemned, it constitutes a second taking of private property for public use. Armbruster versus Stanton-Pilger Drainage District, 169 Nebraska 594, 100 National Western [Reporter]2d 781 (1960).


Recovery on behalf of city by taxpayer of amount paid on void contract was not a taking of defendant's property for public use without compensation. Arthur versus Trindel, 168 Nebraska 429, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 208 (1959).


Where land is taken outside the boundaries of right-of-way condemned, liability attaches for a second taking of private property for public use. McGree versus Stanton-Pilger Drainage District, 164 Nebraska 552, 82 National Western [Reporter]2d 798 (1957).


City ordinance imposing license fee on taxicabs is not taking of private property for public use. Richter versus City of Lincoln, 136 Nebraska 289, 285 National Western [Reporter] 593 (1939).


An individual does not have the right of eminent domain for the use and benefit of himself or his estate under the statute for the irrigation of his own land. Onstott versus Airdale Ranch & Cattle Company, 129 Nebraska 54, 260 National Western [Reporter] 556 (1935).


The furnishing of water to the inhabitants of a city for the purpose of health, convenience, and comfort is a public use of such water. Olson versus City of Wahoo, 124 Nebraska 802, 248 National Western [Reporter] 304 (1933).


Statute authorizing private individuals to create and fix boundaries of a district for public improvement, to be paid for by taxes levied on the property within the district, without a tribunal for determination whether owner's property was arbitrarily or unjustly included, violates this section. Elliott versus Wille, 112 Nebraska 78, 200 National Western [Reporter] 847 (1924).


Statutes providing for special assessments for paving, when not in excess of special benefits, are not invalid as taking private property for public use. Brown Real Estate Company versus Lancaster County, 110 Nebraska 665, 194 National Western [Reporter] 897 (1923).


Statute making railroad company liable for one dollar per day per car for delay in forwarding, giving notices, or delivery, and in addition thereto imposes liability for actual damages caused by such delay, by necessary implication, violates this section. Sunderland Bros. Company versus Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 104 Nebraska 319, 177 National Western [Reporter] 156 (1920).


Ordinance prohibiting removal of garbage except by city employee, is not taking of private property in violation of this section, though it prevents restaurant keeper from selling garbage as feed for swine. Urbach versus City of Omaha, 101 Nebraska 314, 163 National Western [Reporter] 307 (1917).


The use of water power to generate electricity to supply a city and its inhabitants with light and power is a public use and owners of riparian lands should be entitled to damages sustained. Lucas versus Ashland Light, Mill & Power Company, 92 Nebraska 550, 138 National Western [Reporter] 761 (1912).


Transferring unclaimed witness fees and costs to school fund is not taking of private property for public use. Douglas County versus Moores, 66 Nebraska 284, 92 National Western [Reporter] 199 (1902), overruling State ex rel. Broatch versus Moores, 52 Nebraska 770, 73 National Western [Reporter] 299 (1897).


Use of water for irrigation works, and establishment thereof, must be common and not to a particular individual to be a public use. Paxton & Hershey Irrigation Canal & Land Company versus Farmers & Merchants Irrigation & Land Company, 45 Nebraska 884, 64 National Western [Reporter] 343 (1895).


Use need not be for benefit of whole public or state, but may be for benefit of small and restricted locality, provided use and benefit is common, not to particular individual or estate. Welton versus Dickson, 38 Nebraska 767, 57 National Western [Reporter] 559 (1894).


Where statute required railroad company to provide underground cattle pass partly at company expense, not as safety measure but to save farmer inconvenience, there was a taking of private property for public use. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Company versus Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930), reversing Holmberg versus Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Company, 115 Nebraska 727, 214 National Western [Reporter] 746 (1927).


Condemnation by drainage district in conformity with Nebraska statute was not for private purpose, where the enterprise had been adjudged by state court to be public utility. O'Neill versus Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915).


Statute requiring property owners to destroy as public nuisance red cedar trees growing within two miles of orchards containing 1,000 or more apple trees is not void as taking of property for public or private use without compensation. Upton versus Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Nebraska 1932).


3. Public improvements

County and irrigation district were liable for damages caused by structure placed in drainage ditch. Baum versus County of Scotts Bluff, 169 Nebraska 816, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 455 (1960).


Municipality would be held liable for damages resulting from construction and maintenance of flood control project. Gruntorad versus Hughes Bros. Incorporated, 161 Nebraska 358, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 700 (1955).


The only foundation for a local assessment lies in the special benefits conferred upon the property assessed by the improvement, and an assessment beyond the benefit so conferred is a taking of property for public use without compensation and therefore illegal. Loup River Public Power District versus Platte County, 144 Nebraska 600, 14 National Western [Reporter]2d 210 (1944).


City is liable to abutting property owner for damages caused by paving street in accordance with established grade ordinance. Heflin versus City of Lincoln, 131 Nebraska 484, 268 National Western [Reporter] 364 (1936).


Property abutting on street is "damaged" within meaning of Constitution by changing grade from natural level. Stocking versus City of Lincoln, 93 Nebraska 798, 142 National Western [Reporter] 104 (1913).


Petition was insufficient to allege damages to adjacent property for erection of standpipe for city water supply. Bonge versus Village of Winnetoon, 90 Nebraska 260, 133 National Western [Reporter] 203 (1911).


Landowner is entitled to recover the damages he has actually sustained, less the special benefits to his property, if any, by subsequent change of street grade. Kavan versus South Omaha, 86 Nebraska 469, 126 National Western [Reporter] 77 (1910).


Owner of land is entitled to compensation for taking of part thereof for highway purposes. Johnson versus Peterson, 85 Nebraska 83, 122 National Western [Reporter] 683 (1909).


The construction and operation of railroad and closing of a public street entitles landowner to recover the difference between the value of the land before and its value after the road was constructed and put in operation. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Company versus O'Neill, 58 Nebraska 239, 78 National Western [Reporter] 521 (1899).


The placing of poles and wires in city street by an electric street railway is such interference with owner's enjoyment of property to entitle him to compensation commensurate with injury sustained. Jaynes versus Omaha Street Ry. Company, 53 Nebraska 631, 74 National Western [Reporter] 67 (1898).


Owner of land is entitled to damages resulting from grading street or highway by either county or city. Douglas County versus Taylor, 50 Nebraska 535, 70 National Western [Reporter] 27 (1897).


A city is liable to a lot owner for the diminution in value of his property caused by construction of a sewer, built by the city near his lot, on which a brick building had been erected before the sewer grade was established. City of Plattsmouth versus Boeck, 32 Nebraska 297, 49 National Western [Reporter] 167 (1891).


A city is liable to a lot owner for such damages as he may sustain by filling in the street in front of his lot above the level of the same, when the buildings were erected on the lot before any grade was established or by reason of filling in street. Hammond versus City of Harvard, 31 Nebraska 635, 48 National Western [Reporter] 462 (1891); Harmon versus City of Omaha, 17 Nebraska 548, 23 National Western [Reporter] 503 (1885).


Depreciation in value in construction of public improvements entitles abutting owner to just compensation therefor. Chicago, K. & N. Ry. Company versus Hazels, 26 Nebraska 364, 42 National Western [Reporter] 93 (1889).


Before section line road can be opened and worked, the damages suffered by the owners whose lands are taken must be ascertained and paid. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Douglas County, 1 Nebraska Unof. 247, 95 National Western [Reporter] 339 (1901).


4. Damages

The diminution in market value establishes the damages in an eminent domain case, and the term "consequential damage" only defines the kinds of damages which are compensable. Walkenhorst versus State, Dept. of Roads, 253 Nebraska 986, 573 National Western [Reporter]2d 474 (1998).


When private property has been damaged for public use, the owner is entitled to seek compensation in a direct action under this constitutional provision, regardless of whether the plaintiff could have sued in tort under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. Uhing versus City of Oakland, 236 Nebraska 58, 459 National Western [Reporter]2d 187 (1990).


Where cropland, no part of which is taken, temporarily suffers compensable damage, the measure of compensation is not the market value, but the value of the use for the period damaged, i.e., the value of the crops which could and would have been grown upon the land. Kula versus Prososki, 228 Nebraska 692, 424 National Western [Reporter]2d 117 (1988).


When a political subdivision with the power of eminent domain damages property for a public use, the property owner may seek damages in an action for tort, in an action for inverse condemnation under the provisions of sections 76-701 to 76-725, or in an action under the language of this provision. Slusarski versus County of Platte, 226 Nebraska 889, 416 National Western [Reporter]2d 213 (1987).


When private property has been damaged for a public use, the owner of such property is entitled to seek compensation in an action under this section. Parriott versus Drainage District Number 6 of Peru, 226 Nebraska 123, 410 National Western [Reporter]2d 97 (1987).


An irrigation district may be liable for damage due to seepage without proof of negligence if the district's activities caused the seepage. Wood versus Farwell Irrigation District, 217 Nebraska 511, 349 National Western [Reporter]2d 633 (1984).


Under this section, an irrigation district is strictly liable for seepage damage. Lindgren versus City of Gering, 206 Nebraska 360, 292 National Western [Reporter]2d 921 (1980).


Damages caused by fire spreading from municipal dump onto land of plaintiff is within protection of this section. Colburn versus City of Valentine, 183 Nebraska 391, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 203 (1968).


An abutting property owner is entitled to recover damages resulting from material impairment of his right of access to an existing highway. Swanson versus State, 178 Nebraska 671, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 810 (1965).


Recovery could be had where prohibition was imposed by statute upon use of land for display of highway signs. Fulmer versus State, 178 Nebraska 20, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 657 (1964), opinion withdrawn, 178 Nebraska 664, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 798 (1965).


All actual damages resulting from exercise of power of eminent domain which diminish market value of property not taken may be recovered. Pieper versus City of Scottsbluff, 176 Nebraska 561, 126 National Western [Reporter]2d 865 (1964).


Tenant was entitled to recover damages for deprivation of right to produce crop. State versus Dillon, 175 Nebraska 350, 121 National Western [Reporter]2d 798 (1963).


The words "or damaged" include all actual damages resulting from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Leffelman versus City of Hartington, 173 Nebraska 259, 113 National Western [Reporter]2d 107 (1962).


Constitutional provision does not change measure of damages in taking of leasehold. Ballantyne Company versus City of Omaha, 173 Nebraska 229, 113 National Western [Reporter]2d 486 (1962).


Agreement by city to construct median and barrier curbs in street did not violate this section. Hillerege versus City of Scottsbluff, 164 Nebraska 560, 83 National Western [Reporter]2d 76 (1957).


Temporary damage created by maintenance of a public city dump was recoverable. Patrick versus City of Bellevue, 164 Nebraska 196, 82 National Western [Reporter]2d 274 (1957).


All actual damages resulting from exercise of power of eminent domain may be recovered. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District versus Armstrong, 159 Nebraska 609, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 200 (1955).


Injury to entire property consisting of several city lots could be considered. Rath versus Sanitary District Number One of Lancaster County, 156 Nebraska 444, 56 National Western [Reporter]2d 741 (1955).


All damages which diminish market value of private property may be recovered. Quest versus East Omaha Drainage District, 155 Nebraska 538, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 417 (1952).


Landowner is assured of recovery in one action of the whole damage sustained. Little versus Loup River Public Power District, 150 Nebraska 864, 36 National Western [Reporter]2d 261 (1949).


Proof of negligence or the commission of a wrongful act is not necessary to a recovery. Wagner versus Loup River Public Power District, 150 Nebraska 7, 33 National Western [Reporter]2d 300 (1948).


Damages from seepage caused by public power and irrigation districts can be recovered under this provision without regard to negligence. Halligan versus Elander, 147 Nebraska 709, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 13 (1946).


Suit may be maintained against state under this section for improper construction of state highway. Schmutte versus State, 147 Nebraska 193, 22 National Western [Reporter]2d 691 (1946).


The words "or damaged" include all actual damages resulting from the exercise of the right of eminent domain which diminish the market value of private property. Robinson versus Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, 146 Nebraska 534, 20 National Western [Reporter]2d 509 (1945).


Legislative act conditionally destroying right to recover damages arising from flooding of lands by drainage district violated this section. Cooper versus Sanitary District Number 1 of Lancaster County, 146 Nebraska 412, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 619 (1945).


Damages sustained by all property owners alike arising from removal and relocation of railroad cannot be recovered under this provision of the Constitution. Scully versus Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, 143 Nebraska 184, 9 National Western [Reporter]2d 207 (1943).


Measure of damages for land taken for public use is the fair and reasonable market value of the land actually taken and the difference in the fair and reasonable market value of the remainder of the land before and after the taking. Schultz versus Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, 138 Nebraska 529, 293 National Western [Reporter] 409 (1940).


In action for damages to land caused by seepage from reservoir, recovery for loss of crops for 1936 and 1937, and for depreciation of land at time of trial was proper. Applegate versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 136 Nebraska 280, 285 National Western [Reporter] 585 (1939).


The words "or damaged" include all damages arising from the exercise of right of eminent domain which cause a diminution in value of a leasehold. James Poultry Company versus Nebraska City, 135 Nebraska 787, 284 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1939).


A city is liable to owner of abutting real estate for damages caused by changing the grade of street. Quivey versus City of Mitchell, 133 Nebraska 727, 277 National Western [Reporter] 50 (1938).


Rule of damages is value of land actually taken and also depreciation in value of remainder of tract, exclusive of general benefits. Regouby versus Dawson County Irrigation Company, 126 Nebraska 711, 254 National Western [Reporter] 389 (1934).


Subsequent change in highway grade to facilitate travel is not basis for action for additional damages. Psota versus Sherman County, 124 Nebraska 154, 245 National Western [Reporter] 405 (1932).


Organizer of irrigation district under the statutes waives right to compensation under this section for damages to property and accepts in lieu thereof the statutory remedy. Omaha Life Ins. Company versus Gering & Ft. Laramie Irrigation District, 123 Nebraska 761, 244 National Western [Reporter] 296 (1932).


One whose land is damaged temporarily for public use by the construction of a public improvement by the state suffers such a damage as requires compensation under this section. Gledhill versus State, 123 Nebraska 726, 243 National Western [Reporter] 909 (1932).


Seepage from irrigation ditches does not entitle adjoining landowners to damages for taking or damaging property for public use. Livanis versus Northport Irrigation District, 121 Nebraska 777, 238 National Western [Reporter] 757 (1931); Spurrier versus Mitchell Irrigation District, 119 Nebraska 401, 229 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1930), overruled in Snyder versus Platte Valley P. P. & I. District, 144 Nebraska 308, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 160 (1944).


Liability of drainage district extends to damages caused by reason of volume of water passed on plaintiff's land. Compton versus Elkhorn Valley Drainage District, 120 Nebraska 94, 231 National Western [Reporter] 685 (1930).


The words "or damaged" include all damages causing diminution in value by reason of vacating public highway. Lowell versus Buffalo County, 119 Nebraska 776, 230 National Western [Reporter] 842 (1930).


Construction of drainage ditches across public highway does not damage abutting property within meaning of Constitution. Douglas County versus Papillion Drainage District, 92 Nebraska 771, 139 National Western [Reporter] 718 (1913).


Where in the performance of duty railroads may be required, when necessary, to construct viaducts over and across their tracks, they are liable for damages to any person whose property is injured by such construction. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Company versus City of Lincoln, 91 Nebraska 150, 135 National Western [Reporter] 445 (1912).


In the taking or damaging of private property by a drainage district corporation in carrying out the purposes of its organization, landowner is entitled to damages for the location of a highway or the construction of a railroad. Nemaha Valley Drainage District Number 2 versus Marconnit, 90 Nebraska 514, 134 National Western [Reporter] 177 (1912).


Measure of damages for lowering the surface of street in front of lots was the difference between market value of the real estate immediately before and after the grading. Whelan versus City of Plattsmouth, 87 Nebraska 824, 128 National Western [Reporter] 520 (1910).


Granting of right-of-way for construction and maintenance of poles and wires does not permit the trimming of trees without responding in damages. Slabaugh versus Omaha Electric Light & Power Company, 87 Nebraska 805, 128 National Western [Reporter] 505 (1910).


One whose land is traversed by a drainage ditch is entitled to recover the value of the land actually taken therefor, together with special damages, if any, to the remainder, but not in such proceedings the damages sustained for neglect of county board to keep a previously established ditch free from silt and debris. Gutschow versus Washington County, 81 Nebraska 275, 116 National Western [Reporter] 46 (1908).


Where city partially vacates a street and builds a viaduct thereon opposite landowner's real estate abutting on such street, thereby diminishing the convenience of access to such property, the true measure of damages is the difference in value of property before and immediately after the improvement, unaffected by increase or decrease of property values generally in same vicinity. Gillespie versus South Omaha, 79 Nebraska 441, 112 National Western [Reporter] 582 (1907).


The words "or damaged" include smoke, soot, noise, and convenience of ingress and egress. Stehr versus Mason City & Fort Dodge Ry. Company, 77 Nebraska 641, 110 National Western [Reporter] 701 (1906).


A person whose property has been taken for a highway is entitled not only to the fair market value of the land actually taken, but also such additional damages as accrue to the remainder of the tract by reason of the opening of the road. Scace versus Wayne County, 72 Nebraska 162, 100 National Western [Reporter] 149 (1904).


The words "or damaged" include all damages arising from the exercise of the right of eminent domain which cause a diminution in the value of private property. City of Omaha versus Kramer, 25 Nebraska 489, 41 National Western [Reporter] 295 (1889).


The insertion of the words "or damaged" was intended to give a right of recovery which did not previously exist, and was not intended to limit or restrict any remedy previously existing. Omaha & R. versus R. R. Company versus Standen, 22 Nebraska 343, 35 National Western [Reporter] 183 (1887).


The words "or damaged" were added to Constitution to grant relief in cases where no direct injury to the real estate, but some physical disturbance of a right possessed by owner in connection therewith. Gottschalk versus C., B. & Q. R. R., 14 Nebraska 550, 16 National Western [Reporter] 475 (1883), 17 National Western [Reporter] 120 (1883).


Where damages for original construction have been settled or barred, railroad company is not liable to neighboring property owners for damages from smoke. Thompson versus Kimball, 165 F.2d 677 (8th Circuit 1948).


Operator of irrigation canal under state authority is liable for incidental damage to private property. Hooker versus Farmers Irrigation District, 272 F. 600 (8th Circuit 1921).


5. Just compensation

The Nebraska Constitution limits the sovereign's absolute power to take private property by requiring that property owners whose property has been taken or damaged for public use under the eminent domain authority be compensated. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Company versus Chaulk, 262 Nebraska 235, 631 National Western [Reporter]2d 131 (2001).


Payment of just compensation applies only to vested property rights. Tracy versus City of Deshler, 253 Nebraska 170, 568 National Western [Reporter]2d 903 (1997).


Where city of Fairbury obtained an easement by prescription across plaintiffs' land for public sewer, compensation of plaintiffs referred to in this section not required. Beach versus City of Fairbury, 207 Nebraska 836, 301 National Western [Reporter]2d 584 (1981).


Right of landowner to just compensation for property taken or damaged for public use is guaranteed by this section. W.E.W. Truck Lines, Incorporated versus State, 178 Nebraska 218, 132 National Western [Reporter]2d 782 (1965).


Right of landowner or lessee to just compensation for property taken or damaged for public use is guaranteed by this section. Balog versus State, 177 Nebraska 826, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 402 (1964).


Landowner could not be deprived without compensation of right to reversion of property upon vacation of street. Dell versus City of Lincoln, 170 Nebraska 176, 102 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1960).


Exercise of power of eminent domain has been limited only insofar as it is required that just compensation shall be paid for all property taken or damaged. Burnett versus Central Nebraska P. P. & I. District, 147 Nebraska 458, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 661 (1946).


Owner is entitled to recover full compensation for land actually taken and such damages to the remainder as are equivalent to diminution in the fair market value thereof. Langdon versus Loup River Public Power District, 144 Nebraska 325, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 168 (1944).


Condemner is required to compensate for property taken, and also for consequential damage to other property in excess of damage sustained by the public at large. Snyder versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 144 Nebraska 308, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 160 (1944).


Temporary damage caused by acquisition of an easement for construction of electric transmission line requires payment of compensation. Pierce versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 143 Nebraska 898, 11 National Western [Reporter]2d 813 (1943).


Section cited in stating contention of public power and irrigation district that assessments for drainage ditch were beyond the benefits conferred, and operated to take property without compensation in violation of this section. Loup River Public Power District versus County of Platte, 141 Nebraska 29, 2 National Western [Reporter]2d 609 (1942).


In a proceeding to condemn riparian land for public use, consequential damages to other land in the same tract are not limited to governmental section a part of which is included in the land actually taken, where depreciation in the value of the remainder extends beyond those sections. McGinley versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 133 Nebraska 420, 275 National Western [Reporter] 593 (1937). (Syllabus Number 2, McGinley versus Platte Valley District, 132 Nebraska 292, 271 National Western [Reporter] 864 (1937), withdrawn.)


A public power and irrigation district is not authorized to condemn and take private property for public use without just compensation. State ex rel. Loseke versus Fricke, 126 Nebraska 736, 254 National Western [Reporter] 409 (1934).


The compensation for land taken by eminent domain is measured by its market value at the time taken, and no evidence is admissible of its peculiar value for special reasons to its owner. Wiles versus Department of Public Works, 120 Nebraska 689, 234 National Western [Reporter] 918 (1931).


"Just compensation" means market value at time of taking, and includes interest from time owner deprived of use pending appeal. Sioux City R. R. Company versus Brown, 13 Nebraska 317, 14 National Western [Reporter] 407 (1882).


Compensation shall be made for the fair market value of the land actually taken, while special benefits may be set off against any local or incidental injury. Wagner versus Gage County, 3 Nebraska 237 (1874).


Statute requiring railroads to construct sidetracks to elevators along right-of-way of railway company is taking property without just compensation. Missouri Pacific Railway Company versus State, 217 U.S. 196 (1910), reversing State Number Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 81 Nebraska 15, 115 National Western [Reporter] 614 (1908).


Loss of market place by landowner, due to removal of town occasioned by condemnation for reservoir site, is a damage common to all of the inhabitants around it, and does not deprive the landowner of property without just compensation. Feltz versus Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, 124 F.2d 578 (8th Circuit 1942).


6. Compensation, payment

Change from a two-way street to a one-way street is not ordinarily compensable in eminent domain proceedings. Painter versus State, 177 Nebraska 905, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 587 (1964).


Restricting funds from which a public power and irrigation district may pay for private property taken or damaged solely to revenue derived from operation, does not violate constitutional provision. Johnson versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 133 Nebraska 97, 274 National Western [Reporter] 386 (1937).


Public utility property cannot be acquired by a city by condemnation without paying for it. City of Mitchell versus Western Public Service Company, 124 Nebraska 248, 246 National Western [Reporter] 484 (1933).


Though claim for damages not filed by owner in time, county cannot appropriate land for road without paying damages. Weinel versus Box Butte County, 108 Nebraska 293, 187 National Western [Reporter] 939 (1922).


Lessee of school land is entitled to damages before road opened. Beste versus Cedar County, 87 Nebraska 689, 128 National Western [Reporter] 29 (1910).


Payment need not, unless so provided by law, precede actual taking; it is for the Legislature to determine manner of taking and time and manner of payment. State versus Several Parcels of Land, 79 Nebraska 638, 113 National Western [Reporter] 248 (1907).


Object of section is to stay the hand of the sovereign from the property of the individual until proper compensation has been made. Hopper versus Douglas County, 75 Nebraska 329, 106 National Western [Reporter] 330 (1905).


Until compensation of the landowner has been made sure and certain, he may not be compelled to give up his property, and the public use of the same may be enjoined. Morris versus Washington County, 72 Nebraska 174, 100 National Western [Reporter] 144 (1904).


Statute for depositing award with county judge is only intended as security and does not constitute payment. Brown versus Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Company, 66 Nebraska 106, 92 National Western [Reporter] 128 (1902).


Owner of property taken by eminent domain proceedings is not compensated until the sum to which he is entitled is paid or tendered to him or to someone authorized by him to receive it. Brown versus Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Company, 64 Nebraska 62, 89 National Western [Reporter] 405 (1902).


A landowner cannot be required to surrender his land for a public use until his damages are first ascertained, and either paid or proper provision made for their payment. Lewis versus City of Lincoln, 55 Nebraska 1, 75 National Western [Reporter] 154 (1898); Hodges versus Board of Supervisors of Seward County, 49 Nebraska 666, 68 National Western [Reporter] 1027 (1896); Hogsett versus Harlan County, 4 Nebraska Unof. 310, 97 National Western [Reporter] 316 (1903).


The just compensation required to be made for taking private property for public use, must, before such taking, be ascertained and payment made accordingly, whether the appropriation of such property is by a municipal or other corporation. Livingston versus County Commissioners of Johnson County, 42 Nebraska 277, 60 National Western [Reporter] 555 (1894).


7. Miscellaneous

The Nebraska Constitution's limit on the sovereign power of eminent domain set forth in this provision applies to temporary as well as permanent takings. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Company versus Chaulk, 262 Nebraska 235, 631 National Western [Reporter]2d 131 (2001).


As this provision is self-executory, a petition alleging that one's property was damaged for a public use is sufficient as against a general demurrer, notwithstanding the fact that the petition refers neither to this article and section nor to the pertinent constitutional language. Slusarski versus County of Platte, 226 Nebraska 889, 416 National Western [Reporter]2d 213 (1987).


To recover damages for loss of or damage to land taken for a public use under this section, it is not necessary that the constitutional provision be set out or its existence alleged in the petition stating the cause of action. It is sufficient for the litigant to allege and prove facts constituting a cause of action because of the loss. Kula versus Prososki, 219 Nebraska 626, 365 National Western [Reporter]2d 441 (1985).


A city may not require a property owner to dedicate private property for some future public purpose as a condition for receiving a building permit unless such future use is directly occasioned by the construction for which the permit is sought. In other cases, eminent domain proceedings are required and compensation must be paid. Simpson versus City of North Platte, 206 Nebraska 240, 292 National Western [Reporter]2d 297 (1980).


When construing eminent domain statutes fundamental concept of this section must be considered. Keller versus State, 184 Nebraska 853, 172 National Western [Reporter]2d 782 (1969).


Cited in a reverse condemnation action. Dietloff versus City of Norfolk, 183 Nebraska 648, 163 National Western [Reporter]2d 586 (1968).


Act of Legislature authorizing city of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands did not violate this section. Campbell versus City of Lincoln, 182 Nebraska 459, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 444 (1968).


Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz versus Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Nebraska 410, 149 National Western [Reporter]2d 105 (1967).


Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities District versus Merritt Beach Company, 179 Nebraska 783, 140 National Western [Reporter]2d 626 (1966).


An owner of land is not entitled to recover damages for barricade of a county road where he does not suffer an injury different in kind from the public at large. Fougeron versus County of Seward, 174 Nebraska 753, 119 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (1963).


This section is self-executing. Legislative action is not necessary to make it available. Gentry versus State, 174 Nebraska 515, 118 National Western [Reporter]2d 643 (1962).


Rural Cemetery District Act violated this provision of the Constitution. Anderson versus Carlson, 171 Nebraska 741, 107 National Western [Reporter]2d 535 (1961).


Weather Control Act of 1957 violated this section. Summerville versus North Platte Valley Weather Control District, 170 Nebraska 46, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 748 (1960).


Filing of claim for damages under statute is not a condition precedent to maintenance of action. Armbruster versus Stanton-Pilger Drainage District, 165 Nebraska 459, 86 National Western [Reporter]2d 56 (1957).


Statute providing for appointment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceedings meets all the requirements of due process. May versus City of Kearney, 145 Nebraska 475, 17 National Western [Reporter]2d 448 (1945).


Zoning ordinance sustained as constitutional. Dundee Realty Company versus City of Omaha, 144 Nebraska 448, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 634 (1944).


A private employment agency is not a business in which the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included as a method of regulation. Boomer versus Olsen, 143 Nebraska 579, 10 National Western [Reporter]2d 507 (1943).


Provision is self-executing and no waiver of immunity of state from suit is required. Bordy versus State, 142 Nebraska 714, 7 National Western [Reporter]2d 632 (1943).


Where a party having the right to condemn lands takes possession without instituting condemnation proceedings, the owner may waive this feature and recover compensation. Dawson County Irrigation District versus Stuart, 142 Nebraska 435, 8 National Western [Reporter]2d 507 (1943).


In action against city for taking and damaging realty for public use without just compensation, it is not necessary that property owner plead or prove that she filed claim with city as provided by city charter. Bridge versus City of Lincoln, 138 Nebraska 461, 293 National Western [Reporter] 375 (1940).


Statute imposing restrictions regarding automobile brake and light equipment and providing for inspection, was not violative of constitutional provision. Beisner versus Cochran, 138 Nebraska 445, 293 National Western [Reporter] 289 (1940).


Housing authority acts did not violate constitutional provision prohibiting taking or damaging private property for public use without compensation. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


The Legislature cannot waive sovereignty of state in favor of a particular person or persons to permit suit against state for negligence of its agents and servants. Cox versus State, 134 Nebraska 751, 279 National Western [Reporter] 482 (1938).


Noisome odors from city sewage is not damaging of private property entitling owner to injunction where nuisance may be corrected by chemical treatment of sewage. Hall versus City of Friend, 134 Nebraska 652, 279 National Western [Reporter] 346 (1938).


Moratorium Law provided for the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. First Trust Company of Lincoln versus Smith, 134 Nebraska 84, 277 National Western [Reporter] 762 (1938).


Where the state acquired legal title to mortgaged real estate it cannot be made defendant in foreclosure suit without its consent. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Company versus Nordhues, 129 Nebraska 379, 261 National Western [Reporter] 687 (1935).


Suit against state for infringement of patent can not be brought in state court on theory that plaintiff's property is taken for public use without compensation. Thimgan versus State, 125 Nebraska 696, 251 National Western [Reporter] 837 (1933).


Where employees of the state enter upon land, against the will of the owner, under a void appraisement for damages and attempt to use his land for highway purposes without compensation paid or tendered, they may be restrained by injunction. Goergen versus Department of Public Works, 123 Nebraska 648, 243 National Western [Reporter] 886 (1932).


The Legislature has power to formulate, prescribe, enlarge, modify and alter remedies; provided, however, it does not, under the guise of a statute relating to procedure, attempt to deprive any person of a right secured by the Constitution. Croft versus Scotts Bluff County, 121 Nebraska 343, 237 National Western [Reporter] 149 (1931).


Zoning ordinance was valid under the police power, having substantial relation to the public health, safety and general welfare. City of Lincoln versus Foss, 119 Nebraska 666, 230 National Western [Reporter] 592 (1930).


Owner standing by and neglecting to assert constitutional rights while paving construction is going on, cannot enforce his constitutional rights by means of injunction in a court of equity when he has an adequate remedy at law. Meyer versus City of Alma, 117 Nebraska 511, 221 National Western [Reporter] 438 (1928).


The right of eminent domain cannot be exercised to take land against landowners consent as a site for a reservoir from which to irrigate private property. Vetter versus Broadhurst, 100 Nebraska 356, 160 National Western [Reporter] 109 (1916).


This section is self-executing, and it requires no legislation to prevent private property from being taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Hopper versus Douglas County, 75 Nebraska 329, 106 National Western [Reporter] 330 (1905); Douglas County versus Taylor, 50 Nebraska 535, 70 National Western [Reporter] 27 (1897).


Mere passive acquiescence by landowner, unaccompanied by conduct indicating affirmative assent, is not waiver of right to compensation. Kime versus Cass County, 71 Nebraska 677, 99 National Western [Reporter] 546 (1904), affirmed on rehearing 71 Nebraska 680, 101 National Western [Reporter] 2 (1904).


Levying special assessments upon tracts of land adjacent to proposed drainage ditch for special benefits received does not violate this section. Dodge County versus Acom, 61 Nebraska 376, 85 National Western [Reporter] 292 (1901).


It is not incumbent upon property owner to take affirmative action as condition precedent to protecting his rights. Propst versus Cass County, 51 Nebraska 736, 71 National Western [Reporter] 748 (1897).


Land is appropriated when its corpus is seized and devoted to an improvement so as to deprive owner of use, and it is not necessary that owner be divested of fee. Martin versus Fillmore County, 44 Nebraska 719, 62 National Western [Reporter] 863 (1895).


Legislature may regulate remedy and prescribe forms to be observed to enforce law, but such regulation must be reasonable and by general laws of uniform operation. City of Lincoln versus Grant, 38 Nebraska 369, 56 National Western [Reporter] 995 (1893).


Legislature has no power to take property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even when full compensation made. Jenal versus Green Island Draining Company, 12 Nebraska 163, 10 National Western [Reporter] 547 (1881).


Public cannot, by means of assessment of benefits against abutting property, reimburse itself for payment of damages occasioned by changing of street grade. Goodrich versus City of Omaha, 10 Nebraska 98, 4 National Western [Reporter] 424 (1880).


1-22. Elections to be free.

All elections shall be free; and there shall be no hindrance or impediment to the right of a qualified voter to exercise the elective franchise.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 22 (1875).

Annotations

1. Nominations

Legislature is authorized to establish different qualifications for voters in a school district election. Farrell versus School District Number 54 of Lincoln County, 164 Nebraska 853, 84 National Western [Reporter]2d 126 (1957).


Statute prohibiting state and federal officers and employees from being delegates to county, district, and state political conventions did not violate this section. State ex rel. Baldwin versus Strain, 152 Nebraska 763, 42 National Western [Reporter]2d 796 (1950).


This provision does not operate to circumscribe power of Legislature to define the method of effecting the appointment of presidential electors. State ex rel. Beeson versus Marsh, 150 Nebraska 233, 34 National Western [Reporter]2d 279 (1948).


Statutes regulating nomination and election of candidates and prescribing formation of new party are constitutional, if elections are left free and open to all electors. State ex rel. Nelson versus Marsh, 123 Nebraska 423, 243 National Western [Reporter] 277 (1932).


Statute providing for nomination of delegates to constitutional convention by petition only, does not infringe this section, which applies to elections and not to method of nomination. Baker versus Moorhead, 103 Nebraska 811, 174 National Western [Reporter] 430 (1919).


Legislature may regulate nomination of candidates provided regulations are reasonable and do not unnecessarily hamper or impede right of voter to vote for whomsoever he pleases. Morrissey versus Waite, 92 Nebraska 271, 138 National Western [Reporter] 186 (1912).


Statute describing form of official ballot but limiting candidates named thereon to nominees by petition, which has effect of depriving all electors excepting five hundred in each county of right to take part in nominating, violates Constitution. State ex rel Ragan versus Junkin, 85 Nebraska 1, 122 National Western [Reporter] 473 (1909).


Statute requiring candidates for primary elections to pay fee for filing nomination papers, computed at 1 per cent of emoluments received as salary by that officer, is in conflict with Constitution. State ex rel. Adair versus Drexel, 74 Nebraska 776, 105 National Western [Reporter] 174 (1905).


2. Miscellaneous

This section has no application to a public corporation or political subdivision where it operates in a proprietary capacity. Wittler versus Baumgartner, 180 Nebraska 446, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1966).


The second reapportionment act enacted by the 1965 Legislature did not impede the right of a voter to exercise the elective franchise. Carpenter versus State, 179 Nebraska 628, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 541 (1966).


Levy of tax for municipal university did not violate free elections clause. Ratigan versus Davis, 175 Nebraska 416, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 12 (1963).


Holding an election shortly after a blizzard did not operate as a hindrance or impediment to the right to vote. Peterson versus Cook, 175 Nebraska 296, 121 National Western [Reporter]2d 399 (1963).


Requirement that candidate for office of member of State Railway Commission be not less than thirty years of age does not violate this section. State ex rel. Quinn versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 436, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 892 (1942).


Offer of federal government to aid in remodeling of schoolhouse does not invalidate school district election to vote bonds for that purpose. Taxpayers League versus Benthack, 136 Nebraska 277, 285 National Western [Reporter] 577 (1939).


Requirement of Australian Ballot Law that signatures of two judges of election shall be on back of each ballot, is not inimical to constitutional provisions. Swan versus Bowker, 135 Nebraska 405, 281 National Western [Reporter] 891 (1938).


A statute substituting a municipal court for justice of peace courts which excludes electors outside of city but within jurisdiction of municipal court from voting for municipal judge, contravenes constitutional provision. State ex rel. Wright versus Brown, 131 Nebraska 239, 267 National Western [Reporter] 466 (1936).


Statute prohibiting candidate defeated at primary from filing by petition in general election next following is constitutional. State ex rel. Driscoll versus Swanson, 127 Nebraska 715, 256 National Western [Reporter] 872 (1934).


Statute restricting the right to petition for recall of city officers to voters whose names appear upon the registration list is not violative of this section. State ex rel. Miller versus Berg, 97 Nebraska 63, 149 National Western [Reporter] 61 (1914).


Election commissioner is required to accept statements of voter under oath as true and register him as a voter. State ex rel. Williams versus Moorhead, 96 Nebraska 559, 148 National Western [Reporter] 552 (1914).


Following this section, the law makes county clerk liable to forfeit his office and to be fined and imprisoned if he neglects to furnish correct ballots. Wahlquist versus Adams County, 94 Nebraska 682, 144 National Western [Reporter] 171 (1913).


To preserve right of voter at general election, it is not necessary that name of candidate should appear on ballot more than once, nor that he be described as member of more than one political party, as no party can be compelled to put forth as its candidate one who does not affiliate with it. State ex rel. Curyea versus Wells, 92 Nebraska 337, 138 National Western [Reporter] 165 (1912).


The right of every voter to vote a straight ticket for the candidates of his party is guaranteed and any attempt by deception or otherwise to deprive him of that right is a violation of the Constitution. State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Central Committee versus Wait, 92 Nebraska 313, 138 National Western [Reporter] 159 (1912).


Legislature may control and regulate official ballot and manner of selection of names to be printed thereon, but cannot abolish nor prevent their formation, nor prevent free and open discussion of qualifications and fitness for office. State ex rel. Ragan versus Junkin, 85 Nebraska 1, 122 National Western [Reporter] 473 (1909).


In creation of drainage districts requirement that officers shall be elected by freeholders only does not violate Constitution. State ex rel. Harris versus Hanson, 80 Nebraska 738, 117 National Western [Reporter] 412 (1908).


Legislature may provide for election of officers not named in Constitution by means other than popular vote. State ex rel. Harris versus Hanson, 80 Nebraska 724, 115 National Western [Reporter] 294 (1908).


Where statutes require that ballot be signed by two judges of election, voter cannot be deprived of vote because some ballots were in good faith signed by clerk. Bingham versus Broadwell, 73 Nebraska 605, 103 National Western [Reporter] 323 (1905).


Electors of city cannot be deprived of right to vote for public officer because of failure of Legislature to make special provision for such election. State ex rel. Gordon versus Moores, 70 Nebraska 48, 96 National Western [Reporter] 1011 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 70 Nebraska 56, 99 National Western [Reporter] 504 (1904).


The requirements of the Australian Ballot Law that the names or signatures of the two judges of an election shall be written on the back of each ballot to be used, and that a ballot not so endorsed shall be void, and not counted, are mandatory, and are not inimical to constitutional provisions. Orr versus Bailey, 59 Nebraska 128, 80 National Western [Reporter] 495 (1899).


1-23. Capital cases; right of direct appeal; effect; other cases; right of appeal.

In all capital cases, appeal directly to the Supreme Court shall be as a matter of right and shall operate as a supersedeas to stay the execution of the sentence of death until further order of the Supreme Court. In all other cases, criminal or civil, an aggrieved party shall be entitled to one appeal to the appellate court created pursuant to Article 5, section 1, of this Constitution or to the Supreme Court as may be provided by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution art I, Section 23 (1875);
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 196, Section 1;
Amended 1990, Laws 1990, Law Report 8, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Right of review

Right to be heard on question of changes in boundaries of school district by error proceedings could not be denied. Languis versus De Boer, 181 Nebraska 32, 146 National Western [Reporter]2d 750 (1966).


Legislature cannot deprive courts of jurisdiction conferred on them by Constitution. Writ of prohibition is not abolished by statutory provisions. State ex rel. Wright versus Barney, 133 Nebraska 676, 276 National Western [Reporter] 676 (1937).


Right of review of judgment rendered party at open public hearing is guaranteed by Constitution. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Nemaha County Bank of Auburn, 124 Nebraska 883, 248 National Western [Reporter] 650 (1933).


Right of review is to be held inviolate. State versus Odd Fellows Hall Association, 123 Nebraska 440, 243 National Western [Reporter] 616 (1932).


2. Regulation of exercise of right

This section of the Nebraska Constitution does not bar either the Legislature or the Supreme Court from making reasonable rules and regulations governing review on appeal. Nebraska State Bank versus Dudley, 203 Nebraska 226, 278 National Western [Reporter]2d 334 (1979).


Requirement for furnishing of appeal bond in probate matter did not deprive party of right to be heard in court of last resort. Rundall versus Whiteside, 182 Nebraska 176, 153 National Western [Reporter]2d 236 (1967).


Right to be heard in civil case in Supreme Court is dependent upon its exercise in strict conformity to law. Weiner versus State, 179 Nebraska 297, 137 National Western [Reporter]2d 852 (1965).


This section does not prohibit the Legislature from prescribing reasonable rules for review of cause on appeal. Barney versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 144 Nebraska 230, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 120 (1944).


Constitutional provision does not prohibit Legislature from prescribing reasonable rules and regulations for the review of a cause by appeal. In reference Kothe's Estate, 131 Nebraska 531, 268 National Western [Reporter] 464 (1936).


Legislature may prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for review of case on appeal. In reference Estate of Mathews, 125 Nebraska 737, 252 National Western [Reporter] 210 (1933).


Section does not prevent Supreme Court from making reasonable rules to facilitate procedure, nor prohibit Legislature from taking away one method of review, provided another adequate one is left. Schmidt versus Boyle, 54 Nebraska 387, 74 National Western [Reporter] 964 (1898).


Legislature is not prohibited from prescribing reasonable regulations, such as requiring appellant to give bond. School District Number 6 of Cass County versus Traver, 43 Nebraska 524, 61 National Western [Reporter] 720 (1895).


3. Miscellaneous

The writ of error is a writ of right in all cases of felony. State versus Longmore, 178 Nebraska 509, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 66 (1965).


Judicial discretion should be exercised to promote rather than to defeat right of review. Keil versus Farmers' Irrigation District, 119 Nebraska 503, 229 National Western [Reporter] 898 (1930).


Statute denying right of review in mortgage foreclosure suit, where defendant files request for stay, will be strictly construed. Theisen versus Peterson, 114 Nebraska 154, 206 National Western [Reporter] 768 (1925).


Court of equity will grant new trial where party is deprived of right of review because, without his fault, he was unable to obtain bill of exceptions or transcript. Ferber versus Leise, 97 Nebraska 795, 151 National Western [Reporter] 307 (1915); Zweibel versus Caldwell, 72 Nebraska 47, 99 National Western [Reporter] 843 (1904), motion for rehearing overruled 72 Nebraska 53, 102 National Western [Reporter] 84 (1905).


Section does not give absolute right to oral argument, but was intended in sense of review. Schmidt versus Boyle, 54 Nebraska 387, 74 National Western [Reporter] 964 (1898).


1-24. Repealed 1990. Laws 1990, Law Report 8, Section 1.

1-25. Rights of property; no discrimination; aliens.

There shall be no discrimination between citizens of the United States in respect to the acquisition, ownership, possession, enjoyment or descent of property. The right of aliens in respect to the acquisition, enjoyment and descent of property may be regulated by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 25 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 2.

Annotations

1. Discrimination

Statute abrogating a right of action for a future tort does not violate this section. State Securities Company versus Norfolk Livestock Sales Company, Incorporated, 187 Nebraska 446, 191 National Western [Reporter]2d 614 (1971).


Prohibiting wholesalers from giving discounts to retailers for quantity purchases of alcoholic liquor does not violate this section. Central Markets West, Incorporated versus State, 186 Nebraska 79, 180 National Western [Reporter]2d 880 (1970).


Harm caused by statute permitting independent hospital district to fractionate territory of counties insufficient to constitute violation of this section. Shadbolt versus County of Cherry, 185 Nebraska 208, 174 National Western [Reporter]2d 733 (1970).


Prohibiting retailer from accepting credit for purchase of beer from wholesaler while permitting acceptance of credit on purchase of liquor is constitutional. Tom & Jerry, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Nebraska 410, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 232 (1968).


A citizen may not only acquire property but he may sell it at such price as he can obtain in fair barter. Burger versus City of Beatrice, 181 Nebraska 213, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 784 (1967).


Penalty for failure to return personal property for taxation was discriminatory and void under this section. Bachus versus Swanson, 179 Nebraska 1, 136 National Western [Reporter]2d 189 (1965).


Statute requiring fencing of right-of-way by railroads did not discriminate between citizens with respect to ownership and enjoyment of property. Linenbrink versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 177 Nebraska 838, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 417 (1964).


Every citizen has the right to acquire property and sell it at such price as he can obtain in fair barter. Elder versus Doerr, 175 Nebraska 483, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 528 (1963).


Levy of tax for municipal university did not violate discrimination clause. Ratigan versus Davis, 175 Nebraska 416, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 12 (1963).


City ordinance prescribing charge for conducting business of commercial aerial spraying did not violate this section. City of Ord versus Biemond, 175 Nebraska 333, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 6 (1963).


Penalty provisions of tax statute were discriminatory and violated this section. Creigh versus Larsen, 171 Nebraska 317, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 187 (1960).


Amendments to Blue-Sky Law did not violate this section. Davis versus Walker, 170 Nebraska 891, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 479 (1960).


Public Auction Law was discriminatory and not based upon reasonable classification. Blauvelt versus Beck, 162 Nebraska 576, 76 National Western [Reporter]2d 738 (1956).


Curb-cut ordinance admitted by demurrer to be discriminatory and not a reasonable exercise of police power violated this section. Panebianco versus City of Omaha, 151 Nebraska 463, 37 National Western [Reporter]2d 731 (1949).


Imposition of liability for reimbursement on estate of recipient of old age assistance does not violate this section. Boone County Old Age Assistance Board versus Myhre, 149 Nebraska 669, 32 National Western [Reporter]2d 262 (1948).


A private employment agency is not a business in which the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included as a method of regulation. Boomer versus Olsen, 143 Nebraska 579, 10 National Western [Reporter]2d 507 (1943).


Housing Authority Act sustained as constitutional. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


Limitation on lawful business creating a monopoly violates this section. Nelsen versus Tilley, 137 Nebraska 327, 289 National Western [Reporter] 388 (1939).


Regulation of size of containers in which alcoholic liquors are sold at retail is not violative of this section. Marsh & Marsh versus Carmichael, 136 Nebraska 797, 287 National Western [Reporter] 616 (1939).


The constitutional right to acquire and possess property includes the right to dispose of it in such innocent manner as the owner pleases. State ex rel. English versus Ruback, 135 Nebraska 335, 281 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1938).


Zoning ordinance was not discriminatory. City of Lincoln versus Foss, 119 Nebraska 666, 230 National Western [Reporter] 592 (1930).


Statute providing for tuberculin test making distinction between breeding cattle and feeding cattle and authorizing summary destruction of diseased animals, is constitutional. State ex rel. Spillman versus Splittgerber, 119 Nebraska 436, 229 National Western [Reporter] 332 (1930).


Former statute prohibiting trial of divorce suit within six months after service of summons is not violative of this section. Garrett versus State, 118 Nebraska 373, 224 National Western [Reporter] 860 (1929).


Occupation tax on "rolling store" was not discriminatory. Erwin versus City of Omaha, 118 Nebraska 331, 224 National Western [Reporter] 692 (1929).


"Cedar Rust" law is constitutional. Upton versus Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Nebraska 1932).


2. Rights of aliens

Provision precluding distinction between resident aliens and citizens was inapplicable to nonresident wife of resident alien. Engen versus Union State Bank of Harvard, 121 Nebraska 257, 236 National Western [Reporter] 741 (1931).


Legislature did not intend by Alien Act of 1889 to discriminate against the heirs of a resident alien in favor of the heirs of a nonresident. State ex rel. Toop versus Thomas, 103 Nebraska 151, 172 National Western [Reporter] 690 (1919).


Statutes limiting right of dower of nonresident widow to lands of which husband died seized, while extending right of dower to resident widow of other lands, does not violate Constitution. Miner versus Morgan, 83 Nebraska 400, 119 National Western [Reporter] 781 (1909).


The words "aliens" and "citizens" relate to political status of persons as respecting their relation to United States, while the word "residents" relates to status of persons with respect to State of Nebraska. Glynn versus Glynn, 62 Nebraska 872, 87 National Western [Reporter] 1052 (1901).


Statute denying aliens the right to take or hold title to real estate in Nebraska by descent or devise, with certain exceptions and qualifications, does not violate this section. Toop versus Ulysses Land Company, 278 F. 840 (D. Nebraska 1913).


3. Miscellaneous

This provision of the Nebraska Constitution is no more demanding than the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Mach versus County of Douglas, 259 Nebraska 787, 612 National Western [Reporter]2d 237 (2000).


1-26. Powers retained by people.

This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people, and all powers not herein delegated, remain with the people.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 26 (1875).

Annotations

Legislative Bill 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 does not contravene this section. Dwyer versus Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Nebraska 30, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 236 (1972).


A state agency may not, by invoking the doctrine of police power, exercise powers not granted it by and inconsistent with provisions of the state Constitution. First Trust Company of Lincoln versus Smith, 134 Nebraska 84, 277 National Western [Reporter] 762 (1938).


This section is characteristic of republican form of government and distinguishes such government from monarchy or oligarchy. State ex rel. Harte versus Moorhead, 99 Nebraska 527, 156 National Western [Reporter] 1067 (1916).


This section removes all doubt that powers other than those specified in bill of rights were retained by the people, and any act in violation of such rights is as clearly invalid as though same had been expressly prohibited by fundamental law. State ex rel. Smyth, Attorney General versus Moores, 55 Nebraska 480, 76 National Western [Reporter] 175 (1898), overruled in Redell versus Moores, 63 Nebraska 219, 88 National Western [Reporter] 243 (1901).


Police power is one of the powers which has been reserved by the people of the state, and which cannot be surrendered. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus State ex rel. City of Omaha, 47 Nebraska 549, 66 National Western [Reporter] 624 (1896).


1-27. English language to be official.

The English language is hereby declared to be the official language of this state, and all official proceedings, records and publications shall be in such language, and the common school branches shall be taught in said language in public, private, denominational and parochial schools.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 27 (1920);
Adopted 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 3.

1-28. Crime victims; rights enumerated; effect; Legislature; duties.

(1) A victim of a crime, as shall be defined by law, or his or her guardian or representative shall have: The right to be informed of all criminal court proceedings; the right to be present at trial unless the trial court finds sequestration necessary for a fair trial for the defendant; and the right to be informed of, be present at, and make an oral or written statement at sentencing, parole, pardon, commutation, and conditional release proceedings. This enumeration of certain rights for crime victims shall not be construed to impair or deny others provided by law or retained by crime victims.

(2) The Legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of the rights granted in this section. There shall be no remedies other than as specifically provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights granted by this section.

(3) Nothing in this section shall constitute a basis for error in favor of a defendant in any criminal proceeding, a basis for providing standing to participate as a party to any criminal proceeding, or a basis to contest the disposition of any charge.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 28 (1996);
Adopted 1996, Laws 1995, Law Report 21CA, Section 1.

Annotations

This provision is not self-executing. Legislative action is necessary to provide for the implementation of the rights provided herein. State ex rel. Lamm versus Nebraska Board of Pardons, 260 Nebraska 1000, 620 National Western [Reporter]2d 763 (2001).


1-29. Marriage; same-sex relationships not valid or recognized.

Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 29 (2000);
Adopted 2000, Initiative Measure Number 416.

1-30. Discrimination or grant of preferential treatment prohibited; public employment, public education, or public contracting; section, how construed; remedies.

(1) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. (2) This section shall apply only to action taken after the section's effective date. (3) Nothing in this section prohibits bona fide qualifications based on sex that are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. (4) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any court order or consent decree that is in force as of the effective date of this section. (5) Nothing in this section prohibits action that must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, if ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state. (6) For purposes of this section, state shall include, but not be limited to: (A) the State of Nebraska; (b) any agency, department, office, board, commission, committee, division, unit, branch, bureau, council, or sub-unit of the state; (c) any public institution of higher education; (d) any political subdivision of or within the state; and (e) any government institution or instrumentally of or within the state. (7) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available for violations of Nebraska's antidiscrimination law. (8) This section shall be self executing. If any part or parts of this section are found to be in conflict with federal law or the Constitution of the United States, this section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the Constitution of the United States permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 1, Section 30 (2008); Adopted 2008, Initiative Measure Number 424

2-1. Legislative, executive, judicial.

(1) The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others except as expressly directed or permitted in this Constitution.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, supervision of individuals sentenced to probation, released on parole, or enrolled in programs or services established within a court may be undertaken by either the judicial or executive department, or jointly, as provided by the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 2, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 2006, Laws 2006, Law Report 274CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Legislative power

An executive agency decision which is a legislative act encroaches upon and interferes with legislative powers that cannot be delegated to an executive agency. Such unilateral action by an agency violates the language of this provision. Clemens versus Harvey, 247 Nebraska 77, 525 National Western [Reporter]2d 185 (1994).


A grant of administrative authority is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Blackledge versus Richards, 194 Nebraska 188, 231 National Western [Reporter]2d 319 (1975).


Sections 77-202.25 to 77-202.33 do not constitute an appropriation and are not violative hereof. Stahmer versus State, 192 Nebraska 63, 218 National Western [Reporter]2d 893 (1974).


Sections 79-486 and 79-4,102 do not unlawfully delegate legislative authority and are not unconstitutional. Mann versus Wayne County Board of Equalization, 186 Nebraska 752, 186 National Western [Reporter]2d 729 (1971).


Legislature cannot through appropriations exercise or invade constitutional rights or powers of executive. Legislature cannot administer appropriations once made. State ex rel. Meyer versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Nebraska 490, 176 National Western [Reporter]2d 920 (1970).


Nebraska Revenue Act of 1967 was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the United States. Anderson versus Tiemann, 182 Nebraska 393, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 322 (1967).


Legislature may not delegate or impose legislative functions upon judicial department. McDonald versus Rentfrow, 176 Nebraska 796, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 480 (1964).


Grant of legislative power to Department of Education was an exception expressly authorized by Constitution. School District Number 8 of Sherman County versus State Board of Education, 176 Nebraska 722, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1964).


Legislature, in creating an administrative body, cannot delegate power which is conferred solely upon the Legislature. Terry Carpenter, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 175 Nebraska 26, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 374 (1963).


Legislature has power to confirm appointments to public office. State ex rel. Johnson versus Hagemeister, 161 Nebraska 475, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 625 (1955).


Delegation of rule-making power to Superintendent of Public Instruction, without adequate standards, violated this section. School District Number 39 of Washington County versus Decker, 159 Nebraska 693, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 354 (1955).


Delegation of legislative powers to a county committee to fix boundaries of school district was constitutional. Nickel versus School Board of Axtell, 157 Nebraska 813, 61 National Western [Reporter]2d 566 (1953).


Legislature could delegate to Board of Regents authority to make rules for efficient operation of University Hospital. Board of Regents versus County of Lancaster, 154 Nebraska 398, 48 National Western [Reporter]2d 221 (1951).


Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District versus Hall County, 152 Nebraska 410, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1950).


Housing authority acts granting administrative functions to city council were not unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


Legislature has no power to delegate legislative authority to an administrative board or to outside agency such as United States Congress. Smithberger versus Banning, 129 Nebraska 651, 262 National Western [Reporter] 492 (1935).


Statute regulating size of loaf of bread, authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to fix reasonable excess tolerances, is not invalid as a delegation of legislative power. Petersen Baking Company versus Bryan, 124 Nebraska 464, 247 National Western [Reporter] 39 (1933), affirmed in 290 U.S. 570 (1934).


Act providing for control and eradication of diseases among domestic animals does not delegate legislative power, and is not invalid. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Knudtsen, 121 Nebraska 270, 236 National Western [Reporter] 696 (1931).


Governor, in submitting budget recommendations and in acting on appropriation bills, is in performance of "legislative duties" within meaning hereof. Elmen versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Nebraska 141, 231 National Western [Reporter] 772 (1930).


Proviso of law relating to organization of new school districts was unconstitutional as attempting to delegate legislative functions to private persons. Rowe versus Ray, 120 Nebraska 118, 231 National Western [Reporter] 689 (1930).


Duty placed on administrative board to provide form of insurance contract was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. State ex rel. Martin versus Howard, 96 Nebraska 278, 147 National Western [Reporter] 689 (1914).


Statute providing for direct appeals to Supreme Court from Railway Commission is not invalid as attempting to confer legislative power on court. Hooper Tel. Company versus Nebraska Tel. Company, 96 Nebraska 245, 147 National Western [Reporter] 674 (1914).


This section prohibits attempting to confer upon district court legislative authority to sever agricultural lands from municipal limits. Winkler versus City of Hastings, 85 Nebraska 212, 122 National Western [Reporter] 858 (1909).


Making it discretionary in district court to determine necessity for calling grand jury does not confer legislative powers upon judiciary. Dinsmore versus State, 61 Nebraska 418, 85 National Western [Reporter] 445 (1901).


2. Executive power

The Board of Nursing has power to deny a license upon proof applicant is guilty of unprofessional conduct, and upon review de novo, district court may not substitute its own judgment on that issue. Scott versus State ex rel. Board of Nursing, 196 Nebraska 681, 244 National Western [Reporter]2d 683 (1976).


The statutes which give the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over public employees are not unconstitutional. American Fed. of S., C. & M. Employees versus Department of Public Institutions, 195 Nebraska 253, 237 National Western [Reporter]2d 841 (1976).


Adoption of existing law or regulation by reference does not delegate legislative power to administrative officer to create criminal offenses. State versus Workman, 186 Nebraska 467, 183 National Western [Reporter]2d 911 (1971).


Statute authorizing transfer of land from a nonaccredited to an accredited high school district did not violate this section. De Jonge versus School District of Bloomington, 179 Nebraska 539, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 296 (1966).


Regulation of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission fixing hours for sale of beer outside corporate limits of cities and villages did not violate this section. Griffin versus Gass, 133 Nebraska 56, 274 National Western [Reporter] 193 (1937).


Powers of State Board of Agriculture are neither legislative nor judicial. Crete Mills versus Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Nebraska 244, 271 National Western [Reporter] 684 (1937).


Legislature may not impose judicial power upon executive officers or delegate legislative power to them. Laverty versus Cochran, 132 Nebraska 118, 271 National Western [Reporter] 354 (1936).


Act requiring county attorney to perform duties of coroner is not invalid as clothing administrative officer with judicial power. State ex rel. Crosby versus Moorhead, 100 Nebraska 298, 159 National Western [Reporter] 412 (1916).


Act authorizing chief officer of state department or institution to employ attorney, rather than to have Attorney General act, is not invalid. Follmer versus State, 94 Nebraska 217, 142 National Western [Reporter] 908 (1913).


Ministerial officers, such as board of education, while not exactly executive or political, are obviously more nearly related to executive than to legislative or judicial department. State versus Loechner, 65 Nebraska 814, 91 National Western [Reporter] 874 (1902).


Attempt to confer upon courts authority to remove police magistrates for misconduct in office was unlawful delegation of executive power. Gordon versus Moores, 61 Nebraska 345, 85 National Western [Reporter] 298 (1901).


By quo warranto proceeding court does not exercise nor assume to exercise any power belonging to executive department. State ex rel. Thayer versus Boyd, 31 Nebraska 682, 48 National Western [Reporter] 739 (1891), 51 National Western [Reporter] 602 (1892), reversed in Boyd versus Nebraska ex rel. Thayer 143 U.S. 135 (1892).


3. Judicial power

The Nebraska Supreme Court is vested with the sole power to admit persons to the practice of law in this state and to fix qualifications for admission to the Nebraska bar. In reference Application of Brown, 270 Nebraska 891, 708 National Western [Reporter]2d 251 (2006).


A trial court that indicates it will concur in an agreement granting sentence concessions is not bound and has not ceded its authority and, thus, has not violated the doctrine of the separation of powers. State versus Lotter, 255 Nebraska 456, 586 National Western [Reporter]2d 591 (1998).


Although courts have no jurisdiction to review wholly legislative acts, some agency determinations possess quasi-judicial characteristics and are reviewable without violating the separations of powers doctrine. Slack Nsg. Home versus Department of Soc. Servs., 247 Nebraska 452, 528 National Western [Reporter]2d 285 (1995).


The Nebraska Supreme Court, and only that court, is invested with the power to admit persons to the practice of law and to fix qualifications for admission to the bar. Thus, it has the responsibility to adopt and implement systems designed to protect the public and safeguard the judicial system by assuring that those admitted to the bar are of such character and fitness as to be worthy of the trust and confidence such admission implies. In reference Application of Majorek, 244 Nebraska 595, 508 National Western [Reporter]2d 275 (1993).


The discretion vested in a prosecuting attorney to determine in which court a minor shall be prosecuted does not violate this section as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. State versus Grayer, 191 Nebraska 523, 215 National Western [Reporter]2d 859 (1974).


Legislative act attempting to confer upon the courts the power of determining what lands should be annexed to a city violated this section. Williams versus County of Buffalo, 181 Nebraska 233, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 776 (1967).


Legislature may confer upon the courts the power to review action taken by county board of equalization in levying taxes. C. R. T. Corp. versus Board of Equalization, 172 Nebraska 540, 110 National Western [Reporter]2d 194 (1961).


Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act does not confer judicial powers on Department of Roads and Irrigation. Hadden versus Aitken, 156 Nebraska 215, 55 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1952).


Under separation of powers of government, judiciary has the inherent right to admit attorneys to practice law and prescribe their qualifications, and while Legislature may impose minimum standards as an exercise of the police power, the judiciary is not required to accept lower standards than it prescribes. State ex rel. Ralston versus Turner, 141 Nebraska 556, 4 National Western [Reporter]2d 302 (1942).


Power to admit persons to practice of law and fix their qualifications to practice is vested solely in Supreme Court. State ex rel. Wright versus Hinckle 137 Nebraska 735, 291 National Western [Reporter] 68 (1940).


Statute conferring powers over solvent and insolvent banks on Department of Banking is not unconstitutional as attempt to delegate judicial powers to the department. Department of Banking versus Hedges, 136 Nebraska 382, 286 National Western [Reporter] 277 (1939).


The right to define and regulate the practice of law belongs to the judicial department of government. In reference Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Nebraska 283, 275 National Western [Reporter] 265 (1937).


The Supreme Court has no power to regulate public utilities. Furstenberg versus Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company, 132 Nebraska 562, 272 National Western [Reporter] 756 (1937).


Power to admit persons to practice law in this state and to fix their qualifications is vested solely in the Supreme Court. State ex rel. Wright versus Barlow, 131 Nebraska 294, 268 National Western [Reporter] 95 (1936).


Statute providing for assignment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceedings is not unconstitutional delegation of power hereunder. City of Mitchell versus Western Public Service Company, 124 Nebraska 248, 246 National Western [Reporter] 484 (1933).


Judicial department of government must protect its jurisdiction at boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Mitchell State Bank, 123 Nebraska 120, 242 National Western [Reporter] 283 (1932); State ex rel. Sorensen versus State Bank of Minatare, 123 Nebraska 109, 242 National Western [Reporter] 278 (1932).


Statute relating to declaratory judgments is valid since it does not confer nonjudicial powers on courts. Lynn versus Kearney County, 121 Nebraska 122, 236 National Western [Reporter] 192 (1931).


Power conferred on Supreme Court Justice to require filing of nomination acceptance is judicial, not quasi political or administrative. State ex rel. Meissner versus McHugh, 120 Nebraska 356, 233 National Western [Reporter] 1 (1930).


Statute requiring court to determine whether power district should be incorporated, what its boundaries should be, etc., is invalid as imposing nonjudicial duties. Searle versus Yensen, 118 Nebraska 835, 226 National Western [Reporter] 464 (1929).


Statute making federal census reports basis for determining population of subdivisions of state is void as usurping judicial power. Gordon versus Lowry, 116 Nebraska 359, 217 National Western [Reporter] 610 (1928).


Appointment by Supreme Court of district judges to appraise public utility does not violate this section. In reference Appraisement of Omaha Gas Plant, 102 Nebraska 782, 169 National Western [Reporter] 725 (1918).


Statute vesting in district court duty of ordering annexation or disconnecting territory from municipal limits upon determination of existence of required facts does not violate Constitution. Bisenius versus City of Randolph, 82 Nebraska 520, 118 National Western [Reporter] 127 (1908).


Statute providing for appointment of municipal park commissioners by judges of district court is void as violating Constitution. State ex rel. Thompson versus Neble and Latenser, 82 Nebraska 267, 117 National Western [Reporter] 723 (1908).


Statute cannot vest judiciary with legislative functions under subterfuge of giving court jurisdiction over such questions on appeal. Tyson versus Washington County, 78 Nebraska 211, 110 National Western [Reporter] 634 (1907).


Creation of State Banking Board with regulatory power over banking corporations does not vest such board with judicial powers in violation of this article. State ex rel. Prout versus N. W. Trust Company, 72 Nebraska 497, 101 National Western [Reporter] 14 (1904).


Issuance of writ of mandamus by judicial branch directing performance of duty by member of executive department does not violate this section. State ex rel. Wright versus Savage, 64 Nebraska 684, 90 National Western [Reporter] 898 (1902), modified on rehearing 64 Nebraska 702, 91 National Western [Reporter] 557 (1902).


Supreme Court, on appeal from State Board of Equalization involving valuation and assessment of railroad property, acts in judicial and not in administrative capacity. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company versus Bauman, 69 F.2d 171 (8th Circuit 1934).


4. Miscellaneous

The distribution of powers clause prohibits one branch of government from exercising the duties of another. State versus Divis, 256 Nebraska 328, 589 National Western [Reporter]2d 537 (1999).


The powers of the state government are separated into three distinct departments, none of which shall exercise the powers belonging to the others. State versus Bainbridge, 249 Nebraska 260, 543 National Western [Reporter]2d 154 (1996).


This provision separates the powers of state government into three distinct departments, none of which shall exercise the powers belonging to the others. State versus Jones, 248 Nebraska 117, 532 National Western [Reporter]2d 293 (1995).


This provision, which distributes state governmental powers to the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, does not apply to the governing bodies of municipalities. Howard versus City of Lincoln, 243 Nebraska 5, 497 National Western [Reporter]2d 53 (1993).


This provision prohibits one branch of government from encroaching on the duties and prerogatives of the others or from improperly delegating its own duties and prerogatives, and prohibits one who exercises the powers of one branch from being a member of one of the other branches. An employee of a state college is a member of the executive branch of government. An individual cannot simultaneously hold a position as an assistant professor at a state college and serve in the Legislature. State ex rel. Spire versus Conway, 238 Nebraska 766, 472 National Western [Reporter]2d 403 (1991).


Act establishing Court of Industrial Relations does not violate any constitutional provision and the standards for its guidance are adequate. Orleans Education Association versus School District of Orleans, 193 Nebraska 675, 229 National Western [Reporter]2d 172 (1975).


The provision authorizing an Industrial Commission is an independent part of the Constitution and not an amendment to Article 2. School District of Seward Education Association versus School District of Seward, 188 Nebraska 772, 199 National Western [Reporter]2d 752 (1972).


Provision in Nebraska Clean Waters Commission Act regarding appointment of trustees construed so as not to violate this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus Duxbury, 183 Nebraska 302, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 88 (1968).


Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz versus Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Nebraska 410, 149 National Western [Reporter]2d 105 (1967).


Statute providing that judicial determination that legislative act is unconstitutional shall have prospective effect only held to be in violation of this section. Davis versus General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Nebraska 865, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 907 (1964).


Statute authorizing paving in city of the second class did not delegate legislative functions to private individuals. Elliott versus City of Auburn, 172 Nebraska 1, 108 National Western [Reporter]2d 328 (1961).


Grade A Milk Act was unconstitutional as conferring legislative power upon administrative officer. Lincoln Dairy Company versus Finigan, 170 Nebraska 777, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 227 (1960).


Powers of government are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, the executive and the judicial. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Appointment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceedings does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. May versus City of Kearney, 145 Nebraska 475, 17 National Western [Reporter]2d 448 (1945).


Requirement that candidate for office of member of State Railway Commission be not less than thirty years of age does not violate this section. State ex rel. Quinn versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 436, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 892 (1942).


Purpose of section was to establish and maintain the independence of the three branches of government. State ex rel. Randall versus Hall, 125 Nebraska 236, 249 National Western [Reporter] 756 (1933).


This section concerns only government of state and does not attempt to limit Legislature in prescribing manner in which municipalities may administer local affairs. State ex rel. Baughn versus Ure, 91 Nebraska 31, 135 National Western [Reporter] 224 (1912).


3-1. Legislative authority; how vested; power of initiative; power of referendum.

The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a Legislature consisting of one chamber. The people reserve for themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the Legislature, which power shall be called the power of initiative. The people also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any act passed by the Legislature, which power shall be called the power of referendum.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 223, Section 2, page 671;
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 2000, Laws 1999, Law Report 18CA, Section 3.

Annotations

1. Grant of power

The statutes which give the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over public employees are not unconstitutional. American Fed. of S., C. & M. Employees versus Department of Public Institutions, 195 Nebraska 253, 237 National Western [Reporter]2d 841 (1976).


A grant of administrative authority is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Blackledge versus Richards, 194 Nebraska 188, 231 National Western [Reporter]2d 319 (1975).


The right of the people to exercise the initiative and referendum is specifically reserved to them. Klosterman versus Marsh, 180 Nebraska 506, 143 National Western [Reporter]2d 744 (1966).


The Legislature, subject only to the initiative and referendum, and constitutional inhibitions, and provided that legislation is for a public purpose, has an unlimited field within which to legislate. Power Oil Company versus Cochran, 138 Nebraska 827, 295 National Western [Reporter] 805 (1941).


Right of local self-government in cities and towns existed prior to present Constitution, is vested in people of respective municipalities, and cannot be taken away by Legislature. State ex rel. Smyth, Attorney General versus Moores, 55 Nebraska 480, 76 National Western [Reporter] 175 (1898), overruled in Redell versus Moores, 63 Nebraska 219, 88 National Western [Reporter] 243 (1901).


2. Limitations on exercise of power

Under this provision, a legislature may not attempt to restrict the constitutional power of a succeeding legislature to legislate. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Moore, 249 Nebraska 589, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 344 (1996).


In the creation of a new executive department, a two-thirds majority of all members elected to the Legislature is required. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Restrictions and limitations of the Constitution apply with equal force to legislative proceedings under the unicameral system as they did under the bicameral system. Mekota versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 146 Nebraska 370, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 633 (1945).


Constitution does not define, but limits, the powers of the Legislature; otherwise as to powers of city council under home rule charter. Consumers Coal Company versus City of Lincoln, 109 Nebraska 51, 189 National Western [Reporter] 643 (1922).


The 1934 amendment to this section giving all legislative powers to the Unicameral applied to Article 4, section 15, of the Constitution so as to require all orders, resolutions, and votes of the one house Legislature to be presented to the Governor and this controlled procedure as to the 1969 resolution retroceding jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska versus Village of Walthill, 334 F.Supp. 823 (D. Nebraska 1971).


3. Delegation of power

The power of the Legislature to create a body with power to deal with labor relations of governmental entities and departments does not depend upon Article 15, section 9, of the Nebraska Constitution, but it exists by virtue of Article 3, section 1. Orleans Education Association versus School District of Orleans, 193 Nebraska 675, 229 National Western [Reporter]2d 172 (1975).


Sections 79-486 and 79-4,102 do not unlawfully delegate legislative authority and are not unconstitutional. Mann versus Wayne County Board of Equalization, 186 Nebraska 752, 186 National Western [Reporter]2d 729 (1971).


Adoption of existing law or regulation by reference does not delegate legislative power to administrative officer to create criminal offenses. State versus Workman, 186 Nebraska 467, 183 National Western [Reporter]2d 911 (1971).


Nebraska Clean Waters Commission Act did not delegate legislative authority in violation of this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus Duxbury, 183 Nebraska 302, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 88 (1968).


Nebraska Revenue Act of 1967 was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the United States. Anderson versus Tiemann, 182 Nebraska 393, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 322 (1967).


Statute authorizing transfer of land from a nonaccredited to an accredited high school district did not violate this section. De Jonge versus School District of Bloomington, 179 Nebraska 539, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 296 (1966).


Legislature cannot delegate to administrative agency powers conferred solely upon Legislature. Terry Carpenter, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 175 Nebraska 26, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 374 (1963).


Legislature cannot delegate its legislative power to define a criminal offense to an administrative or executive authority. Lincoln Dairy Company versus Finigan, 170 Nebraska 777, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 227 (1960).


Fair Trade Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. McGraw Electric Company versus Lewis & Smith Drug Company, Incorporated, 159 Nebraska 703, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 608 (1955).


In absence of adequate standards, delegation of rule-making power to Superintendent of Public Instruction was unconstitutional. School District Number 39 of Washington County versus Decker, 159 Nebraska 693, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 354 (1955).


Legislature can delegate to administrative agency power to make rules and regulations covering the details of the legislative purpose. Board of Regents versus County of Lancaster, 154 Nebraska 398, 48 National Western [Reporter]2d 221 (1951).


Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District versus Hall County, 152 Nebraska 410, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1950).


Housing authority acts granting administrative functions to city council are not unconstitutional delegation of authority. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


The extraordinary session of the Legislature of 1935 was properly constituted. Steinacher versus Swanson, 131 Nebraska 439, 268 National Western [Reporter] 317 (1936).


The Legislature may not delegate legislative powers to an administrative board or to any outside agency such as the United States Congress. Smithberger versus Banning, 129 Nebraska 651, 262 National Western [Reporter] 492 (1935).


Proviso of law relating to organization of new school districts is not invalid as attempt to delegate legislative functions. Rowe versus Ray, 120 Nebraska 118, 231 National Western [Reporter] 689 (1930).


4. Miscellaneous

Act establishing Court of Industrial Relations does not violate any constitutional provision and the standards for its guidance are adequate. Orleans Education Association versus School District of Orleans, 193 Nebraska 675, 229 National Western [Reporter]2d 172 (1975).


Legislative Bill 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 does not contravene this section. Dwyer versus Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Nebraska 30, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 236 (1972).


Rural Cemetery District Act violated this provision of the Constitution. Anderson versus Carlson, 171 Nebraska 741, 107 National Western [Reporter]2d 535 (1961).


Conditions and restrictions upon former Bicameral Legislature apply to the Unicameral Legislature. State ex rel. Caldwell versus Peterson, 153 Nebraska 402, 45 National Western [Reporter]2d 122 (1950).


Constitution relating to referendum contemplates that actions brought under law be speedily disposed of so that elections be had at time specified. Barkley versus Pool, 102 Nebraska 799, 169 National Western [Reporter] 730 (1918).


Office created by Legislature may be abolished by it. State ex rel. Topping versus Houston, 94 Nebraska 445, 143 National Western [Reporter] 796 (1913).


3-2. First power reserved; initiative.

The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of the Legislature. This power may be invoked by petition wherein the proposed measure shall be set forth at length. If the petition be for the enactment of a law, it shall be signed by seven percent of the registered voters of the state, and if the petition be for the amendment of the Constitution, the petition therefor shall be signed by ten percent of such registered voters. In all cases the registered voters signing such petition shall be so distributed as to include five percent of the registered voters of each of two-fifths of the counties of the state, and when thus signed, the petition shall be filed with the Secretary of State who shall submit the measure thus proposed to the electors of the state at the first general election held not less than four months after such petition shall have been filed. The same measure, either in form or in essential substance, shall not be submitted to the people by initiative petition, either affirmatively or negatively, more often than once in three years. If conflicting measures submitted to the people at the same election be approved, the one receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall thereby become law as to all conflicting provisions. The constitutional limitations as to the scope and subject matter of statutes enacted by the Legislature shall apply to those enacted by the initiative. Initiative measures shall contain only one subject. The Legislature shall not amend, repeal, modify, or impair a law enacted by the people by initiative, contemporaneously with the adoption of this initiative measure or at any time thereafter, except upon a vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 1A (1912);
Adopted 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 223, Section 2, page 671;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 4;
Amended 1988, Laws 1988, Law Report 248, Section 1;
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 32CA, Section 1;
Amended 2004, Initiative Measure Number 418, Section 1.

Annotations

In order to qualify for the ballot, a petition to amend Nebraska's Constitution must be signed by 10 percent of the registered voters of the state. State ex rel. Bellino versus Moore, 254 Nebraska 385, 576 National Western [Reporter]2d 793 (1998).


In a case involving the people's amendment to this state's Constitution, the Supreme Court makes no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability in enacting such amendments. Duggan versus Beermann, 249 Nebraska 411, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 68 (1996).


Article 3, section 2, which refers to registered voters repeals the reference in Article 3, section 4, which refers to those voting in the preceding gubernatorial election. The number of signatures required for placement of an initiative petition on the ballot by the Nebraska Constitution is equal to 10 percent of the number of registered voters on the date the signatures are to be turned in. Duggan versus Beermann, 245 Nebraska 907, 515 National Western [Reporter]2d 788 (1994).


Provisions in a statute making it a criminal offense for a person to willfully and knowingly circulate a petition outside the county in which the person is registered to vote, and providing that signatures secured in such a manner shall not be counted, unnecessarily obstruct the people's right to participate in the initiative and referendum process and are therefore unconstitutional. A law which unnecessarily obstructs or impedes operation of the initiative and referendum process is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Beermann, 240 Nebraska 754, 485 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (1992).


Article 3, sections 2 and 4, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska set out some of the procedural requirements that must be met before an enactment initiated by a petition becomes a part of the statutory law of Nebraska or a part of the Nebraska Constitution. The people of Nebraska have specifically reserved the right to amend their Constitution themselves in sections 2 and 4 of Article 3 and in Article 16, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution. Omaha National Bank versus Spire, 223 Nebraska 209, 389 National Western [Reporter]2d 269 (1986).


This section is satisfied by a filing on July 5 for a general election to be held November 5. State ex rel. Morris versus Marsh, 183 Nebraska 521, 162 National Western [Reporter]2d 262 (1968).


Legislature is authorized to enact laws to facilitate operation of the initiative power. State ex rel. Winter versus Swanson, 138 Nebraska 597, 294 National Western [Reporter] 200 (1940).


Provision that election on initiative shall be submitted at next general election is not mandatory. If court proceedings require, election may be at subsequent general election. Barkley versus Pool, 102 Nebraska 799, 169 National Western [Reporter] 730 (1918).


Initiative procedure did not constitute adequate remedy to correct existing inequalities in apportionment of legislative districts. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 209 F.Supp. 189 (D. Nebraska 1962).


3-3. Second power reserved; referendum.

The second power reserved is the referendum which may be invoked, by petition, against any act or part of an act of the Legislature, except those making appropriations for the expense of the state government or a state institution existing at the time of the passage of such act. Petitions invoking the referendum shall be signed by not less than five percent of the registered voters of the state, distributed as required for initiative petitions, and filed in the office of the Secretary of State within ninety days after the Legislature at which the act sought to be referred was passed shall have adjourned sine die or for more than ninety days. Each such petition shall set out the title of the act against which the referendum is invoked and, in addition thereto, when only a portion of the act is sought to be referred, the number of the section or sections or portion of sections of the act designating such portion. No more than one act or portion of an act of the Legislature shall be the subject of each referendum petition. When the referendum is thus invoked, the Secretary of State shall refer the same to the electors for approval or rejection at the first general election to be held not less than thirty days after the filing of such petition.

When the referendum is invoked as to any act or part of act, other than emergency acts or those for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, by petition signed by not less than ten percent of the registered voters of the state distributed as aforesaid, it shall suspend the taking effect of such act or part of act until the same has been approved by the electors of the state.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 1B (1912);
Adopted 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 223, Section 2, page 671;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 4;
Amended 1988, Laws 1988, Law Report 248, Section 1;
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 32CA, Section 2.

Annotations

A funding provision in a bill providing for future contributions to a public school support trust fund is not an appropriation bill and referendum may be invoked. Lawrence versus Beermann, 192 Nebraska 507, 222 National Western [Reporter]2d 809 (1974).


An act of the Legislature means a particular legislative bill which has been passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor. Klosterman versus Marsh, 180 Nebraska 506, 143 National Western [Reporter]2d 744 (1966).


Taking effect of an emergency act is not suspended until the act has been voted upon by the electors. Read versus City of Scottsbluff, 179 Nebraska 410, 138 National Western [Reporter]2d 471 (1965).


Section has reference only to state legislation, and is not applicable to municipal legislation. Carlberg versus Metcalfe, 120 Nebraska 481, 234 National Western [Reporter] 87 (1930).


Provisions of this section, relating to referendum, have reference to acts of the Legislature only, and not to municipal legislation. Schroeder versus Zehrung, 108 Nebraska 573, 188 National Western [Reporter] 237 (1922).


Federal district court would not abstain from deciding whether state banking statute was properly adopted by Nebraska Legislature where analysis of the applicable Nebraska case law left no doubt that such statute was invalid. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Incorporated versus Omaha National Bank, 423 F.Supp. 519 (D. Nebraska 1976).


3-4. Initiative or referendum; signatures required; veto; election returns; constitutional amendments; non-partisan ballot.

The whole number of votes cast for Governor at the general election next preceding the filing of an initiative or referendum petition shall be the basis on which the number of signatures to such petition shall be computed. The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to measures initiated by or referred to the people. A measure initiated shall become a law or part of the Constitution, as the case may be, when a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not less than thirty-five per cent of the total vote cast at the election at which the same was submitted, are cast in favor thereof, and shall take effect upon proclamation by the Governor which shall be made within ten days after the official canvass of such votes. The vote upon initiative and referendum measures shall be returned and canvassed in the manner prescribed for the canvass of votes for president. The method of submitting and adopting amendments to the Constitution provided by this section shall be supplementary to the method prescribed in the article of this Constitution, entitled, "Amendments" and the latter shall in no case be construed to conflict herewith. The provisions with respect to the initiative and referendum shall be self-executing, but legislation may be enacted to facilitate their operation. All propositions submitted in pursuance hereof shall be submitted in a non-partisan manner and without any indication or suggestion on the ballot that they have been approved or endorsed by any political party or organization. Only the title or proper descriptive words of measures shall be printed on the ballot and when two or more measures have the same title they shall be numbered consecutively in the order of filing with the Secretary of State and the number shall be followed by the name of the first petitioner on the corresponding petition.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 1C & 1D (1912);
Adopted 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 223, Section 2, page 671;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 4.

Annotations

Article 3, section 2, which refers to registered voters repeals the reference in Article 3, section 4, which refers to those voting in the preceding gubernatorial election. The number of signatures required for placement of an initiative petition on the ballot by the Nebraska Constitution is equal to 10 percent of the number of registered voters on the date the signatures are to be turned in. Duggan versus Beermann, 245 Nebraska 907, 515 National Western [Reporter]2d 788 (1994).


Provisions in a statute making it a criminal offense for a person to willfully and knowingly circulate a petition outside the county in which the person is registered to vote, and providing that signatures secured in such a manner shall not be counted, unnecessarily obstruct the people's right to participate in the initiative and referendum process and are therefore unconstitutional. A law which unnecessarily obstructs or impedes operation of the initiative and referendum process is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Beermann, 240 Nebraska 754, 485 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (1992).


Under the constitutional provision authorizing the Legislature to enact laws which facilitate the initiative and referendum process, the Legislature may enact reasonable legislation to prevent fraud or to render intelligible the purpose of the proposed law or constitutional amendment. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Beermann, 240 Nebraska 754, 485 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (1992).


Article 3, sections 2 and 4, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska set out some of the procedural requirements that must be met before an enactment initiated by a petition becomes a part of the statutory law of Nebraska or a part of the Nebraska Constitution. The people of Nebraska have specifically reserved the right to amend their Constitution themselves in sections 2 and 4 of Article 3 and in Article 16, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution. Omaha National Bank versus Spire, 223 Nebraska 209, 389 National Western [Reporter]2d 269 (1986).


Legislation may be enacted to facilitate referendum. Klosterman versus Marsh, 180 Nebraska 506, 143 National Western [Reporter]2d 744 (1966).


This section authorizes Legislature to enact laws to prevent fraud or to render intelligible the purpose of the proposed law or constitutional amendment. State ex rel. Winter versus Swanson, 138 Nebraska 597, 294 National Western [Reporter] 200 (1940).


The result of a vote upon a proposed constitutional amendment is determined by State Canvassing Board, and, if carried, becomes operative on the date of the Governor's proclamation to that effect. Swanson versus State, 132 Nebraska 82, 271 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1937).


An election held without affirmative constitutional or statutory authority is a nullity. Thompson versus James, 125 Nebraska 350, 250 National Western [Reporter] 237 (1933).


3-5. Legislative districts; apportionment; redistricting, when required.

The Legislature shall by law determine the number of members to be elected and divide the state into legislative districts. In the creation of such districts, any county that contains population sufficient to entitle it to two or more members of the Legislature shall be divided into separate and distinct legislative districts, as nearly equal in population as may be and composed of contiguous and compact territory. One member of the Legislature shall be elected from each such district. The basis of apportionment shall be the population excluding aliens, as shown by the next preceding federal census. The Legislature shall redistrict the state after each federal decennial census. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed whenever practicable, but other established lines may be followed at the discretion of the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 2 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 5;
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 246, Section 1, page 731;
Amended 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 304, Section 1, page 856;
Amended 2000, Laws 1999, Law Report 18CA, Section 3.

Annotations

Where only two counties in the state possessed populations such that they could legally constitute unitary legislative districts and reapportionment plans were offered in the Legislature to that end, it was "practicable" to establish districts which followed the boundaries of those counties. When the population of a county is such that it can legally constitute a legislative district and it is practicable to do so, the Legislature must establish a district which follows that county's boundaries. Day versus Nelson, 240 Nebraska 997, 485 National Western [Reporter]2d 583 (1992).


The part of the 1962 amendment to this section permitting the crossing of county lines in making reapportionment of legislative districts was constitutional. Carpenter versus State, 179 Nebraska 628, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 541 (1966).


Changing of boundaries of city did not operate to interfere with power of Legislature to divide state into legislative districts. Buller versus City of Omaha, 164 Nebraska 435, 82 National Western [Reporter]2d 578 (1957).


Where grave, unreasonable and gross inequalities exist between different districts, apportionment will be held void. Rogers versus Morgan, 127 Nebraska 456, 256 National Western [Reporter] 1 (1934).


Legislature may only redistrict itself once every ten years. Exon versus Tiemann, 279 F.Supp. 603 (D. Nebraska 1967).


Crossing of county lines in making reapportionment of legislative districts was permissible. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 253 F.Supp. 27 (D. Nebraska 1966).


Portion of 1962 amendment to this section providing for not less than twenty and not more than thirty per cent weight to be given to area in making apportionment for legislative districts was unconstitutional. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 232 F.Supp. 411 (D. Nebraska 1964).


Federal court would not interfere with submission to electors of 1962 amendment to this section. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 209 F.Supp. 189 (D. Nebraska 1962).


3-6. Legislature; number of members; annual sessions.

The Legislature shall consist of not more than fifty members and not less than thirty members. The sessions of the Legislature shall be annual except as otherwise provided by this constitution or as may be otherwise provided by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 3 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 6;
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 415, Section 1, page 1424.

Annotations

Second 1965 reapportionment act sustained as constitutional. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 253 F.Supp. 27 (D. Nebraska 1966).


Legislative act of 1965 on apportionment of Legislature was unconstitutional. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 242 F.Supp. 357 (D. Nebraska 1965).


3-7. Legislators; terms; effect of redistricting; election; salary; expenses; mileage.

At the general election to be held in November 1964, one-half the members of the Legislature, or as nearly thereto as may be practicable, shall be elected for a term of four years and the remainder for a term of two years, and thereafter all members shall be elected for a term of four years, with the manner of such election to be determined by the Legislature. When the Legislature is redistricted, the members elected prior to the redistricting shall continue in office, and the law providing for such redistricting shall where necessary specify the newly established district which they shall represent for the balance of their term. Each member shall be nominated and elected in a nonpartisan manner and without any indication on the ballot that he or she is affiliated with or endorsed by any political party or organization. Each member of the Legislature shall receive a salary of not to exceed one thousand dollars per month during the term of his or her office. In addition to his or her salary, each member shall receive an amount equal to his or her actual expenses in traveling by the most usual route once to and returning from each regular or special session of the Legislature. Members of the Legislature shall receive no pay nor perquisites other than his or her salary and expenses, and employees of the Legislature shall receive no compensation other than their salary or per diem.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 4 (1875);
Amended 1886, Laws 1885, Chapter 124, page 435;
Amended 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 224, Section 1, page 675;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 7;
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 1960, Laws 1959, Chapter 235, Section 1, page 818;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 247, Section 1, page 733;
Amended 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 304, Section 1, page 856;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 323, Section 1, page 859;
Amended 1988, Laws 1988, Law Report 7, Section 1.

Annotations

Legislative Bill 1129, adopted by the Nebraska Legislature on April 16, 1986, created a pension program for members of the Legislature that constitutes "pay or perquisites" and is in contravention of this portion of the Constitution, and is thus invalid and unenforceable. State ex rel. Spire versus Public Employees Ret. Board, 226 Nebraska 176, 410 National Western [Reporter]2d 463 (1987).


This constitutional provision does not prohibit reimbursement to legislators for their actual expenses of holding office. State ex rel. Douglas versus Beermann, 216 Nebraska 849, 347 National Western [Reporter]2d 297 (1984).


It was a practical impossibility to redistrict legislative districts without taking into consideration the staggered terms of members of Legislature required by this section. Carpenter versus State, 179 Nebraska 628, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 541 (1966).


Legislator can receive for services as member of Legislature, or member of committee, only compensation provided by Constitution. In reference Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Nebraska 748, 219 National Western [Reporter] 9 (1928).


3-8. Legislators; qualifications; one-year residence in district; removal from district, effect.

No person shall be eligible to the office of member of the Legislature unless on the date of the general election at which he is elected, or on the date of his appointment he is a registered voter, has attained the age of twenty-one years and has resided within the district from which he is elected for the term of one year next before his election, unless he shall have been absent on the public business of the United States or of this State. And no person elected as aforesaid shall hold his office after he shall have removed from such district.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 5 (1875);
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 126, Section 1;
Amended 1992, Initiative Measure Number 407;
Amended 1994, Initiative Measure Number 408.
Note: The changes made to Article 3, section 8, of the Constitution of Nebraska by Initiative 407 in 1992 have been omitted because of the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan versus Beermann, 245 Nebraska 907, 515 National Western [Reporter]2d 788 (1994).
Note: The changes made to Article 3, section 8, of the Constitution of Nebraska by Initiative 408 in 1994 have been omitted because of the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan versus Beermann, 249 Nebraska 411, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 68 (1996).

3-9. Legislators; disqualifications; election to other office; resignation required.

No person holding office under the authority of the United States, or any lucrative office under the authority of this state, shall be eligible to or have a seat in the Legislature. No person elected or appointed to the Legislature shall receive any civil appointment to a state office while holding membership in the Legislature or while the Legislature is in session, and all such appointments shall be void. Except as otherwise provided by law, a member of the Legislature who is elected to any other state or local office prior to the end of his or her term in the Legislature shall resign from the Legislature prior to the commencement of the legislative session during which the term of the state or local office will begin.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 6 (1875);
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1514, Section 1;
Amended 2000, Laws 2000, Law Report 6CA, Section 1.

Annotations

It was the purpose not to permit any incentive or temptation for emoluments, gains, or position, to influence members of the Legislature. In reference Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Nebraska 748, 219 National Western [Reporter] 9 (1928).


3-10. Legislative sessions; time; quorum; rules of procedure; expulsion of members; disrespectful behavior, penalty.

Beginning with the year 1975, regular sessions of the Legislature shall be held annually, commencing at 10 a.m. on the first Wednesday after the first Monday in January of each year. The duration of regular sessions held shall not exceed ninety legislative days in odd-numbered years unless extended by a vote of four-fifths of all members elected to the Legislature, and shall not exceed sixty legislative days in even-numbered years unless extended by a vote of four-fifths of all members elected to the Legislature. Bills and resolutions under consideration by the Legislature upon adjournment of a regular session held in an odd-numbered year may be considered at the next regular session, as if there had been no such adjournment. The Lieutenant Governor shall preside, but shall vote only when the Legislature is equally divided. A majority of the members elected to the Legislature shall constitute a quorum; the Legislature shall determine the rules of its proceedings and be the judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of its members, shall choose its own officers, including a Speaker to preside when the Lieutenant Governor shall be absent, incapacitated, or shall act as Governor. No member shall be expelled except by a vote of two-thirds of all members elected to the Legislature, and no member shall be twice expelled for the same offense. The Legislature may punish by imprisonment any person not a member thereof who shall be guilty of disrespect to the Legislature by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence, but no such imprisonment shall extend beyond twenty-four hours at one time, unless the person shall persist in such disorderly or contemptuous behavior.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 7 (1875);
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 415, Section 1, page 1424;
Amended 1974, Laws 1974, Legislative Bill 598, Section 1.

Annotations

This section applies to all but final passage of a legislative bill. Center Bank versus Dept. of Banking & Finance, 210 Nebraska 227, 313 National Western [Reporter]2d 661 (1981).


Legislature may provide by its rules for reconsideration of confirmation of appointments. State ex rel. Johnson versus Hagemeister, 161 Nebraska 475, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 625 (1955).


Canvass of votes for executive state officers occurs when Legislature convenes on first Tuesday in January after election. State ex rel. Caldwell versus Peterson, 153 Nebraska 402, 45 National Western [Reporter]2d 122 (1950).


Court will, by mandamus, compel proper officers to issue certificate of election to member elected. State ex rel. Norton versus Van Camp, 36 Nebraska 91, 54 National Western [Reporter] 113 (1893).


3-11. Legislative journal; vote viva voce; open doors; committee votes.

The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish them, except such parts as may require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members on any question shall at the desire of any one of them be entered on the journal. All votes shall be viva voce. The doors of the Legislature and of the committees of the Legislature shall be open, except when the business shall be such as ought to be kept secret. The yeas and nays of each member of any committee of the Legislature shall be recorded and published on any question in committee to advance or to indefinitely postpone any bill.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 8 (1875);
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 10CA, Section 1.

Annotations

When journals of both houses of Legislature and signature of Governor each clearly show the passage of an act in a certain definite form, the undisputed mistake of an enrolling clerk will not be allowed to defeat the act. State ex rel. Ball versus Hall, 130 Nebraska 18, 263 National Western [Reporter] 400 (1935).


A bill duly certified as having passed both houses of the Legislature and approved by the Governor imports verity and its passage can only be overthrown by the journals of the Legislature showing affirmatively that it was not passed in manner prescribed by the Constitution. State ex rel. Loseke versus Fricke, 126 Nebraska 736, 254 National Western [Reporter] 409 (1934).


Electric roll call device answers constitutional requirements of "viva voce" vote in Legislature. Day versus Walker, 124 Nebraska 500, 247 National Western [Reporter] 350 (1933).


Procedural action by the Legislature in passing on appropriation bill is prescribed, in part, by this section. Elmen versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Nebraska 141, 231 National Western [Reporter] 772 (1930).


Legislative journals are the best evidence of what affirmatively appears regarding enactment of the law. Webster versus City of Hastings, 59 Nebraska 563, 81 National Western [Reporter] 510 (1900).


Certificate of presiding officer of branch of Legislature, that bill was duly passed, is mere prima facie evidence of that fact. Evidence may be received to ascertain whether or not bill actually passed. Webster versus City of Hastings, 56 Nebraska 669, 77 National Western [Reporter] 127 (1898).


It is not competent to impeach proceedings of Legislature by contradicting journals, and facts proper to be inferred from approval of Governor and adoption of bill by officers in House and Senate. In reference Granger, 56 Nebraska 260, 76 National Western [Reporter] 588 (1898).


Federal district court would not abstain from deciding whether state banking statute was properly adopted by Nebraska Legislature where analysis of the applicable Nebraska case law left no doubt that such statute was invalid. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Incorporated versus Omaha National Bank, 423 F.Supp. 519 (D. Nebraska 1976).


3-12. Legislators; terms; limitation.

(1) No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of the Legislature for four years next after the expiration of two consecutive terms regardless of the district represented.

(2) Service prior to January 1, 2001, as a member of the Legislature shall not be counted for the purpose of calculating consecutive terms in subsection (1) of this section.

(3) For the purpose of this section, service in office for more than one-half of a term shall be deemed service for a term.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 12 (2000);
Adopted 2000, Initiative Measure Number 415.

3-13. Style of bills; majority necessary to passage; yeas and nays entered on journal.

The style of all bills shall be, Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska, and no law shall be enacted except by bill. No bill shall be passed by the Legislature unless by the assent of a majority of all members elected and the yeas and nays on the question of final passage of any bill shall be entered upon the journal.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 10 (1875);
Amended 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 223, Section 3, page 674;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 8;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 132, Section 1.

Annotations

Under this provision, a legislature may not attempt to restrict the constitutional power of a succeeding legislature to legislate. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Moore, 249 Nebraska 589, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 344 (1996).


Language requiring assent of a majority of all members elected to the Legislature before a bill can be passed means that to pass a bill on final reading, bill must have affirmative votes of a majority of all members, and a vote of the Lieutenant Governor is not effective to break a tie and pass a legislative bill on final reading. Center Bank versus Dept. of Banking & Finance, 210 Nebraska 227, 313 National Western [Reporter]2d 661 (1981).


Enrolled bill signed by presiding officers of both houses of Legislature and approved by Governor imports verity as to its passage. State ex rel. Loseke versus Fricke, 126 Nebraska 736, 254 National Western [Reporter] 409 (1934).


Electric roll call device answers constitutional requirement if it provides proper record of vote in journal. Day versus Walker, 124 Nebraska 500, 247 National Western [Reporter] 350 (1933).


Appropriation bill containing items in excess of budget recommendations was legally adopted by three-fifths vote of Legislature, without separate three-fifths vote on each item increased over budget proposal. Elmen versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Nebraska 141, 231 National Western [Reporter] 772 (1930).


This section requires an affirmative vote of a majority of all members elected to the Legislature, and not merely the majority of a quorum, in order to either enact a law or add amendments to a bill or a rescission of an affirmative act already taken. Moore versus Neece, 80 Nebraska 600, 114 National Western [Reporter] 767 (1908).


3-14. Bills and resolutions read by title; printing; vote for final passage; bills to contain one subject; amended section to be set forth; signing of bills.

Every bill and resolution shall be read by title when introduced, and a printed copy thereof provided for the use of each member. The bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed and presented before the vote is taken upon its final passage and shall be read at large unless three-fifths of all the members elected to the Legislature vote not to read the bill and all amendments at large. No vote upon the final passage of any bill shall be taken until five legislative days after its introduction nor until it has been on file for final reading and passage for at least one legislative day. No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. No law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed. The Lieutenant Governor, or the Speaker if acting as presiding officer, shall sign, in the presence of the Legislature while it is in session and capable of transacting business, all bills and resolutions passed by the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 11 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 8;
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 330;
Amended 1996, Laws 1995, Law Report 4CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Title to act

The Supreme Court will not strike down legislation as violative of this section if the title calls attention to the subject matter of the bill, and the portion of the bill challenged is germane to the purpose announced in the title. One does not have standing to complain that a statute is unconstitutional unless he is injuriously affected thereby. Blackledge versus Richards, 194 Nebraska 188, 231 National Western [Reporter]2d 319 (1975).


Purpose of the title is to describe the subject not to synopsize the contents or every conceivable consequence. Title found sufficient. Hall versus Simpson, 184 Nebraska 762, 171 National Western [Reporter]2d 805 (1969).


Bill providing procedure for withdrawal from area vocational technical schools did not violate this section. Chaloupka versus Area Vocational Technical School Number 2, 184 Nebraska 196, 165 National Western [Reporter]2d 719 (1969).


Title of act need not refer to provisions of the act being amended if the nature of the legislation contained or the nature of the changes or additions made by it are sufficiently indicated. Tom & Jerry, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Nebraska 410, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 232 (1968).


In enacting act increasing penalty for assault upon guard by inmate of penal institution, the title of the act did not violate this section. State versus Lovell, 181 Nebraska 401, 149 National Western [Reporter]2d 46 (1967).


Title to Industrial Development Act of 1961 was sufficient, and act was not broader than title. State ex rel. Meyer versus County of Lancaster, 173 Nebraska 195, 113 National Western [Reporter]2d 63 (1962).


Title of amendatory act must give reasonable notice of the general subject upon which it is proposed to legislate. State ex rel. Bottolfson versus School Board of Sch. District Number R1 of Cedar and Dixon Counties, 170 Nebraska 417, 103 National Western [Reporter]2d 146 (1960).


Amendment to Installment Loan Act was broader than title and was violative of this section. Thompson versus Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Nebraska 377, 99 National Western [Reporter]2d 761 (1959).


Title to amendatory act relating to taxation of motor vehicles was sufficient. Peterson versus Hancock, 166 Nebraska 637, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (1958).


Defect in title was cured by incorporation of statute in 1943 revision. Peterson versus Vasak, 162 Nebraska 498, 76 National Western [Reporter]2d 420 (1956).


Title to act dealing with depopulated school districts was sufficient. Schutte versus Schmitt, 162 Nebraska 162, 75 National Western [Reporter]2d 656 (1956).


Defect in title to legislative act was cured by adoption by Legislature of general revision act. McGraw Electric Company versus Lewis & Smith Drug Company, Incorporated, 159 Nebraska 703, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 608 (1955).


Title to Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was good. Hadden versus Aitken, 156 Nebraska 215, 55 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1952).


Where bill contains but one subject and that subject is clearly expressed in the title, constitutional requirements have been met, even though title contains duplicitous or extraneous provisions not necessary to its validity. Midwest Popcorn Company versus Johnson, 152 Nebraska 867, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 174 (1950).


Legislative act defining offense of foeticide is constitutional. Hans versus State, 147 Nebraska 67, 22 National Western [Reporter]2d 385 (1946).


Where title to amendatory act indicates the subject of the proposed legislation, and the provisions of the act are germane to the subject matter of the original section proposed to be changed, the act is not violative of this section. County of Dawson versus South Side Irrigation Company, 146 Nebraska 512, 20 National Western [Reporter]2d 387 (1945).


It is not required that title be a synopsis of the act. Maher versus State, 144 Nebraska 463, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 641 (1944).


If act has but one general object, no matter how broad, and contains no matter not germane thereto, and title fairly expresses the subject of the bill, it does not violate constitutional provisions. Beisner versus Cochran, 138 Nebraska 445, 293 National Western [Reporter] 289 (1940).


Statute defining ice cream was not vulnerable to objection act was broader than its title. State versus McCosh, 134 Nebraska 780, 279 National Western [Reporter] 775 (1938).


A title is not necessary to an act providing for submission of a proposed amendment to Constitution, and will be treated as null and void. Swanson versus State, 132 Nebraska 82, 271 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1937).


Title, "An act relating to municipal courts," is sufficient to include a section providing for eligibility of judges of such courts. Spier versus Thomas, 131 Nebraska 579, 269 National Western [Reporter] 61 (1936).


Act providing for payment of delinquent taxes by annual installments was not broader than title. Steinacher versus Swanson, 131 Nebraska 439, 268 National Western [Reporter] 317 (1936).


Act providing for adoption of managerial form of county government was broader than title. State ex rel. O'Connor versus Tusa, 130 Nebraska 528, 265 National Western [Reporter] 524 (1936).


In determining whether an act amending a previous act is broader than its title, court will consider the titles to both the amending and amended acts. Miller versus Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Company, 129 Nebraska 757, 262 National Western [Reporter] 855 (1935).


A proviso attached to an appropriation, subject of which proviso is not referred to in title of act, is invalid. State ex rel National Surety Corp. versus Price, 129 Nebraska 433, 261 National Western [Reporter] 894 (1935).


Title reading, "to provide punishment for one who makes statements or representations with intent to defraud," is not broad enough to include imposition of penalty on one who does not know that statements are false but had ground to believe they were false. Joseph versus State, 128 Nebraska 824, 260 National Western [Reporter] 803 (1935).


Title of independent act authorizing construction of sewers and providing that owners or occupants of premises be charged for the services, and to raise money, is broad enough to include legislation authorizing issuance of bonds secured by property and revenue of sewerage system. State ex rel. City of Columbus versus Price, 127 Nebraska 132, 254 National Western [Reporter] 889 (1934).


Act relating to irrigation, flood control, storage of waters, and to generation, distribution, transmission, sale and purchase of electrical energy was valid. State ex rel. Loseke versus Fricke, 126 Nebraska 736, 254 National Western [Reporter] 409 (1934).


Act providing for erecting bridges over irrigation ditches on public roads was invalid to extent it was broader than title. State ex rel. County of Dawson versus Dawson County Irrigation Company, 125 Nebraska 836, 252 National Western [Reporter] 320 (1934).


Where title to act provided for the regulation and licensing of traffic in tobacco, it was not unconstitutional as a revenue measure, a subject not mentioned in title. Nash-Finch Company versus Beal, 124 Nebraska 835, 248 National Western [Reporter] 374 (1933).


Nepotism law was void because provisions for penalty were not embraced in title. Wayne County versus Steele, 121 Nebraska 438, 237 National Western [Reporter] 288 (1931).


Act providing for control and eradication of disease among domestic animals was not invalid as containing more than one subject not clearly expressed in title. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Knudtsen, 121 Nebraska 270, 236 National Western [Reporter] 696 (1931).


Title designating act as establishing laws relating to civil government and administration thereof was broad enough to include provisions regulating banking. Westbrook versus State, 120 Nebraska 625, 234 National Western [Reporter] 579 (1931).


Securities law was not invalid because provision for burden of proof as to exemptions was not specifically referred to in title. Pandolfo versus State, 120 Nebraska 616, 234 National Western [Reporter] 483 (1931).


Where title fairly gives expression to general subject matter, act will not be held invalid as broader than title. Mehrens versus Bauman, 120 Nebraska 110, 231 National Western [Reporter] 701 (1930).


Title must be such as to give reasonable notice to members of Legislature and others interested, of the general subject upon which it is proposed to legislate. Appel Mercantile Company versus Barker, 92 Nebraska 669, 138 National Western [Reporter] 1133 (1912).


If general purpose of act is expressed and matter contained in body is germane thereto, title is sufficient. State ex rel. Baughn versus Ure, 91 Nebraska 31, 135 National Western [Reporter] 224 (1912).


Title need not be abstract of bill, but it is sufficient if title indicates subject of proposed legislation. Nebraska Loan & Bldg. Association versus Perkins, 61 Nebraska 254, 85 National Western [Reporter] 67 (1901).


Title of act is part thereof and must clearly express subject matter. State versus Burlington & M. R. R. Company, 60 Nebraska 741, 84 National Western [Reporter] 254 (1901).


Purpose is to prevent subjects of different nature from being inserted under color of amendment. State ex rel. Graham versus Tibbets, 52 Nebraska 228, 71 National Western [Reporter] 990 (1897).


Provisions relating to title should be liberally construed to admit insertion in act of all provisions which, though not specifically expressed in title, are comprehended within objects and purposes of act, and all provisions germane and not foreign to expressed provisions in title. Affholder versus State ex rel. McMullen, 51 Nebraska 91, 70 National Western [Reporter] 544 (1897).


Provision as to title applies to amendatory acts as well as complete and independent acts. West Point Water Power & Land Improvement Company versus State ex rel. Moodie, 49 Nebraska 223, 68 National Western [Reporter] 507 (1896).


2. Acts containing more than one subject

Act of Legislature authorizing city of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands did not violate this section. Campbell versus City of Lincoln, 182 Nebraska 459, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 444 (1968).


Nebraska Revenue Act of 1967 did not violate provision that no bill shall contain more than one subject. Anderson versus Tiemann, 182 Nebraska 393, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 322 (1967).


Title of Blanket Mill Tax Levy Act was good and act was independent legislation. Peterson versus Hancock, 155 Nebraska 801, 54 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1952).


Statute prohibiting state and federal officers and employees from being delegates to county, district, and state political conventions contained but one subject which was clearly expressed in the title. State ex rel. Baldwin versus Strain, 152 Nebraska 763, 42 National Western [Reporter]2d 796 (1950).


Act relating to county jails and fees of sheriffs with reference to care of prisoners therein contained but one subject and was constitutional. Dorrance versus County of Douglas, 149 Nebraska 685, 32 National Western [Reporter]2d 202 (1948).


Statute relating to condemnation of public utilities is not violative of constitutional requirement of single subject clearly expressed in title. City of Mitchell versus Western Public Service Company, 124 Nebraska 248, 246 National Western [Reporter] 484 (1933).


Intangible tax statute was not invalid as containing more than one subject. Mehrens versus Greenleaf, 119 Nebraska 82, 227 National Western [Reporter] 325 (1929).


Act relating to recovery on forfeited recognizance was not void as containing more than one subject not clearly expressed in title. State versus Painter, 117 Nebraska 42, 219 National Western [Reporter] 794 (1928).


Statute entitled "An act to amend" certain sections "and to repeal" the same as then existing, was not broader than title. Conservative Sav. & L. Association of Omaha versus Anderson, 116 Nebraska 627, 218 National Western [Reporter] 423 (1928).


Including provision for drainage of subirrigated lands in act relating to organization of irrigation district does not violate requirement that bill shall contain only one subject to be expressed in title. State ex rel. Reed versus Farmers Irrigation District, 116 Nebraska 373, 217 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1928).


Provisions for raising money by taxation, issuing bonds, and eminent domain, was not beyond scope of act "defining powers and government of light, heat and power districts." Elliott versus Wille, 112 Nebraska 78, 200 National Western [Reporter] 347 (1924).


Provision for housing municipal court in county courthouse was not beyond scope of act "to create municipal court," etc. State ex rel. City of Omaha versus Board of County Comrs. of Douglas County, 109 Nebraska 35, 189 National Western [Reporter] 639 (1922).


Where title of act refers to both relocation of county seats and county division, but body of act relates only to relocation, it is not invalid as containing two subjects. Murray versus Nelson, 107 Nebraska 52, 185 National Western [Reporter] 319 (1921).


Statute "relating to stealing, buying or concealing automobiles," was not invalid as containing more than one subject, although providing for rules of evidence, and for including more than one count in indictment. Birdhead versus State, 105 Nebraska 296, 180 National Western [Reporter] 583 (1920).


Act "to provide for county farm bureaus," was not invalid for containing more than one subject, though it contains provisions for employment and payment of county agent, duties of county board, etc. State ex rel. Hall County Farm Bureau versus Miller, 104 Nebraska 838, 178 National Western [Reporter] 846 (1920).


Including crime of buying or receiving stolen automobiles in act relating to larceny of motor vehicles was not more than one subject. Sandlovich versus State, 104 Nebraska 169, 176 National Western [Reporter] 81 (1920).


Act relating to rural school districts contained only one subject. Gauchat versus School District Number 5 in Nemaha County, 101 Nebraska 377, 163 National Western [Reporter] 334 (1917).


Statute regulating licensing of persons practicing chiropody, chiropractic, and dentistry, was not invalid as containing more than one subject. Peet Stock Remedy Company versus McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Circuit 1929).


3. Independent complete acts

If an act is complete and independent in itself it may incidentally amend, modify, or have impact upon provisions of existing statutes without violating this section. Aschenbrenner versus Nebraska P.P. District, 206 Nebraska 157, 291 National Western [Reporter]2d 720 (1980).


The independent act considered herein is not unconstitutional for failure to mention in the incidental provision for payment or exemption from payment of costs, nor for failing to refer to and repeal certain other statutes. State ex rel. Douglas versus Gradwohl, 194 Nebraska 745, 235 National Western [Reporter]2d 854 (1975).


Legislative Bill 1357, Laws 1969, providing for natural resources districts was independent legislation and not violative of this section. Neeman versus Nebraska National Resources Commission, 191 Nebraska 672, 217 National Western [Reporter]2d 166 (1974).


Act prohibiting merger of school districts in certain cases was complete and independent. Bodenstedt versus Rickers, 189 Nebraska 407, 203 National Western [Reporter]2d 110 (1972).


Nebraska Trust Deeds Act did not violate this section. Blair Company versus American Savings Company, 184 Nebraska 557, 169 National Western [Reporter]2d 292 (1969).


Parking Authority Law was original and independent legislation and title to act was sufficient. Omaha Parking Authority versus City of Omaha, 163 Nebraska 97, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 862 (1956).


Eminent domain procedure act sustained as constitutional. Jensen versus Omaha Public Power District, 159 Nebraska 277, 66 National Western [Reporter]2d 591 (1954).


Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District versus Hall County, 152 Nebraska 410, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1950).


General appropriation bill of 1945 sustained as constitutional. Rein versus Johnson, 149 Nebraska 67, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 548 (1947).


An independent act may incorporate within itself by reference provisions of another existing act, and the effect is the same as though the statute or part adopted had been written into the adopting statute. Rocky Mountain Lines versus Cochran, 140 Nebraska 378, 299 National Western [Reporter] 596 (1941).


Housing authority acts of 1937 are independent and complete in themselves and hence not violative of constitutional provision. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


If act is complete and independent in itself, it may amend or modify provisions of existing statutes without controverting the provisions of Constitution relating to amendments. Live Stock National Bank versus Jackson, 137 Nebraska 161, 288 National Western [Reporter] 515 (1939); Hinman versus Temple, 133 Nebraska 268, 274 National Western [Reporter] 605 (1937).


Independent act, complete in itself, is not rendered amendatory because it refers to another act for procedure taken. Department of Banking versus Foe, 136 Nebraska 422, 286 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1939).


An independent legislative act covering the entire subject of legislation may change or repeal former enactments in conflict with new provisions. State ex rel. Kaspar versus Lehmkuhl, 127 Nebraska 812, 257 National Western [Reporter] 229 (1934).


Civil Administrative Code law was complete in itself, and not amendatory. Sheridan County versus Hand, 114 Nebraska 813, 210 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1926).


Act, complete in itself, which conflicts with prior statute but does not purport to amend it, is not invalid, but repeals earlier statute by implication. Drew versus Mumford, 114 Nebraska 100, 206 National Western [Reporter] 159 (1925).


Act defining and providing penalties for blackmail was complete act covering distinct crime, and not amendatory of statutes covering related offenses. McKenzie versus State, 113 Nebraska 576, 204 National Western [Reporter] 60 (1925).


Act relating to state mineral land leases was complete and not amendatory. Briggs versus Neville, 103 Nebraska 1, 170 National Western [Reporter] 188 (1918).


Mothers' Pension Law was complete and not amendatory of poor laws. Rumsey versus Saline County, 102 Nebraska 302, 167 National Western [Reporter] 66 (1918).


Act requiring county attorney to perform duties of coroner was complete, and its effect was to incorporate into new law the existing laws relating to duties of coroner. State ex rel. Crosby versus Moorhead, 100 Nebraska 298, 159 National Western [Reporter] 412 (1916).


Later act relating to verification, filing and allowance of claims against counties, being complete in itself, repealed by implication conflicting prior statute. Uttley versus Sievers, 100 Nebraska 59, 158 National Western [Reporter] 373 (1916).


Act providing for teaching foreign languages in schools was complete, and not amendatory of or in conflict with any prior law. State ex rel. Thayer versus School District of Nebraska City, 99 Nebraska 338, 156 National Western [Reporter] 641 (1916).


Act to define "week" in legal notices was complete and not amendatory. In reference Estate of Johnson, 98 Nebraska 799, 154 National Western [Reporter] 550 (1915).


Act complete in itself repeals by implication existing laws in conflict or repugnant thereto. State ex rel. Farmers State Bank of Pickrell versus Hevelone, 92 Nebraska 748, 139 National Western [Reporter] 636 (1913).


Mere fact that act refers to prior act by implication does not render new act amendatory if otherwise complete. Stewart versus Barton, 91 Nebraska 96, 135 National Western [Reporter] 381 (1912).


Provision is not violated by changes or modifications in existing statutes merely as incidental result of adopting new law covering whole subject to which it relates. De France versus Harmer, 66 Nebraska 14, 92 National Western [Reporter] 159 (1902).


Law relating to irrigation districts containing no reference to previous law must be construed as independent act. Bridgeport Irrigation District versus United States, 40 F.2d 827 (8th Circuit 1930).


Statute conferring additional powers on irrigation district was independent act, complete in itself, not governed by this section. New York Trust Company versus Farmers Irrigation District, 280 F. 785 (8th Circuit 1922).


4. Amendatory acts

The Depressant and Stimulant Drugs Act of 1967 did not violate this section. State versus Waechter, 189 Nebraska 433, 203 National Western [Reporter]2d 104 (1972).


Legislative Bill 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 did not violate this section since it was not amendatory. Dwyer versus Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Nebraska 30, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 236 (1972).


An act which does not contain section amended but changes existing statutes in part so that changes and existing provisions result in connected piece of legislation covering same subject matter is void under this section. State versus Greenburg, 187 Nebraska 149, 187 National Western [Reporter]2d 751 (1971).


Cited in construing intent of the Legislature. Schurmann versus Curtiss, 183 Nebraska 277, 159 National Western [Reporter]2d 554 (1968).


Airport Authority Act did not violate this section. Obitz versus Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Nebraska 410, 149 National Western [Reporter]2d 105 (1967).


The 1959 amendments to the act prescribing rules for administrative agencies were constitutional. Yellow Cab Company versus Nebraska State Railway Commission, 175 Nebraska 150, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 922 (1963).


The fact that legislation is cast in the form of an independent act is not controlling if in substance it is amendatory. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus County of Box Butte, 166 Nebraska 603, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 72 (1958).


Inference of amendment by implication could not be made. Omaha National Bank versus Jensen, 157 Nebraska 22, 58 National Western [Reporter]2d 582 (1953).


Legislative act providing for proceedings with reference to children born out of wedlock did not violate this section. In reference Application of Rozgall, 147 Nebraska 260, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1946).


Reference to sections in compilation by an amendatory act applied to constitutional parts of original act, even though portions thereof had been held unconstitutional. Sullivan versus City of Omaha, 146 Nebraska 297, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 510 (1945).


Statute may adopt penalty provision of another statute without being amendatory thereof. Adams versus State, 138 Nebraska 613, 294 National Western [Reporter] 396 (1940).


Under prior constitutional provision, if a bill was introduced in Legislature with constitutional time limit, amendments germane to its subject may be made after expiration of such time limit. Pierson versus Faulkner, 134 Nebraska 865, 279 National Western [Reporter] 813 (1938).


Where an act, although purporting to be independent act complete in itself, is in fact purely amendatory of existing legislation, it is void for noncompliance with this section. State ex rel. Day versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 699, 262 National Western [Reporter] 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


Statute providing for payment of delinquent taxes without interest and penalty was amendatory of existing laws and invalid because not repealing original sections. Tukey versus Douglas County, 129 Nebraska 353, 261 National Western [Reporter] 833 (1935).


Where title states that subject of an act is to amend one section of a former statute, the act cannot be extended to amend other sections, and where title is to repeal certain sections the bill cannot reference-enact the substance of the statutes repealed in title nor amend sections so repealed. Moeller, McPherrin & Judd versus Smith, 127 Nebraska 424, 255 National Western [Reporter] 551 (1934).


Where an act, although professing to be an independent act, makes changes in existing acts by adding new provisions and mingling the new with the old so as to make of the new and the old a connected piece of legislation covering the same subject, it is within the constitutional prohibition. State ex rel. Beal versus Bauman, 126 Nebraska 566, 254 National Western [Reporter] 256 (1934).


Substituting complete new act authorizing counties to foreclose liens for taxes delinquent more than three years, by amendment germane to original act, was not violative of requirement that new act set out amended sections. Douglas County versus Barker Company, 125 Nebraska 253, 249 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1933); Commercial Savings & Loan Association versus Pyramid Realty Company, 121 Nebraska 493, 237 National Western [Reporter] 575 (1931).


Common law marriage statute was not violative of constitutional prohibitions herein. Collins versus Hoag & Rollins, 122 Nebraska 805, 241 National Western [Reporter] 766 (1932).


Provision appointing county treasurer agent of department of public works in collection of automobile registration fees, and providing that he should retain 5-cent fee and account therefor was germane to act which it amended. Wayne County versus Steele, 121 Nebraska 438, 237 National Western [Reporter] 288 (1931).


Act to determine heirship did not violate provision respecting amendments. In reference Robinson Heirship, 119 Nebraska 285, 228 National Western [Reporter] 852 (1930).


Intangible tax statute was not violative of provision respecting amendments. Mehrens versus Greenleaf, 119 Nebraska 82, 227 National Western [Reporter] 325 (1929).


Where act does not cover the whole subject or general scheme of legislation, and fails to amend existing statutes, it is void. State versus Painter, 117 Nebraska 42, 219 National Western [Reporter] 794 (1928).


Statute purporting to amend a certain section mentioned in title, but which attempts to amend another section without reference thereto, is void. Endres versus McDonald, 115 Nebraska 827, 215 National Western [Reporter] 114 (1927).


Statute requiring claims for damages against utilities district to be filed within 20 days, was void because not germane to original section attempted to be amended. Day versus Metropolitan Utilities District, 115 Nebraska 711, 214 National Western [Reporter] 647 (1927).


Section in Bovine Tuberculosis Act was void because not germane to subject expressed in title. State ex rel. Spillman versus Heldt, 115 Nebraska 435, 213 National Western [Reporter] 578 (1927).


Title of amendatory act using the word "bootlegging" was not inconsistent with body of act or subject matter of section to be amended. Knothe versus State, 115 Nebraska 119, 211 National Western [Reporter] 619 (1926).


Act amending section of Workmen's Compensation Law was void because added words were not germane to original section. Allen versus Trester, 112 Nebraska 515, 199 National Western [Reporter] 841 (1924).


Where two statutes are enacted at the same session without reference to one another, but as amendments of identical sections of the statutes, the one which is the later expression of the legislative will prevails, if the two enactments are irreconcilable. State ex rel. City of Omaha versus Board of County Comrs. of Douglas County, 109 Nebraska 35, 189 National Western [Reporter] 639 (1922).


Act amending section of prohibition law was germane to subject of legislation. State versus Badberg, 108 Nebraska 816, 189 National Western [Reporter] 157 (1922).


Amendatory act relating to county high school districts was germane to subject of legislation. State ex rel. Stockwell versus Berryman, 102 Nebraska 553, 167 National Western [Reporter] 790 (1918).


Amendatory act providing for consolidating contiguous school districts was germane to purpose of original section providing for children in one district attending school in another. Johnson versus School District Number 101 of Saunders County, 102 Nebraska 347, 167 National Western [Reporter] 210 (1918).


Amendatory act requiring drainage district directors to submit question of incurring expense to election was germane to original section defining directors' duties. State ex rel. Gantz versus Drainage District Number 1 of Merrick County, 100 Nebraska 625, 160 National Western [Reporter] 997 (1916).


Act increasing limit of taxation for county building was not complete but amendatory of existing statute fixing limit, and void because it does not contain or repeal amended section. Minier versus Burt County, 95 Nebraska 473, 145 National Western [Reporter] 977 (1914), rehearing denied 95 Nebraska 483, 145 National Western [Reporter] 1104 (1914).


Section as amended should contain all that is substituted for original section and original section should be entirely repealed. State ex rel. Martin versus Farmers & Merchants Bank of Oakland, 93 Nebraska 1, 139 National Western [Reporter] 653 (1913).


Where act amends specified section of statute, it is sufficient if the amendment is germane. State ex rel. Sch. District of City of Lincoln versus Barton, 91 Nebraska 357, 136 National Western [Reporter] 22 (1912).


No amendatory legislation not germane to subject matter of original section can be included in act to amend particular section. Armstrong versus Mayer, 60 Nebraska 423, 83 National Western [Reporter] 401 (1900).


Amendatory legislation foreign to subject of original act, and not embraced in title thereof, cannot be included in amendatory act. State ex rel. Scott versus Bowen, 54 Nebraska 211, 74 National Western [Reporter] 615 (1898).


Act must set out in full new section and also contain repeal of old section amended. Reynolds versus State, 53 Nebraska 761, 74 National Western [Reporter] 330 (1898).


Referring to section of statute is sufficient in an amendatory act, but matters not germane to original section can not be included. Horkey versus Kendall, 53 Nebraska 522, 73 National Western [Reporter] 953 (1898).


Amendatory act is void if there is no mention of, or reference to, amended section or law. Douglas County versus Hayes, 52 Nebraska 191, 71 National Western [Reporter] 1023 (1897).


This section requires all parts of amended law to be included in new act and old law so amended to be repealed. State ex rel. Carey versus Cornell, 50 Nebraska 526, 70 National Western [Reporter] 56 (1897).


Act amending subdivision of section, and which contains subdivision so amended, does not violate Constitution. State ex rel. City Water Company versus City of Kearney, 49 Nebraska 325, 68 National Western [Reporter] 533 (1896).


Where act may be construed to be either amendatory or an independent act, it will be given that construction which will sustain its constitutionality. Bridgeport Irrigation District versus United States, 40 F.2d 827 (8th Circuit 1930).


Statute relating to practice of veterinary medicine and surgery was not violative of this section. Peet Stock Remedy Company versus McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Circuit 1929).


5. Legislative procedure

This provision does not demand that a bill remain uninterrupted on final reading for at least 1 legislative day immediately prior to its passage. DeCamp versus State, 256 Nebraska 892, 594 National Western [Reporter]2d 571 (1999).


This section, applying to legislative bills, refers to final passage. Klosterman versus Marsh, 180 Nebraska 506, 143 National Western [Reporter]2d 744 (1966).


Substituting an entire new bill by amendment is not unconstitutional where changes are germane; and it is not necessary that bill, if read twice before amendment, should again be placed on first and second reading. State ex rel. Davis versus Cox, 105 Nebraska 75, 178 National Western [Reporter] 913 (1920).


Failure of senate presiding officer to sign bill, afterwards approved by Governor, and shown on senate journal passed by constitutional majority, does not invalidate. State ex rel. Nebraska State Railway Commission versus Missouri P. Ry. Company, 100 Nebraska 700, 161 National Western [Reporter] 270 (1916).


Three readings are not required after amendments have been made following the first and second reading. State ex rel. Martin versus Ryan, 92 Nebraska 636, 139 National Western [Reporter] 235 (1912).


Bill not authenticated by signature of presiding officer of either branch of Legislature was void. State ex rel. McClay versus Mickey, 73 Nebraska 281, 102 National Western [Reporter] 679 (1905).


This section does not require three separate readings of bills as finally amended. State ex rel. First National Bank of Atkinson versus Cronin, 72 Nebraska 636, 101 National Western [Reporter] 325 (1904).


This section does not require that amendment or bills as amended, shall be read on three separate days. Cleland versus Anderson, 66 Nebraska 252, 92 National Western [Reporter] 306 (1902), affirmed on rehearing 66 Nebraska 273, 96 National Western [Reporter] 212 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 66 Nebraska 276, 98 National Western [Reporter] 1075 (1904).


Bill must be read on three separate days. State versus Burlington & M. R. R. Company, 60 Nebraska 741, 84 National Western [Reporter] 254 (1900).


6. Miscellaneous

Under this provision, a legislature may not attempt to restrict the constitutional power of a succeeding legislature to legislate. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Moore, 249 Nebraska 589, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 344 (1996).


Act establishing Court of Industrial Relations does not violate any constitutional provision and the standards for its guidance are adequate. Orleans Education Association versus School District of Orleans, 193 Nebraska 675, 229 National Western [Reporter]2d 172 (1975).


Constitutionality of Municipal Ground Water Act raised, but not decided. Metropolitan Utilities District versus Merritt Beach Company, 179 Nebraska 783, 140 National Western [Reporter]2d 626 (1966).


Unconstitutionality of tax statute under this section raised but not decided. Creigh versus Larsen, 171 Nebraska 317, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 187 (1960).


Provision of former primary election law requiring filing fifty days before primary by incumbent of one office seeking another was unconstitutional. Fitzgerald versus Kuppinger, 163 Nebraska 286, 79 National Western [Reporter]2d 547 (1956).


Installment Loan Act did not violate requirements of this section. State ex rel. Beck versus Associates Discount Corp., 162 Nebraska 683, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 215 (1956).


This section does not apply to passage of city ordinances, and decisions thereunder are only valuable as analogies. Gembler versus City of Seward, 136 Nebraska 196, 285 National Western [Reporter] 542 (1939).


Entire act is void, where part of the act which is held unconstitutional is an inducement to the passage thereof, and is not separable. McShane versus Douglas County, 96 Nebraska 664, 148 National Western [Reporter] 569 (1914).


Federal district court would not abstain from deciding whether state banking statute was properly adopted by Nebraska Legislature where analysis of the applicable Nebraska case law left no doubt that such statute was invalid. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Incorporated versus Omaha National Bank, 423 F.Supp. 519 (D. Nebraska 1976).


3-15. Members privileged from arrest.

Members of the Legislature in all cases except treason, felony or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during the session of the Legislature, and for fifteen days next before the commencement and after the termination thereof.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 12 (1875).

Annotations

Legislature may by law provide that members are exempt from service of civil process during session. Berlet versus Weary, 67 Nebraska 75, 93 National Western [Reporter] 238 (1903).


Privilege of member is not privilege of the Legislature merely but of the people, and is conferred to enable him to discharge trust confided to him by constituents. State versus Elder, 31 Nebraska 169, 47 National Western [Reporter] 710 (1891).


3-16. Members of the Legislature and state officers; conflicts of interest; standards for.

No member of the Legislature or any state officer shall have a conflict of interest, as defined by the Legislature, directly in any contract, with the state or any county or municipality thereof, authorized by any law enacted during the term for which he shall have been elected or appointed, or within one year after the expiration of such term. The Legislature shall prescribe standards and definitions for determining the existence of such conflicts of interest in contracts, and it shall prescribe sanctions for enforcing this section.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 13 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 9;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 322, Section 1, page 856;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1514, Section 1.

Annotations

Legislator can receive from state only compensation provided by Constitution, for services as member of Legislature or of committee. In reference Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Nebraska 748, 219 National Western [Reporter] 9 (1928).


If member is interested in any contract authorized by law passed during his term, this section would prevent his claiming any rights under such contract, but would not invalidate the law. Briggs versus Neville, 103 Nebraska 1, 170 National Western [Reporter] 188 (1918).


3-17. Impeachment; procedure.

The Legislature shall have the sole power of impeachment, but a majority of the members elected must concur therein. Proceedings may be initiated in either a regular session or a special session of the Legislature. Upon the adoption of a resolution of impeachment, which resolution shall give reasonable notice of the acts or omissions alleged to constitute impeachable offenses but need not conform to any particular style, a notice of an impeachment of any officer, other than a Judge of the Supreme Court, shall be forthwith served upon the Chief Justice, by the Clerk of the Legislature, who shall thereupon call a session of the Supreme Court to meet at the Capitol in an expeditious fashion after such notice to try the impeachment. A notice of an impeachment of the Chief Justice or any Judge of the Supreme Court shall be served by the Clerk of the Legislature, upon the clerk of the judicial district within which the Capitol is located, and he or she thereupon shall choose, at random, seven Judges of the District Court in the State to meet within thirty days at the Capitol, to sit as a Court to try such impeachment, which Court shall organize by electing one of its number to preside. The case against the impeached civil officer shall be brought in the name of the Legislature and shall be managed by two senators, appointed by the Legislature, who may make technical or procedural amendments to the articles of impeachment as they deem necessary. The trial shall be conducted in the manner of a civil proceeding and the impeached civil officer shall not be allowed to invoke a privilege against self-incrimination, except as otherwise applicable in a general civil case. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Court of impeachment that clear and convincing evidence exists indicating that such person is guilty of one or more impeachable offenses, but judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, profit, or trust, in this State, but the party impeached, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution and punishment according to law. No officer shall exercise his or her official duties after he or she shall have been impeached and notified thereof, until he or she shall have been acquitted.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 14 (1875);
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 126, Section 1;
Amended 1986, Laws 1986, Law Report 318, Section 1.

Annotations

An impeachment must be tried by the Supreme Court. State versus Douglas, 217 Nebraska 199, 349 National Western [Reporter]2d 870 (1984).


The effect of this provision is to require the concurrence of five or more judges to convict on any count of an impeachable offense. State versus Douglas, 217 Nebraska 199, 349 National Western [Reporter]2d 870 (1984).


A constitutional officer can only be removed by impeachment. Laverty versus Cochran, 132 Nebraska 118, 271 National Western [Reporter] 354 (1936).


Only method of removing county judge is by impeachment under this section. Conroy versus Hallowell, 94 Nebraska 794, 144 National Western [Reporter] 895 (1913).


Impeachment is essentially criminal prosecution and accused must be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. State versus Hastings, 37 Nebraska 96, 55 National Western [Reporter] 774 (1893).


Authority to present other or amended articles of impeachment rests along with Legislature, and power to impeach cannot be delegated. State versus Leese, 37 Nebraska 92, 55 National Western [Reporter] 798 (1893).


Power of impeachment is exclusively conferred upon the Legislature and either one of two judgments can be pronounced, removal from office or removal and disqualification to hold office. Impeachment will not lie after term of office has expired. State versus Hill, 37 Nebraska 80, 55 National Western [Reporter] 794 (1893).


3-18. Local or special laws prohibited.

The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, that is to say:

For granting divorces.

Changing the names of persons or places.

Laying out, opening altering and working roads or highways.

Vacating roads, Town plats, streets, alleys, and public grounds.

Locating or changing County seats.

Regulating County and Township offices.

Regulating the practice of Courts of Justice.

Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace, Police Magistrates and Constables.

Providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases.

Incorporating Cities, Towns and Villages, or changing or amending the charter of any Town, City, or Village.

Providing for the election of Officers in Townships, incorporated Towns or Cities.

Summoning or empaneling Grand or Petit Juries.

Providing for the bonding of cities, towns, precincts, school districts or other municipalities.

Providing for the management of Public Schools.

The opening and conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting.

The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors, or others under disability.

The protection of game or fish.

Chartering or licensing ferries, or toll bridges, remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures, creating, increasing and decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.

Changing the law of descent.

Granting to any corporation, association, or individual, the right to lay down railroad tracks, or amending existing charters for such purpose.

Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever; PROVIDED, that notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature shall have authority to separately define and classify loans and installment sales, to establish maximum rates within classifications of loans or installment sales which it establishes, and to regulate with respect thereto. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 15 (1875);
Amended 1964, Laws 1965, (Appendix), Seventy-fourth Extraordinary Session, 1963, Chapter 3, Section 1, page 1921.

Annotations

1. Valid legislation

The provisions of section 79-487 authorizing the transportation of nonprofit private school students on public school buses do not violate the provisions of this section in that they extend transportation benefits to nonprofit private school students on exactly the same basis and under the same regulations governing the transportation of public school students. State ex rel. Bouc versus School District of City of Lincoln, 211 Nebraska 731, 320 National Western [Reporter]2d 472 (1982).


Section 25-222 relating to limitation of actions for professional negligence does not violate this section. Taylor versus Karrer, 196 Nebraska 581, 244 National Western [Reporter]2d 201 (1976).


Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act including one year notice of claim requirements and two year limitation for bringing action held constitutional. Campbell versus City of Lincoln, 195 Nebraska 703, 240 National Western [Reporter]2d 339 (1976).


The affected class defined in Legislative Bill 1003, Eighty-second Legislature, First Session, sections 23-2601 to 23-2612 is valid and the act is not a local or special law. Dwyer versus Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Nebraska 30, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 236 (1972).


Statute authorizing transfer of land for school purposes was not void as special legislation. Kaup versus Sweet, 187 Nebraska 226, 188 National Western [Reporter]2d 891 (1971).


Law prohibiting usury defenses by corporation not violative of this section. Snyder versus Woxo, Incorporated, 185 Nebraska 545, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 281 (1970).


Prohibiting retailer from accepting credit for purchase of beer from wholesaler while permitting acceptance of credit on purchase of liquor is constitutional. Tom & Jerry, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Nebraska 410, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 232 (1968).


Act of Legislature authorizing cities of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands was not local or special law. Campbell versus City of Lincoln, 182 Nebraska 459, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 444 (1968).


The 1964 amendment to this section was designed and intended to authorize legislation regulating installment sales. Engelmeyer versus Murphy, 180 Nebraska 295, 142 National Western [Reporter]2d 342 (1966).


Statute authorizing transfer of land for school purposes was not special legislation in violation of this section. McDonald versus Rentfrow, 176 Nebraska 796, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 480 (1964).


Statute providing for limited access to interstate highway was not special legislation. Fougeron versus County of Seward, 174 Nebraska 753, 119 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (1963).


Brand Inspection Act is not special legislation within meaning of this section. Satterfield versus State, 172 Nebraska 275, 109 National Western [Reporter]2d 415 (1961).


Statute providing for sewer use charge in metropolitan cities did not violate this section. Metropolitan Utilities District versus City of Omaha, 171 Nebraska 609, 107 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1961).


Parking Authority Law did not violate constitutional prohibition against special legislation. Omaha Parking Authority versus City of Omaha, 163 Nebraska 97, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 862 (1956).


Installment Loan Act was not a local or special law regulating interest on money. State ex rel. Beck versus Associates Discount Corp., 162 Nebraska 683, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 215 (1956).


A statute which becomes operative within thirty days from the date it takes effect as to existing counties in the class, but specifies no machinery by which it shall become immediately operative in counties subsequently entering the class, is not violative of this section. Midwest Popcorn Company versus Johnson, 152 Nebraska 867, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 174 (1950).


Statute providing for appointment of district judges as appraisers in condemnation proceeding is reasonable and not inimical to this section. May versus City of Kearney, 145 Nebraska 475, 17 National Western [Reporter]2d 448 (1945).


Requirement that candidate for office of member of State Railway Commission be not less than thirty years of age does not violate this section. State ex rel. Quinn versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 436, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 892 (1942).


Act creating Nebraska Advertising Commission did not violate this section. Power Oil Company versus Cochran, 138 Nebraska 827, 295 National Western [Reporter] 805 (1941).


If a law is general and operates uniformly and equally on all brought within the relation and circumstances for which it provides, it is not a local or special law in the constitutional sense. Bauer versus State Game, Forestation & Parks Commission, 138 Nebraska 436, 293 National Western [Reporter] 282 (1940).


Acts creating housing authorities was not special legislation. Lennox versus Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Nebraska 582, 290 National Western [Reporter] 451 (1940).


Act exempting irrigation companies from building bridges over ditches crossing public roads was discriminatory and void. State ex rel. County of Dawson versus Dawson County Irrigation Company, 125 Nebraska 836, 252 National Western [Reporter] 320 (1934).


Statute providing for condemnation of public utilities is not special act regulating courts prohibited hereunder. City of Mitchell versus Western Public Service Company, 124 Nebraska 248, 246 National Western [Reporter] 484 (1933).


Statute providing venue of actions was not in violation of this section. Schwarting versus Ogram, 123 Nebraska 76, 242 National Western [Reporter] 273 (1932).


Act according priority to classes of claims in bank receiverships was not violative of prohibition against special and class legislation. State ex rel Sorensen versus First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Nebraska 510, 240 National Western [Reporter] 750 (1932); State ex rel. Sorensen versus First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Nebraska 502, 240 National Western [Reporter] 747 (1932).


Law permitting fencing with gates across highway was not unconstitutional as class, local, or special legislation. McFadden versus Denter, 118 Nebraska 38, 223 National Western [Reporter] 462 (1929).


Law relating to testing cattle for tuberculosis does not violate provision forbidding special law where general law applicable. State ex rel Spillman versus Wallace, 117 Nebraska 588, 221 National Western [Reporter] 712 (1928).


Law adding ministers to classes exempted from Railroad Anti-Pass Law was not special legislation. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 112 Nebraska 248, 199 National Western [Reporter] 534 (1924).


Law requiring Board of Regents to manufacture and sell hog cholera serum, at cost, to farmers and swine growers, was valid. Fisher versus Board of Regents of Univ. of Nebraska, 108 Nebraska 666, 189 National Western [Reporter] 161 (1922).


Law authorizing counties of 150,000 or more to issue bonds and levy tax to rebuild courthouse destroyed by fire or riot was valid. Cunningham versus Douglas County, 104 Nebraska 405, 177 National Western [Reporter] 742 (1920).


Law restricting number of candidates appearing on ballot at primary election for delegates to constitutional convention was valid. Baker versus Moorhead, 103 Nebraska 811, 174 National Western [Reporter] 430 (1919).


Law relating to state mineral land leases was valid. Briggs versus Neville, 103 Nebraska 1, 170 National Western [Reporter] 188 (1918).


Prohibiting saloons within two and one half miles of military posts is valid. Rushart versus Crippen, 99 Nebraska 682, 157 National Western [Reporter] 611 (1916).


Law fixing maximum rate of interest and brokerage fee for money lenders was valid. Althaus versus State, 99 Nebraska 465, 156 National Western [Reporter] 1038 (1916).


Law permitting teaching of foreign languages in schools was valid. State ex rel. Thayer versus School District of Nebraska City, 99 Nebraska 338, 156 National Western [Reporter] 641 (1916).


Law regulating hours of service for firemen, but excepting chief and assistant chief was valid. State ex rel. Rea versus City Council of Lincoln, 98 Nebraska 634, 154 National Western [Reporter] 217 (1915).


Law authorizing county board to pay for bridge material, though claim had previously been adjudged invalid in court, was valid. Gibson versus Sherman County, 97 Nebraska 79, 149 National Western [Reporter] 107 (1914).


Act regulating practice of medicine was valid. Mathews versus Hedlund, 82 Nebraska 825, 119 National Western [Reporter] 17 (1908).


Act prohibiting common labor on Sunday was valid. In reference Caldwell, 82 Nebraska 544, 118 National Western [Reporter] 133 (1908).


Act relating to taxation of building and loan associations as a class was valid. Nebraska Central Bldg. & Loan Association versus Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 78 Nebraska 472, 111 National Western [Reporter] 147 (1907).


Act providing for election of city officers on particular day was valid. State ex rel. Pentzer versus Malone, 74 Nebraska 645, 105 National Western [Reporter] 893 (1905).


Act giving irrigation companies right to prior appropriation in water, does not contravene Constitution prohibiting special privileges. Farmers Canal Company versus Frank, 72 Nebraska 136, 100 National Western [Reporter] 286 (1904).


Act regulating hours of employment of females in manufacturing and mechanical establishments was valid. Wenham versus State, 65 Nebraska 394, 91 National Western [Reporter] 421 (1902).


Act providing for Tax Commissioner in city of specified class was valid. State ex rel. Prout versus Aitken, 62 Nebraska 428, 87 National Western [Reporter] 153 (1901).


General law, though affecting but single county, is not for that reason void as special legislation. State ex rel Douglas County versus Frank, 61 Nebraska 679, 85 National Western [Reporter] 956 (1901).


Permitting prosecution by information in one county and indictment in another is valid. Dinsmore versus State, 61 Nebraska 418, 85 National Western [Reporter] 445 (1901).


Act providing for recovery of attorney's fees to be treated as costs in action against fire insurance company was valid. Insurance Company of North America versus Bachler, 44 Nebraska 549, 62 National Western [Reporter] 911 (1895).


Ordinance granting exclusive contract for removal of garbage was valid. Coombs versus MacDonald, 43 Nebraska 632, 62 National Western [Reporter] 41 (1895).


Statute allowing reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff, to be taxed as costs, in suit on insurance policy covering real property was valid. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Company versus Dobney, 189 U.S. 301 (1903).


Statute relative to practice of veterinary medicine and surgery was not discriminatory hereunder. Peet Stock Remedy Company versus McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Circuit 1929).


Cedar Rust Law was not special legislation. Upton versus Felton, 4 F.Supp. 585 (D. Nebraska 1932).


2. Invalid legislation

Act providing for the reimbursement of funds to depositors of failed industrial loan and investment companies violated this provision. Haman versus Marsh, 237 Nebraska 699, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 836 (1991).


An act which permits public grants to students, which must be used in private institutions in this state, is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Rogers versus Swanson, 192 Nebraska 125, 219 National Western [Reporter]2d 726 (1974).


To hold that city of first class without home rule charter may be annexed but one with home rule charter could not be dissolved would violate this section. City of Millard versus City of Omaha, 185 Nebraska 617, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1970).


Act which fixed value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment as those used by taxpayer in determining federal income tax violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus McNeil, 185 Nebraska 586, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 596 (1970).


Cited legislation violated this section by creating permanently closed class and by being totally arbitrary and unreasonable in method of classification. City of Scottsbluff versus Tiemann, 185 Nebraska 256, 175 National Western [Reporter]2d 74 (1970).


Amendment extending time for appeal under section 77-510, R.R.S.1943, after appeal time had expired violated this section. In reference Valuation and Equalization, 182 Nebraska 621, 156 National Western [Reporter]2d 728 (1968).


Penalty for failure to return property for taxation was special law in violation of this section. Bachus versus Swanson, 179 Nebraska 1, 136 National Western [Reporter]2d 189 (1965).


Legislative Bill 16 of 1963 Special Session violated this section and was unconstitutional in its entirety. Kometscher versus Wade, 177 Nebraska 299, 128 National Western [Reporter]2d 781 (1964).


Statute changing penalty relating to agreements for sale of personal property upon an installment basis held to be special legislation in violation of this section. Davis versus General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Nebraska 865, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 907 (1964).


Designation of retail installment sales contracts as a class, in fixing maximum interest permitted to be charged, was special legislation inhibited by this section. Stanton versus Mattson, 175 Nebraska 767, 123 National Western [Reporter]2d 844 (1963).


Installment Sales Act of 1959 was unconstitutional because it fixed different interest rates on automobiles according to age. Elder versus Doerr, 175 Nebraska 483, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 528 (1963).


Statute requiring reporting of property in warehouse for taxation and excepting household goods was violative of this section. United States Cold Storage Corp. versus Stolinski, 168 Nebraska 513, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 408 (1959).


Legislature cannot create liability on part of state for fraud of its officers, and waive statute of limitations for benefit of few within a class. Bordy versus State, 142 Nebraska 714, 7 National Western [Reporter]2d 632 (1943).


Where legislation is of state wide concern, a legislative act applying to part of cities within designated class and not applying to other cities within the same class having a home rule charter violates this section. Axberg versus City of Lincoln, 141 Nebraska 55, 2 National Western [Reporter]2d 613 (1942).


An act of Legislature attempting to waive sovereignty of the state and create liability on state's part in favor of an individual for negligence of state's servants and agents is a special law in contravention of this section. Cox versus State, 134 Nebraska 751, 279 National Western [Reporter] 482 (1938).


Law authorizing counties of more than 150,000 to use portion of gas tax to retire highway construction bonds was invalid, as special legislation. State ex rel. Cone versus Bauman, 120 Nebraska 77, 231 National Western [Reporter] 693 (1930).


Statute purporting to validate proceedings to form light and power districts was invalid as special legislation. Anderson versus Lehmkuhl, 119 Nebraska 451, 229 National Western [Reporter] 773 (1930).


Law regulating public dances on Sunday, but excepting metropolitan cities from its operation, was invalid special legislation. Galloway versus Wolfe, 117 Nebraska 824, 223 National Western [Reporter] 1 (1929).


Proviso authorizing irrigation districts under certain circumstances, to require landowners to construct and maintain laterals and supervise water distribution, was prohibited special legislation. State ex rel. Campbell versus Gering Irrigation District, 114 Nebraska 329, 207 National Western [Reporter] 525 (1926).


Law imposing liability on counties for destruction of personal property of officers in public buildings by riotous mobs, was void. Court intimates that it would also be void as special legislation. Wakeley versus Douglas County, 109 Nebraska 396, 191 National Western [Reporter] 337 (1922).


Classification of counties for purpose of relocating county seats, if not general and cannot be applied to all counties, is void as special legislation. State ex rel. Conkling versus Kelso, 92 Nebraska 628, 139 National Western [Reporter] 226 (1912).


Statute operating upon county of specified population for particular year was void as special legislation. State versus Scott, 70 Nebraska 685, 100 National Western [Reporter] 812 (1904).


Act fixing day's work at eight hours for labor but exempting farmers or domestic labor, was void as special legislation. Low versus Rees Printing Company, 41 Nebraska 127, 59 National Western [Reporter] 362 (1894).


3. Classification

A legislative act constitutes special legislation, violative of this provision, if it (1) creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) creates a permanently closed class. City of Ralston versus Balka, 247 Nebraska 773, 530 National Western [Reporter]2d 594 (1995).


A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) by creating a permanently closed class. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline versus State Board of Equal., 238 Nebraska 565, 471 National Western [Reporter]2d 734 (1991).


A classification which limits the application of the law to a present condition, and leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in the numbers of the class by future growth or development, is special. Haman versus Marsh, 237 Nebraska 699, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 836 (1991).


A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation in one of two ways: (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or (2) by creating a permanently closed class. Haman versus Marsh, 237 Nebraska 699, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 836 (1991).


The term "class legislation" is a characterization of legislation in contravention of this provision. It is that which makes improper discrimination by conferring privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference. Haman versus Marsh, 237 Nebraska 699, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 836 (1991).


A legislative classification must operate uniformly on all within a class which is reasonable. Natural Gas Pipeline Company versus State Board of Equal., 237 Nebraska 357, 466 National Western [Reporter]2d 461 (1991).


The Legislature may, for the purpose of legislating, classify persons, places, objects, or subjects, but such classification must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class. Natural Gas Pipeline Company versus State Board of Equal., 237 Nebraska 357, 466 National Western [Reporter]2d 461 (1991).


The Legislature may classify persons under this section as long as, absent implication of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the categorization has a rational basis. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Company versus Cox, 232 Nebraska 846, 443 National Western [Reporter]2d 566 (1989).


Section 60-1701 contains classifications and exceptions which are unreasonable, arbitrary, and unrelated to the public interest, and is therefore unconstitutional and void in violation of this section. State versus Edmunds, 211 Nebraska 380, 318 National Western [Reporter]2d 859 (1982).


Provisions of legislation creating the Local Government Revenue Fund were unconstitutional because classifications created by the act were arbitrary and unreasonable closed classifications in that they prevented a county from moving from one classification to another and the legislation was, therefore, a special law as to each of the state's counties. State ex rel. Douglas versus Marsh, 207 Nebraska 598, 300 National Western [Reporter]2d 181 (1980).


A bill which treats all those who exceed the fifty-five miles per hour interstate highway limit by no more than ten miles per hour, in different manner, as to fines and costs, than those in other categories is not special legislation. State ex rel. Douglas versus Gradwohl, 194 Nebraska 745, 235 National Western [Reporter]2d 854 (1975).


The partial exemption from taxation of classes of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer versus State, 192 Nebraska 63, 218 National Western [Reporter]2d 893 (1974).


Free port law does not violate constitutional provisions for uniformity and against special privileges. Norden Laboratories, Incorporated versus County Board of Equalization, 189 Nebraska 437, 203 National Western [Reporter]2d 152 (1973).


Cigarette Tax Act, sections 77-2602 et seq., 1971 Supp., is not void for unreasonable classification, nor is it a special law. Sandberg versus State, 188 Nebraska 335, 196 National Western [Reporter]2d 501 (1972).


Cited legislation violated this section by creating permanently closed class and by being totally arbitrary and unreasonable in method of classification. City of Scottsbluff versus Tiemann, 185 Nebraska 256, 175 National Western [Reporter]2d 74 (1970).


Prohibiting retailer from accepting credit for purchase of beer from wholesaler while permitting acceptance of credit on purchase of liquor is constitutional. Tom & Jerry, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 183 Nebraska 410, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 232 (1968).


Act of Legislature authorizing cities of primary class to annex contiguous or adjacent lands was not local or special law. Campbell versus City of Lincoln, 182 Nebraska 459, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 444 (1968).


Provisions of Grid System Act constituted a grant of special privileges and an unlawful splitting of a class, and was unconstitutional. Wittler versus Baumgartner, 180 Nebraska 446, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1966).


Act regulating the profession of engineers and architects sustained as constitutional against claim of discrimination in classification. State ex rel. Meyer versus Knutson, 178 Nebraska 375, 133 National Western [Reporter]2d 577 (1965).


State Employees Retirement Act did not constitute an unreasonable classification and was not unconstitutional as special legislation. Gossman versus State Employees Retirement System, 177 Nebraska 326, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 97 (1964).


Waiver or remission of penalties by a local or special law is prohibited. Creigh versus Larsen, 171 Nebraska 317, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 187 (1960).


Constitution recognizes that villages and cities are separate and distinct. Hueftle versus Eustis Cemetery Association, 171 Nebraska 293, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 400 (1960).


Amendment to Installment Loan Act creating four classes as to which different penalties were applicable was violative of this section. Thompson versus Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Nebraska 377, 99 National Western [Reporter]2d 761 (1959).


Arbitrary classification may result in special legislation. United Community Services versus Omaha National Bank, 162 Nebraska 786, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1956).


Classification according to population is permitted where real and substantial differences exist. Dorrance versus County of Douglas, 149 Nebraska 685, 32 National Western [Reporter]2d 202 (1948).


Classification of business or property for taxation can be permitted only if classification is reasonable and the tax operates uniformly upon all members of the class. Thorin versus Burke, 146 Nebraska 94, 18 National Western [Reporter]2d 664 (1945).


Penalties for nonpayment of taxes are punitive in their nature and their remission by Legislature is not forbidden as arbitrary class legislation. Tukey versus Douglas County, 133 Nebraska 732, 277 National Western [Reporter] 57 (1938).


Act providing for annual tax on fire insurance companies based on gross premiums received by each for insurance written within state was invalid because it did not operate equally and uniformly upon all members of class. Continental Ins. Company versus Smrha, 131 Nebraska 791, 270 National Western [Reporter] 122 (1936).


Act extending time in which to pay taxes was invalid as based on arbitrary classification. Steinacher versus Swanson, 131 Nebraska 439, 268 National Western [Reporter] 317 (1936).


Legislature may classify persons, corporations and property for purposes of legislation, but classification must rest upon real differences in situation and circumstances of members of the class relative to subject of legislation, and the law must operate uniformly on every member of class so designated. State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


Classification must be reasonable. Althaus versus State, 94 Nebraska 780, 144 National Western [Reporter] 799 (1913); Livingston Loan & Building Association versus Drummond, 49 Nebraska 200, 68 National Western [Reporter] 375 (1896).


If statute operates equally upon all persons or objects of a class so constituted, it is enough. Dougherty versus Kubat, 67 Nebraska 269, 93 National Western [Reporter] 317 (1903).


Statute must be general and uniform throughout the state, and operate alike on all persons and localities of a class reasonably constituted with reference to relations and circumstances provided for. Cleland versus Anderson, 66 Nebraska 252, 92 National Western [Reporter] 306 (1902), affirmed on rehearing 66 Nebraska 273, 96 National Western [Reporter] 212 (1903), affirmed on rehearing 66 Nebraska 276, 98 National Western [Reporter] 1075 (1904).


If law is general and uniform throughout the state, operating alike on all persons and localities of a class, it is not objectionable. Livingston Loan & Bldg. Association versus Drummond, 49 Nebraska 200, 68 National Western [Reporter] 375 (1896).


Classification of cities into classes and subclasses for purposes of legislation does not violate Constitution. State ex rel. Jones versus Graham, 16 Nebraska 74, 19 National Western [Reporter] 470 (1884).


4. Miscellaneous

In Nebraska, both equal protection and the prohibition against special legislation emanate from this provision, however the test of validity under each is different. Haman versus Marsh, 237 Nebraska 699, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 836 (1991).


This provision concerns itself with disparate treatment in much the same manner as does the language of U.S. Constitution amendment XIV, which prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws." Distinctive Printing & Packaging Company versus Cox, 232 Nebraska 846, 443 National Western [Reporter]2d 566 (1989).


Requiring registration of mobile homes and assessing a reasonable fee to defray cost of registration and inspection, if any, does not violate constitutional provision requiring uniform and proportionate taxation of personal property. Gates versus Howell, 204 Nebraska 256, 282 National Western [Reporter]2d 22 (1979).


Statute abrogating right of action against auctioneers under conditions stated does not violate this section. State Securities Company versus Norfolk Livestock Sales Company, Incorporated, 187 Nebraska 446, 191 National Western [Reporter]2d 614 (1971).


Claim of unconstitutionality of city ordinance regulating labor relations as special law raised but not decided. Midwest Employers Council, Incorporated versus City of Omaha, 177 Nebraska 877, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 609 (1964)


Power to regulate interest on money may not be done by local or special law. State Securities Company versus Ley, 177 Nebraska 251, 128 National Western [Reporter]2d 766 (1964).


State may enjoin threatened diversion of realty from its original use where it was granted by state to a church for religious purposes. State ex rel. Hunter versus Home Savings & Loan Association, 137 Nebraska 231, 288 National Western [Reporter] 691 (1939).


Regulation of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission providing that opening and closing hours for sale of beer in rural districts shall be same as those fixed by ordinance in nearest incorporated city or village was valid. Griffin versus Gass, 133 Nebraska 56, 274 National Western [Reporter] 193 (1937).


Refusal of State Railway Commission to grant authority to operate motor buses to a second common carrier in Omaha was not inhibited by this section. Furstenberg versus Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company, 132 Nebraska 562, 272 National Western [Reporter] 756 (1937).


Prohibitions in this section are confined to specific cases mentioned, and Legislature may legislate upon any subject not therein prohibited. Stewart versus Barton, 91 Nebraska 96, 135 National Western [Reporter] 381 (1912).


Special privilege is right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege granted to, or vested in, a person or class of persons to exclusion of others and in derogation of common rights. City of Plattsmouth versus Nebraska Tel. Company, 80 Nebraska 460, 114 National Western [Reporter] 588 (1908).


It is for Legislature to determine as to applicability of general law and propriety of special law. Weston versus Ryan, 70 Nebraska 211, 97 National Western [Reporter] 347 (1903).


Determination of whether act is general or special depends upon substance of act, not its form. State ex rel. Wheeler versus Stuht, 52 Nebraska 209, 71 National Western [Reporter] 941 (1897).


This section is not restriction upon powers of Legislature over subject involved, but rather limitation in respect to manner of exercise of power. Smiley versus MacDonald, 42 Nebraska 5, 60 National Western [Reporter] 355 (1894).


If law is general in terms and restricted to no particular locality, and operates equally upon all of a group of objects, it is not special law. Hunzinger versus State, 39 Nebraska 653, 58 National Western [Reporter] 194 (1894).


No special law can be enacted where general law can be made applicable. In reference House Roll 284, 31 Nebraska 505, 48 National Western [Reporter] 275 (1891).


Federal district court would not abstain from deciding whether state banking statute was properly adopted by Nebraska Legislature where analysis of the applicable Nebraska case law left no doubt that such statute was invalid. Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Incorporated versus Omaha National Bank, 423 F.Supp. 519 (D. Nebraska 1976).


3-19. Compensation; increase when; extra compensation to public officers and contractors prohibited; retirement benefits; adjustment.

The Legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any public officer, agent, or servant after the services have been rendered nor to any contractor after the contract has been entered into, except that retirement benefits of retired public officers and employees may be adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of living and wage levels that have occurred subsequent to the date of retirement.

The compensation of any public officer, including any officer whose compensation is fixed by the Legislature, shall not be increased or diminished during his or her term of office, except that when there are members elected or appointed to the Legislature or the judiciary, or officers elected or appointed to a board or commission having more than one member, and the terms of such members commence and end at different times, the compensation of all members of the Legislature, of the judiciary, or of such board or commission may be increased or diminished at the beginning of the full term of any member thereof.

Nothing in this section shall prevent local governing bodies from reviewing and adjusting vested pension benefits periodically as prescribed by ordinance.

The surviving spouse of any retired public officer, agent, or servant, who has retired under a pension plan or system, shall be considered as having pensionable status and shall be entitled to the same benefits which may, at any time, be provided for or available to spouses of other public officers, agents, or servants who have retired under such pension plan or system at a later date, and such benefits shall not be prohibited by the restrictions of this section or of Article 13, section 3 of the Constitution of Nebraska.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 16 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 10;
Amended 1952, Laws 1951, Chapter 159, Section 1, page 634;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 322, Section 1, page 856;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1414, Section 1;
Amended 1978, Laws 1978, Legislative Bill 739, Section 1;
Amended 2000, Laws 2000, Law Report 291CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Salary increase

A resolution of a county board fixing the salaries of elected county officers at an amount plus an annual adjustment for changes in the cost of living as determined by an independent federal agency, does not violate this Article and section of the Nebraska Constitution. Shepoka versus Knopik, 201 Nebraska 780, 272 National Western [Reporter]2d 364 (1978).


Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 743, was not effective as to compensation for county attorney whose term had started before it was adopted. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association versus Holscher, 193 Nebraska 729, 230 National Western [Reporter]2d 75 (1975).


Act creating State Employees Retirement System did not violate this section. Gossman versus State Employees Retirement System, 177 Nebraska 326, 129 National Western [Reporter]2d 97 (1964).


Salary of executive officer could not be increased during term. State ex rel. Laughlin versus Johnson, 156 Nebraska 671, 57 National Western [Reporter]2d 531 (1953).


Increase or decrease in compensation resulting from a change in population is not prohibited by this section. Hamilton versus Foster, 155 Nebraska 89, 50 National Western [Reporter]2d 542 (1951).


Increase in salaries of county commissioners during their term of office was prohibited by this section. Ramsey versus County of Gage, 153 Nebraska 24, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 593 (1950).


Legislature has authority to increase salary of officer during term whose compensation has not previously been fixed by legislative enactment. State ex rel. Johnson versus Marsh, 149 Nebraska 1, 29 National Western [Reporter]2d 799 (1947).


Statute providing for garnishment of officers and employees of state and its subdivisions does not violate provision prohibiting increase or diminution of compensation of public officers during term of office. Department of Banking versus Foe, 136 Nebraska 422, 286 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1939).


Action of a county board in determining population of a county as a basis for determining salaries of county officers, without notice and opportunity to such officers to be heard was void. Shambaugh versus Buffalo County, 133 Nebraska 46, 274 National Western [Reporter] 207 (1937).


Salary of any public officer, whether fixed by Constitution or statute, cannot be diminished during term. State ex rel. Day versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 699, 262 National Western [Reporter] 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


Salary of officer created by Constitution could not be diminished during his term. State ex rel. Randall versus Hall, 125 Nebraska 236, 249 National Western [Reporter] 756 (1933).


2. Extra compensation

The prohibition contained in this section of the Nebraska Constitution is not applicable to the compensation paid to a jailer, even if the duties of jailer are performed by the sheriff. State ex rel. Landanger versus Madison County, 213 Nebraska 33, 327 National Western [Reporter]2d 93 (1982).


Law authorizing payment to county treasurer of 25 cent fee for each applicant for motor vehicle operator's license was not void as increasing salary. Mehrens versus Bauman, 120 Nebraska 110, 231 National Western [Reporter] 701 (1930).


Legislator can receive from state for services as member, or member of committee, only compensation provided by Constitution. In reference Appeal of Wilkins, 116 Nebraska 748, 219 National Western [Reporter] 9 (1928).


Pension granted to firemen in municipality is not gratuity nor extra compensation within Constitution. State ex rel. Haberlan versus Love, 89 Nebraska 149, 131 National Western [Reporter] 196 (1911).


3. Miscellaneous

Prohibition against a gratuity of compensation after services rendered applies both to the state and all political subdivisions thereof. Retired City Gov. Employees Club of Omaha versus City of Omaha Employees Ret. Sys., 199 Nebraska 507, 260 National Western [Reporter]2d 472 (1977).


Judges of the district court of this state are members of a court within meaning of this section. Garrotto versus McManus, 185 Nebraska 644, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 570 (1970).


Deduction from salary for retirement pay during existing term of judge was violation of this section. Wilson versus Marsh, 162 Nebraska 237, 75 National Western [Reporter]2d 723 (1956).


Office of police judge is constitutional office within this section, and period of an officer holding over, together with regular term, constitutes one term. State ex rel. Gordon versus Moores, 61 Nebraska 9, 84 National Western [Reporter] 399 (1900).


Before 1920 amendment this section applied alone to those officers whose offices were created by the Constitution and did not apply to office of county commissioner. Douglas County versus Timme, 32 Nebraska 272, 49 National Western [Reporter] 266 (1891).


3-20. Salt springs, coal, oil, minerals; alienation prohibited.

The salt springs, coal, oil, minerals, or other natural resources on or contained in the land belonging to the state shall never be alienated; but provision may be made by law for the leasing or development of the same.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 17 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 11.

Annotations

Phrase all mineral rights in challenged statute held declaratory of this section. State ex rel. Belker versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 184 Nebraska 621, 171 National Western [Reporter]2d 156 (1969).


Prohibition against alienation of mineral rights in state educational lands did not apply to sale made prior to 1920. Stoller versus State, 171 Nebraska 93, 105 National Western [Reporter]2d 852 (1960).


Object of this section was not to prevent alienation of salt springs where brine yield is of no commercial value and state may convey with reservation that springs shall belong to state if they become commercially valuable. State ex rel. Central Realty & Investment Company versus McMullen, 119 Nebraska 739, 230 National Western [Reporter] 677 (1930).


Board of Educational Lands and Funds has no jurisdiction over disposal of saline lands. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Neville, 102 Nebraska 817, 170 National Western [Reporter] 176 (1918); McMurtry versus Engelhardt, 5 Nebraska Unof. 271, 98 National Western [Reporter] 40 (1904).


3-21. Donation of state lands prohibited; when.

Lands under control of the State shall never be donated to railroad companies, private corporations or individuals.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 18 (1875).

Annotations

Industrial Development Act of 1961 was sustained as constitutional under constitutional amendment notwithstanding this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus County of Lancaster, 173 Nebraska 195, 113 National Western [Reporter]2d 63 (1962).


3-22. Appropriations for state; deficiencies; bills for pay of members and officials.

Each Legislature shall make appropriations for the expenses of the Government. And whenever it is deemed necessary to make further appropriations for deficiencies, the same shall require a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to the Legislature. Bills making appropriations for the pay of members and officers of the Legislature, and for the salaries of the officers of the Government, shall contain no provision on any other subject.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 19 (1875);
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 139, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Necessity of appropriation

Before a state warrant may issue, there must have been an appropriation made by the Legislature for its payment. Fischer versus Marsh, 113 Nebraska 153, 202 National Western [Reporter] 422 (1925).


Appropriation for one biennium cannot be used to supply deficiency of preceding biennium. State ex rel. Western Bridge & Construction Company versus Marsh, 111 Nebraska 185, 196 National Western [Reporter] 130 (1923).


It is not essential that money be actually drawn during fiscal year, but expenses must have been actually incurred during the period for which appropriation was made. State ex rel. Ledwith versus Brian, 84 Nebraska 30, 120 National Western [Reporter] 916 (1909).


No appropriation will lapse before the end of the first fiscal quarter after adjournment of Legislature unless specifically otherwise directed by act making appropriation. State ex rel. Dales versus Moore, 36 Nebraska 579, 54 National Western [Reporter] 866 (1893).


Unless otherwise limited, the appropriation extends to the end of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next session of the Legislature. State ex rel. Bullock Mfg. Company versus Babcock, 22 Nebraska 33, 33 National Western [Reporter] 709 (1887).


2. Subject of appropriation

Sections 77-202.25 to 77-202.33 do not constitute an appropriation and are not violative hereof. Stahmer versus State, 192 Nebraska 63, 218 National Western [Reporter]2d 893 (1974).


Imposition of maximum expenditures for personal services on annual basis constitutional. State ex rel. Meyer versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Nebraska 490, 176 National Western [Reporter]2d 920 (1970).


Act which allowed pledging of fees and charges received by the commission beyond the biennium violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus Duxbury, 183 Nebraska 302, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 88 (1968).


Act which pledged future receipts of fees for permits and licenses to hunt, trap, and fish for payment of bonds violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus Steen, 183 Nebraska 297, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 164 (1968).


Bills appropriating salaries for state officers cannot contain provisions on any other subject. This limitation applies to all officers of the state government. State ex rel. Hibbard versus Cornell, 60 Nebraska 276, 83 National Western [Reporter] 72 (1900).


3. Continuing appropriation

Continuing legislative appropriations are prohibited. Rein versus Johnson 149 Nebraska 67, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 548 (1947).


Warrants may be drawn on special fund originally established as a continuing appropriation without subsequent biennial appropriation. State ex rel. Ridgell versus Hall, 99 Nebraska 89, 155 National Western [Reporter] 228 (1915), affirmed on rehearing 99 Nebraska 95, 156 National Western [Reporter] 16 (1916), overruled in Rein versus Johnsen, 149 Nebraska 67, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 548 (1947).


An appropriation under this section cannot be made to continue for a longer period than the biennium. State ex rel. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Company versus Moore, 50 Nebraska 88, 69 National Western [Reporter] 373 (1896).


4. Miscellaneous

Attempt to appropriate funds was not an inducing element to passage of remainder of Tax Appraisal Board Act. Midwest Popcorn Company versus Johnson, 152 Nebraska 867, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 174 (1950).


Legislature has authority to increase salary of officer during term whose compensation has not previously been fixed by legislative enactment. State ex rel. Johnson versus Marsh, 149 Nebraska 1, 29 National Western [Reporter]2d 799 (1947).


Excess of gasoline inspection fees paid without protest or demand for refund, lapsed after each biennium, and after having lapsed, court is without power to determine directly the question of their excessiveness. Power Oil Company versus Cochran, 138 Nebraska 827, 295 National Western [Reporter] 805 (1941).


3-23. Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1.

3-24. Games of chance, lotteries, and gift enterprises; restrictions; parimutuel wagering on horseraces; bingo games; use of state lottery proceeds.

(1) Except as provided in this section, the Legislature shall not authorize any game of chance or any lottery or gift enterprise when the consideration for a chance to participate involves the payment of money for the purchase of property, services, or a chance or admission ticket or requires an expenditure of substantial effort or time.

(2) The Legislature may authorize and regulate a state lottery pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and other lotteries, raffles, and gift enterprises which are intended solely as business promotions or the proceeds of which are to be used solely for charitable or community betterment purposes without profit to the promoter of such lotteries, raffles, or gift enterprises.

(3)(A) The Legislature may establish a lottery to be operated and regulated by the State of Nebraska. The proceeds of the lottery shall be appropriated by the Legislature for the costs of establishing and maintaining the lottery and for the following purposes, as directed by the Legislature:

(1) The first five hundred thousand dollars after the payment of prizes and operating expenses shall be transferred to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund;

(2) Forty-four and one-half percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the Nebraska Environmental Trust Fund to be used as provided in the Nebraska Environmental Trust Act;

(iii) Forty-four and one-half percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be used for education as the Legislature may direct;

(iv) Ten percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the Nebraska State Fair Board if the most populous city within the county in which the fair is located provides matching funds equivalent to ten percent of the funds available for transfer. Such matching funds may be obtained from the city and any other private or public entity, except that no portion of such matching funds shall be provided by the state. If the Nebraska State Fair ceases operations, ten percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the General Fund; and

(v) One percent of the money remaining after the payment of prizes and operating expenses and the initial transfer to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund shall be transferred to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance Fund.

(b) No lottery game shall be conducted as part of the lottery unless the type of game has been approved by a majority of the members of the Legislature.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit (A) the enactment of laws providing for the licensing and regulation of wagering on the results of horseraces, wherever run, either within or outside of the state, by the parimutuel method, when such wagering is conducted by licensees within a licensed racetrack enclosure or (b) the enactment of laws providing for the licensing and regulation of bingo games conducted by nonprofit associations which have been in existence for a period of five years immediately preceding the application for license, except that bingo games cannot be conducted by agents or lessees of such associations on a percentage basis.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 21 (1875);
Amended 1934, Initiative Measure Number 332;
Amended 1958, Initiative Measure Number 302;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 248, Section 1, page 735;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 307, Section 1, page 832;
Amended 1988, Laws 1988, Law Report 15, Section 1;
Amended 1992, Laws 1991, Law Report 24CA, Section 1;
Amended 2004, Laws 2004, Law Report 209CA, Section 1.

Cross References

Nebraska Environmental Trust Act, see section 81-15,167.

Annotations

This provision plainly requires that parimutuel wagering on horses must be conducted by an entity licensed to do so and must be conducted by licensees at a racetrack enclosure which is licensed to operate horse races. Wagering that occurs in a detached facility, one that is by definition outside a licensed racetrack enclosure, cannot logically occur within a licensed racetrack enclosure as required by this provision. State ex rel. Stenberg versus Douglas Racing Corp., 246 Nebraska 901, 524 National Western [Reporter]2d 61 (1994).


Free replays are things of value and when obtained on a gambling device constitute property. State ex rel. Spire versus Strawberries, Incorporated, 239 Nebraska 1, 473 National Western [Reporter]2d 428 (1991).


"Proceeds" means net proceeds and "promoter" means only the person or organization legally responsible for operating a lottery, not each employee thereof. State versus City Betterment Corp., 197 Nebraska 575, 250 National Western [Reporter]2d 601 (1977).


Where registration was required to participate in drawing for prize, the element of consideration was present to constitute a lottery. State ex rel. Line versus Grant, 162 Nebraska 210, 75 National Western [Reporter]2d 611 (1956).


Pinball machine was prohibited as game of chance. Baedaro versus Caldwell, 156 Nebraska 489, 56 National Western [Reporter]2d 706 (1953).


3-25. Incidental expenses of state officers; specific appropriations always necessary; warrants for money.

No allowance shall be made for the incidental expenses of any state officer except the same be made by general appropriation and upon an account specifying each item. No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law, and on the presentation of a warrant issued as the Legislature may direct, and no money shall be diverted from any appropriation made for any purpose or taken from any fund whatever by resolution.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 22 (1875);
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 302, Section 2(1), page 894.

Annotations

1. General appropriation for incidental expenses

Funds in state treasury which may be used in payment of claims against state may be withdrawn only pursuant to appropriation by Legislature. Fischer versus Marsh, 113 Nebraska 153, 202 National Western [Reporter] 422 (1925); State ex rel. Pearson versus Cornell, 54 Nebraska 647, 75 National Western [Reporter] 25 (1898); State ex rel. Graham versus Babcock, 18 Nebraska 221, 24 National Western [Reporter] 683 (1885).


State cannot use appropriation for one biennium to meet deficiency for preceding biennium. State ex rel. Western Bridge & Construction Company versus Marsh, 111 Nebraska 185, 196 National Western [Reporter] 130 (1923).


Appropriation to pay expenses of State Board of Education was sufficient to include appropriation for salary of secretary. State ex rel. Ludden versus Barton, 88 Nebraska 576, 130 National Western [Reporter] 260 (1911).


Appropriations for incidental expenses of state officer in general appropriation must specify each item for which appropriation is made. State ex rel. James versus Babcock, 22 Nebraska 38, 33 National Western [Reporter] 711 (1887).


A specific appropriation is one expressly providing funds for particular purpose. There can be no implied appropriation under the Constitution. State ex rel. Cline versus Wallichs, 15 Nebraska 609, 20 National Western [Reporter] 110 (1884).


Under an appropriation for current expenses of state government, no money may be drawn for expenses of returning prisoners to penitentiary. State ex rel. Nobes versus Wallichs, 15 Nebraska 457, 19 National Western [Reporter] 641 (1884).


2. Specific appropriation

Act itself is sufficient appropriation, at least for current biennium, for expenditure of fees and charges to carry on work of commission. State ex rel. Meyer versus Duxbury, 183 Nebraska 302, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 88 (1968).


Act providing for refunding of excess grain inspection fees was not in conflict herewith. Bollen versus Price, 129 Nebraska 342, 261 National Western [Reporter] 689 (1935).


Subsequent appropriation of money raised by previous special tax levy amounts to specific appropriation of entire fund. State ex rel. Ledwith versus Searle, 79 Nebraska 111, 112 National Western [Reporter] 380 (1907).


Specific appropriations for salaries of officers fixed by Constitution are not necessary. Weston versus Herdman, 64 Nebraska 24, 89 National Western [Reporter] 384 (1902).


Money paid into the treasury by the state cannot be credited by bookkeeping and thus deducted from the proper charge. It requires specific appropriation to transfer the fund. Providence Washington Ins. Company versus Weston, 63 Nebraska 764, 89 National Western [Reporter] 253 (1902).


Under general act providing bounty for sugar manufacturers, but carrying no specific appropriation, no such bounty payment can be made. State ex rel. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Company versus Moore, 50 Nebraska 88, 69 National Western [Reporter] 373 (1896).


Where the Legislature has made a specific appropriation for a special purpose, it is no part of the auditor's duty to inquire as to the justice of such appropriation. State ex rel. Sayre versus Moore, 40 Nebraska 854, 59 National Western [Reporter] 755 (1894).


3. Miscellaneous

Sections 77-202.25 to 77-202.33 do not constitute an appropriation and are not violative hereof. Stahmer versus State, 192 Nebraska 63, 218 National Western [Reporter]2d 893 (1974).


This section prevents the diversion of money from any appropriation or the taking thereof from any fund by legislative resolution as distinguished from legislative act. Rein versus Johnson, 149 Nebraska 67, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 548 (1947).


Noncompliance with this section by Nebraska State Board of Agriculture disclosed that it was not public governmental agency. Crete Mills versus Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Nebraska 244, 271 National Western [Reporter] 684 (1937).


This section has no reference to any provision which the Legislature might see fit to make regarding custody or investment of money in treasury while waiting disbursement. State versus Hill, 47 Nebraska 456, 66 National Western [Reporter] 541 (1896).


Money may be drawn from the treasury only on vouchers which shall be presented to auditor that he may see that claim is one for which appropriation has been made. State ex rel. Garneau versus Moore, 37 Nebraska 507, 55 National Western [Reporter] 1078 (1893), 56 National Western [Reporter] 154 (1893).


When appropriation provides for rewards and fees for capture of escaped convicts, etc., no warrant can be drawn to pay sheriff for conveying offenders to reform schools. State ex rel. Ensign versus Wallichs, 12 Nebraska 407, 11 National Western [Reporter] 860 (1882).


3-26. Privilege of members.

No member of the Legislature shall be liable in any civil or criminal action whatever for words spoken in debate.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 23 (1875).

3-27. Acts take effect after three months; emergency bills; session laws.

No act shall take effect until three calendar months after the adjournment of the session at which it passed, unless in case of emergency, which is expressed in the preamble or body of the act, the Legislature shall by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected otherwise direct. All laws shall be published within sixty days after the adjournment of each session and distributed among the several counties in such manner as the Legislature may provide.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 24 (1875);
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 126, Section 1;
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 32CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Without emergency clause

Without an emergency clause, a legislative act takes effect three calendar months after adjournment of Legislature. Summerville versus North Platte Valley Weather Control District, 170 Nebraska 46, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 748 (1960).


While act passed without emergency clause takes effect three calendar months after adjournment of session, operation of act can be postponed to a later date. Wilson versus Marsh, 162 Nebraska 237, 75 National Western [Reporter]2d 723 (1956).


Statute without emergency clause does not become operative until three calendar months after adjournment of the Legislature which enacted it. Bainter versus Appel, 124 Nebraska 40, 245 National Western [Reporter] 16 (1932).


Following clause of act "this act shall take effect on and after its passage and approval" does not express an emergency. State versus Pacific Express Company, 80 Nebraska 823, 115 National Western [Reporter] 619 (1908).


Act containing no emergency clause does not become operative until after three calendar months from adjournment of Legislature. State ex rel. City Water Company versus City of Kearney, 49 Nebraska 325, 68 National Western [Reporter] 533 (1896).


2. With emergency clause

An act adopted with an emergency clause by vote of two-thirds of all members elected to the Legislature and vetoed by the Governor becomes effective when passed over the veto by vote of three-fifths of the members elected. Sandberg versus State, 188 Nebraska 335, 196 National Western [Reporter]2d 501 (1972).


An act of the Legislature stating an emergency, without stating the nature thereof, is sufficient. Read versus City of Scottsbluff, 179 Nebraska 410, 138 National Western [Reporter]2d 471 (1965).


When a statute passes with an emergency clause in computing the time it takes effect, the day of its passage is excluded, and it goes into effect the next day. Wilson & Company, Incorporated versus Otoe County et al., 140 Nebraska 518, 300 National Western [Reporter] 415 (1941).


Where two acts are companion laws and must be construed together, the fact that one has an emergency clause does not operate to put companion law into effect prior to date set by Constitution. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Company versus Albers, 126 Nebraska 329, 253 National Western [Reporter] 429 (1934).


3. Miscellaneous

Right of referendum extends to emergency acts of Legislature. Klosterman versus Marsh, 180 Nebraska 506, 143 National Western [Reporter]2d 744 (1966).


Interest on forbearance of money computed at the legal rate on date claim arose. Wheaton versus Aetna Life Ins. Company, 128 Nebraska 583, 259 National Western [Reporter] 753 (1935).


Automobile guest law does not affect a cause of action arising after Legislature adjourned but before law took effect. Roh versus Opocensky, 125 Nebraska 551, 251 National Western [Reporter] 102 (1933).


Act may specifically provide for separate provisions taking effect at different dates. State ex rel. Wheeler versus Stuht, 52 Nebraska 209, 71 National Western [Reporter] 941 (1897).


Term "calendar month" denotes period terminating with day of succeeding month, numerically corresponding to day of its beginning, less one. McGinn versus State, 46 Nebraska 427, 65 National Western [Reporter] 46 (1895).


Legislative act may provide that it shall not apply until expiration of terms of incumbent officers. Hopkins versus Scott, 38 Nebraska 661, 57 National Western [Reporter] 391 (1894).


3-28. Repealed 1934. Initiative Measure Number 330.

3-29. Legislative authority in emergencies due to enemy attack upon United States.

(1). In order to insure continuity of state and local governmental operations in periods of emergency resulting from enemy attack upon the United States, or the imminent threat thereof, the Legislature shall have the power and the immediate duty, notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in this Constitution, to provide by law for:

(A) The prompt and temporary succession to the powers and duties of all public offices, of whatever nature and whether filled by election or appointment, the incumbents of which, after an attack, may be or become unavailable or unable to carry on the powers and duties of such offices;

(b) The convening of the Legislature into general or extraordinary session, upon or without call by the Governor, during or after a war or enemy caused disaster occurring in the United States; and, with respect to any such emergency session, the suspension or temporary change of the provisions of this Constitution or of general law relating to the length and purposes of any legislative session or prescribing the specific proportion or number of legislators whose presence or vote is necessary to constitute a quorum or to accomplish any legislative act or function;

(c) The selection and changing from time to time of a temporary state seat of government, of temporary county seats, and of temporary seats of government for other political subdivisions; to be used if made necessary by enemy attack or imminent threat thereof;

(d) The determination, selection, reproduction, preservation, and dispersal of public records necessary to the continuity of governmental operations in the event of enemy attack or imminent threat thereof; and

(e) Such other measures and procedures as may be necessary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations in the event of enemy attack or imminent threat thereof.

(2). In the exercise of the powers hereinbefore conferred, the Legislature shall in all respects conform to the requirements of this Constitution except to the extent that, in the judgment of the Legislature, so to do would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 3, Section 29 (1960);
Adopted 1960, Laws 1959, Chapter 234, Section 1, page 815.

3-30. Legislature to pass necessary laws.

The Legislature shall pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this constitution.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 16, Section 20 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 17, Section 6;
Nebraska Constitution Article 17, Section 6 (1997);
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 17CA, Section 2.

Annotations

Legislative power governing the rights and duties of persons is conferred entirely on the elected legislative body. Terry Carpenter, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 175 Nebraska 26, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 374 (1963).


Legislature must provide standards for distribution of school funds. School District Number 39 of Washington County versus Decker, 159 Nebraska 693, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 354 (1955).


4-1. Executive departments; officers; when elected; terms; eligibility; books to be kept at seat of government; residence of officers; heads of departments; appointments.

The executive officers of the state shall be the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, Attorney General, and the heads of such other executive departments as set forth herein or as may be established by law. The Legislature may provide for the placing of the above named officers as heads over such departments of government as it may by law establish.

The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, and State Treasurer shall be chosen at the general election held in November 1974, and in each alternate even-numbered year thereafter, for a term of four years and until their successors shall be elected and qualified.

Each candidate for Governor shall select a person to be the candidate for Lieutenant Governor on the general election ballot. In the general election one vote shall be cast jointly for the candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The Governor shall be ineligible to the office of Governor for four years next after the expiration of two consecutive terms for which he or she was elected.

The records, books, and papers of all executive officers shall be kept at the seat of government. Executive officers shall reside within the State of Nebraska during their respective terms of office. Officers in the executive department of the state shall perform such duties as may be provided by law.

The heads of all executive departments established by law, other than those to be elected as provided herein, shall be appointed by the Governor, with the consent of a majority of all members elected to the Legislature, but officers so appointed may be removed by the Governor. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the heads of the various executive or civil departments shall have power to appoint and remove all subordinate employees in their respective departments.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 1;
Amended 1936, Laws 1935, Chapter 188, Section 1, page 694;
Amended 1952, Laws 1951, Chapter 164, Section 2(2), page 645;
Amended 1958, Laws 1957, Chapter 213, Section 1, page 748;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 249, Section 1, page 736;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 296, Section 1, page 883;
Amended 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 300, Section 1, page 846;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 417, Section 1, page 1428;
Amended 1998, Laws 1997, Law Report 8CA, Section 1;
Amended 2000, Laws 1999, Law Report 14CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Term of office

Period for which an executive officer holds over is part of the term for which he was elected. State ex rel. Gordon versus Moores, 61 Nebraska 9, 84 National Western [Reporter] 399 (1900).


"Until his successor is elected and qualified" imposes the duty upon incumbent Governor to hold over until his successor is elected and qualified. State ex rel. Thayer versus Boyd, 31 Nebraska 682, 48 National Western [Reporter] 739 (1891), 51 National Western [Reporter] 602 (1892).


2. Nature of office or department

The officers referred to in this section are the executive officers of the state. Sorensen versus Swanson, 181 Nebraska 205, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1967).


Heads of all executive departments are required to be appointed by the Governor. State ex rel. Beck versus Obbink, 172 Nebraska 242, 109 National Western [Reporter]2d 288 (1961).


Attorney General is an executive officer. State ex rel. Caldwell versus Peterson, 153 Nebraska 402, 45 National Western [Reporter]2d 122 (1950).


Merit System Act did not create an executive department. Sommerville versus Johnson, 149 Nebraska 167, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 577 (1948).


Member of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission is not the head of an executive department. State ex rel. Johnson versus Chase, 147 Nebraska 758, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (1946).


Department of Agriculture and Inspection is an executive department established by law. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Secretary of State is a constitutional officer. State ex rel. Brazda versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 817, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 206 (1942).


The Insurance Department is not an agency created by the Constitution but is an executive department of government created by the Legislature under constitutional authority. Clark versus Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Company, 139 Nebraska 65, 296 National Western [Reporter] 449 (1941).


The constitutional provision creating the State Railway Commission is an independent part of the Constitution and not an amendment to the executive, legislative, or judicial articles thereof. Furstenberg versus Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company, 132 Nebraska 562, 272 National Western [Reporter] 756 (1937).


Nebraska State Board of Agriculture is not a part of executive branch of government, but is a private corporation. Crete Mills versus Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Nebraska 244, 271 National Western [Reporter] 684 (1937).


3. Miscellaneous

The statutes which give the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over public employees are not unconstitutional. American Fed. of S., C. & M. Employees versus Department of Public Institutions, 195 Nebraska 253, 237 National Western [Reporter]2d 841 (1976).


The 1920 amendment to this section was deemed essential to include heads of other executive departments. Swanson versus Sorensen, 181 Nebraska 312, 148 National Western [Reporter]2d 197 (1967).


Legislature has no power to provide for suspension or removal of a constitutional officer where the Constitution creates the office, fixes its terms, and the grounds and manner of removal. Laverty versus Cochran, 132 Nebraska 118, 271 National Western [Reporter] 354 (1937).


Amendment abolishing office of Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings was properly submitted and adopted. Swanson versus State, 132 Nebraska 82, 271 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1937).


Where Department of Insurance is appointed receiver of insurance company for purpose of liquidation, it becomes, for that purpose, subject to orders of the court rather than of the Governor. State ex rel. Good versus National Old Line Life Ins. Company, 129 Nebraska 473, 261 National Western [Reporter] 902 (1935).


This section secures to electors the right to vote at all elections for state officers. State ex rel. Adair versus Drexel, 74 Nebraska 776, 105 National Western [Reporter] 174 (1905).


State Treasurer must reside at seat of government, which is state capital. State versus Hill, 38 Nebraska 698, 57 National Western [Reporter] 548 (1894).


If constitutional provision, either directly or by implication, imposes duty upon officer or officers, no legislation is necessary to require the performance of such duty. State ex rel. City of Lincoln versus Babcock, 19 Nebraska 230, 27 National Western [Reporter] 98 (1886).


4-2. Governor; Lieutenant Governor; eligibility; qualifications; appointive officers, ineligible for other office.

No person shall be eligible to the office of Governor, or Lieutenant Governor, who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and who shall not have been for five years next preceding his election a resident and citizen of this state and a citizen of the United States. None of the appointive officers mentioned in this article shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they have been appointed.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 2 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 2;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 250, Section 1, page 738;
Amended 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 291, Section 1, page 832.

Annotations

Railway commissioner did not fall within the prohibition of this section. Swanson versus Sorensen, 181 Nebraska 312, 148 National Western [Reporter]2d 197 (1967).


Member of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission is not precluded by this section from being appointed to the office of district judge. State ex rel. Johnson versus Chase, 147 Nebraska 758, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (1946).


Head of an executive department is ineligible to be a candidate for the office of Governor during term for which he was appointed. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Unlike officers designated in this section, there is no requirement that candidate for office of Secretary of State be a resident of the state, or possess the qualifications of an elector prior to elections. State ex rel. Brazda versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 817, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 206 (1942).


No presumption arises from this section that the Legislature should be without power to require that members of the State Railway Commission should possess reasonable qualifications as a condition of eligibility to office. State ex rel. Quinn versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 436, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 892 (1942).


Under former law, Lieutenant Governor, during term for which he was elected, was ineligible to office of Governor for succeeding term. State ex rel. McKelvie versus Wait, 95 Nebraska 806, 146 National Western [Reporter] 1048 (1914).


Candidate for Governor was citizen of United States, although of foreign birth. Boyd versus State ex rel Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892), reversing State ex rel. Thayer versus Boyd, 31 Nebraska 682, 48 National Western [Reporter] 739 (1891), 51 National Western [Reporter] 602 (1892).


4-3. Treasurer; ineligibility.

The treasurer shall be ineligible to the office of treasurer, for two years next after the expiration of two consecutive terms for which he was elected.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 3 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 3;
Amended 1992, Initiative Measure Number 407; Amended 1994, Initiative Measure Number 408.
Note: The changes made to Article 4, section 3, of the Constitution of Nebraska by Initiative 407 in 1992 have been omitted because of the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan versus Beermann, 245 Nebraska 907, 515 National Western [Reporter]2d 788 (1994).
Note: The changes made to Article 4, section 3, of the Constitution of Nebraska by Initiative 408 in 1992 have been omitted because of the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan versus Beermann, 249 Nebraska 411, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 68 (1996).

4-4. Election returns; canvass by Legislature; conduct of election contests.

The returns of every election for the officers of the executive department shall be sealed up and transmitted by the returning officers to the Secretary of State, directed to the Speaker of the Legislature, who shall immediately after the organization of the Legislature, and before proceeding to other business, open and publish the same in the presence of a majority of the members of the Legislature. The person having the highest number of votes for each of said offices shall be declared duly elected; but if two or more have an equal and the highest number of votes, the Legislature shall choose one of such persons for said office. The conduct of election contests for any of said offices shall be in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 4 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 4;
Amended 1960, Laws 1959, Chapter 236, Section 1, page 820;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 340, Section 1.

Annotations

The 1960 amendment of this section did not purport to be and is not amendatory of the limited original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Sorensen versus Swanson, 181 Nebraska 205, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1967).


Canvass of returns of election for officers of executive department must be made by the Legislature. State ex rel. Caldwell versus Peterson, 153 Nebraska 402, 45 National Western [Reporter]2d 122 (1950).


Returns of election upon constitutional amendment must be directed to Speaker and votes canvassed by Legislature. State ex rel. Oldham versus Dean, 84 Nebraska 344, 121 National Western [Reporter] 719 (1909).


Joint resolution in contest proceedings requires signature of presiding officer of House and Senate, also the Governor's. In reference Contest Proceeding, 31 Nebraska 262, 47 National Western [Reporter] 923 (1891).


Speaker must open and publish returns of general election even though directed by Legislature not to do so. State ex rel. Benton versus Elder, 31 Nebraska 169, 47 National Western [Reporter] 710 (1891).


4-5. Impeachment.

All civil officers of this state shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 5 (1875);
Transfered by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 5.

Annotations

An act or omission for which an officer may be impeached and removed from office must relate to the duties of the office. A misdemeanor in office may consist of a violation of some provision in the Constitution or a statute, willful neglect of duty done with a corrupt intention, or negligence so gross and disregard of duty so flagrant as to warrant an inference that it was willful and corrupt. A violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is not, as such, an impeachable offense. State versus Douglas, 217 Nebraska 199, 349 National Western [Reporter]2d 870 (1984).


Holder of constitutional office may be removed only by impeachment. Fitzgerald versus Kuppinger, 163 Nebraska 286, 79 National Western [Reporter]2d 547 (1956).


County judge can be removed only by impeachment. Conroy versus Hallowell, 94 Nebraska 794, 144 National Western [Reporter] 895 (1913).


The word "term" does not include time for which office is held under appointment. Dodson versus Bowlby, 78 Nebraska 190, 110 National Western [Reporter] 698 (1907).


Misdemeanor under this section is violation of positive statute or Constitution amounting to crime, or willful neglect of duty with corrupt intent or gross negligence inferring willful or corrupt intent. State versus Hastings, 37 Nebraska 96, 55 National Western [Reporter] 774 (1893).


Impeachment power cannot be delegated by Legislature. State versus Leese, 37 Nebraska 92, 55 National Western [Reporter] 798 (1893).


Officer cannot be impeached after his term has expired. State versus Hill, 37 Nebraska 80, 55 National Western [Reporter] 794 (1893).


4-6. Supreme executive power.

The supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor, who shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed and the affairs of the state efficiently and economically administered.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 6 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 6.

Annotations

Legislature cannot through appropriations exercise or invade constitutional rights or powers of executive; Legislature cannot administer appropriations once made. State ex rel. Meyer versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Nebraska 490, 176 National Western [Reporter]2d 920 (1970).


The supreme executive power is vested in the Governor. Wittler versus Baumgartner, 180 Nebraska 446, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1966); State ex rel. Beck versus Obbink, 172 Nebraska 242, 109 National Western [Reporter]2d 288 (1961).


All officers and employees of executive department who are not appointed for a definite term are removable at will of Governor. State ex rel. Beck versus Young, 154 Nebraska 588, 48 National Western [Reporter]2d 677 (1951).


As to the executive department, the supreme power is vested in the Governor. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


4-7. Message by Governor; budget; contents; budget bill; preparation; appropriations not to be in excess of budget; exception; excess subject to veto.

The Governor may, at the commencement of each session, and at the close of his term of office and whenever the Legislature may require, give by message to the Legislature information of the condition of the state, and shall recommend such measures as he shall deem expedient. At a time fixed by law, he shall present, by message, a complete itemized budget of the financial requirements of all departments, institutions and agencies of the state and a budget bill to be introduced by the Speaker of the Legislature at the request of the Governor. Said budget bill shall be prepared with such expert assistance and under such regulations as may be required by the Governor. No appropriations shall be made in excess of the recommendation contained in such budget including any amendment the Governor may make thereto unless by three-fifths vote of the Legislature, and such excess so approved shall be subject to veto by the Governor.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 7 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 7;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 302, Section 2(2), page 895;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 301, Section 1.

Annotations

Appropriations in excess of recommendation which did not receive two-thirds vote on final passage invalid; section applies to all departments, institutions, and agencies of state in being at commencement of legislative session. State ex rel. Meyer versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Nebraska 490, 176 National Western [Reporter]2d 920 (1970).


Requirement of three-fifths vote applies only to increases in amount for departments, institutions and agencies in existence at the time that Governor is required to make budget recommendations. Mekota versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 146 Nebraska 370, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 633 (1945).


Appropriation bill containing items in excess of budget recommendation, adopted by three-fifths vote of both houses, but without separate three-fifths vote on each such increased item was legally enacted and not subject to Governor's veto. Elmen versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Nebraska 141, 231 National Western [Reporter] 772 (1930).


4-8. Special sessions.

The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Legislature by proclamation, stating therein the purpose for which they are convened, and the Legislature shall enter upon no business except that for which they were called together.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 8 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 8.

Annotations

Under this section the Governor may, during the Legislature's special session convened pursuant to a gubernatorial proclamation, submit by an appropriate amended proclamation any additional subjects for valid legislation to be enacted at such special session of the Legislature. Jaksha versus State, 222 Nebraska 690, 385 National Western [Reporter]2d 922 (1986).


Amendments to Liquor Control Act, made by chapter 5, Seventy-fourth Extraordinary Session of the Legislature, were unconstitutional because not within Governor's call. Arrow Club, Incorporated versus Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 177 Nebraska 686, 131 National Western [Reporter]2d 134 (1964).


Governor's call of special session of the Legislature was sufficient. State Securities Company versus Ley, 177 Nebraska 251, 128 National Western [Reporter]2d 766 (1964).


Amendments made to election laws at the 1944 extraordinary session of the Legislature were within the scope of the proclamation of the Governor calling the session. State ex rel. Baldwin versus Strain, 152 Nebraska 763, 42 National Western [Reporter]2d 796 (1950).


Special session can transact no business except that included in objects of proclamation, calling the session. Statement in proclamation asking for revision or amendment of general incorporation law will include in its scope the regulation, control and government of railroad companies. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Wolfe, 61 Nebraska 502, 86 National Western [Reporter] 441 (1901).


Proclamation calling special session may be revoked by Governor. People ex rel. Tennant versus Parker, 3 Nebraska 409 (1873).


4-9. Repealed 1934. Initiative Measure Number 330.

4-10. Governor to appoint officers; removal.

The Governor shall appoint with the approval of a majority of the Legislature, all persons whose offices are established by the Constitution, or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise by law or herein provided for; and no such person shall be appointed or elected by the Legislature. The Governor shall have power to remove, for cause and after a public hearing, any person whom he may appoint for a term except officers provided for in Article 5 of the Constitution, and he may declare his office vacant, and fill the same as herein provided as in other cases of vacancy. The Governor shall have power to remove any other person whom he appoints at any time and for any reason.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 10 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 10;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Power of appointment

Designation by Legislature of University of Nebraska officers as members of Natural Resources Commission was a legislative appointment in violation of Constitution; but designation of Director of Water Resources was valid as simply adding to the duties of a state officer. Neeman versus Nebraska National Resources Commission, 191 Nebraska 672, 217 National Western [Reporter]2d 166 (1974).


Power of appointment and removal of officers is in the Governor except as limited by this section. Wittler versus Baumgartner, 180 Nebraska 446, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1966).


Governor has power to appoint heads of executive departments. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Legislature after it has created an office cannot itself fill it. State ex rel. Hensley versus Plasters, 74 Nebraska 652, 105 National Western [Reporter] 1092 (1905).


Constitution prohibits appointment or election of officers by Legislature. State ex rel. Horne versus Holcomb, 46 Nebraska 88, 64 National Western [Reporter] 437 (1895).


2. Power of removal

The Governor is empowered to remove any officer appointed by him for incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. State ex rel. Beck versus Obbink, 172 Nebraska 242, 109 National Western [Reporter]2d 288 (1961).


Power to remove member of Liquor Control Commission is derived from this section. State ex rel. Beck versus Young, 154 Nebraska 588, 48 National Western [Reporter]2d 677 (1951).


In addition to the power of appointment, the Governor has the power of removal in case of incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Lieutenant Governor cannot, during mere temporary absence of Governor from the state, remove from office appointees of the Governor. Johnson versus Johnson, 141 Nebraska 239, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 414 (1942).


3. Procedure

In a hearing for removal of an officer, the charge must be reasonably definite, notice of hearing must be given, and an opportunity to defend afforded. State ex rel. Meyer versus Sorrell, 174 Nebraska 340, 117 National Western [Reporter]2d 872 (1962).


Three steps are contemplated, namely: Nomination, confirmation, and appointment. State ex rel. Johnson versus Hagemeister, 161 Nebraska 475, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 625 (1955).


4. Miscellaneous

This section does not apply to county treasurer whom the Legislature designates as ex officio city treasurer. Cathers versus Hennings, 76 Nebraska 295, 107 National Western [Reporter] 586 (1906).


This section applies only to officers mentioned in Constitution. It has no application to municipal officers. State ex rel. Hastings versus Smith, 35 Nebraska 13, 52 National Western [Reporter] 700 (1892).


This section does not apply to police commissioner of municipality as created by Legislature. State ex rel. Hastings versus Smith, 35 Nebraska 13, 52 National Western [Reporter] 700 (1892).


4-11. Elected state officer; vacation of office; Governor fill by appointment; term.

If any elected state office created by this Constitution, except offices provided for in Article 5 of this Constitution, shall be vacated by death, resignation or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the Governor to fill that office by appointment, and the appointee shall hold the office until his successor shall be elected and qualified in such manner as may be provided by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 11 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 11;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(1), page 741;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1;
Amended 1980, Laws 1979, Law Report 5, Section 1.

4-12. Nonelective state officers; vacation; Governor; fill the office by appointment; approval by Legislature.

If any nonelective state office, except offices provided for in Article 5 of this Constitution, shall be vacated by death, resignation or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the Governor to fill that office by appointment. If the Legislature is in session, such appointment shall be subject to the approval of a majority of the members of the Legislature. If the Legislature is not in session, the Governor shall make a temporary appointment until the next session of the Legislature, at which time a majority of the members of the Legislature shall have the right to approve or disapprove the appointment. All appointees shall hold their office until their successors shall be appointed and qualified. No person after being rejected by the Legislature shall be again nominated for the same office at the same session, unless at request of the Legislature, or be appointed to the same office during the recess or adjournment of the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 12 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 12;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1.

Annotations

Judges appointed under the merit plan do not hold temporary appointments. Garrotto versus McManus, 185 Nebraska 644, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 570 (1970).


During recess of Legislature, appointment to fill vacancy in nonelective office is temporary. State ex rel. Johnson versus Hagemeister, 161 Nebraska 475, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 625 (1955).


4-13. Board of parole; members; powers; reprieves; proceedings; power to pardon; limitations.

The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of a Board of Parole and the qualifications of its members. Said board, or a majority thereof, shall have power to grant paroles after conviction and judgment, under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, for any offenses committed against the criminal laws of this state except treason and cases of impeachment. The Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State, sitting as a board, shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures and to grant respites, reprieves, pardons, or commutations in all cases of conviction for offenses against the laws of the state, except treason and cases of impeachment. The Board of Parole may advise the Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State on the merits of any application for remission, respite, reprieve, pardon or commutation but such advice shall not be binding on them. The Governor shall have power to suspend the execution of the sentence imposed for treason until the case can be reported to the Legislature at its next session, when the Legislature shall either grant a pardon, or commute the sentence or direct the execution, or grant a further reprieve.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 13 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 13;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 319, Section 1, page 852.

Annotations

This provision clearly entrusts the power of commutation to the Board of Pardons. State versus Bainbridge, 249 Nebraska 260, 543 National Western [Reporter]2d 154 (1996).


Sentencing judge's announcement he considered possible effect of statutes permitting prison authorities to ameliorate sentences did not violate constitutional due process, and sentences were not excessive. State versus Houston, 196 Nebraska 724, 246 National Western [Reporter]2d 63 (1976).


This section governs paroles after conviction and sentence and Post Conviction Act not available for that purpose. State versus Carpenter, 186 Nebraska 605, 185 National Western [Reporter]2d 663 (1971).


Limitation on power of Governor to reprieve did not prevent granting of successive reprieves which in aggregate might exceed thirty days. Simmons versus Fenton, 113 Nebraska 768, 205 National Western [Reporter] 296 (1925).


The word "offenses" is equivalent to "crimes." Governor cannot pardon until after conviction by a court. Champion versus Gillan, 79 Nebraska 364, 112 National Western [Reporter] 585 (1907).


Pardon is free gift from supreme authority confided to chief magistrate. Act authorizing justice of the peace to remit penalty for misdemeanor is not granting pardoning power. Pleuler versus State, 11 Nebraska 547, 10 National Western [Reporter] 481 (1881).


4-14. Governor to be commander-in-chief of militia.

The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the state (except when they shall be called into the service of the United States) and may call out the same to execute the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 14 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 14.

Annotations

Member of national guard upon enlistment became subject to the provisions of this section. Lind versus Nebraska National Guard, 144 Nebraska 122, 12 National Western [Reporter]2d 652 (1944).


4-15. Bills to be presented to Governor; approval; procedure; disapproval or reduction of items of appropriation; passage despite disapproval or reduction.

Every bill passed by the Legislature, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to the Governor. If he approves he shall sign it, and thereupon it shall become a law, but if he does not approve or reduces any item or items of appropriations, he shall return it with his objections to the Legislature, which shall enter the objections at large upon its journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill with the objections as a whole, or proceed to reconsider individually the item or items disapproved or reduced. If then three-fifths of the members elected agree to pass the bill with objections it shall become a law, or if three-fifths of the members elected agree to repass any item or items disapproved or reduced, the bill with such repassage shall become a law. In all cases the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, to be entered upon the journal. Any bill which shall not be returned by the Governor within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it; unless the Legislature by their adjournment prevent its return; in which case it shall be filed, with his objections, in the office of the Secretary of State within five days after such adjournment, or become a law. The Governor may disapprove or reduce any item or items of appropriation contained in bills passed by the Legislature, and the item or items so disapproved shall be stricken therefrom, and the items reduced shall remain as reduced unless the Legislature has reconsidered the item or items disapproved or reduced and has repassed any such item or items over the objection of the Governor by a three-fifths approval of the members elected.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 15 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 15;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 301, Section 1;
Amended 1974, Laws 1974, Legislative Bill 1034, Section 1;
Amended 1976, Laws 1975, Legislative Bill 17, Section 1.

Annotations

It is not the publication by the Revisor of Statutes which creates a law. It is adoption by the Legislature and the Governor's signature which cause a law to be enacted. State ex rel. Wright versus Pepperl, 221 Nebraska 664, 380 National Western [Reporter]2d 259 (1986).


This section does not give the Governor power to return a bill to the Legislature as a "clerical function". Where Governor returns a legislative bill to the Legislature with his objections, action constitutes a veto, regardless of reasons stated in the accompanying message. Center Bank versus Dept. of Banking & Finance, 210 Nebraska 227, 313 National Western [Reporter]2d 661 (1981).


A legislative bill, passed with an emergency clause, vetoed by the Governor, is within the ambit of this section and requires only a three-fifths vote to override the veto. Sandberg versus State, 188 Nebraska 335, 196 National Western [Reporter]2d 501 (1972).


Governor's veto of items of appropriation bill in excess of budget recommendation was invalid, where bill, as a whole, was adopted by three-fifths vote of both houses. Elmen versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Nebraska 141, 231 National Western [Reporter] 772 (1930).


Governor, as respects approval or veto of bills, acts as part of lawmaking power. State ex rel. Crocker versus Junkin, 79 Nebraska 532, 113 National Western [Reporter] 256 (1907).


Governor is part of lawmaking power and his duty with relation to bills is a legislative duty enjoined upon him by Constitution. Weis versus Ashley, 59 Nebraska 494, 81 National Western [Reporter] 318 (1899).


This section requires Governor to either approve or veto, and if held by Governor for more than five days, act becomes effective. State versus Abbott, 59 Nebraska 106, 80 National Western [Reporter] 499 (1899); State ex rel. Main versus Crounse, 36 Nebraska 835, 55 National Western [Reporter] 246 (1893); Miller versus Hurford, 11 Nebraska 377, 9 National Western [Reporter] 477 (1881).


Joint resolution providing for contest in an election proceeding must be approved by Governor. In reference Contest Proceeding, 31 Nebraska 262, 47 National Western [Reporter] 923 (1891).


Upon receiving resolution, valid on its face, ceding jurisdiction over Indian reservations, Secretary of Interior could rely on it without having determined under state law whether Governor's signature was necessary. United States versus Brown, 334 F.Supp. 536 (D. Nebraska 1971).


4-16. Order of succession to become Governor; Lieutenant Governor; duties.

In case of the conviction of the Governor on impeachment, his removal from office, his resignation or his death, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the Legislature and such other persons designated by law shall in that order be Governor for the remainder of the Governor's term.

In case of the death of the Governor-elect, the Lieutenant Governor-elect, the Speaker of the Legislature and such other persons designated by law shall become Governor in that order at the commencement of the Governor-elect's term.

If the Governor or the person in line of succession to serve as Governor is absent from the state, or suffering under an inability, the powers and duties of the office of Governor shall devolve in order of precedence until the absence or inability giving rise to the devolution of powers ceases as provided by law. After January 1, 1975, the Lieutenant Governor shall serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of the Governor whenever so designated by the Governor, shall perform such duties as may be delegated him by the Governor, and shall devote his full time to the duties of his office.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 16 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 16;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 417, Section 1, page 1428;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1.

Annotations

Lieutenant Governor is not entitled to the emoluments of the Governor's office on account of mere temporary absence of the Governor from the state. Johnson versus Johnson, 141 Nebraska 239, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 414 (1942).


This section does not apply to incumbent holding over on account of failure to elect successor, but refers only to persons elected and failing to qualify. State ex rel. Thayer versus Boyd, 31 Nebraska 682, 48 National Western [Reporter] 739 (1891), 51 National Western [Reporter] 602 (1892).


4-17. Repealed 1934. Initiative Measure Number 330.

4-18. Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1.

4-19. State institutions; management, control, and government; determination by Legislature.

The general management, control and government of all state charitable, mental, reformatory, and penal institutions shall be vested as determined by the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 19 (1875);
Amended 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 225, Section 1, page 677;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 19;
Amended 1958, Laws 1957, Chapter 216, Section 1, page 753.

Annotations

The statutes which give the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction over public employees are not unconstitutional. American Fed. of S., C. & M. Employees versus Department of Public Institutions, 195 Nebraska 253, 237 National Western [Reporter]2d 841 (1976).


Under former law, members of the Board of Control were constituted a separate class as to salaries. State ex rel. Day versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 699, 262 National Western [Reporter] 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


Constitutional amendment purporting to exclude schools of deaf and blind from jurisdiction of Board of Control was ineffective for failure to comply with constitutional requirements. State ex rel. Hall versus Cline, 118 Nebraska 150, 224 National Western [Reporter] 6 (1929).


4-20. Public Service Commission; membership; terms; powers.

There shall be a Public Service Commission, consisting of not less than three nor more than seven members, as the Legislature shall prescribe, whose term of office shall be six years, and whose compensation shall be fixed by the Legislature. Commissioners shall be elected by districts of substantially equal population as the Legislature shall provide. The powers and duties of such commission shall include the regulation of rates, service and general control of common carriers as the Legislature may provide by law. But, in the absence of specific legislation, the commission shall exercise the powers and perform the duties enumerated in this provision.

Source

Nebraska Constitution (1906);
Adopted 1906, Laws 1905, Chapter 233, Section 2, page 791;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 20;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 251, Section 1, page 740;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 347, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Jurisdiction and powers

The powers enumerated in this provision apply only to common carriers. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm. versus Nebraska Pub. Power District, 256 Nebraska 479, 590 National Western [Reporter]2d 840 (1999).


A legislative act or statute may constitutionally divest the Public Service Commission of jurisdiction over common carriers to the extent that the Legislature, through specific legislation, has preempted the Public Service Commission in control of common carriers. State ex rel. Spire versus Northwestern Bell Tel. Company, 233 Nebraska 262, 445 National Western [Reporter]2d 284 (1989).


Although the Public Service Commission is an independent regulatory body under the Nebraska Constitution, Public Service Commission jurisdiction to regulate common carriers may be restricted by the Legislature through "specific legislation." State ex rel. Spire versus Northwestern Bell Tel. Company, 233 Nebraska 262, 445 National Western [Reporter]2d 284 (1989).


The Legislature cannot constitutionally divest the Public Service Commission of jurisdiction over a class of common carriers by vesting a governmental agency, body of government, or branch of government, except the Legislature, with control over the class of common carriers. State ex rel. Spire versus Northwestern Bell Tel. Company, 233 Nebraska 262, 445 National Western [Reporter]2d 284 (1989).


While the Legislature may constitutionally occupy a regulatory field, thereby specifically and preemptively excluding the Public Service Commission from some control over a class of common carriers, the Legislature cannot absolutely and totally abandon or abolish constitutionally conferred regulatory control over common carriers. State ex rel. Spire versus Northwestern Bell Tel. Company, 233 Nebraska 262, 445 National Western [Reporter]2d 284 (1989).


The powers of the Public Service Commission are plenary and self-executing and past unauthorized services may be considered by the commission if not prohibited by statute. Groenewold versus Building Movers, Incorporated, 197 Nebraska 187, 247 National Western [Reporter]2d 629 (1976).


The Public Service Commission has exclusive power and jurisdiction to inquire into complaints concerning telephone rates and where service is woefully inadequate, may require rebates. Myers versus Blair Tel. Company, 194 Nebraska 55, 230 National Western [Reporter]2d 190 (1975).


The powers of the Nebraska Public Service Commission to regulate common carriers hereunder are plenary and self-executing, but where the Legislature enacts specific legislation implementing this section, it is controlling. Dahlsten versus Harris, 191 Nebraska 714, 217 National Western [Reporter]2d 813 (1974).


The Nebraska Public Service Commission is without jurisdiction or authority to fix rates and charges for motor vehicle carriers transporting livestock in intrastate commerce. Livestock Carriers Div. of M.C. Association versus Midwest Packers Traf. Association, 191 Nebraska 1, 213 National Western [Reporter]2d 443 (1973).


Because of plaintiffs' lack of standing, issue of constitutionality is not reached but, in any event, the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act does not prohibit regulation and control by Public Service Commission. Ritums versus Howell, 190 Nebraska 503, 209 National Western [Reporter]2d 160 (1973).


Railway Commission's plenary power to regulate common carriers hereunder extends to new and improved devices, equipment, and methods in telephone service. Radio-Fone, Incorporated versus A.T.S. Mobile Telephone, Incorporated, 187 Nebraska 637, 193 National Western [Reporter]2d 442 (1972).


Railway Commission's powers of enforcement are not limited to injunction authorized by statute in absence of specific legislation to that effect. Nebraska State Railway Commission versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 187 Nebraska 369, 191 National Western [Reporter]2d 438 (1971).


The fact that the State Railway Commission has certain legislative and judicial powers does not prevent it from being in a broad sense an administrative agency. Yellow Cab Company versus Nebraska State Railway Commission, 175 Nebraska 150, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 922 (1963).


Telephone companies are subject to regulation by the State Railway Commission. Block versus Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Company, 170 Nebraska 531, 103 National Western [Reporter]2d 312 (1960).


State Railway Commission has authority to reconsider an order denying a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Miller versus Consolidated Motor Freight, Incorporated, 168 Nebraska 712, 97 National Western [Reporter]2d 265 (1959).


Pipe line carriers are subject to regulation by State Railway Commission but are not required to obtain certificate of public convenience and necessity under Motor Carrier Act. Toronto Pipe Line Company versus Camerland Pipelines Company, Incorporated, 167 Nebraska 201, 92 National Western [Reporter]2d 554 (1958).


Specific legislation controls over general powers of commission. Edgar versus Wheeler Transport Service, Incorporated, 157 Nebraska 1, 58 National Western [Reporter]2d 496 (1953).


Motor Carrier Act was specific legislation limiting plenary power of commission. In reference Application of Richling, 154 Nebraska 108, 47 National Western [Reporter]2d 413 (1951).


Transfer of jurisdiction over common carriers by air from State Railway Commission to Department of Aeronautics was unconstitutional. State ex rel. State Railway Commission versus Ramsey, 151 Nebraska 333, 37 National Western [Reporter]2d 502 (1949).


Legislature may properly enact specific legislation limiting the scope of the commission's powers. Union Transfer Company versus Bee Line Motor Freight, 150 Nebraska 280, 34 National Western [Reporter]2d 363 (1948).


State Railway Commission has original jurisdiction to grant or deny certificate of convenience and necessity to common carrier. In reference Application of Effenberger, 150 Nebraska 13, 33 National Western [Reporter]2d 296 (1948).


Legislative act may deprive the Nebraska State Railway Commission of any power to act to extent that it occupies the field. State versus Chicago & National Western [Reporter] Ry. Company, 147 Nebraska 970, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 824 (1947).


The State Railway Commission is a constitutionally created body, as distinguished from an executive department or commission created by the Legislature. State ex rel. Johnson versus Chase, 147 Nebraska 758, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (1946).


Nebraska State Railway Commission is a constitutionally created body endowed with powers and duties. In reference Application of Hergott, 145 Nebraska 100, 15 National Western [Reporter]2d 418 (1944).


State Railway Commission has power to determine properly presented issues on application of railroad company to discontinue passenger trains on branch line, and, on appeal to Supreme Court, the question for determination is the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the order is not unreasonable or arbitrary. In reference Application of Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 138 Nebraska 767, 295 National Western [Reporter] 389 (1940).


Railway Commission has sole power to grant, deny, amend, transfer or revoke certificate of convenience and necessity for the operation of a bus line. Marconnit versus Effenberger, 135 Nebraska 564, 283 National Western [Reporter] 226 (1939); Effenberger versus Marconnit, 135 Nebraska 558, 283 National Western [Reporter] 223 (1939).


Legislature may delegate power to Railway Commission to regulate contract carriers where public may not continue to have safe and dependable transportation system unless contract carriers are brought under just and reasonable regulations bringing their service into relation with common carriers. Rodgers versus Nebraska State Railway Commission, 134 Nebraska 832, 279 National Western [Reporter] 800 (1938).


State Railway Commission is without power to prevent railroad company from leasing portions of its private right-of-way to certain persons for private lumber yards and deny same privilege to others where demised premises are not railroad transportation facilities devoted or necessary to public use. Johnson versus Union Pac. R. R. Company, 133 Nebraska 243, 274 National Western [Reporter] 581 (1937).


State Railway Commission has power to make award of damages against railroad company for exacting over charge from shipper. Central Bridge & Construction Company versus Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company, 129 Nebraska 726, 262 National Western [Reporter] 852 (1935).


In reviewing orders of Railway Commission which require exercise of legislative authority, the courts can only determine the limitation of power and reasonableness of the regulation. Central Bridge & Construction Company versus Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company, 128 Nebraska 779, 260 National Western [Reporter] 172 (1935).


Taxicab companies are common carriers and under jurisdiction of Railway Commission in absence of specific legislation. In reference Yellow Cab & Baggage Company, 126 Nebraska 138, 253 National Western [Reporter] 80 (1934).


Railway Commission has jurisdiction over street railways in cities. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company versus City of Omaha, 125 Nebraska 825, 252 National Western [Reporter] 407 (1934).


Resolution of commission requiring motor carrier to deposit liability insurance or other security is not in excess of powers. Petersen versus Beal, 121 Nebraska 348, 237 National Western [Reporter] 146 (1931).


Power to regulate and control telephone companies is subject to general constitutional limitations, but includes power to order connection of systems. Blackledge versus Farmers' Ind. Tel. Company of Red Cloud, 105 Nebraska 713, 181 National Western [Reporter] 709 (1921).


Railway Commission has jurisdiction over irrigation companies and may inquire into, regulate and fix water rates. McCook Irrigation & Water Power Company versus Burtless, 98 Nebraska 141, 152 National Western [Reporter] 334 (1915).


When parties fail to agree, Railway Commission may prescribe terms and conditions of connection, use of lines, and apportionment of expense. Hooper Tel. Company versus Nebraska Tel. Company, 96 Nebraska 245, 147 National Western [Reporter] 674 (1914).


Power to regulate includes street railway companies. Herpolsheimer Company versus Lincoln Traction Company, 96 Nebraska 154, 147 National Western [Reporter] 206 (1914), 147 National Western [Reporter] 1114 (1914), rehearing denied, 97 Nebraska 113, 149 National Western [Reporter] 326 (1914).


Power extends over all railroads and within municipalities. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Company versus Nebraska State Railway Commission, 89 Nebraska 853, 132 National Western [Reporter] 409 (1911).


2. Regulation of rates and service

The Nebraska Public Service Commission is without jurisdiction or authority to fix rates and charges for motor vehicle carriers transporting livestock in intrastate commerce. Livestock Carriers Div. of M.C. Association versus Midwest Packers Traf. Association, 191 Nebraska 1, 213 National Western [Reporter]2d 443 (1973).


There being no specific legislation to the contrary, this provision is sufficiently broad to authorize the State Railway Commission to fix joint line rates. Howard McLean Company versus Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Company, 187 Nebraska 30, 187 National Western [Reporter]2d 300 (1971).


State Railway Commission is clothed with power to hold hearings and establish rates for common carriers in intrastate commerce. Erickson versus Metropolitan Utilities District, 171 Nebraska 654, 107 National Western [Reporter]2d 324 (1961).


State Railway Commission has power to regulate rates of telephone companies. City of Scottsbluff versus United Telephone Company of the West, 171 Nebraska 229, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 12 (1960).


State Railway Commission has jurisdiction over regulation of rates and service of motor carriers. Strasheim versus Martin, 169 Nebraska 787, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 161 (1960).


Powers of State Railway Commission do not include regulation of rates of private carriers. City of Bayard versus North Central Gas Company, 164 Nebraska 819, 83 National Western [Reporter]2d 861 (1957).


State Railway Commission had power to consider and determine the issues with respect to discontinuance of motor passenger train service on branch line of railroad. In reference Application of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Company, 152 Nebraska 367, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 165 (1950); In reference Application of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Company, 152 Nebraska 352, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 157 (1950).


State Railway Commission has power to make rules and regulations for administration of Motor Carrier Act. In reference Application of Neylon, 151 Nebraska 587, 38 National Western [Reporter]2d 552 (1949).


Legislature has right to prescribe how commission shall proceed and what authority it may exercise in regulating common carriers. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company versus County Board of Dodge County, 148 Nebraska 648, 28 National Western [Reporter]2d 396 (1947).


The grant or refusal of a certificate of convenience and necessity to a motor carrier is within the constitutional authority of the State Railway Commission. Moritz versus State Railway Commission, 147 Nebraska 400, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 545 (1946).


State Railway Commission may make different intrastate freight rates from the initial shipping point to different places in the same switching district at the station to which shipments are consigned, where difference in conditions so warrants. Shields Company versus Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 133 Nebraska 722, 276 National Western [Reporter] 925 (1938).


State Railway Commission has plenary jurisdiction over the rates, service and regulation of common carriers. Furstenberg versus Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company, 132 Nebraska 562, 272 National Western [Reporter] 756 (1937).


Telephone companies are subject to Railway Commission's reasonable orders on due hearings as to rates and time and manner of service. Farmers & Merchants Tel. Company of Alma versus Orleans Community Club, 116 Nebraska 633, 218 National Western [Reporter] 583 (1928).


Railway Commission, in absence of specific legislation limiting power, has under this section all power in regulation of rates and service, and general control, that the people themselves could exercise. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Company versus Nebraska State Ry. Com., 103 Nebraska 695, 173 National Western [Reporter] 690 (1919); In reference Lincoln Traction Company, 103 Nebraska 229, 171 National Western [Reporter] 192 (1919).


When question is whether community or locality is properly served, not only question of rates are involved, but other questions and conditions peculiarly within province of Railway Commission. Rivett Lumber & Coal Company of Benson versus Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company, 102 Nebraska 492, 167 National Western [Reporter] 570 (1918).


Railway Commission has power to regulate rates and service within municipalities, and municipality is not empowered to contract with telephone company so as to deprive commission of right to regulate. Marquis versus Polk County Tel. Company, 100 Nebraska 140, 158 National Western [Reporter] 927 (1916).


Railway Commission can fix rates only in absence of specific legislation. State ex rel. Missouri P. R. Company versus Clarke, 98 Nebraska 566, 153 National Western [Reporter] 623 (1915).


State Railway Commission had jurisdiction to regulate intrastate business use and charges therefor of team tracks on railroad's belt line in city of Omaha. Missouri Pac. R. R. Corp. versus Nebraska State Ry. Commission, 65 F.2d 557 (8th Circuit 1933).


Rates are within rule-making power of State Railway Commission. Mogis versus Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 90 F.Supp. 251 (D. Nebraska 1950).


3. Miscellaneous

Railway commissioner was eligible for office of State Treasurer. Swanson versus Sorensen, 181 Nebraska 312, 148 National Western [Reporter]2d 197 (1967).


Where the Legislature enacts specific legislation implementing this section, such legislation is controlling. Sherdon versus American Communication Company, 178 Nebraska 454, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 42 (1965).


Public power districts are not common carriers. Consumers P. P. District versus Twin Valleys P. P. District, 172 Nebraska 315, 109 National Western [Reporter]2d 372 (1961).


State Railway Commission is subject to and governed by specific legislation. Neuswanger versus Houk, 170 Nebraska 670, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 235 (1960).


Legislature has, by specific legislation, regulated common carriers by motor vehicle. R. B. "Dick" Wilson, Incorporated versus Hargleroad, 165 Nebraska 468, 86 National Western [Reporter]2d 177 (1957).


While this section does not contain provisions pertaining to eligibility, the Legislature may make reasonable restrictions upon eligibility to hold office of member of State Railway Commission. State ex rel. Quinn versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 436, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 892 (1942).


One not admitted to the bar is not authorized to engage in the practice of the law before the Nebraska State Railway Commission. State ex rel. Johnson versus Childe, 139 Nebraska 91, 295 National Western [Reporter] 381 (1941).


Members of Railway Commission are constituted a separate class in fixing salary. State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


A State Railway Commissioner is not required to give an official bond. State ex rel. Shields versus Hall, 103 Nebraska 17, 170 National Western [Reporter] 173 (1918).


4-21. Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 302, Section 1.

4-22. Executive officials to keep accounts; reports; false reports, penalty.

The Legislature shall provide by statute for the keeping of accounts and the reporting by those agencies of the state which are required to administer cash funds not subject to appropriation by the Legislature, and an annual report thereof shall be made to the Governor under oath; and any officer who makes a false report shall be guilty of perjury and punished accordingly.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 21 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 22;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 302, Section 2(2), page 895.

Annotations

This section applies to all officers of public institutions. Moore versus State, 53 Nebraska 831, 74 National Western [Reporter] 319 (1898).


4-23. Executive officials and heads of institutions; reports to Legislature; information from expending agencies.

All expending agencies of the state as the Legislature may provide shall at least ten days preceding each regular session of the Legislature severally report to the Governor, who shall transmit such reports to the Legislature, together with the reports of the Judges of the Supreme Court of defects in the constitution and laws, and the Governor or the Legislature may at any time require information, in writing, under oath, from the officers of all expending agencies, upon any subject relating to the condition, management and expenses of their respective offices.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 22 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 23;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 302, Section 2(2), page 895.

Annotations

Amendment to Habitual Criminal Act was enacted as result of report of Judges to Legislature of defects in the Constitution and laws. Haffke versus State, 149 Nebraska 83, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 462 (1948).


4-24. Great seal.

There shall be a seal of the state, which shall be called the "Great Seal of the State of Nebraska," which shall be kept by the Secretary of State and used by him officially as directed by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 23 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 24.

4-25. Salaries of officials; fees.

The officers provided for in this article shall receive such salaries as may be provided by law. Such officers, or such other officers as may be provided for by law, shall not receive for their own use any fees, costs, or interest upon public money in their hands. All fees that may hereafter be payable by law for services performed, or received by an officer provided for in this article, by virtue of his office shall be paid forthwith into the state treasury.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 24 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 25;
Amended 1956, Laws 1955, Chapter 193, Section 1, page 555.

Annotations

Under former law, salary of executive officer could not be changed more than once in eight years. State ex rel. Laughlin versus Johnson, 156 Nebraska 671, 57 National Western [Reporter]2d 531 (1953).


County officer is required to perform the duties of his office for the compensation allowed him by statute. Hoctor versus State, 141 Nebraska 329, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 558 (1942).


During temporary absence of Governor from state, Lieutenant Governor is entitled only to salary fixed by law for the office of Lieutenant Governor and not for office of Governor. Johnson versus Johnson, 141 Nebraska 239, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 414 (1942).


Salary of State Railway Commissioner is subject to garnishment under statute in force at time he was candidate and elected to office. Department of Banking versus Foe, 136 Nebraska 422, 286 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1939).


Nebraska State Board of Agriculture was not a public agency so as to require funds to be paid into state treasury. Crete Mills versus Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Nebraska 244, 271 National Western [Reporter] 684 (1937).


Act providing for refunding of excess grain inspection fees is not in conflict herewith. Bollen versus Price, 129 Nebraska 342, 261 National Western [Reporter] 689 (1935).


Occupancy by Governor of mansion provided by state is not a perquisite of office or other compensation. State versus Sheldon, 78 Nebraska 552, 111 National Western [Reporter] 372 (1907).


Constitution modified all previous statutes so as to require all fees to be paid in advance into the treasury. State versus Home Insurance Company, 59 Nebraska 524, 81 National Western [Reporter] 443 (1900); State versus Moore, 56 Nebraska 82, 76 National Western [Reporter] 474 (1898); Moore versus State, 53 Nebraska 831, 74 National Western [Reporter] 319 (1898).


4-26. Officials to give bonds.

All officers of government shall give bond as may be prescribed by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 25 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 26;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 302, Section 2(2), page 895.

Annotations

Bond required of public officers by Constitution may be defined as a contractual obligation that such officer will faithfully discharge the duties of his office. Laverty versus Cochran, 132 Nebraska 118, 271 National Western [Reporter] 354 (1936).


4-27. Executive offices; creation of.

No executive state office other than herein provided shall be created except by a two-thirds majority of all members elected to the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 26 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 13;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 27;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 341, Section 1.

Annotations

Merit System Act did not create an executive state office. Sommerville versus Johnson, 149 Nebraska 167, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 577 (1948).


Member of Nebraska Liquor Control Commission is not the head of an executive department. State ex rel. Johnson versus Chase, 147 Nebraska 758, 25 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (1946).


Subject to the limitations of this section, the Legislature has power to create new executive state departments and executive state officers as heads thereof. State ex rel. Howard versus Marsh, 146 Nebraska 750, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 503 (1946).


Department of Industrial Development was an executive office which required two-thirds vote to create. Mekota versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 146 Nebraska 370, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 633 (1945).


Power to create or continue an office is vested in the legislative department of government, subject to constitutional restrictions. Swanson versus State, 132 Nebraska 82, 271 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1937).


4-28. Tax Equalization and Review Commission; members; powers; Tax Commissioner; powers.

By January 1, 1997, there shall be a Tax Equalization and Review Commission. The members of the commission shall be appointed by the Governor as provided by law. The commission shall have power to review and equalize assessments of property for taxation within the state and shall have such other powers and perform such other duties as the Legislature may provide. The terms of office and compensation of members of the commission shall be as provided by law.

A Tax Commissioner shall be appointed by the Governor with the approval of the Legislature. The Tax Commissioner may have jurisdiction over the administration of the revenue laws of the state and such other duties and powers as provided by law. The Tax Commissioner shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 27 (1920);
Adopted 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 14;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 4, Section 28;
Amended 1996, Laws 1995, Law Report 3CA, Section 1.

Annotations

Power to hold examinations of applicants for certification as county assessors and determine qualifications is granted by this section, dependent only on implementing legislative action. Shear versus County Board of Commissioners, 187 Nebraska 849, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (1972).


Authority and power of State Board of Equalization and Assessment noted. In reference Valuation and Equalization, 182 Nebraska 621, 156 National Western [Reporter]2d 728 (1968).


Section is self-executing, and together with statute, constitutes Tax Commissioner an administrative agency to enforce revenue laws. State versus Odd Fellows Hall Association, 123 Nebraska 440, 243 National Western [Reporter] 616 (1932).


Where Auditor of Public Accounts certified appropriation as reduced by unauthorized veto, review of action of State Board of Equalization and Assessment was not confined to writ of error. Elmen versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Nebraska 141, 231 National Western [Reporter] 772 (1930).


State Supreme Court on appeal from decision of State Board of Equalization in proceedings involving valuation and assessment of railroad property for taxation acts in judicial, and not in administrative capacity. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company versus Bauman, 69 F.2d 171 (8th Circuit 1934).


5-1. Power vested in courts; Chief Justice; powers.

The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, an appellate court, district courts, county courts, in and for each county, with one or more judges for each county or with one judge for two or more counties, as the Legislature shall provide, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be created by law. In accordance with rules established by the Supreme Court and not in conflict with other provisions of this Constitution and laws governing such matters, general administrative authority over all courts in this state shall be vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice shall be the executive head of the courts and may appoint an administrative director thereof.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 1;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1, page 1432;
Amended 1990, Laws 1990, Law Report 8, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Establishment of courts

Act establishing Court of Industrial Relations does not violate any constitutional provision and the standards for its guidance are adequate. Orleans Education Association versus School District of Orleans, 193 Nebraska 675, 229 National Western [Reporter]2d 172 (1975).


The Legislature has power to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Anderson versus Tiemann, 182 Nebraska 393, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 322 (1967).


Legislature has power to abolish justice of the peace courts only as an incident to the exercise of the power to substitute other courts for the justice of the peace courts. State ex rel Woolsey versus Morgan, 138 Nebraska 635, 294 National Western [Reporter] 436 (1940).


Justice courts are courts created by the Constitution, and only persons licensed to practice law are entitled to practice in such courts. State ex rel. Hunter versus Kirk, 133 Nebraska 625, 276 National Western [Reporter] 380 (1937).


Workmen's Compensation Court was created pursuant to this section. City of Lincoln versus Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Nebraska 225, 274 National Western [Reporter] 576 (1937).


Legislature may substitute municipal court for justice of peace court within such districts. State ex rel. Wright versus Brown, 131 Nebraska 239, 267 National Western [Reporter] 466 (1936).


Legislature may provide for justice of the peace districts, etc., and may substitute other courts for justice courts within such districts. State ex rel. Bunce versus Kubat, 110 Nebraska 362, 193 National Western [Reporter] 754 (1923).


County judge is constitutional officer, and can be removed only by impeachment. Conroy versus Hallowell, 94 Nebraska 794, 144 National Western [Reporter] 895 (1913).


Police magistrate is a constitutional office, and the term thereof is fixed by Constitution. State ex rel. McDermott versus Reilly, 94 Nebraska 232, 142 National Western [Reporter] 923 (1913), rehearing denied 94 Nebraska 238, 143 National Western [Reporter] 200 (1913).


Police judge is judicial constitutional officer and must be elected as such. State ex rel. Benson versus Mayor & Council of City of Hastings, 91 Nebraska 304, 135 National Western [Reporter] 1028 (1912); State ex rel. Gordon versus Moores, 61 Nebraska 9, 84 National Western [Reporter] 399 (1900); State ex rel. Wheeler versus Stuht, 52 Nebraska 209, 71 National Western [Reporter] 941 (1897).


County courts are by this section made courts of record. Noakes versus Switzer, 12 Nebraska 156, 10 National Western [Reporter] 536 (1881).


Justice of the peace is a state office and the person filling that office is an officer of the state included in the term public officers under agreement with the Federal Security Administrator requiring social security contributions from state based on compensation paid to officers of the state. State versus Finch, 339 F.Supp. 528 (D. Nebraska 1972).


County courts are by this section made a part of the judicial power of the state, being courts of record, with certain constitutional original jurisdiction as well as that given them by statute. City of Hattiesburg versus First National Bank of Hattiesburg, 8 F.Supp. 157 (S. D. Miss. 1934).


2. Functions of judicial department

The Nebraska Supreme Court is vested with the sole power to admit persons to the practice of law in this state and to fix qualifications for admission to the Nebraska bar. In reference Application of Brown, 270 Nebraska 891, 708 National Western [Reporter]2d 251 (2006).


A court cannot, in enforcing directives of a superior court, deprive a party of legal or substantive rights by acting in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner which is inconsistent with or contravenes principles of general law or constitutional or statutory provisions. In reference Estate of Reed, 267 Nebraska 121, 672 National Western [Reporter]2d 416 (2003).


The Supreme Court has administrative authority over all inferior courts. It is essential for the Supreme Court, as a part of its inherent authority, to provide inferior courts with case progression standards in order to ensure that cases are properly disposed of in a timely and efficient manner. In reference Estate of Reed, 267 Nebraska 121, 672 National Western [Reporter]2d 416 (2003).


The Nebraska Supreme Court, and only that court, is invested with the power to admit persons to the practice of law and to fix qualifications for admission to the bar. Thus, it has the responsibility to adopt and implement systems designed to protect the public and safeguard the judicial system by assuring that those admitted to the bar are of such character and fitness as to be worthy of the trust and confidence such admission implies. In reference Application of Majorek, 244 Nebraska 595, 508 National Western [Reporter]2d 275 (1993).


County courts can only acquire jurisdiction through legislative enactment. Miller versus Janecek, 210 Nebraska 316, 314 National Western [Reporter]2d 250 (1982).


This provision clearly grants county courts jurisdiction over actions involving speeding violations. State versus Jones, 209 Nebraska 296, 307 National Western [Reporter]2d 126 (1981).


Establishment of judicial department conferred authority necessary to exercise its powers as coordinate department of government. State ex rel. Ralston versus Turner, 141 Nebraska 556, 4 National Western [Reporter]2d 302 (1942).


Supreme Court is vested with sole power to admit persons to practice of law and fix their qualifications. State ex rel. Wright versus Hinckle, 137 Nebraska 735, 291 National Western [Reporter] 68 (1940).


It is an imperative duty of the judicial department of government to protect its jurisdiction at the boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution. State ex rel. Wright versus Barney, 133 Nebraska 676, 276 National Western [Reporter] 676 (1937).


Right to define and regulate the practice of law belongs to the Judicial Department of State Government. In reference Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Nebraska 283, 275 National Western [Reporter] 265 (1937).


This section places judicial power in the courts. Laverty versus Cochran, 132 Nebraska 118, 271 National Western [Reporter] 354 (1936).


Supreme Court is vested with sole power to admit persons to practice of law in this state and to fix qualifications for admission to the bar. State ex rel. Wright versus Barlow, 131 Nebraska 294, 268 National Western [Reporter] 95 (1936).


Power conferred by special statute on Supreme Court Justice to require election commissioner to file nomination acceptance and place name on ballot is judicial, not quasi-political or administrative. State ex rel. Meissner versus McHugh, 120 Nebraska 356, 233 National Western [Reporter] 1 (1930).


Unless Constitution provides otherwise, Legislature may classify and regulate judicial powers and functions. State ex rel. Smyth versus Magney, 52 Nebraska 508, 72 National Western [Reporter] 1006 (1897).


Judicial power is the authority of some persons or tribunals to hear and determine a controversy and render judgment or decree binding parties thereto. Acknowledgment of deed is not judicial function. Horbach versus Tyrrell, 48 Nebraska 514, 67 National Western [Reporter] 485 (1896).


3. Judicial powers of administrative boards

Provision in Nebraska Clean Waters Commission Act regarding appointment of trustees construed so as not to violate this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus Duxbury, 183 Nebraska 302, 160 National Western [Reporter]2d 88 (1968).


Party who invoked special proceeding could not question constitutionality thereof under this section. Lackaff versus Department of Roads & Irrigation, 153 Nebraska 217, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1950).


Reclamation Act did not violate this section. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District versus Hall County, 152 Nebraska 410, 41 National Western [Reporter]2d 397 (1950).


Statute providing for board of appraisers designated as "court of condemnation," does not create "court" in contravention of Constitution although board's functions are judicial in nature. City of Mitchell versus Western Public Service Company, 124 Nebraska 248, 246 National Western [Reporter] 484 (1933).


Statute empowering administrative department to cancel water appropriation after hearing, where water was not put to beneficial use, was not void as giving department judicial powers. Dawson County Irrigation Company versus McMullen, 120 Nebraska 245, 231 National Western [Reporter] 840 (1930).


Law authorizing appointment of three district judges to act as appraisers in condemnation of gas plant by municipality does not create new court. In reference Appraisement of Omaha Gas Plant, 102 Nebraska 782, 169 National Western [Reporter] 725 (1918).


Conferring upon boards or individuals of executive or administrative functions requiring exercise of judicial powers does not thereby confer judicial functions. Enterprise Irrigation District versus Tri-State Land Company, 92 Nebraska 121, 138 National Western [Reporter] 171 (1912).


Giving discretionary and regulatory powers to administrative board does not make it a judicial body. State ex rel. Prout versus Northwestern Trust Company, 72 Nebraska 497, 101 National Western [Reporter] 14 (1904).


Administrative board was not clothed with judicial functions because it incidentally determines water rights of riparian owners. Crawford Company versus Hathaway, 60 Nebraska 754, 84 National Western [Reporter] 271 (1900).


Granting to county board of duty of passing on claims against county, with right of appeal to district court, does not confer judicial power. Stenberg versus State ex rel. Keller, 48 Nebraska 299, 67 National Western [Reporter] 190 (1896).


Conferring power on county board to oust county officer for corruption does not of itself confer judicial powers on such board. State ex rel. Walters versus Oleson, 15 Nebraska 247, 18 National Western [Reporter] 45 (1893).


4. Miscellaneous

Article 5, section 30(3), of the Nebraska Constitution does not limit suspension with pay to the two instances listed; suspension may be imposed in other instances pursuant to this provision. In reference Complaint Against Jones, 255 Nebraska 1, 581 National Western [Reporter]2d 876 (1998).


Where district judges are appointed to appraise property in condemnation proceedings, the body thus created is not a court but a special tribunal. May versus City of Kearney, 145 Nebraska 475, 17 National Western [Reporter]2d 448 (1945).


Creation of municipal courts is provided for in Constitution, and vacancies in office of judge of municipal court must be filled in accordance with constitutional provisions. State ex rel. Hunter versus Maguire, 136 Nebraska 365, 285 National Western [Reporter] 921 (1939).


An affirmative statute giving a remedy not known to the common law does not take away the common law remedy. State ex rel. Wright versus Barney, 133 Nebraska 676, 276 National Western [Reporter] 676 (1937).


Freedom of press does not extend to contemptuous interferences with pending litigation. State versus Lovell, 117 Nebraska 710, 222 National Western [Reporter] 625 (1929).


Notary public cannot impose fine or imprisonment in punishment for contempt in taking of depositions. Courtnay versus Knox, 31 Nebraska 652, 48 National Western [Reporter] 763 (1891).


District judge is not officer of county, but of state. Jones versus York County, 26 F.2d 623 (8th Circuit 1928).


5-2. Supreme Court; number of judges; quorum; jurisdiction; retired judges, temporary duty; court divisions; assignments by Chief Justice.

The Supreme Court shall consist of seven judges, one of whom shall be the Chief Justice. A majority of the judges shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. A majority of the members sitting shall have authority to pronounce a decision except in cases involving the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases relating to the revenue, civil cases in which the state is a party, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, election contests involving state officers other than members of the Legislature, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law. The Legislature may provide that any judge of the Supreme Court or judge of the appellate court created pursuant to Article 5, section 1, of this Constitution who has retired may be called upon for temporary duty by the Supreme Court. Whenever necessary for the prompt submission and determination of causes, the Supreme Court may appoint judges of the district court or the appellate court to act as associate judges of the Supreme Court, sufficient in number, with the judges of the Supreme Court, to constitute two divisions of the court of five judges in each division. Whenever judges of the district court or the appellate court are so acting, the court shall sit in two divisions, and four of the judges thereof shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. Judges of the district court or the appellate court so appointed shall serve during the pleasure of the court and shall have all the powers of judges of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice shall make assignments of judges to the divisions of the court, preside over the division of which he or she is a member, and designate the presiding judge of the other division. The judges of the Supreme Court, sitting without division, shall hear and determine all cases involving the constitutionality of a statute and all appeals involving capital cases and may review any decision rendered by a division of the court. In such cases, in the event of the disability or disqualification by interest or otherwise of any of the judges of the Supreme Court, the court may appoint judges of the district court or the appellate court to sit temporarily as judges of the Supreme Court, sufficient to constitute a full court of seven judges. Judges of the district court or the appellate court shall receive no additional salary by virtue of their appointment and service as herein provided, but they shall be reimbursed their necessary traveling and hotel expenses.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 2 (1875);
Amended 1908, Laws 1907, Chapter 202, Section 1, page 581;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Nos. 15 and 16;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 2;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 316, Section 1, page 846;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 420, Section 1, page 1434;
Amended 1990, Laws 1990, Law Report 8, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Original jurisdiction

The Nebraska Constitution places original sentencing authority in the district courts and does not provide sentencing as one of the Supreme Court's powers. State versus Reeves, 258 Nebraska 511, 604 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (2000).


Jurisdiction in this case accepted by the Supreme Court because the state is a party and has an interest relating to the revenue. State ex rel. Douglas versus Gradwohl, 194 Nebraska 745, 235 National Western [Reporter]2d 854 (1975).


Declaratory judgment action to determine question of constitutionality of state statute was properly brought in Supreme Court. State Securities Company versus Ley, 177 Nebraska 251, 128 National Western [Reporter]2d 766 (1964).


Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of declaratory judgment action relating to the revenue of the state. Anderson versus Herrington, 169 Nebraska 391, 99 National Western [Reporter]2d 621 (1959).


Original jurisdiction existed over action relating to validity of Judges Retirement Act. Wilson versus Marsh, 162 Nebraska 237, 75 National Western [Reporter]2d 723 (1956).


Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in quo warranto to try title to office of member of Board of Control. State ex rel. Johnson versus Hagemeister, 161 Nebraska 475, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 625 (1955).


Unless unusual circumstances are present or the matter is of statewide importance, Supreme Court will not issue writ of habeas corpus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Williams versus Olson, 143 Nebraska 115, 8 National Western [Reporter]2d 830 (1943).


Original jurisdiction in quo warranto is vested in Supreme Court. State ex rel. Johnson versus Consumers Public Power District, 142 Nebraska 114, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 202 (1942).


Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court is limited to cases specified in this section. State ex rel. Wright versus Barney, 133 Nebraska 676, 276 National Western [Reporter] 676 (1937).


State of Nebraska and executive departments thereof may seek relief in original action under Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. State ex rel. Smrha versus General American Life Ins. Company, 132 Nebraska 520, 272 National Western [Reporter] 555 (1937).


Supreme Court may decline to take original jurisdiction to oust executive state officer where information fails to state cause of action in quo warranto. State ex rel. Good versus Conklin, 127 Nebraska 417, 255 National Western [Reporter] 925 (1934).


On appeal from confirmation of judicial sale to foreclose mortgage on real estate, an application for moratorium is not within original jurisdiction of Supreme Court. Wallace versus Clements, 125 Nebraska 358, 250 National Western [Reporter] 235 (1933).


Repeated violations of criminal statute, harmfully affecting rights of people generally, is "public wrong" enjoinable by Supreme Court in original suit by state as plaintiff. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Company, 118 Nebraska 851, 226 National Western [Reporter] 705 (1929).


Original jurisdiction includes injunction to enforce intoxicating liquor law. State versus Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 88 Nebraska 669, 130 National Western [Reporter] 295 (1911).


Original jurisdiction in cases in which the state is a party is not confined to those of mere pecuniary interest, but includes cases in which the state seeks to enforce public rights or restrain a public wrong. State versus Pacific Express Company, 80 Nebraska 823, 115 National Western [Reporter] 619 (1908).


Designation of original jurisdiction in Supreme Court is prohibition in all other cases. Parties cannot by consent confer jurisdiction on Supreme Court. Edney versus Baum, 70 Nebraska 159, 97 National Western [Reporter] 252 (1903).


Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction in cases criminal in nature. Applied to action for collection of penalty. State versus Missouri Pac. Ry. Company, 64 Nebraska 679, 90 National Western [Reporter] 877 (1902).


Where method of procedure in original jurisdiction of Supreme Court is not pointed out either by Constitution or statutes, court will adopt its own rules of procedure. State ex rel. Broatch versus Moores, 56 Nebraska 1, 76 National Western [Reporter] 530 (1898).


Mandamus cannot be invoked to take place of injunction as preventive remedy only. State ex rel. Dahlman versus Piper, 50 Nebraska 25, 69 National Western [Reporter] 378 (1896).


Legislature cannot confer original jurisdiction of subjects not enumerated in Constitution. Applied to writ of prohibition. State ex rel. King versus Hall, 47 Nebraska 579, 66 National Western [Reporter] 642 (1896).


Original jurisdiction does not include actions for relief for fraud unless state is party. Coombs versus MacDonald, 43 Nebraska 632, 62 National Western [Reporter] 41 (1895).


Unless expressly restricted, original jurisdiction of Supreme Court is concurrent with district courts. In reference Petition of Attorney General, 40 Nebraska 402, 58 National Western [Reporter] 945 (1894).


Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to appoint receiver of defunct bank under banking law. State versus Exchange Bank of Milligan, 34 Nebraska 198, 51 National Western [Reporter] 765 (1892); State versus Commercial State Bank, 28 Nebraska 677, 44 National Western [Reporter] 998 (1890).


Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of quo warranto to determine rights to public office. State ex rel. Thayer versus Boyd, 31 Nebraska 682, 48 National Western [Reporter] 739 (1891), 51 National Western [Reporter] 602 (1892).


Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in quo warranto for determining conflicting claims to public office, but cannot act in contested election claims. State ex rel. Fair versus Frazier, 28 Nebraska 438, 44 National Western [Reporter] 471 (1890).


Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court is limited to those cases designated by this section. Bell versus Templin, 26 Nebraska 249, 41 National Western [Reporter] 1093 (1889).


2. Appellate jurisdiction

The Nebraska Supreme Court, except in those cases wherein original jurisdiction is specially conferred, exercises appellate jurisdiction, and such appellate jurisdiction can be conferred only in the manner provided by statute. State versus Reeves, 258 Nebraska 511, 604 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (2000).


Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, action includes any proceeding in a court and only final orders therein are bases for appeals. Grantham versus General Telephone Company, 187 Nebraska 647, 193 National Western [Reporter]2d 449 (1972).


Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to review of judgments and final orders. Rhodes versus Houston, 172 Nebraska 177, 108 National Western [Reporter]2d 807 (1961).


Supreme Court has jurisdiction on appeal to grant temporary injunction and appoint receiver. State ex rel. Beck versus Associates Discount Corp., 162 Nebraska 683, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 215 (1956).


Except in those cases in which original jurisdiction is conferred hereby, Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction only, which can be conferred only in the manner provided by statute. Larson versus Wegner, 120 Nebraska 449, 233 National Western [Reporter] 253 (1930).


Where cause is determined on appeal by concurrence of five judges as provided by this section, motion for rehearing will be denied, where appellant failed to file written request for hearing to full bench. Day versus Metropolitan Utilities District, 115 Nebraska 711, 216 National Western [Reporter] 556 (1927).


Act conferring jurisdiction upon Supreme Court to review decisions of the State Railway Commission confers appellate jurisdiction. Hooper Telephone Company versus Nebraska Telephone Company, 96 Nebraska 245, 147 National Western [Reporter] 674 (1914).


Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to compel accounting by corporation manager. State versus Tabitha Home, 78 Nebraska 651, 111 National Western [Reporter] 586 (1907).


Jurisdiction of Supreme Court limited in both original and appellate, former by Constitution, latter by statutes. Johnson versus Parrotte, 46 Nebraska 51, 64 National Western [Reporter] 363 (1895).


Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to try contested elections. Miller versus Wheeler, 33 Nebraska 765, 51 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1892).


Supreme Court is intended as court of review of judgments of district court. Bell versus Templin, 26 Nebraska 249, 41 National Western [Reporter] 1093 (1889).


State Supreme Court on appeal from decision of State Board of Equalization in proceedings involving valuation and assessment of railroad property for taxation acts in judicial, and not in administrative capacity. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company versus Bauman, 69 F.2d 171 (8th Circuit 1934).


3. Miscellaneous

Absent a concurrent basis for jurisdiction over the subject matter of a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court of Nebraska does not have original jurisdiction to address declaratory judgment actions. State ex rel. Wieland versus Moore, 252 Nebraska 253, 561 National Western [Reporter]2d 230 (1997).


Since five judges of the court do not hold that sections 85-1,118 to 85-1,123 are unconstitutional, the sections are constitutional. State ex rel. Spire versus Beermann, 235 Nebraska 384, 455 National Western [Reporter]2d 749 (1990).


District judge was empowered to sit with all the powers of the Supreme Court under this provision. ConAgra, Incorporated versus Cargill, Incorporated, 223 Nebraska 92, 388 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1986).


Purpose of this provision was to create an elastic system which would enable the court to clear its docket, keep it so, and ultimately allow matters to be determined by a full court of seven judges. ConAgra, Incorporated versus Cargill, Incorporated, 223 Nebraska 92, 388 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1986).


The Nebraska Constitution clearly permits district court judges, retired or not, to act as associate Supreme Court judges when necessary for prompt submission and determination of causes. ConAgra, Incorporated versus Cargill, Incorporated, 223 Nebraska 92, 388 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1986).


Case on appeal first heard by a division of the Supreme Court and opinion adopted was set for reargument before the full court, and by it affirmed. State versus Schrader, 196 Nebraska 632, 244 National Western [Reporter]2d 498 (1976).


Cited in determining constitutionality of law relating to sale of school lands. State ex rel. Belker versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 184 Nebraska 621, 171 National Western [Reporter]2d 156 (1969).


Cited in determining constitutionality of section of Juvenile Court Act. DeBacker versus Brainard, 183 Nebraska 461, 161 National Western [Reporter]2d 508 (1968).


Except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is a court of limited and enumerated powers. Sorensen versus Swanson, 181 Nebraska 205, 147 National Western [Reporter]2d 620 (1967).


District judge may be designated to act as Judge of Supreme Court whenever necessary for prompt submission and determination of causes. Ruehle versus Ruehle, 161 Nebraska 691, 74 National Western [Reporter]2d 689 (1956).


Legislative act cannot be held unconstitutional except by concurrence of five Judges of Supreme Court. Sommerville versus Johnson, 149 Nebraska 167, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 577 (1948); Mehrens versus Greenleaf, 119 Nebraska 82, 227 National Western [Reporter] 325 (1929).


Constitutional questions will not be decided unless necessary to a determination of the case and the protection of some substantial right. State ex rel. Nelson versus Butler, 145 Nebraska 638, 17 National Western [Reporter]2d 683 (1945).


Suit involving constitutional question may be decided on stipulation that absent Justice should participate on briefs. Bauer versus State Game, Forestation & Parks Commission, 138 Nebraska 436, 293 National Western [Reporter] 282 (1940).


Power to correct errors in their own proceedings is inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction. Gate City Company versus Douglas County, 135 Nebraska 531, 282 National Western [Reporter] 532 (1938).


Private rights of parties which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation. Mooney versus Drainage District Number 1 of Richardson County, 134 Nebraska 192, 278 National Western [Reporter] 368 (1938).


It is the duty of the Supreme Court not to legislate but to expound the law as written. Ray versus Sanitary Garbage Company, 134 Nebraska 178, 278 National Western [Reporter] 139 (1938).


The Supreme Court has inherent constitutional powers to determine whether facts on which emergency legislation is based have ceased to exist or ever did, in fact, exist. First Trust Company of Lincoln versus Smith, 134 Nebraska 84, 277 National Western [Reporter] 762 (1938).


Supreme Court is constituted a separate class with respect to payment of salary. State ex rel. Day versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 699, 262 National Western [Reporter] 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


The word "revenue" refers only to those revenues for general state administration and not to those of municipal corporation. Aachen & Munich Fire Insurance Company versus City of Omaha, 72 Nebraska 112, 100 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1904).


Proceeding by quo warranto is as civil remedy, and is the means employed by state to cancel and recall privilege which corporation has abused. State versus Standard Oil Company, 61 Nebraska 28, 84 National Western [Reporter] 413 (1900); State versus Nebraska Distilling Company, 29 Nebraska 700, 46 National Western [Reporter] 155 (1890).


Jury trial in original quo warranto action in Supreme Court is not demandable as of right. State ex rel. Broatch versus Moores, 56 Nebraska 1, 76 National Western [Reporter] 530 (1898).


5-3. Terms of Supreme Court.

At least two terms of the supreme court shall be held each year, at the seat of government.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 3 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 3.

5-4. Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court; selection; residence; location of offices.

The Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court shall be selected as provided in this Article versus They may reside at the place where the court is located but shall reside within the state, and no Chief Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court shall be deemed thereby to have lost his or her residence at the place from which he or she was selected. The offices of the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court shall be at the place where the court is located.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 4 (1875);
Amended 1908, Laws 1907, Chapter 202, Section 2, page 581;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 17;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 4;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(2), page 742;
Amended 1998, Laws 1998, Law Report 303CA, Section 1.

Annotations

Judges of the Supreme Court are created as a distinct class for all purposes of legislation affecting them. State ex rel. Day versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 699, 262 National Western [Reporter] 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


5-5. Supreme Court judicial districts; redistricting; when.

The Legislature shall divide the state into six contiguous and compact districts of approximately equal population, which shall be numbered from one to six, which shall be known as the Supreme Court judicial districts. The Legislature shall redistrict the state after each federal decennial census. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed whenever practicable, but other established lines may be followed at the discretion of the Legislature. Such districts shall not be changed except upon the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Legislature. Whenever the Supreme Court is redistricted, the judges serving prior to the redistricting shall continue in office, and the law providing for such redistricting shall where necessary specify the newly established districts which they shall represent for the balance of their terms.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 5 (1875);
Amended 1908, Laws 1907, Chapter 202, Section 3, page 581;
Amended 1912, Laws 1911, Chapter 226, Section 1, page 679;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 17;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 5;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(2), page 742;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 421, Section 1, page 1437.

Annotations

Neither this section nor section 7 makes any mention of application to substitute judges. ConAgra, Incorporated versus Cargill, Incorporated, 223 Nebraska 92, 388 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1986).


5-6. Chief Justice to preside.

The Chief Justice shall preside at all terms and sittings of the supreme court, and in his absence or disability the judges present shall select one of their number chief justice pro tempore.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 6 (1875);
Amended 1908, Laws 1907, Chapter 202, Section 4, page 582;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 6.

5-7. Chief Justice; Associate Justices; qualifications.

No person shall be eligible to the office of Chief Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court unless he shall be at least thirty years of age, and a citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in this state at least three years next preceding his selection; nor, in the case of a Judge of the Supreme Court selected from a Supreme Court judicial district, unless he shall be a resident and elector of the district from which selected.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 7 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 7;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(2), page 742.

Annotations

Neither this section nor section 5 makes any mention of application to substitute judges. ConAgra, Incorporated versus Cargill, Incorporated, 223 Nebraska 92, 388 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1986).


Unlike officer designated in this section, there is no requirement that candidate for office of Secretary of State be a resident of the state. State ex rel. Brazda versus Marsh, 141 Nebraska 817, 5 National Western [Reporter]2d 206 (1942).


5-8. Supreme Court appoint staff; budget; copyright of state reports.

The Supreme Court shall appoint such staff as may be needed for the proper dispatch of the business of the court. The court shall prepare and recommend to each session of the Legislature a budget of the estimated expenses of the court. The copyright of the state reports shall forever remain the property of the state.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 8 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 8;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 333, Section 1;
Amended 1990, Laws 1990, Law Report 8, Section 1.

5-9. District courts; jurisdiction; felons may plead guilty; sentence.

The district courts shall have both chancery and common law jurisdiction, and such other jurisdiction as the Legislature may provide; and the judges thereof may admit persons charged with felony to a plea of guilty and pass such sentence as may be prescribed by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 9 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 9.

Annotations

1. Jurisdiction in general

The Nebraska Constitution places original sentencing authority in the district courts and does not provide sentencing as one of the Supreme Court's powers. State versus Reeves, 258 Nebraska 511, 604 National Western [Reporter]2d 151 (2000).


Jurisdiction in suits for an injunction are in the district courts which cannot be legislatively limited or controlled. Omaha Fish and Wildlife Club, Incorporated versus Community Refuse, Incorporated, 208 Nebraska 110, 302 National Western [Reporter]2d 379 (1981).


District court had inherent power to punish for contempt of court which Legislature could not limit. State ex rel. Beck versus Frontier Airlines, Incorporated, 174 Nebraska 172, 116 National Western [Reporter]2d 281 (1962).


District court alone has jurisdiction over controversy between adverse claimants with respect to interpretation of testamentary trust. In reference Trust Estate of Myers, 151 Nebraska 255, 37 National Western [Reporter]2d 228 (1949).


While Legislature may grant to district court such other jurisdiction as it may deem proper, it can not limit or take from such courts the general jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. State ex rel Wright versus Barney, 133 Nebraska 676, 276 National Western [Reporter] 676 (1937).


Judicial department of government must protect its jurisdiction at boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Mitchell State Bank, 123 Nebraska 120, 242 National Western [Reporter] 283 (1932); State ex rel. Sorensen versus State Bank of Minatare, 123 Nebraska 109, 242 National Western [Reporter] 278 (1932).


Where cause is properly before equity court, the appointment of receiver for failed or insolvent bank is judicial function hereunder, not subject to executive or legislative control. State ex rel. Sorenesen versus State Bank of Minatare, 123 Nebraska 109, 242 National Western [Reporter] 278 (1932).


This section refers to jurisdiction of court as such, rather than to duties of judge when acting as court. State ex rel. Thompson versus Neble and Latenser, 82 Nebraska 267, 117 National Western [Reporter] 723 (1908).


Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent of parties. Crawford Company versus Hathaway, 61 Nebraska 317, 85 National Western [Reporter] 303 (1901).


Where Legislature confers right without special tribunal for its enforcement, district court has jurisdiction. Armstrong versus Mayer, 60 Nebraska 423, 83 National Western [Reporter] 401 (1900); Foxworthy versus Lincoln & F. R. R. Company, 13 Nebraska 398, 14 National Western [Reporter] 394 (1882).


Legislature may provide original jurisdiction for district court other than that enumerated in Constitution. Arnold versus Weimer, 40 Nebraska 216, 58 National Western [Reporter] 709 (1894).


2. Equity jurisdiction

The equity jurisdiction of the district court is granted by the Constitution and cannot be legislatively limited or controlled. K N Energy, Incorporated versus City of Scottsbluff, 233 Nebraska 644, 447 National Western [Reporter]2d 227 (1989).


The equity jurisdiction granted the district court hereby cannot be legislatively limited or controlled. Village of Springfield versus Hevelone, 195 Nebraska 37, 236 National Western [Reporter]2d 811 (1975).


An action in equity to partition personal property may be brought in the district court by one owning an undivided interest therein against the administrator of the estate of a deceased person. Hoover versus Haller, 146 Nebraska 697, 21 National Western [Reporter]2d 450 (1946).


An equity court has inherent jurisdiction over the administration of charitable trusts. John A. Creighton Home versus Waltman, 140 Nebraska 3, 299 National Western [Reporter] 261 (1941).


The district court has jurisdiction to compel specific performance of contract to leave property to another by bequest, even though the property is personalty. Cox versus Johnston, 139 Nebraska 223, 296 National Western [Reporter] 883 (1941).


The insurance code in no way curbs or abridges the constitutional, common law or equity powers of the district court. Clark versus Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Company, 139 Nebraska 65, 296 National Western [Reporter] 449 (1941).


The equity power conferred by the Constitution on district courts is ample to grant relief in case where default judgment was obtained through negligence and fraud of attorney and term had expired. Seward versus Churn Ranch Company, 136 Nebraska 804, 287 National Western [Reporter] 610 (1939).


District courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine whether owner of agricultural lands included in corporate limits of city is entitled to have same disconnected therefrom. Witham versus City of Lincoln, 125 Nebraska 366, 250 National Western [Reporter] 247 (1933).


District courts have constitutional equity jurisdiction exercisable without legislative enactment. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Nebraska State Bank of Bloomfield, 124 Nebraska 449, 247 National Western [Reporter] 31 (1933); State versus Odd Fellows Hall Association, 123 Nebraska 440, 243 National Western [Reporter] 616 (1932).


Equity jurisdiction exists independently of statute and comes from the Constitution. Hall versus Hall, 123 Nebraska 280, 242 National Western [Reporter] 607 (1932).


Equity jurisdiction vested in district courts hereby is beyond Legislature's power to limit or control, and extends to administration of trusts. State ex rel. Sorensen versus Farmers State Bank of Polk, 121 Nebraska 532, 237 National Western [Reporter] 857 (1931); Burnham versus Bennison, 121 Nebraska 291, 236 National Western [Reporter] 745 (1931).


Court has chancery power hereunder to enforce rule of laches barring suit to cancel special assessments brought after four years by parties who petitioned for improvements. Tombrink versus Sarpy County, 120 Nebraska 160, 231 National Western [Reporter] 783 (1930).


District courts have constitutional equity jurisdiction which may be exercised without legislative enactment. Matteson versus Creighton University, 105 Nebraska 219, 179 National Western [Reporter] 1009 (1920).


Equity jurisdiction is beyond power of Legislature to limit or control. Lacey versus Zeigler, 98 Nebraska 380, 152 National Western [Reporter] 792 (1915).


3. Criminal jurisdiction

Under this provision, jail time is to be imposed by judges. The trial court may not delegate the authority to impose a jail sentence, or to eliminate a jail sentence, to a nonjudge. State versus Lee, 237 Nebraska 724, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 661 (1991).


District courts have such jurisdiction in criminal cases as may be provided by law. State versus Furstenau, 167 Nebraska 439, 93 National Western [Reporter]2d 384 (1958).


Judges of district court may admit persons charged with a felony to plead guilty. Lingo versus Hann, 161 Nebraska 67, 71 National Western [Reporter]2d 716 (1955).


Court, after sentence for less than minimum term prescribed by statute has been served, is without power to vacate it and impose greater penalty. Hickman versus Fenton, 120 Nebraska 66, 231 National Western [Reporter] 510 (1930).


Entire criminal code of Nebraska proceeds upon the principle that a plea of guilty, where it may be received unreservedly, is a waiver of the right to a trial by jury. Smith versus Olson, 44 F.Supp. 456 (D. Nebraska 1942).


4. Miscellaneous

Purpose of the medical review panel under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act is to provide expert opinion only, not arbitrate the dispute or dispose of the claim. Prendergast versus Nelson, 199 Nebraska 97, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 657 (1977).


Divorce decree providing for child support is subject to power of district court over its processes and decrees in furtherance of justice. Wassung versus Wassung, 136 Nebraska 440, 286 National Western [Reporter] 340 (1939).


Combining legal and equitable causes of action does not conflict with Constitution. Turner versus Althaus, 6 Nebraska 54 (1877).


5-10. District court judicial districts.

The state shall be divided into district court judicial districts. Until otherwise provided by law, the boundaries of the judicial districts and the number of judges of the district courts shall remain as now fixed. The judges of the district courts shall be selected from the respective districts as provided in this Article versus

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 10 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 10;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(2), page 742.

Annotations

Under former law, district judge must have been elected for each judicial district. State ex rel. Polk versus Galusha, 74 Nebraska 188, 104 National Western [Reporter] 197 (1905).


Under former law, judges of district court were elected for a term of four years. State ex rel. Wheeler versus Stuht, 52 Nebraska 209, 71 National Western [Reporter] 941 (1897).


Unorganized territory is part of the judicial district of county to which it is attached. State versus Page, 12 Nebraska 386, 11 National Western [Reporter] 495 (1882); Ex parte Crawford, 12 Nebraska 379, 11 National Western [Reporter] 494 (1882).


County cannot be part of two judicial districts. Olive versus State, 11 Nebraska 1, 7 National Western [Reporter] 444 (1881).


District judge is state, not county, officer. Jones versus York County, 26 F.2d 623 (8th Circuit 1928).


5-11. District court judges; change of number; boundaries.

The Legislature may change the number of judges of the district courts and alter the boundaries of judicial districts. Such change in number or alterations in boundaries shall not vacate the office of any judge. Such districts shall be formed of compact territory bounded by county lines.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 11 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 11;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 303, Section 1.

Annotations

The Governor must approve bills increasing number of districts. State ex rel. Main versus Crounse, 36 Nebraska 835, 55 National Western [Reporter] 246 (1893).


Legislature may provide additional judges of district court. State ex rel. Morton versus Stevenson, 18 Nebraska 416, 25 National Western [Reporter] 585 (1885).


5-12. District court judges may hold court for each other; retired judges, temporary duty.

The judges of the district court may hold court for each other and shall do so when required by law or when ordered by the Supreme Court. The Legislature may provide that any judge of the district court who has retired may be called upon for temporary duty by the Supreme Court.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 12 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 12;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 420, Section 1, page 1434.

Annotations

Section 24-729 was enacted in response to this provision. ConAgra, Incorporated versus Cargill, Incorporated, 223 Nebraska 92, 388 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1986).


District court is court of general jurisdiction of this state divided into judicial districts for the transaction of business; district court is one court of general jurisdiction with interchangeable judges, all exercising the same jurisdiction. Garrotto versus McManus, 185 Nebraska 644, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 570 (1970).


Supreme Court is given power to order a district judge to serve in a district other than his own. Ruehle versus Ruehle, 161 Nebraska 691, 74 National Western [Reporter]2d 689 (1956).


District judge had jurisdiction to preside over murder trial in another district during absence of regular judge. Iron Bear versus Jones, 149 Nebraska 651, 32 National Western [Reporter]2d 125 (1948).


A district judge is not disqualified to serve in the district court of another district in the state. Rhodes versus Van Steenberg, 225 F.Supp. 113 (D. Nebraska 1963).


5-13. Supreme and district judges; salaries.

The chief justice, the judges of the supreme court and the judges of the district court shall receive such salaries as may be provided by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 13 (1875);
Amended 1908, Laws 1907, Chapter 202, Section 5, page 582;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 13.

Annotations

Legislature had authority to increase during term salaries of Judges of Supreme Court provided to be paid by temporary salary schedule of Constitution. State ex rel. Johnson versus Marsh, 149 Nebraska 1, 29 National Western [Reporter]2d 799 (1947).


Act of 1933, purporting to reduce salaries of judges and other state officers, was unconstitutional. State ex rel. Day versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 699, 262 National Western [Reporter] 850 (1935); State ex rel. Taylor versus Hall, 129 Nebraska 669, 262 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1935).


5-14. Supreme and district judges not to act as attorneys; judge not to practice law, when.

No judge of the Supreme or district courts shall act as attorney or counsellor at law in any manner whatsoever. No judge shall practice law in any court in any matter arising in or growing out of any proceedings in his own court.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 14 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 14;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1(1), page 1432.

Annotations

Participation of county judge as counsel for interested parties was in violation of this section. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association versus Conover, 166 Nebraska 132, 88 National Western [Reporter]2d 135 (1958).


Participation in litigation by county judge was improper and subject to censure. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association versus Bates, 162 Nebraska 652, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 302 (1956).


County judge cannot practice in any proceeding brought in his own court. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association versus Wiebusch, 153 Nebraska 583, 45 National Western [Reporter]2d 583 (1951).


County judge may not appear as counsel in any matter in his own court. Tucker versus Heirs of Myers, 151 Nebraska 359, 37 National Western [Reporter]2d 585 (1949).


5-15. Repealed 1970. Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1(2), page 1432.

5-16. Repealed 1970. Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1(2), page 1432.

5-17. Repealed 1970. Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1(2), page 1432.

5-18. Repealed 1970. Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1(2), page 1432.

5-19. Practice of all courts to be uniform.

The organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 19 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 19.

Annotations

Legislature may provide for election, term, and districts for justices, and also may substitute other court for justice in metropolitan city. State ex rel. Bunce versus Kubat, 110 Nebraska 362, 193 National Western [Reporter] 754 (1923).


This section does not prohibit establishing of local courts inferior to district court in municipal corporations. State ex rel. Magney versus Hunter, 99 Nebraska 520, 156 National Western [Reporter] 975 (1916).


Uniformity is not violated if all courts of same grade have jurisdiction over same matters and of equal authority. Moores versus State ex rel. Gordon, 63 Nebraska 345, 88 National Western [Reporter] 514 (1901); State ex rel. Smyth versus Magney, 52 Nebraska 508, 72 National Western [Reporter] 1006 (1897).


Law giving authority to prosecute by information does not violate requirement of uniformity. Dinsmore versus State, 61 Nebraska 418, 85 National Western [Reporter] 445 (1901).


Legislature cannot give to district court power or authority to remove from office police judge of one class of cities. Gordon versus Moores, 61 Nebraska 345, 85 National Western [Reporter] 298 (1901).


Law applying to all counties adopting township organization is uniform. Van Horn versus State ex rel. Abbott, 46 Nebraska 62, 64 National Western [Reporter] 365 (1895).


Law which is general and uniform throughout state, operating alike upon all persons and localities of a class who are brought within relations and circumstances provided for, is not wanting in uniformity. State ex rel. Crawford versus Norris, 37 Nebraska 299, 55 National Western [Reporter] 1086 (1893); State ex rel. Selden versus Berka, 20 Nebraska 375, 30 National Western [Reporter] 267 (1886).


5-20. Officers in this Article; tenure; residence; duties; compensation.

All officers provided for in this Article shall hold their offices until their successors shall be qualified and they shall respectively reside in the district or county from which they shall be selected. All officers, when not otherwise provided for in this Article, shall perform such duties and receive such compensation as may be prescribed by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 20 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 20;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(2), page 742;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 419, Section 1, page 1432.

Annotations

Elections for police judge must be held along with general election of other constitutional officers. State ex rel. McDermott versus Reilly, 94 Nebraska 232, 142 National Western [Reporter] 923 (1913), rehearing denied 94 Nebraska 238, 143 National Western [Reporter] 200 (1913); State ex rel. Benson versus Mayor and Council of the City of Hastings, 91 Nebraska 304, 135 National Western [Reporter] 1028 (1912).


Term includes period for which incumbent may hold over until his successor has qualified. State ex rel. Polk versus Galusha, 74 Nebraska 188, 104 National Western [Reporter] 197 (1905).


The term of a constitutional officer can neither be extended nor shortened by legislative act. State ex rel. Gordon versus Moores, 70 Nebraska 48, 96 National Western [Reporter] 1011 (1903); State ex rel. Wheeler versus Stuht, 52 Nebraska 209, 71 National Western [Reporter] 941 (1897).


Office of police judge falls within provisions of this section. State ex rel. Gordon versus Moores, 61 Nebraska 9, 84 National Western [Reporter] 399 (1900).


Territorial jurisdiction of justice of the peace is precinct for which he was elected or appointed, but judgment rendered in any other precinct is not void for that reason alone. Jones versus Church of the Holy Trinity, 15 Nebraska 81, 17 National Western [Reporter] 362 (1883).


District judge is state, not county, officer. Jones versus York County, 26 F.2d 623 (8th Circuit 1928).


5-21. Merit plan for selection of judges; terms of office; filling of vacancies; procedure; voting for nominee.

(1) In the case of any vacancy in the Supreme Court or in any district court or in such other court or courts made subject to this provision by law, such vacancy shall be filled by the Governor from a list of at least two nominees presented to him by the appropriate judicial nominating commission. If the Governor shall fail to make an appointment from the list within sixty days from the date it is presented to him, the appointment shall be made by the Chief Justice or the acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from the same list.

(2) In all other cases, any vacancy shall be filled as provided by law.

(3) At the next general election following the expiration of three years from the date of appointment of any judge under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and every six years thereafter as long as such judge retains office, each Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or district court or such other court or courts as the Legislature shall provide shall have his right to remain in office subject to approval or rejection by the electorate in such manner as the Legislature shall provide; Provided, that every judge holding or elected to an office described in subsection (1) of this section on the effective date of this amendment whether by election or appointment, upon qualification shall be deemed to have been selected and to have once received the approval of the electorate as herein provided, and shall be required to submit his right to continue in office to the approval or rejection of the electorate at the general election next preceding the expiration of the term of office for which such judge was elected or appointed, and every six years thereafter. In the case of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the electorate of the entire state shall vote on the question of approval or rejection. In the case of any Judge of the Supreme Court, other than the Chief Justice, and any judge of the district court or any other court made subject to subsection (1) of this section, the electorate of the district from which such judge was selected shall vote on the question of such approval or rejection.

(4) There shall be a judicial nominating commission for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and one for each judicial district of the Supreme Court and of the district court and one for each area or district served by any other court made subject to subsection (1) of this section by law. Each judicial nominating commission shall consist of nine members, one of whom shall be a Judge of the Supreme Court who shall be designated by the Governor and shall act as chairman, but shall not be entitled to vote. The members of the bar of the state residing in the area from which the nominees are to be selected shall designate four of their number to serve as members of said commission, and the Governor shall appoint four citizens, not admitted to practice law before the courts of the state, from among the residents of the same geographical area to serve as members of said commission. Not more than four of such voting members shall be of the same political party. The terms of office for members of each judicial nominating commission shall be staggered and shall be fixed by the Legislature. The nominees of any such commission cannot include a member of such commission or any person who has served as a member of such commission within a period of two years immediately preceding his nomination or for such additional period as the Legislature shall provide. The names of candidates shall be released to the public prior to a public hearing.

(5) Members of the nominating commission shall vote for the nominee of their choice by roll call. Each candidate must receive a majority of the voting members of the nominating commission to have his name submitted to the Governor.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 21 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 21;
Amended 1962, Laws 1961, Chapter 252, Section 2(2), page 742;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1199, Section 1.

Annotations

Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, judicial offices are filled by appointment. Nebraska Account. & Disc. Comm. versus Citizens for Resp. Judges, 256 Nebraska 95, 588 National Western [Reporter]2d 807 (1999).


Judge appointed pursuant to this section appointed to independent term and enters upon full term of office upon appointment and qualification. Garrotto versus McManus, 185 Nebraska 644, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 570 (1970).


Vacancies in office of municipal judge are to be filled under this section. State ex rel. Hunter versus Maguire, 136 Nebraska 365, 285 National Western [Reporter] 921 (1939).


Where no time to nominate candidates to fill vacancies in Supreme Court, Governor's appointee holds until successor is regularly elected. State ex rel. Oleson versus Minor, 105 Nebraska 228, 180 National Western [Reporter] 84 (1920).


Where one elected to office of county judge failed to take oath and file bond within required time, but soon thereafter qualified, before any vacancy declared, right to office was not forfeited. Duffy versus State ex rel. Edson, 60 Nebraska 812, 84 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1900).


Vacancy in office of county judge is filled under provisions of general election law. State ex rel. Berge versus Lansing, 46 Nebraska 514, 64 National Western [Reporter] 1104 (1895).


5-22. State may sue and be sued.

The state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 22 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 22.

Annotations

1. Suit by state

2. Suit against state

3. Appeal from disallowance of claim

1. Suit by state

State may sue in its own name to seek enforcement of public right or restrain public wrong. State versus Pacific Express Company, 80 Nebraska 823, 115 National Western [Reporter] 619 (1908).


When state invokes judgment of court it lays aside its sovereignty. State ex rel. Smyth versus Kennedy, 60 Nebraska 300, 83 National Western [Reporter] 87 (1900).


Constitutional provision that state may sue and be sued is not self-executing. O'Connor versus Slaker, 22 F.2d 147 (8th Circuit 1927).


2. Suit against state

This section is not self-executing, but requires legislative action for waiver of a state's sovereign immunity. Riley versus State, 244 Nebraska 250, 506 National Western [Reporter]2d 45 (1993).


This provision, concerning a waiver of sovereign immunity, is not self-executing, but requires legislative action to waive the state's sovereign immunity. Concerned Citizens versus Department of Environ. Contr., 244 Nebraska 152, 505 National Western [Reporter]2d 654 (1993).


Trial court erred in assessing fees and expenses incurred by a special prosecutor in a civil child support action in the absence of a statute permitting such an award. State on behalf of Garcia versus Garcia, 238 Nebraska 455, 471 National Western [Reporter]2d 388 (1991).


This section is not self-executing. Legislative action is necessary to make it available. Gentry versus State, 174 Nebraska 515, 118 National Western [Reporter]2d 643 (1962).


Legislative consent is not necessary to maintenance of suit against state seeking to recover under the Constitution damages arising as the result of improper construction of state highway. Schmutte versus State, 147 Nebraska 193, 22 National Western [Reporter]2d 691 (1946).


In a workmen's compensation case, special appearance of state should have been sustained in view of fact that Legislature had failed to provide manner in which service of process may be had against the state or a department of state government. Callen versus State, 137 Nebraska 192, 288 National Western [Reporter] 547 (1939).


Constitutional provision relating to suits against state is not self-executing and legislative action is necessary to make it available. Anstine versus State, 137 Nebraska 148, 288 National Western [Reporter] 525 (1939).


Legislature cannot by special act waive sovereignty of state in favor of an individual and authorize such individual to sue for damages due to negligence of state's agents and servants. Cox versus State, 134 Nebraska 751, 279 National Western [Reporter] 482 (1938).


Suit to foreclose mortgage involving real estate to which state has legal title cannot be maintained against state without its consent. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Company versus Nordhues, 129 Nebraska 379, 261 National Western [Reporter] 687 (1935).


Immunity of state from suit does not apply to injunction proceeding to prevent administrative department and its employees from taking possession of land under void award in eminent domain proceedings. Goergen versus Department of Public Works, 123 Nebraska 648, 243 National Western [Reporter] 886 (1932).


Where statutes provide exclusive remedy against state and particular form, one branch of Legislature alone cannot extend jurisdiction beyond that limited by statute or to another forum. McNeel versus State, 120 Nebraska 674, 234 National Western [Reporter] 786 (1931).


Prior to amendment of Workmen's Compensation Act by 1935 special session, neither state nor administrative department thereof could be sued on claim under Workmen's Compensation Act. Eidenmiller versus State, 120 Nebraska 430, 233 National Western [Reporter] 447 (1930).


Resolution by Legislature authorizing recovery for negligence of state employee does not render state liable and no recovery can be had until Legislature by law establishes liability of state therefor. Shear versus State, 117 Nebraska 865, 223 National Western [Reporter] 130 (1929).


State's immunity from suit cannot be waived by voluntary general appearance by Attorney General. McShane versus Murray, 106 Nebraska 512, 184 National Western [Reporter] 147 (1921).


Resolution by Legislature is sufficient authority for claimant to sue state. Lancaster County versus State, 74 Nebraska 211, 104 National Western [Reporter] 187 (1905), affirmed on rehearing 74 Nebraska 215, 107 National Western [Reporter] 388 (1906).


This section has been sufficiently supplemented to permit suits by or against the state. In reference Petition of Attorney General, 40 Nebraska 402, 58 National Western [Reporter] 945 (1894).


3. Appeal from disallowance of claim

Claims against the state founded on a contract, express or implied, must be presented to the Auditor of Public Accounts, with right of appeal to the courts, but may not be presented to the courts in the first instance. Scotts Bluff County versus State, 133 Nebraska 508, 276 National Western [Reporter] 185 (1937).


To confer jurisdiction on appeal from rejection of claim against state, certified transcript of proceedings before auditor and Secretary of State must be filed in district court. Pickus versus State, 115 Nebraska 869, 215 National Western [Reporter] 129 (1927).


State may be sued in district court where capital located, on claim based on contract with Department of Public Works after disallowance of claim by auditor. Peterson versus State, 113 Nebraska 546, 203 National Western [Reporter] 1002 (1925).


State cannot be sued until after auditor refuses to adjust claim. State versus Lancaster County Bank, 8 Nebraska 218 (1879).


5-23. Jurisdiction of judges at chambers.

The several judges of the courts of record shall have such jurisdiction at chambers as may be provided by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 23 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 23.

Annotations

Without a written stipulation of the parties, a district judge can hear application to modify an award of child support in county where the proceeding is pending only. Hanson versus Hanson, 195 Nebraska 836, 241 National Western [Reporter]2d 131 (1976).


Judges at chambers have no inherent authority to rule on motion for new trial. Vasa versus Vasa, 163 Nebraska 642, 80 National Western [Reporter]2d 696 (1957); Mueller versus Keeley, 163 Nebraska 613, 80 National Western [Reporter]2d 707 (1957).


District judges may be given jurisdiction in chambers to impose sentence on plea of guilty. Duggan versus Olson, 146 Nebraska 248, 19 National Western [Reporter]2d 353 (1945).


District judge in chambers had jurisdiction under independent act to enter orders in connection with liquidation of insolvent bank. County of Morrill versus Bliss, 125 Nebraska 97, 249 National Western [Reporter] 98 (1933).


Establishment of municipal court without powers to the judge at chambers does not violate this section. State ex rel. Magney versus Hunter, 99 Nebraska 520, 156 National Western [Reporter] 975 (1916).


Constitution confers no judicial powers on judge of district court at chambers. He can exercise such authority alone as is given by Legislature. Hodgin versus Whitcomb, 51 Nebraska 617, 71 National Western [Reporter] 314 (1897).


5-24. Style of process.

All process shall run in the name of "The State of Nebraska," and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name of "The State of Nebraska."

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 24 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 24.

Annotations

This section applies in mandamus. State ex rel. Hansen versus Carrico, 86 Nebraska 448, 125 National Western [Reporter] 1110 (1910).


All criminal prosecutions must be by, and carried on in, the name of the "State of Nebraska." Worthen versus County of Johnson, 62 Nebraska 754, 87 National Western [Reporter] 909 (1901).


"State of Nebraska, Gage County, to the Sheriff of said County" complies with this section. Hoyt versus Little, 55 Nebraska 71, 75 National Western [Reporter] 56 (1898).


Under Constitution of 1866 requiring all process to run in the name of "The People of the State of Nebraska," a prosecution under a city ordinance "In the Name of the City" is void. City of Brownville versus Cook, 4 Nebraska 101 (1875).


5-25. Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice; to make recommendations to Legislature.

For the effectual administration of justice and the prompt disposition of judicial proceedings, the supreme court may promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all courts, uniform as to each class of courts, and not in conflict with laws governing such matters. To the same end, the court may, and when requested by the Legislature by resolution shall, certify to the Legislature its conclusions as to desirable amendments or changes in the general laws governing such practice and proceedings.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 25 (1920);
Adopted 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 25;
Amended 2000, Laws 1999, Law Report 18CA, Section 3.

Annotations

1. Power of Supreme Court

The Nebraska Supreme Court is vested with the sole power to admit persons to the practice of law in this state and to fix qualifications for admission to the Nebraska bar. In reference Application of Brown, 270 Nebraska 891, 708 National Western [Reporter]2d 251 (2006).


The Nebraska Supreme Court, and only that court, is invested with the power to admit persons to the practice of law and to fix qualifications for admission to the bar. Thus, it has the responsibility to adopt and implement systems designed to protect the public and safeguard the judicial system by assuring that those admitted to the bar are of such character and fitness as to be worthy of the trust and confidence such admission implies. In reference Application of Majorek, 244 Nebraska 595, 508 National Western [Reporter]2d 275 (1993).


Rulemaking power of Supreme Court may not be used to change venue set by statute. Peck versus Dunlevey, 184 Nebraska 812, 172 National Western [Reporter]2d 613 (1969).


This section does not limit the judicial power with respect to making rules as qualifications for admission to the bar. State ex rel. Ralston versus Turner, 141 Nebraska 556, 4 National Western [Reporter]2d 302 (1942).


Supreme Court is vested with sole power to admit persons to practice law and fix their qualifications. State ex rel. Wright versus Hinckle, 137 Nebraska 735, 291 National Western [Reporter] 68 (1940).


Supreme Court is vested with sole powers to admit persons to practice law and fix qualifications for admission to the bar, and possesses inherent power to punish for contempt any person assuming to practice law without having been duly licensed to do so. State ex rel. Wright versus Barlow, 131 Nebraska 294, 268 National Western [Reporter] 95 (1936).


Supreme Court is precluded by law from promulgating rules of practice and procedure empowering trial courts to enter nonsuit on conclusion of opening statements to jury. Temple versus Cotton Transfer Company, 126 Nebraska 287, 253 National Western [Reporter] 349 (1934).


2. Rules of practice

Rule of practice promulgated, with reference to procurement, service, return, and settlement of bill of exceptions. Neighbors & Danielson versus West Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 162 Nebraska 33, 74 National Western [Reporter]2d 854 (1956).


Rule of practice that court determines punishment to be inflicted on conviction of subsequent offense adhered to. Poppe versus State, 155 Nebraska 527, 52 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1952).


Rule of practice established for all courts that imposition of increased penalty for subsequent offense is matter for court and not jury. Haffke versus State, 149 Nebraska 83, 30 National Western [Reporter]2d 462 (1948).


Rule of practice to the effect that plaintiff may, in personal injury action, establish on cross-examination that defendant is indemnified from loss by insurance company, was revoked. Fielding versus Publix Cars, Incorporated, 130 Nebraska 576, 265 National Western [Reporter] 726 (1936).


Information charging murder in first degree, following statute and form approved by Supreme Court, was sufficient. Hansen versus State, 121 Nebraska 169, 236 National Western [Reporter] 329 (1931).


Pursuant to its right to promulgate rules of practice, Supreme Court had power to prescribe short form of information for murder. Nichols versus State, 109 Nebraska 335, 191 National Western [Reporter] 333 (1922).


Rule of practice that party may not contradict testimony of his own witness set aside, and party may, within court's discretion, be permitted to show contradictory statements by witness before trial. Penhansky versus Drake Realty Constr. Company, 109 Nebraska 120, 190 National Western [Reporter] 265 (1922).


3. Miscellaneous

Where a rule of practice promulgated by the Supreme Court is later abrogated and a new rule is promulgated effective on a certain date, the new rule is not retroactive and applicable to cases tried under the former rule. Heineman versus Wilson, 132 Nebraska 159, 271 National Western [Reporter] 346 (1937).


5-26. Proviso as to effect of amendment.

If the foregoing amendment shall be adopted by the electors, all existing courts which are not in the foregoing amendment specifically enumerated and concerning which no other provision is herein made, shall continue in existence and exercise their present jurisdiction, and the judges thereof shall receive their present compensation, until otherwise provided by law; and such judges or appointees to fill vacancies shall hold their offices until their successors shall be elected and qualified.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 6, Section 26 (1920);
Adopted 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 15;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 5, Section 26.

5-27. Juvenile courts; authorization.

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9 of this Article, the Legislature may establish courts to be known as juvenile courts, with such jurisdiction and powers as the Legislature may provide. The term, qualification, compensation, and method of appointment or election of the judges of such courts, and the rules governing proceedings therein, may be fixed by the Legislature. The state shall be divided into juvenile court judicial districts that correspond to district court judicial districts until otherwise provided by law. No such court shall be established or afterwards abolished in any juvenile court judicial district unless approved by a majority of those voting on the issue.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 27 (1958);
Adopted 1958, Laws 1957, Chapter 217, Section 1, page 754;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 305, Section 1.

Annotations

Legislature may establish separate juvenile courts. State ex rel. Weiner versus Hans, 174 Nebraska 612, 119 National Western [Reporter]2d 72 (1963).


5-28. Commission on Judicial Qualifications; appointment; composition; qualifications.

The Legislature shall provide for a Commission on Judicial Qualifications consisting of: (1) Three judges, including one district court judge, one county court judge, and one judge of any other court inferior to the Supreme Court as now exists or may hereafter be created by law, all of whom shall be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; (2) three members of the Nebraska State Bar Association who shall have practiced law in this state for at least ten years and who shall be appointed by the Executive Council of the Nebraska State Bar Association; (3) three citizens, none of whom shall be a Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or judge of any court, active or retired, nor a member of the Nebraska State Bar Association, and who shall be appointed by the Governor; and (4) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall serve as its chairperson.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 28 (1966);
Adopted 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 301, Section 1, page 848;
Amended 1980, Laws 1980, Legislative Bill 82, Section 1.

5-29. Commission on Judicial Qualifications; vote of majority required for action.

The commission shall act by a vote of the majority of its members and no action of the commission shall be valid unless concurred in by the majority of its members.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 29 (1966);
Adopted 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 301, Section 1, page 848;
Amended 1980, Laws 1980, Legislative Bill 82, Section 1.

5-30. Judges; discipline; removal from office; grounds; procedure.

(1) A Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or judge of any court of this state may be reprimanded, disciplined, censured, suspended without pay for a definite period of time, not to exceed six months, or removed from office for (A) willful misconduct in office, (b) willful disregard of or failure to perform his or her duties, (c) habitual intemperance, (d) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (e) disbarment as a member of the legal profession licensed to practice law in the State of Nebraska, or (f) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or he or she may be retired for physical or mental disability seriously interfering with the performance of his or her duties if such disability is determined to be permanent or reasonably likely to become permanent. Any citizen of the State of Nebraska may request the Commission on Judicial Qualifications to consider the qualifications of any Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge, and in such event the commission shall make such investigation as the commission deems necessary and shall, upon a finding of probable cause, reprimand such Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge or order a formal open hearing to be held before it concerning the reprimand, discipline, censure, suspension, removal, or retirement of such Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge. In the alternative or in addition, the commission may request the Supreme Court to appoint one or more special masters who shall be judges of courts of record to hold a formal open hearing to take evidence in any such matter, and to report to the commission. If, after formal open hearing, or after considering the record and report of the masters, the commission finds that the charges are established by clear and convincing evidence, it shall recommend to the Supreme Court that the Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge involved shall be reprimanded, disciplined, censured, suspended without pay for a definite period of time not to exceed six months, removed, or retired as the case may be.

(2) The Supreme Court shall review the record of the proceedings and in its discretion may permit the introduction of additional evidence. The Supreme Court shall make such determination as it finds just and proper, and may order the reprimand, discipline, censure, suspension, removal, or retirement of such Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge, or may wholly reject the recommendation. Upon an order for retirement, the Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge shall thereby be retired with the same rights and privileges as if he or she had retired pursuant to statute. Upon an order for removal, the Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge shall be removed from office, his or her salary shall cease from the date of such order, and he or she shall be ineligible for judicial office. Upon an order for suspension, the Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge shall draw no salary and shall perform no judicial functions during the period of suspension. Suspension shall not create a vacancy in the office of Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge.

(3) Upon order of the Supreme Court, a Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge shall be disqualified from acting as a Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge, without loss of salary, while there is pending (A) an indictment or information charging him or her in the United States with a crime punishable as a felony under Nebraska or federal law or (b) a recommendation to the Supreme Court by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications for his or her removal or retirement.

(4) In addition to the procedure set forth in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, on recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications or on its own motion, the Supreme Court (A) shall remove a Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge from office when in any court in the United States such justice or judge pleads guilty or no contest to a crime punishable as a felony under Nebraska or federal law, and (b) may suspend a Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge from office without salary when in any court in the United States such justice or judge is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under Nebraska or federal law or of any other crime that involves moral turpitude. If his or her conviction is reversed, suspension shall terminate and he or she shall be paid his or her salary for the period of suspension. If he or she is suspended and his or her conviction becomes final the Supreme Court shall remove him or her from office.

(5) All papers filed with and proceedings before the commission or masters appointed by the Supreme Court pursuant to this section prior to a reprimand or formal open hearing shall be confidential. The filing of papers with and the testimony given before the commission or masters or the Supreme Court shall be deemed a privileged communication.

When the Commission on Judicial Qualifications determines that disciplinary action is warranted, whether it be a reprimand or otherwise, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications shall issue one or more short announcements confirming that a complaint has been filed; stating the subject and nature of the complaint, the disciplinary action recommended or reprimand issued, or the date of the hearing; clarifying the procedural aspects; and reciting the right of a judge to a fair hearing.

When the Commission on Judicial Qualifications determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, and the existence of any investigation or complaint has become publicly known, the judge against whom a complaint has been filed or investigation commenced may waive the confidentiality of papers and proceedings under this subsection.

The Supreme Court shall by rule provide for procedure under this section before the commission, the masters, and the Supreme Court.

(6) No Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or other judge shall participate, as a member of the commission, or as a master, or as a member of the Supreme Court, in any proceedings involving his or her own reprimand, discipline, censure, suspension, removal, or retirement.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 30 (1966);
Adopted 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 301, Section 1, page 848;
Amended 1980, Laws 1980, Legislative Bill 82, Section 1;
Amended 1984, Laws 1984, Law Report 235, Section 1.

Annotations

Subdivision (1)(e) of this section does not grant authority to the Nebraska State Bar Association to commence disciplinary actions against sitting judges. State ex rel. NSBA versus Krepela, 259 Nebraska 395, 610 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (2000).


Subsection (3) of this section does not limit suspension with pay to the two instances listed; suspension may be imposed in other instances pursuant to Article 5, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution. In reference Complaint Against Jones, 255 Nebraska 1, 581 National Western [Reporter]2d 876 (1998).


5-31. Judges; procedure for removal from office cumulative.

These amendments are alternative to and cumulative with the methods of removal of Justices and judges provided in Article 3, section 17, and Article 4, section 5, of this Constitution, and any other provision of law relating to the methods and manner of the removal of Justices, Judges, and judges of the courts of this state.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 5, Section 31 (1966);
Adopted 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 301, Section 1, page 848.

6-1. Qualifications of electors.

Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years on or before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and has resided within the state and the county and voting precinct for the terms provided by law shall, except as provided in section 2 of this article, be an elector for the calendar year in which such citizen has attained the age of eighteen years and for all succeeding calendar years.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 7, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 1910, Laws 1909, Chapter 199, Section 1, page 666;
Amended 1918, Laws 1918, Thirty-sixth Extraordinary Session, Chapter 11, Section 1, page 53;
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 18;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 6, Section 1;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 422, Section 1, page 1438;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 221, Section 1;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 339, Section 1;
Amended 1988, Laws 1988, Law Report 248, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Electors

The question of determining a voter's residence or domicile is a judicial one and should be determined in accordance with principles which were determinative at the time the Constitution was adopted. Dilsaver versus Pollard, 191 Nebraska 241, 214 National Western [Reporter]2d 478 (1974).


This section has no application to a public corporation or political subdivision where it operates in a proprietary capacity. Wittler versus Baumgartner, 180 Nebraska 446, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 62 (1966).


Election commissioner may be compelled by mandamus to receive oral testimony as to citizenship of applicant for registration as voter. State ex rel. Williams versus Moorhead, 96 Nebraska 559, 148 National Western [Reporter] 552 (1914).


One temporarily living within state or performing labor therein, whose family resides in another state, is not resident of Nebraska within this section. White versus Slama, 89 Nebraska 65, 130 National Western [Reporter] 978 (1911).


Question of residence is judicial, not one for Legislature. Residence is defined to mean place where one has established his home and is habitually present. Berry versus Wilcox, 44 Nebraska 82, 62 National Western [Reporter] 249 (1895).


Indians are citizens under this section upon compliance with United States laws upon that subject. State ex rel. Crawford versus Norris, 37 Nebraska 299, 55 National Western [Reporter] 1086 (1893).


2. Miscellaneous

Levy of tax for municipal university did not violate this section. Ratigan versus Davis, 175 Nebraska 416, 122 National Western [Reporter]2d 12 (1963).


A statute substituting municipal court for justice of peace courts, the election of judge of which court is limited to electors of city where court sits, excluding electors outside city but within jurisdiction of such court, contravenes the Constitution. State ex rel. Wright versus Brown, 131 Nebraska 239, 267 National Western [Reporter] 466 (1936).


This section does not relate to qualifications to hold office. State ex rel. Jordan versus Quible, 86 Nebraska 417, 125 National Western [Reporter] 619 (1910).


Provisions of this section do not apply to elections of officers of local drainage district. State ex rel. Harris versus Hanson, 80 Nebraska 724, 115 National Western [Reporter] 294 (1908).


Provision of Australian Ballot Law requiring signature of two election judges upon ballot is not unconstitutional. Orr versus Bailey, 59 Nebraska 128, 80 National Western [Reporter] 495 (1899).


This section requires residence of six months prior to date of election rather than date of beginning of term of office. Richards versus McMillin, 36 Nebraska 352, 54 National Western [Reporter] 566 (1893).


Status and identification for suffrage purposes are governed by this section. League of Nebraska Municipalities versus Marsh, 253 F.Supp. 27 (D. Nebraska 1966).


6-2. Who disqualified.

No person shall be qualified to vote who is non compos mentis, or who has been convicted of treason or felony under the laws of the state or of the United States, unless restored to civil rights.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 7, Section 2 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 6, Section 2.

6-3. Military or naval service; place and manner of voting.

Every elector in the military or naval service of the United States or of this state may exercise the right of suffrage at such place and under such regulations as may be provided by law.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 7, Section 3 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 19;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 6, Section 3.

6-4. Repealed 1972. Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 339, Section 1.

6-5. Electors; privileged from arrest.

Electors shall in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at elections, and going to and returning from the same.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 7, Section 5 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 6, Section 5;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 339, Section 1.

6-6. Votes, how cast.

All votes shall be by ballot or by other means authorized by the Legislature whereby the vote and the secrecy of the elector's vote will be preserved.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 7, Section 6 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 6, Section 6;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 339, Section 1.

Annotations

Secrecy as to how any elector votes is basic to electoral process. Dugan versus Vlach, 195 Nebraska 81, 237 National Western [Reporter]2d 104 (1975).


7-1. Legislature; free instruction in common schools; provide.

The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years. The Legislature may provide for the education of other persons in educational institutions owned and controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 1 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 1;
Amended 1940, Laws 1939, Chapter 109, Section 1, page 477;
Amended 1952, Laws 1951, Chapter 164, Section 2(3), page 646;
Amended 1954, Laws 1953, Chapter 174, Section 1, page 554;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 423, Section 1, page 1439;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Free instruction

In the context of student discipline cases, no fundamental right to education exists in Nebraska. The term "free instruction" is construed in right to education cases as pertinent to the issue of the constitutionality of school financing, including collection of fees, tuition, and taxes. Kolesnick versus Omaha Pub. Sch. District, 251 Nebraska 575, 558 National Western [Reporter]2d 807 (1997).


Parents of school children occupying federal farmstead project are residents of public school district in which such lands are situated, and such children are entitled to common school privileges without payment of tuition. Tagge versus Gulzow, 132 Nebraska 276, 271 National Western [Reporter] 803 (1937).


Establishment of municipal university in Omaha was a matter of state concern in accord with duty to provide free instruction in public schools. Carlberg versus Metcalfe, 120 Nebraska 481, 234 National Western [Reporter] 87 (1930).


High school district that receives pupils from another district cannot collect additional tuition fee beyond that fixed by the Legislature. State ex rel. Baldwin versus Dorsey, 108 Nebraska 134, 187 National Western [Reporter] 879 (1922).


Child living with married sister, resident of district, is entitled to attend school without paying tuition. Martins versus School District Number 30 of Cuming County, 101 Nebraska 258, 162 National Western [Reporter] 631 (1917).


Mandamus will not lie to compel school district officers to set aside entire revenue for payment of registered warrants, if effect would be to deprive children of free education. State ex rel. Collins versus Gardner, 79 Nebraska 101, 112 National Western [Reporter] 373 (1907).


Statutes with reference to education should be liberally and broadly construed to provide for free instruction. McNish versus State ex rel. Dimick, 74 Nebraska 261, 104 National Western [Reporter] 186 (1905).


The method and means to be adopted to furnish free instruction is left to the Legislature. Affholder versus State ex rel. McMullen, 51 Nebraska 91, 70 National Western [Reporter] 544 (1897).


Under requirement for free school instruction, public lands were designed to provide funds therefor. It is the duty of Legislature, by proper law, to encourage sale of public lands at best possible price. Washington County versus Fletcher, 12 Nebraska 356, 11 National Western [Reporter] 460 (1882).


2. Miscellaneous

Statutory provision authorizing transfer of land from a nonaccredited to an accredited high school district was constitutional. De Jonge versus School District of Bloomington, 179 Nebraska 539, 139 National Western [Reporter]2d 296 (1966).


Matters pertaining to creation and dissolution of school districts are vested in the Legislature. Farrell versus School District Number 54 of Lincoln County, 164 Nebraska 853, 84 National Western [Reporter]2d 126 (1957).


Denial of approval of high school, based on invalid regulation, violated this section. School District Number 39 of Washington County versus Decker, 159 Nebraska 693, 68 National Western [Reporter]2d 354 (1955).


Delegation of legislative powers to a county committee to fix boundaries of school district was constitutional. Nickel versus School Board of Axtell, 157 Nebraska 813, 61 National Western [Reporter]2d 566 (1953).


In enacting legislation under this section, Legislature is restrained by other limitations of Constitution. Peterson versus Hancock, 155 Nebraska 801, 54 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1952).


This provision is not self-executing. State ex rel. Shineman versus Board of Education of School District Number 33, 152 Nebraska 644, 42 National Western [Reporter]2d 168 (1950).


Expulsion of pupil for contumacious behavior is not violative of this section. Smith versus Johnson, 105 Nebraska 61, 178 National Western [Reporter] 835 (1920).


Teaching of foreign language is not repugnant to theory of "common school," and statute providing for such teaching upon petition of parents is not unconstitutional. State ex rel. Thayer versus School District of Nebraska City, 99 Nebraska 338, 156 National Western [Reporter] 641 (1916).


7-2. State Department of Education; general supervision of school system.

The State Department of Education shall be comprised of a State Board of Education and a Commissioner of Education. The State Department of Education shall have general supervision and administration of the school system of the state and of such other activities as the Legislature may direct.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 2 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 2;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

Annotations

Grant of administrative and executive power to the Department of Education is authorized. School District Number 8 of Sherman County versus State Board of Education, 176 Nebraska 722, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1964).


7-3. State Board of Education; members; election; manner of election; term of office.

The State Board of Education shall be composed of eight members, who shall be elected from eight districts of substantially equal population as provided by the Legislature. Their term of office shall be for four years each. Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by the Legislature, and they shall receive no compensation, but shall be reimbursed their actual expense incurred in the performance of their duties. The members of the State Board of Education shall not be actively engaged in the educational profession and they shall be elected on a nonpartisan ballot.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 3 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 3;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

Annotations

Powers and duties of State Board of Education are prescribed by law. School District Number 8 of Sherman County versus State Board of Education, 176 Nebraska 722, 127 National Western [Reporter]2d 458 (1964).


7-4. State Board of Education; Commissioner of Education; appointment; powers; duties.

The State Board of Education shall appoint and fix the compensation of the Commissioner of Education, who shall be the executive officer of the State Board of Education and the administrative head of the State Department of Education, and who shall have such powers and duties as the Legislature may direct. The board shall appoint all employees of the State Department of Education on the recommendation of the Commissioner of Education.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 4 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 4;
Amended 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 294, Section 1, page 836;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

7-5. Fines, penalties, and license money; allocation; use of forfeited conveyances.

(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, all fines, penalties, and license money arising under the general laws of the state, except fines and penalties for violation of laws prohibiting the overloading of vehicles used upon the public roads and highways of this state, shall belong and be paid over to the counties respectively where the same may be levied or imposed, and all fines, penalties, and license money arising under the rules, bylaws, or ordinances of cities, villages, precincts, or other municipal subdivision less than a county shall belong and be paid over to the same respectively. All such fines, penalties, and license money shall be appropriated exclusively to the use and support of the common schools in the respective subdivisions where the same may accrue, except that all fines and penalties for violation of laws prohibiting the overloading of vehicles used upon the public roads and highways shall be placed as follows: Seventy-five per cent in a fund for state highways and twenty-five per cent to the county general fund where the fine or penalty is paid.

(2) Fifty per cent of all money forfeited or seized pursuant to enforcement of the drug laws shall belong and be paid over to the counties for drug enforcement purposes as the Legislature may provide.

(3) Law enforcement agencies may use conveyances forfeited pursuant to enforcement of the drug laws as the Legislature may provide. Upon the sale of such conveyances, the proceeds shall be appropriated exclusively to the use and support of the common schools as provided in subsection (1) of this section.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 5 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 5;
Amended 1956, Laws 1955, Chapter 195, Section 1, page 558;
Amended 1984, Laws 1984, Law Report 2, Section 1.

Annotations

1. License money

Statute requiring use of hunting and fishing license fees for other than school purposes sustained as constitutional. Wilcox versus Havekost, 144 Nebraska 562, 13 National Western [Reporter]2d 889 (1944).


License fees received by Liquor Control Commission, and imposed for benefit of state, do not go to school fund. School District of Omaha versus Gass, 131 Nebraska 312, 267 National Western [Reporter] 528 (1936).


Act imposing license fees upon persons desiring to fish and hunt in state, and requiring such fees to be paid to State Treasurer for benefit of state school funds is not in conflict with this section. State ex rel. Stevens versus Nickerson, 97 Nebraska 837, 151 National Western [Reporter] 981 (1915).


Where sole purpose of occupation tax is to raise revenue, taxes received are not license money within the meaning of this section. State ex rel. School District, City of Auburn versus Boyd, 63 Nebraska 829, 89 National Western [Reporter] 417 (1902).


License money cannot be diverted from school fund under guise of occupation tax. State ex rel. School District of City of Lincoln versus Aitken, 61 Nebraska 490, 85 National Western [Reporter] 395 (1901).


2. Fines and penalties

Court costs are not fines or penalties within the meaning of this Article and section of the Constitution of Nebraska. DeCamp versus City of Lincoln, 202 Nebraska 727, 277 National Western [Reporter]2d 83 (1979).


The provision of section 48-125, R.R.S.1943, for added amount for waiting time does not impose a penalty to an individual within prohibition of this section. University of Nebraska at Omaha versus Paustian, 190 Nebraska 840, 212 National Western [Reporter]2d 704 (1973).


Forfeited recognizances and cash bail bonds are penalties arising under the general laws of the state and should be distributed to the several school districts of the county. School District of Omaha versus City of Omaha, 175 Nebraska 21, 120 National Western [Reporter]2d 267 (1963).


Fines, penalties, and license money arising under city ordinance are to be apportioned among all school districts in city in proportion to the number of children of school age residing in areas of districts within the city. School District Number 54 of Douglas County ex rel. Hogan versus Howell, 172 Nebraska 404, 110 National Western [Reporter]2d 52 (1961).


Fines, penalties, and license money under general laws of state are apportioned among all school districts in county. School District Number 54 of Douglas County ex rel. Hogan versus School District of Omaha, 171 Nebraska 769, 107 National Western [Reporter]2d 744 (1961).


Collections from violations for overparking under parking-meter ordinance were penalties belonging to school fund. School District of McCook versus City of McCook, 163 Nebraska 817, 81 National Western [Reporter]2d 224 (1957).


Words "fines, penalties, and license money" refer to and include fines imposed in punishment of crimes and misdemeanors and exactions imposed for violation of ordinances having the characteristics of a criminal proceeding, and do not include penalties provided for failure to pay taxes. School District of the City of Omaha versus Adams, 147 Nebraska 1060, 26 National Western [Reporter]2d 24 (1947).


Act that provides for recovery of penalty by county, but does not provide manner of distribution of penalty, does not violate this section. In reference Estate of Rogers, 147 Nebraska 1, 22 National Western [Reporter]2d 297 (1946).


Statute making railroad liable to shipper for penalty for delay, in addition to actual damages is void, as all penalties must go to school funds. Sunderland Bros. Company versus Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company, 104 Nebraska 319, 179 National Western [Reporter] 546 (1920).


Statute providing for tax against owner and building adjudged to be liquor nuisance is void as diverting penalty from school fund. State ex rel. McGuire versus Macfarland, 104 Nebraska 42, 175 National Western [Reporter] 663 (1919); State ex rel. English versus Fanning, 97 Nebraska 224, 149 National Western [Reporter] 413 (1914), reversing 96 Nebraska 123, 147 National Western [Reporter] 215 (1914).


Statute imposing only compensatory damages for delay in nature of liquidated damages is valid. Cram versus Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Company, 85 Nebraska 586, 123 National Western [Reporter] 1045 (1909), 84 Nebraska 607, 122 National Western [Reporter] 31 (1909), affirmed in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Company versus Cram, 228 U.S. 70 (1913).


All fines and penalties, when collected, are required to be paid into the school fund. Sothman versus State, 66 Nebraska 302, 92 National Western [Reporter] 303 (1902).


Act allowing compensation and damages to injured party in case of embezzlement is not a fine or penalty within the meaning of this section. Everson versus State, 66 Nebraska 154, 92 National Western [Reporter] 137 (1902).


Statute fixing fifty dollars damage for failure and refusal of mortgagee to release chattel mortgage is not in conflict with this section. Clearwater Bank versus Kurkonski, 45 Nebraska 1, 63 National Western [Reporter] 133 (1895).


3. Miscellaneous

While ordinarily, with respect to state causes of action, punitive damages contravene this section and are not allowed, punitive damages are recoverable in a suit filed in Nebraska state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. State ex rel. Cherry versus Burns, 258 Nebraska 216, 602 National Western [Reporter]2d 477 (1999).


Statute providing for recovery of treble damages in civil action was unconstitutional. Abel versus Conover, 170 Nebraska 926, 104 National Western [Reporter]2d 684 (1960).


Statutory provision making contract wholly void was remedial and not penal. Arthur versus Trindel, 168 Nebraska 429, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 208 (1959).


This provision has no application to action by borrower asserting violation of Installment Loan Act. McNish versus General Credit Corp., 164 Nebraska 526, 83 National Western [Reporter]2d 1 (1957).


Officer collecting money belonging to school fund is custodian thereof and if he defaults he is ineligible to hold any office created by Constitution or statutes. State ex rel. Broatch versus Moores, 52 Nebraska 770, 73 National Western [Reporter] 299 (1897).


Money collected should be divided pro rata among school districts. King versus State ex rel. School District Number 1, Hall County, 50 Nebraska 66, 69 National Western [Reporter] 307 (1896); Guthrie versus State ex rel. School District Number 7, Sioux County, 47 Nebraska 819, 66 National Western [Reporter] 853 (1896).


7-6. Educational lands; management; Board of Educational Lands and Funds; members; appointment; sale of lands.

No lands now owned or hereafter acquired by the state for educational purposes shall be sold except at public auction under such conditions as the Legislature shall provide. The general management of all lands set apart for educational purposes shall be vested, under the direction of the Legislature, in a board of five members to be known as the Board of Educational Lands and Funds. The members shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to the approval of the Legislature, with such qualifications and for such terms and compensation as the Legislature may provide.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 6 (1875);
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 6;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Powers of Legislature

This section authorizes Legislature to direct sale of school lands. State ex rel. Belker versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 185 Nebraska 270, 175 National Western [Reporter]2d 63 (1970).


Legislature has no power to make a grant in fee of, or an easement over, public school lands without compensation. State ex rel. Johnson versus Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, 143 Nebraska 153, 8 National Western [Reporter]2d 841 (1943).


Legislature cannot pass law providing for disposition of school lands otherwise than as provided by Constitution. State versus Tanner, 73 Nebraska 104, 102 National Western [Reporter] 235 (1905).


2. Powers of board

Board of Educational Lands and Funds has control and management of school lands. State versus Kidder, 173 Nebraska 130, 112 National Western [Reporter]2d 759 (1962); State versus Cooley, 156 Nebraska 330, 56 National Western [Reporter]2d 129 (1952); State versus Gardner, 156 Nebraska 326, 56 National Western [Reporter]2d 135 (1952).


While there has been change in composition of board, there has been no change in its functions since 1875. State ex rel. Bottcher versus Bartling, 149 Nebraska 491, 31 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1948).


Board of Commissioners, under direction of Legislature and subject to terms imposed by it, has power to lease school lands. State versus Platte Valley P. P. & I. District, 147 Nebraska 289, 23 National Western [Reporter]2d 300 (1946).


Board is by law in charge of and responsible for the investment of school funds. State versus Bass, 131 Nebraska 592, 269 National Western [Reporter] 68 (1936).


Board of Educational Lands and Funds has executive power over the sale, leasing and general management of school lands under legislative direction. Briggs versus Neville, 103 Nebraska 1, 170 National Western [Reporter] 188 (1918); Fawn Lake Ranch Company versus Cumbow, 102 Nebraska 288, 167 National Western [Reporter] 75 (1918).


Board of Educational Lands and Funds may, in exercise of reasonable discretion, reject appraisement if it appears too low. State ex rel. Rutledge versus Eaton, 78 Nebraska 202, 110 National Western [Reporter] 709 (1907).


Sole power to handle permanent school funds of state is lodged with board. State ex rel. Crounse versus Bartley, 40 Nebraska 298, 58 National Western [Reporter] 966 (1894).


Board has no jurisdiction or control over disposition of so-called saline lands of state. McMurtry versus Engelhardt, 5 Nebraska Unof. 271, 98 National Western [Reporter] 40 (1904).


3. State as trustee

Title to school lands was vested in state upon express trust for support of common schools. State ex rel. Ebke versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 159 Nebraska 79, 65 National Western [Reporter]2d 392 (1954).


The state as trustee is without power to bestow a special benefit upon any person or corporation, public or private, at the expense of the cestui que trust, the public school system of the state. State versus Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 143 Nebraska 661, 10 National Western [Reporter]2d 631 (1943).


Since state, and not the board or its individual members, is trustee of school fund, suit may not be brought against the board and its individual members for an accounting by a taxpayer, since the suit is essentially one against the state. State ex rel. Walker versus Board of Commissioners for Educational Lands & Funds, 141 Nebraska 172, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 196 (1942).


4. Miscellaneous

Prior to 1940 amendment, Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings, as statutory officer, had duties to perform. Swanson versus State, 132 Nebraska 82, 271 National Western [Reporter] 264 (1937).


Where board is created by law, no one member having greater power than every other member, board can act only by majority vote. Follmer versus State, 94 Nebraska 217, 142 National Western [Reporter] 908 (1913).


7-7. Perpetual funds enumerated.

The following are hereby declared to be perpetual funds for common school purposes, including early childhood educational purposes operated by or distributed through the common schools, of which the annual interest or income only can be appropriated, to wit:

First. Such percent as has been, or may hereafter be, granted by Congress on the sale of lands in this state.

Second. All money arising from the sale or leasing of sections number sixteen and thirty-six in each township in this state, and the lands selected, or that may be selected, in lieu thereof.

Third. The proceeds of all lands that have been, or may hereafter be, granted to this state, where by the terms and conditions of such grant the same are not to be otherwise appropriated.

Fourth. The net proceeds of lands and other property and effects that may come to this state, by escheat or forfeiture, or from unclaimed dividends, or distributive shares of the estates of deceased persons.

Fifth. All other property of any kind now belonging to the perpetual fund.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 7 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 20;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 7;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1;
Amended 2006, Laws 2006, Legislative Bill 1006, Section 1.

Annotations

Legislative act providing for offsetting of capital gains against past capital losses held unconstitutional. State ex rel. Bottcher versus Bartling, 149 Nebraska 491, 31 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1948).


Act providing for payment out of state school funds of tuition of children whose parent is in military service of United States, stationed in Nebraska, was void. Taylor versus School District of City of Lincoln, 128 Nebraska 437, 259 National Western [Reporter] 168 (1935).


Constitution recognizes the right of the state to acquire land by escheat. In reference Estate of O'Connor, 126 Nebraska 182, 252 National Western [Reporter] 826 (1934).


School in part sectarian was not eligible to receive portion of state common school trust funds. State ex rel. Public School District Number 6, Cedar County versus Taylor, 122 Nebraska 454, 240 National Western [Reporter] 573 (1932).


Saline lands granted to state by United States are not included in educational lands under control of Board of Educational Lands and Funds. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Neville, 102 Nebraska 817, 170 National Western [Reporter] 176 (1918).


Teaching of foreign language is not contrary to public policy of state to provide common schools. State ex rel. Thayer versus School District of Nebraska City, 99 Nebraska 338, 156 National Western [Reporter] 641 (1916).


Sale of school lands to pay special assessment for drainage purposes does not affect right of state in such lands. Morehouse versus Elkhorn River Drainage District, 90 Nebraska 406, 133 National Western [Reporter] 446 (1911); McMurtry versus Engelhardt, 5 Nebraska Unof. 271, 98 National Western [Reporter] 40 (1904).


Act of Legislature is not necessary to appropriation and use of funds in order to expend same for purposes expressed in grant. State ex rel. Spencer Lens Company versus Searle, 77 Nebraska 155, 109 National Western [Reporter] 770 (1906).


Returns of unsold school lands must be applied to support of common schools and not be vested in permanent school fund. State ex rel. McKenzie versus McBride, 5 Nebraska 102 (1876).


7-8. Trust funds belong to state for educational purposes; use; investment.

All funds belonging to the state for common school purposes, including early childhood educational purposes operated by or distributed through the common schools, the interest and income whereof only are to be used, shall be deemed trust funds. Such funds with the interest and income thereof are hereby solemnly pledged to the purposes for which they are granted and set apart and shall not be transferred to any other fund for other uses. The state shall supply any net aggregate losses thereof realized at the close of each calendar year that may in any manner accrue. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Constitution, such funds shall be invested as the Legislature may by statute provide.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 8 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 21;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 8;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1;
Amended 2006, Laws 2006, Legislative Bill 1006, Section 1.

Annotations

The public school lands are held in trust for educational purposes. State ex rel. Ebke versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 159 Nebraska 79, 65 National Western [Reporter]2d 392 (1954); State ex rel. Ebke versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 154 Nebraska 244, 47 National Western [Reporter]2d 520 (1951).


Lease of school land under unconstitutional law was void from inception. Board of Educational Lands & Funds versus Gillett, 158 Nebraska 558, 64 National Western [Reporter]2d 105 (1954).


Persons dealing with school lands do so subject to trust obligation of state. Propst versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 156 Nebraska 226, 55 National Western [Reporter]2d 653 (1952).


State is under obligation to replace losses in permanent school fund, which cannot be diminished by application of capital gains. State ex rel. Bottcher versus Bartling, 149 Nebraska 491, 31 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1948).


While there is an obligation on the part of the state as trustee to replace shortages in the school fund, the obligation is not self-executing. State ex rel. Walker versus Board of Commissioners for Educational Lands & Funds, 141 Nebraska 172, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 196 (1942).


Educational funds of state are trust funds, and can only be paid out for purposes specified. Taylor versus School District of City of Lincoln, 128 Nebraska 437, 259 National Western [Reporter] 168 (1935).


Funds derived from grant by Congress of public lands, by contract with the federal government, are held by the state as trustee to carry out the object of the grant. State ex rel. Ledwith versus Brian, 84 Nebraska 30, 120 National Western [Reporter] 916 (1909).


School lands are held in trust by the state. United States versus 78.61 Acres of Land in Dawes & Sioux Counties, 265 F.Supp. 564 (D. Nebraska 1967).


7-9. Educational funds; trust funds; use; early childhood education endowment fund; created; use; early childhood education, defined.

(1) The following funds shall be exclusively used for the support and maintenance of the common schools in each school district in the state or for early childhood education operated by or distributed through the common schools as provided in subsection (3) of this section, as the Legislature shall provide:

(A) Income arising from the perpetual funds;

(b) The income from the unsold school lands, except that costs of administration shall be deducted from the income before it is so applied;

(c) All other grants, gifts, and devises that have been or may hereafter be made to the state which are not otherwise appropriated by the terms of the grant, gift, or devise; and

(d) Such other support as the Legislature may provide.

(2) No distribution or appropriation shall be made to any school district for the year in which school is not maintained for the minimum term required by law.

(3)(A) An early childhood education endowment fund shall be created for the purpose of supporting early childhood education in this state as provided by the Legislature.

(b) An amount equal to forty million dollars of the funds belonging to the state for common school and early childhood educational purposes operated by or distributed through the common schools described in Article 7, section 7, of this Constitution shall be allocated for the early childhood education endowment fund.

(c) Only interest or income on such early childhood education endowment fund may be appropriated as provided by the Legislature for the benefit of the common schools and for the exclusive purpose of supporting early childhood education in this state.

(d) For purposes of Article 7 of this Constitution, early childhood education means programs operated by or distributed through the common schools promoting development and learning for children from birth to kindergarten-entrance age.

(e) If the annual income from twenty million dollars of private funding is not irrevocably committed by July 1, 2011, to the use of the early childhood education endowment fund, then the forty-million-dollar allocation pursuant to subdivision (3)(b) of this section may revert to the use of the common schools as the Legislature shall determine.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 9 (1875);
Amended 1908, Laws 1907, Chapter 201, Section 1, page 580;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 9;
Amended 1966, Laws 1965, Chapter 302, Section 2(1), page 852;
Amended 1970, Laws 1969, Chapter 423, Section 1, page 1439;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1;
Amended 2006, Laws 2006, Legislative Bill 1006, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Grants, gifts, and devises

Primary purpose of trust is production of income for the support and maintenance of common schools. State ex rel. Ebke versus Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 154 Nebraska 244, 47 National Western [Reporter]2d 520 (1951).


Profit on sale of securities becomes a part of permanent school fund. State ex rel. Bottcher versus Bartling, 149 Nebraska 491, 31 National Western [Reporter]2d 422 (1948).


Since state, and not the board or its individual members, is trustee of school fund, suit may not be brought against the board and its individual members for an accounting by a taxpayer, since the suit is essentially one against the state. State ex rel. Walker versus Board of Commissioners for Educational Lands & Funds, 141 Nebraska 172, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 196 (1942).


Act providing for payment out of state school funds of tuition of children whose parent is in military service of United States, stationed in Nebraska, was void. Taylor versus School District of City of Lincoln, 128 Nebraska 437, 259 National Western [Reporter] 168 (1935).


State school fund is a trust fund and can be used only for purposes specified. Taylor versus School District of City of Lincoln, 128 Nebraska 437, 259 National Western [Reporter] 168 (1935).


Saline lands granted to state by United States are not included in educational lands. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus Neville, 102 Nebraska 817, 170 National Western [Reporter] 176 (1918).


Funds derived from certain grants for specified purposes cannot be converted to General Fund of the state. Olive versus School District Number 1, 86 Nebraska 135, 125 National Western [Reporter] 141 (1910); State ex rel. Ledwith versus Brian, 84 Nebraska 30, 120 National Western [Reporter] 916 (1909); State ex rel. McKenzie versus McBride, 5 Nebraska 102 (1876); McMurtry versus Engelhardt, 5 Nebraska Unof. 271, 98 National Western [Reporter] 40 (1904).


All lands, money or other property bequeathed, or in any manner conveyed to state for educational purposes, shall be used and expended in accord with terms of grant and cannot be diverted to general fund or other uses. State ex rel. Ledwith versus Brian, 84 Nebraska 30, 120 National Western [Reporter] 916 (1909).


2. Miscellaneous

Constitutionality of a retroactive statute generally depends upon reasonableness. Relevant factors to consider are the nature and strength of the public interest, the extent of modification of the asserted pre-enactment right, and the nature of the right altered by the statute. Hiddleston versus Nebraska Jewish Education Soc., 186 Nebraska 786, 186 National Western [Reporter]2d 904 (1971).


Law having for its object diversion of any funds raised by taxation for school purposes to different purpose is unconstitutional and void. State ex rel. Ahern versus Walsh, 31 Nebraska 469, 48 National Western [Reporter] 263 (1891).


In proceedings by United States to condemn state school lands, measure of compensation is the fair market value of the property in fee, irrespective of number and kind of interests existing therein. State of Nebraska versus United States, 164 F.2d 866 (8th Circuit 1947).


7-10. University of Nebraska; government; Board of Regents; election; student membership; terms.

The general government of the University of Nebraska shall, under the direction of the Legislature, be vested in a board of not less than six nor more than eight regents to be designated the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, who shall be elected from and by districts as herein provided and three students of the University of Nebraska who shall serve as nonvoting members. Such nonvoting student members shall consist of the student body president of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, the student body president of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and the student body president of the University of Nebraska Medical Center. The terms of office of elected members shall be for six years each. The terms of office of student members shall be for the period of service as student body president. Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by law; and they shall receive no compensation, but may be reimbursed their actual expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties.

The Legislature shall divide the state, along county lines, into as many compact regent districts, as there are regents provided by the Legislature, of approximately equal population, which shall be numbered consecutively.

The Legislature shall redistrict the state after each federal decennial census. Such districts shall not be changed except upon the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Legislature. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed whenever practicable, but other established lines may be followed at the discretion of the Legislature. Whenever the state is so redistricted the members elected prior to the redistricting shall continue in office, and the law providing for such redistricting shall where necessary specify the newly established district which they shall represent for the balance of their term.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 10 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 22;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 10;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 320, Section 1, page 853;
Amended 1974, Laws 1974, Legislative Bill 323, Section 1.

Annotations

This section requires the Legislature to vest the general government of the University in the Board of Regents. Board of Regents versus Exon, 199 Nebraska 146, 256 National Western [Reporter]2d 330 (1977).


Government of University of Nebraska is vested in the Board of Regents, subject to direction of the Legislature. Board of Regents versus County of Lancaster, 154 Nebraska 398, 48 National Western [Reporter]2d 221 (1951).


This section does not prohibit Legislature from imposing new duties on regents, or from requiring them to establish and conduct hog-cholera serum plant. Fisher versus Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 108 Nebraska 666, 189 National Western [Reporter] 161 (1922).


Legislature in 1869, in accordance with this section, established the University of Nebraska, and provided the general powers of Board of Regents. Stewart versus Barton, 91 Nebraska 96, 135 National Western [Reporter] 381 (1912).


It was the duty of Board of Regents to establish experimental substations as directed by Legislature. State ex rel. Bushee versus Whitmore, 85 Nebraska 566, 123 National Western [Reporter] 1051 (1909).


This Article and section 85-105, R.R.S.1943, do not grant power to waive immunity from suit in federal court. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska versus Dawes, 370 F.Supp. 1190 (D. Nebraska 1974).


7-11. Appropriation of public funds; handicapped children; sectarian instruction; religious test of teacher or student.

Notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution, appropriation of public funds shall not be made to any school or institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof; Provided, that the Legislature may provide that the state or any political subdivision thereof may contract with institutions not wholly owned or controlled by the state or any political subdivision to provide for educational or other services for the benefit of children under the age of twenty-one years who are handicapped, as that term is from time to time defined by the Legislature, if such services are nonsectarian in nature.

All public schools shall be free of sectarian instruction.

The state shall not accept money or property to be used for sectarian purposes; Provided, that the Legislature may provide that the state may receive money from the federal government and distribute it in accordance with the terms of any such federal grants, but no public funds of the state, any political subdivision, or any public corporation may be added thereto.

A religious test or qualification shall not be required of any teacher or student for admission or continuance in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by public funds or taxation.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 11 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 23;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 11;
Amended 1972, Laws 1971, Legislative Bill 656, Section 1;
Amended 1976, Laws 1976, Legislative Bill 666, Section 1.
Note: Pursuant to Cunningham versus Exon, 207 Nebraska 513, 300 National Western [Reporter]2d 6 (1980), the third paragraph in this section has been reinstated.

Annotations

1. Grant of public funds

The provisions of section 79-487 authorizing the transportation of nonprofit private school students on public school buses do not violate the provisions of this section in that they do not appropriate public funds to a nonpublic institution. State ex rel. Bouc versus School District of City of Lincoln, 211 Nebraska 731, 320 National Western [Reporter]2d 472 (1982).


No appropriation or grant of public funds or property shall be made to any educational institution which is not owned and controlled by the state or a governmental subdivision thereof. Gaffney versus State Department of Education, 192 Nebraska 358, 220 National Western [Reporter]2d 550 (1974).


2. Constitutionality of certain practices

An act which indirectly benefits private institutions through public grants to students is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Rogers versus Swanson, 192 Nebraska 125, 219 National Western [Reporter]2d 726 (1974).


It is not unconstitutional for a public school district to lease classrooms in a church or other sectarian building if the classrooms are under the control and operation of the public school authorities and the instruction offered is nonsectarian. State ex rel. School District of Hartington versus State Board of Education, 188 Nebraska 1, 195 National Western [Reporter]2d 161 (1972).


Reading from Bible, singing of hymns and offering prayer, in accordance with doctrines of religious organizations, is prohibited in public schools by this section. State ex rel. Freeman versus Scheve, 65 Nebraska 853, 91 National Western [Reporter] 846 (1902), judgment adhered to 65 Nebraska 876, 93 National Western [Reporter] 169 (1903).


3. Miscellaneous

The age of twenty-one years is reached upon a person's twenty-first birthday, and, therefore, the term "under the age of twenty-one years" excludes any persons who have reached their twenty-first birthday. Monahan versus School District Number 1 of Douglas County, 229 Nebraska 139, 425 National Western [Reporter]2d 624 (1988).


This section does not prohibit the State from doing business or contracting with private institutions in fulfilling a governmental duty and furthering a public purpose. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. versus Smith, 217 Nebraska 682, 353 National Western [Reporter]2d 267 (1984).


Adoption of 1976 amendment to allow for state contracting with institutions not wholly owned or controlled by the state or any political subdivision for nonsectarian services for handicapped children did not repeal third full paragraph of original section 11, which forbids state to match federal grants to nonpublic institutions with public money. Cunningham versus Exon, 207 Nebraska 513, 300 National Western [Reporter]2d 6 (1980).


A citizen taxpayer has standing to maintain an action for a declaratory judgment to challenge the accuracy and validity of the proclamation, publication, and incorporation of an amendment to this Article and section of the Constitution of Nebraska. Cunningham versus Exon, 202 Nebraska 563, 276 National Western [Reporter]2d 213 (1979).


Legislature cannot authorize donations by public corporations for religious or charitable purposes. United Community Services versus Omaha National Bank, 162 Nebraska 786, 77 National Western [Reporter]2d 576 (1956).


Section is applicable to school in part sectarian. State ex rel. Public School District Number 6, Cedar County versus Taylor, 122 Nebraska 454, 240 National Western [Reporter] 573 (1932).


7-12. Education and reform of minors.

The Legislature may provide by law for the establishment of a school or schools for the safe keeping, education, employment and reformation of all children under the age of eighteen years, who, for want of proper parental care, or other cause, are growing up in mendicancy or crime.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 12 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 24;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 12.

Annotations

Establishment of Boys' Training School is authorized by this section. Lingo versus Hann, 161 Nebraska 67, 71 National Western [Reporter]2d 716 (1955).


Juvenile courts do not have the sole or exclusive jurisdiction of children under eighteen years of age who have violated the law. State versus McCoy, 145 Nebraska 750, 18 National Western [Reporter]2d 101 (1945).


Under former section Legislature was without power to authorize commitment to state industrial school of children over sixteen who had not been convicted of crime. Scott versus Flowers, 61 Nebraska 620, 85 National Western [Reporter] 857 (1901), reversing 60 Nebraska 675, 84 National Western [Reporter] 81 (1900).


7-13. State colleges; government; board; name; selection; duties; compensation.

The general government of the state colleges as now existing, and such other state colleges as may be established by law, shall be vested, under the direction of the Legislature, in a board of seven members to be styled as designated by the Legislature, six of whom shall be appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Legislature, two each for a term of two, four, and six years, and two each biennium thereafter for a term of six years, and the Commissioner of Education shall be a member ex officio. The duties and powers of the board shall be prescribed by law, and the members thereof shall receive no compensation for the performance of their duties, but may be reimbursed their actual expenses incurred therein.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 8, Section 13 (1920);
Adopted 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 25;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 7, Section 13;
Amended 1952, Laws 1951, Chapter 164, Section 2(4), page 646;
Amended 1968, Laws 1967, Chapter 315, Section 1, page 845.

Annotations

Board of Education of State Normal Schools was established in 1920. State ex rel. Johnson versus Hagemeister, 161 Nebraska 475, 73 National Western [Reporter]2d 625 (1955).


Teacher, head of department in state normal school, dismissed by president without action by board, is entitled to test, by quo warranto, the right of teacher employed to take his place. Eason versus Majors, 111 Nebraska 288, 196 National Western [Reporter] 133 (1923).


Upon showing that college administrative body acted from honest conviction upon belief facts showed it was for best interests of the school, and there was no showing that act was arbitrary or generated by ill will, fraud, coercion, or other such motives, court will not interfere. Levitt versus Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges, 376 F.Supp. 945 (D. Nebraska 1974).


7-14. Coordinating Commission for Postsecondary Education; membership; powers and duties; coordination, defined.

On January 1, 1992, there shall be established the Coordinating Commission for Postsecondary Education which shall, under the direction of the Legislature, be vested with the authority for the coordination of public postsecondary educational institutions. Public postsecondary educational institutions shall include each postsecondary educational campus or institution which is governed by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges, any board or boards established for the community colleges, or any other governing board for any other public postsecondary educational institution which may be established by the Legislature.

Coordination shall mean:

(1) Authority to adopt, and revise as needed, a comprehensive statewide plan for postsecondary education which shall include (A) definitions of the role and mission of each public postsecondary educational institution within any general assignments of role and mission as may be prescribed by the Legislature and (b) plans for facilities which utilize tax funds designated by the Legislature;

(2) Authority to review, monitor, and approve or disapprove each public postsecondary educational institution's programs and capital construction projects which utilize tax funds designated by the Legislature in order to provide compliance and consistency with the comprehensive plan and to prevent unnecessary duplication; and

(3) Authority to review and modify, if needed to promote compliance and consistency with the comprehensive statewide plan and prevent unnecessary duplication, the budget requests of the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges, any board or boards established for the community colleges, or any other governing board for any other public postsecondary educational institution which may be established by the Legislature.

The Legislature may provide the commission with additional powers and duties related to postsecondary education as long as such powers and duties do not invade the governance and management authority of the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges as provided in the Constitution of Nebraska, Article 7, sections 10 and 13. The Legislature may provide that coordination of the community colleges by the commission pursuant to this section may be conducted through a board or association representing all the community colleges.

Nothing in this section providing for statewide coordination shall limit or require the use of property tax revenue by and for community colleges.

The commission shall consist of eleven members, residents of the state or the districts for which appointed, who shall be appointed by the Governor with the approval of a majority of the Legislature. Six of the members shall be chosen from six districts of approximately equal population and five shall be chosen on a statewide basis.

The terms of the members of the commission shall be six years or until a successor is qualified and takes office, except that of the members initially appointed, four members shall serve for terms of two years and four members shall serve for terms of four years. The members of the commission shall receive no compensation for the performance of their duties but may be reimbursed their actual and necessary expenses.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 7, Section 14 (1990);
Adopted 1990, Laws 1990, Legislative Bill 1141, Section 1.

7-15. Omitted.

Source

Note: Article 7, section 15, of the Constitution of Nebraska, as adopted in 1992 by Initiative 407, has been omitted because of the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan versus Beermann, 245 Nebraska 907, 515 National Western [Reporter]2d 788 (1994).
Note: Article 7, section 15, of the Constitution of Nebraska, as adopted in 1992 by Initiative 408, has been omitted because of the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Duggan versus Beermann, 249 Nebraska 411, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 68 (1996).

7-16. Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

7-17. Repealed 1972. Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 1023, Section 1.

8-1. Revenue; raised by taxation; legislative powers.

The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be raised by taxation in such manner as the Legislature may direct. Notwithstanding Article 1, section 16, Article 3, section 18, or Article 8, section 4, of this Constitution or any other provision of this Constitution to the contrary: (1) Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all real property and franchises as defined by the Legislature except as otherwise provided in or permitted by this Constitution; (2) tangible personal property, as defined by the Legislature, not exempted by this Constitution or by legislation, shall all be taxed at depreciated cost using the same depreciation method with reasonable class lives, as determined by the Legislature, or shall all be taxed by valuation uniformly and proportionately; (3) the Legislature may provide for a different method of taxing motor vehicles and may also establish a separate class of motor vehicles consisting of those owned and held for resale by motor vehicle dealers which shall be taxed in the manner and to the extent provided by the Legislature and may also establish a separate class for trucks, trailers, semitrailers, truck-tractors, or combinations thereof, consisting of those owned by residents and nonresidents of this state, and operating in interstate commerce, and may provide reciprocal and proportionate taxation of such vehicles. The tax proceeds from motor vehicles taxed in each county shall be allocated to the county and the cities, villages, and school districts of such county; (4) the Legislature may provide that agricultural land and horticultural land, as defined by the Legislature, shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of taxation and may provide for a different method of taxing agricultural land and horticultural land which results in values that are not uniform and proportionate with all other real property and franchises but which results in values that are uniform and proportionate upon all property within the class of agricultural land and horticultural land; (5) the Legislature may enact laws to provide that the value of land actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural use shall for property tax purposes be that value which such land has for agricultural or horticultural use without regard to any value which such land might have for other purposes or uses; (6) the Legislature may prescribe standards and methods for the determination of the value of real property at uniform and proportionate values; (7) in furtherance of the purposes for which such a law of the United States has been adopted, whenever there exists a law of the United States which is intended to protect a specifically designated type, use, user, or owner of property or franchise from discriminatory state or local taxation, such property or franchise shall constitute a separate class of property or franchise under the laws of the State of Nebraska, and such property or franchise may not be taken into consideration in determining whether taxes are levied by valuation uniformly or proportionately upon any property or franchise, and the Legislature may enact laws which statutorily recognize such class and which tax or exempt from taxation such class of property or franchise in such manner as it determines; and (8) the Legislature may provide that livestock shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of taxation and may further provide for reciprocal and proportionate taxation of livestock located in this state for only part of a year. Each actual property tax rate levied for a governmental subdivision shall be the same for all classes of taxed property and franchises. Taxes uniform as to class of property or the ownership or use thereof may be levied by valuation or otherwise upon classes of intangible property as the Legislature may determine, and such intangible property held in trust or otherwise for the purpose of funding pension, profit-sharing, or other employee benefit plans as defined by the Legislature may be declared exempt from taxation. Taxes other than property taxes may be authorized by law. Existing revenue laws shall continue in effect until changed by the Legislature.

Source

Nebraska Constitution Article 9, Section 1 (1875);
Amended 1920, Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Number 26;
Transferred by Constitutional Convention, 1919-1920, Article 8, Section 1;
Amended 1952, Laws 1951, Chapter 160, Section 1, page 636;
Amended 1954, Laws 1954, Sixty-sixth Extraordinary Session, Chapter 3, Section 1, page 61;
Amended 1960, Laws 1959, Chapter 238, Section 1, page 823;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 298, Section 1, page 887;
Amended 1964, Laws 1963, Chapter 301, Section 1, page 892;
Amended 1972, Laws 1972, Legislative Bill 837, Section 1;
Amended 1978, Laws 1978, First Spec. Sess., Law Report 1, Section 1;
Amended 1984, Laws 1984, First Spec. Sess., Law Report 7, Section 1;
Amended 1990, Laws 1989, Law Report 2, Section 1;
Amended 1992, Laws 1992, Law Report 219CA, Section 1;
Amended 1998, Laws 1998, Law Report 45CA, Section 1.

Annotations

1. Uniformity

The object of the uniformity clause is accomplished if all the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed and taxed at a uniform standard of value. No difference in the method of determining the valuation or rate of tax to be imposed can be allowed unless separate classifications rest on some reason of public policy or some substantial difference of situation or circumstance that would naturally suggest justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be classified. Evidence of "sales chasing" may justify differential treatment accorded to a particular county. County of Douglas versus Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 262 Nebraska 578, 635 National Western [Reporter]2d 413 (2001).


The county violated the Nebraska Constitution's uniformity clause by its selective imposition of an increased value and assessment of the taxpayer's property containing mineral interests based solely on the ownership or control of the property. Lyman-Richey Corp. versus Cass Cty. Board of Equal., 258 Nebraska 1003, 607 National Western [Reporter]2d 806 (2000); Ash Grove Cement Company versus Cass Cty. Board of Equal., 258 Nebraska 990, 607 National Western [Reporter]2d 810 (2000).


The constitutional requirement of uniformity extends to both rate and valuation. Real property taxes may not be equalized by merely classifying property and then arbitrarily applying a given value to all properties of that classification; the mere fact that a formula is devised, by which property is nonuniformly and disproportionately assessed, does not satisfy the constitutional requirement. The object of the uniformity clause is accomplished if all of the property within a taxing jurisdiction is assessed and taxed at a uniform value; differential tax treatment can only be based on the use or nature of the property, not upon who controls the property. Constructors, Incorporated versus Cass Cty. Board of Equal., 258 Nebraska 866, 606 National Western [Reporter]2d 786 (2000).


The Class VI school system tax levy set forth in section 79-1078 (formerly section 79-438.13) does not violate this provision requiring uniform taxation. Swanson versus State, 249 Nebraska 466, 544 National Western [Reporter]2d 333 (1996).


A taxpayer who seeks a refund of taxes which are claimed to have been invalid as in violation of the constitutional provision requiring uniformity and proportionality in the taxation of tangible property is at most entitled to a refund of the difference between the taxes levied against the property and the taxes if all of the property treated as exempt had been placed on the rolls and taxed. Trailblazer Pipeline Company versus Balka, 246 Nebraska 221, 518 National Western [Reporter]2d 646 (1994).


Real and personal property are in the same class for purposes of uniformity. A statute exempting all but a small sliver of personal property from the property tax rolls is unconstitutional under the uniformity clause because it improperly shifts the property tax burden to real property owners. Jaksha versus State, 241 Nebraska 106, 486 National Western [Reporter]2d 858 (1992).


Personal property and real property are both "tangible property" and must be equalized and taxed uniformly pursuant to this provision. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline versus State Board of Equal., 238 Nebraska 565, 471 National Western [Reporter]2d 734 (1991).


It is the function of the county board of equalization to determine the actual value of locally assessed property for tax purposes. In carrying out this function, the county board must give effect to the constitutional requirement that taxes be levied uniformly and proportionately upon all taxable property in the county. Individual discrepancies and inequalities within the county must be corrected and equalized by the county board of equalization. AT&T Information Sys. versus State Board of Equal., 237 Nebraska 591, 467 National Western [Reporter]2d 55 (1991).


The taxation of personal property must be uniform not only to the rate of taxation, but to the valuation of property as well. Xerox Corp. versus Karnes, 217 Nebraska 728, 350 National Western [Reporter]2d 566 (1984).


The requirement that taxes be assessed uniformly and proportionately does not preclude the result that the property is assessed at less than actual value. Konicek versus Board of Equalization, 212 Nebraska 648, 324 National Western [Reporter]2d 815 (1982).


A mobile home as defined in section 60-1601.01 is not a motor vehicle within the exception to the constitutional provision providing for uniform and proportionate taxation of personal property. Gates versus Howell, 204 Nebraska 256, 282 National Western [Reporter]2d 22 (1979).


Under this section, the taxation of personal property, except as otherwise authorized herein, must be uniform both as to rate of taxation and valuation of property. State ex rel. Meyer versus Peters, 191 Nebraska 330, 215 National Western [Reporter]2d 520 (1974).


Free port law does not violate constitutional provisions for uniformity and against special privileges. Norden Laboratories, Incorporated versus County Board of Equalization, 189 Nebraska 437, 203 National Western [Reporter]2d 152 (1973).


Harm caused by statute permitting independent hospital district to fractionate territory of counties insufficient to constitute violation of this section. Shadbolt versus County of Cherry, 185 Nebraska 208, 174 National Western [Reporter]2d 733 (1970).


It is the duty of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment to give effect to the requirement that all taxes be levied uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property. Hanna versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 181 Nebraska 725, 150 National Western [Reporter]2d 878 (1967).


The Constitution requires taxes on all tangible property to be levied by valuation, uniformly and proportionately. H/K Company versus Board of Equalization, 175 Nebraska 268, 121 National Western [Reporter]2d 382 (1963).


Tax upon motor vehicle dealers violated rule of uniformity as to class and was unconstitutional. State ex rel. Meyer versus Story, 173 Nebraska 741, 114 National Western [Reporter]2d 769 (1962).


Rule of uniformity applies to valuation of railroad property. Union P. R. R. Company versus State Board of Equal & Assess., 170 Nebraska 139, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 892 (1960); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Company versus State Board of Equal. & Assess., 170 Nebraska 106, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 873 (1960); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Company versus State Board of Equal. & Assess., 170 Nebraska 77, 101 National Western [Reporter]2d 856 (1960).


Taxes are required to be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property. United States Cold Storage Corp. versus Stolinski, 168 Nebraska 513, 96 National Western [Reporter]2d 408 (1959).


Taxes on tangible property must be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately. K-K Appliance Company versus Board of Equalization, 165 Nebraska 547, 86 National Western [Reporter]2d 381 (1957).


Substantial compliance as to value and uniformity is all that is required. LeDioyt versus County of Keith, 161 Nebraska 615, 74 National Western [Reporter]2d 455 (1956).


Uniformity as to class is required of tax on intangible property. Omaha National Bank versus Heintze, 159 Nebraska 520, 67 National Western [Reporter]2d 753 (1954).


One of objectives is to secure a uniform and proportionate valuation. County of Buffalo versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Nebraska 353, 63 National Western [Reporter]2d 468 (1954).


Uniform and proportionate valuation of farm lands is required. Laflin versus State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 156 Nebraska 427, 56 National Western [Reporter]2d 469 (1953).


Blanket Mill Tax Levy Act did not operate uniformly and proportionately, and was unconstitutional. Peterson versus Hancock, 155 Nebraska 801, 54 National Western [Reporter]2d 85 (1952).


Tax Appraisal Board Act did not change uniformity requirements as to taxation of property and therefore did not violate this section. Midwest Popcorn Company versus Johnson, 152 Nebraska 867, 43 National Western [Reporter]2d 174 (1950).


Taxes must be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property, and providing different method for fixing the actual value of real estate than that prescribed for other tangible property violates this section. Homan versus Board of Equalization, 141 Nebraska 400, 3 National Western [Reporter]2d 650 (1942).


Act imposing annual tax on fire insurance companies based on gross premium receipts collected on policies of fire insurance on property located within corporate limits of cities or villages did not violate constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity. Continental Ins. Company versus Smrha, 131 Nebraska 791, 270 National Western [Reporter] 122 (1936).


State authorizing tax levy on stock of banks was invalid as violating rule of uniformity as to class. State ex rel. Spillman versus Ord State Bank, 117 Nebraska 189, 220 National Western [Reporter] 265 (1928); Central National Bank of Lincoln versus Sutherland, 113 Nebraska 126, 202 National Western [Reporter] 428 (1925); State Bank of Omaha versus Endres, 109 Nebraska 753, 192 National Western [Reporter] 322 (1923).


Assessment reasonably uniform and proportionate on all classes of property will not be set aside because all property is not assessed at actual value. Chicago, R. I & P. Ry. Company versus State, 111 Nebraska 362, 197 National Western [Reporter] 114 (1923).


Rule of uniformity, applied to taxation of mortgages and of shares of stock in domestic corporations, inhibits discrimination between taxpayers in any manner. City Trust Company of Omaha versus Douglas County, 101 Nebraska 792, 165 National Western [Reporter] 155 (1917).


Uniformity and equality in value of property of individuals and corporations is required. State ex rel. Breckenridge versus Fleming, 70 Nebraska 529, 97 National Western [Reporter] 1063 (1903).


Requirement of uniformity is accomplished if all the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at uniform standard of value as compared with actual market value. State ex rel. Bee Building Company versus Savage, 65 Nebraska 714, 91 National Western [Reporter] 716 (1902).


This provision is command to Legislature to so enact laws that every person shall pay tax in proportion to value of his property. Scott versus Flowers, 60 Nebraska 675, 84 National Western [Reporter] 81 (1900); State ex rel. Sioux County versus Tucker, 38 Nebraska 56, 56 National Western [Reporter] 718 (1893).


Uniformity is satisfied if observed by each jurisdiction imposing tax. State ex rel. Young versus Osborn, 60 Nebraska 415, 83 National Western [Reporter] 357 (1900).


This section requires that both valuation of property and rate of levy be uniform in taxing district. High School District Number 137, Havelock versus Lancaster County, 60 Nebraska 147, 82 National Western [Reporter] 380 (1900); State ex rel. Ahern versus Walsh, 31 Nebraska 469, 48 National Western [Reporter] 263 (1891).


There must be uniformity as to persons or property within district for which tax is imposed. Clother versus Maher, 15 Nebraska 1, 16 National Western [Reporter] 902 (1883).


This provision requires uniform and proportionate assessment within the class of agricultural land; agricultural land is then divided into “categories” such as irrigated cropland, dry cropland, and grassland. Schmidt versus Thayer Cty. Board of Equal., 10 Nebraska Appelate 10, 624 National Western [Reporter]2d 63 (2001).


2. Valuation

If the State Board of Equalization and Assessment arbitrarily undervalues a particular class of centrally assessed property, so that another class of such property is valued disproportionately higher, the valuation of the latter class of property must be lowered so that it will be equalized with the other property. Natural Gas Pipeline Company versus State Board of Equal., 237 Nebraska 357, 466 National Western [Reporter]2d 461 (1991).


This section requires that taxes upon tangible property shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Company versus County Board of Equalization, 209 Nebraska 465, 308 National Western [Reporter]2d 515 (1981).


Act which fixed value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment as those used by taxpayer in determining federal income tax violated this section. State ex rel. Meyer versus McNeil, 185 Nebraska 586, 177 National Western [Reporter]2d 596 (1970).


Legislature may prescribe standards and methods of determining value of tangible property for taxation. Carpenter versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 178 Nebraska 611, 134 National Western [Reporter]2d 272 (1965).


Assessment of too high a tax does not make it void, and taxpayer should first apply to Board of Equalization for relief. Power versus Jones, 126 Nebraska 529, 253 National Western [Reporter] 867 (1934).


Legislature may tax intangible property by valuation, uniformly, and without proportionate rates. Sommerville versus Board of County Comrs., 116 Nebraska 282, 216 National Western [Reporter] 815 (1927), affirmed on rehearing, 117 Nebraska 507, 221 National Western [Reporter] 433 (1928).


Legislature may fix basis of valuation for taxation. Beadle versus Sanders, 104 Nebraska 427, 177 National Western [Reporter] 789 (1920).


Constitutional provision for levying tax by valuation is not self-executing, and requires legislation to carry it into effect. Failure to provide method of valuing life insurance policies prevents their taxation. Laub versus Furnas County, 104 Nebraska 402, 177 National Western [Reporter] 749 (1920).


Taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at actual value is entitled to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are taxed. Sioux City Bridge Company versus Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).


3. Classification

A legislative classification must operate uniformly on all within a class which is reasonable. Natural Gas Pipeline Company versus State Board of Equal., 237 Nebraska 357, 466 National Western [Reporter]2d 461 (1991).


The Legislature may, for the purpose of legislating, classify persons, places, objects, or subjects, but such classification must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class. Natural Gas Pipeline Company versus State Board of Equal., 237 Nebraska 357, 466 National Western [Reporter]2d 461 (1991).


Constitution flatly contradicts conclusion that real property taxes may be equalized if property classified in same values applied to same classifications. County of Gage versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Nebraska 749, 178 National Western [Reporter]2d 759 (1970).


This section does not prohibit a graduated state income tax and specifically provides authorization for taxes other than property tax. Anderson versus Tiemann, 182 Nebraska 393, 155 National Western [Reporter]2d 322 (1967).


Business inventories and real estate are in the same class for purpose of taxation. Grainger Bros. Company versus Board of Equalization, 180 Nebraska 571, 144 National Western [Reporter]2d 161 (1966).


Taxation on valuation of the capital stock of corporations is required to be uniform as to class. First National Bank & Trust Company of Lincoln versus County of Lancaster, 177 Nebraska 390, 128 National Western [Reporter]2d 820 (1964).


In classifying intangible property for taxation, there must be uniformity as to class. First Continental National Bank & Trust Company versus Davis, 172 Nebraska 118, 108 National Western [Reporter]2d 638 (1961).


Constitution recognizes that villages and cities are separate and distinct. Hueftle versus Eustis Cemetery Association, 171 Nebraska 293, 106 National Western [Reporter]2d 400 (1960).


Separate listing and assessing of motor vehicles is authorized. Peterson versus Hancock, 166 Nebraska 637, 90 National Western [Reporter]2d 298 (1958).


Motor vehicles could be taxed as a separate class of tangible property. Boyd Motor Company versus County of Box Butte, 159 Nebraska 514, 67 National Western [Reporter]2d 774 (1954).


State board was not required to treat ranch land as a separate class of property. County of Grant versus State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 158 Nebraska 310, 63 National Western [Reporter]2d 459 (1954).


Grain on hand in elevator was taxable in same manner as other tangible personal property. State versus T. W. Jones Grain Company, 156 Nebraska 822, 58 National Western [Reporter]2d 212 (1953).


Purpose of 1920 amendment was to provide for a separate classification of intangibl